G.R. Nos. 174992 & 175546 (The
Liberal Party, represented by its President, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Petitioner,
versus COMMISSION, ON ELECTIONS, et al.,
respondents.)
Promulgated:
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J.:
I fully concur with the opinion of Justice Garcia insofar as it affirms the findings of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that (1) petitioner Senator Franklin Drilon had served as president of the Liberal Party in a hold-over capacity, as his term expired in July 2004; (2) the 1992 Salonga Constitution has remained the valid Constitution of the Liberal Party notwithstanding the amendments proposed thereto in 2004; and (3) the party elections of 2 March 2006 wherein the slate affiliated with respondent Mayor Jose Atienza was installed, is invalid. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COMELEC in making these determinations. I fully agree with the reasons expounded by Justice Garcia in support of these rulings, and adopt the same for the purposes of this opinion.
Nevertheless, I write separately to elucidate on the issue of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the leadership dispute within the Liberal Party and the factual issues concerning the Constitution of the Liberal Party.
I.
As indicated in the Court’s Resolution
dated
The parties do not challenge, in fact
implicitly concede, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the leadership
controversy submitted to it by Senator Drilon, as the questions they have
actually raised before this Court are limited as to the specific manner by
which COMELEC exercised its jurisdiction. An argument insisting on the absolute lack of jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to resolve leadership disputes, fosters a radical and retrogressive
shift in jurisprudence that heralds the severe diminution of the capability of
the COMELEC, the body tasked since 1940 by the Filipino people through the
Constitution, to oversee the conduct of orderly elections. The trust reposed on
the COMELEC by the sovereign people through their Constitution cannot be
lightly disregarded. In line with the wise balance engendered by the
constitutional principle of judicial review, errors of the COMELEC are
correctible by this Court, a power that is founded on specific provisions of
the Constitution, and entrenched as well by precedents A contrary holding would
result in the sort of chaos that guts the constitutional imperative that
elections in this country would be free, honest and orderly.
A
submission had been made that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the
leadership dispute in the Liberal Party, including questions pertaining to the
validity of amendments to its Constitution and the determination of which set
of persons should be recognized as the Party’s leaders due the “state interest
to insure maximum freedom of association to political parties,” encompassed in
Section 8, Article III of the Constitution, otherwise known as the “freedom of
association clause.”
Yet this proposition ultimately treats
the Liberal Party no better than it would a privately organized club such as
the Rotary. While both the Rotary Club and the Liberal Party are privately
organized associations, thus engendering a general policy of non-interference on
the part of the courts unless statutory rights and privileges are involved, the
fact that the Liberal Party has since 1946 participated in the country’s
electoral processes, however, is of such sufficient import as to vest
jurisdiction in the COMELEC over the instant petitions in accordance with the
1987 Constitution. For what ultimately is at stake is not a mere matter of bragging
rights among the contending factions, but significant rights under our election
laws affecting the conduct and outcome of elections and on that basis may be extended
or adjudicated by the COMELEC alone.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is
primarily laid by the Constitution, with statutes such as the Omnibus Election
Code augmenting it. At present, there is no need to look beyond the
Constitution to discern that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition
filed by Senator Franklin Drilon. Said petition had sought to enjoin the camp
of Mayor Lito Atienza from acting as the newly-elected officers of the Liberal
Party on the ground that their election on
The first solid foundation in the 1987
Constitution for the COMELEC’s jurisdiction is found in Section 2(1), Article
IX-C, which reads:
Section
2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following powers and functions:
(1)
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
This provision was favorably cited by
the Court in Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino v. COMELEC,[1] or
the LDP case, as a means of affirming
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction therein over the dispute between two competing
factions of the petitioner-party. It might be said that LDP did not involve a dispute on the LDP’s Constitution or on the
legitimacy of the incumbent party officers. However, in resolving the dispute
in the LDP case, the Court did
categorically state:
The COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of
[a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well
within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the
fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such
function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and
"considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote
free, orderly and honest elections."[2]
(Emphasis supplied)
Certainly, if the Court had
reversed its course, it could no longer be said that "the ascertainment of
the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" falls
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
It was also raised Kalaw v. COMELEC[3] had no value as precedent for this case. Kalaw stands as one of the many precedents that definitively established the constitutional authority of the COMELEC to resolve a leadership dispute within a party. Even though Kalaw was resolved by way of a minute resolution, and minute resolutions are generally not considered as decisions,[4] there is no dispute that the rationale for the holding in Kalaw was expressly adopted and incorporated by the Court in LDP, thereby leaving no doubt as to its present doctrinal weight.
Nor is it material in Kalaw that from the minute resolution it could not be ascertained if Eva Estrada Kalaw was a hold-over party president, if she was invoking a different party constitution, or if she had been ousted as party president. That is of no consequence. What is both indubitable and significant is that the adversaries of Kalaw in the case had sought to enjoin her “from usurping or using the title or position of President of the Liberal Party.” Indeed, it was a classic case of a leadership dispute involving the legitimacy of a claimant to an internal party office. The explicit holding of the Court that the COMELEC had jurisdiction to resolve such dispute should bear influence in this case, especially as such holding was reaffirmed in LDP. Declared the Court:
On the merits, we hold that the respondent [COMELEC]
has jurisdiction to hear and decide SP Case No. 85-021 in view of its powers
under Article IX-C, Section 2 of the Constitution to, among others, enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, decide all questions
affecting elections, register and
regulate political parties, and insure orderly elections. These powers include
the determination of the conflicting claims made in SP Case No. 85-021, which
are likely to cause confusion among the electorate if not resolved.
Additionally, the COMELEC is mandated by the Election Code to inter alia
require candidates to specify their political party affiliation in their
certificates of candidacy, allow political parties to appoint watchers, limit
the expenditures of each political party, determine whether or not a political
party shall retain its registration on the basis of its showing in the
preceding elections, etc. These matters
include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for its acts and the resolution of such
controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided
into wings under separate leaders each claiming to be president of the entire
party.[5]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Kalaw notably cited Section 2(1), Article IX-C as the constitutional basis for the COMELEC’s jurisdiction. In Palmares v. COMELEC,[6] a case which also invoked Kalaw as supporting precedent, another constitutional provision was invoked as establishing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to resolve “the issue of leadership in a political party”. Justice Garcia primarily relies on Palmares in asserting the COMELEC’s jurisdiction “over the issue of leadership in a political party.”[7] The provision is Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which reads in part:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections
shall have the following powers and functions:
(5) Register, after sufficient
publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition
to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government;
and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere
to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall
likewise be refused registration.
Thus, the Court explained in Palmares:
. ..[T]hat the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over the issue of leadership in a political party. Under the Constitution, the
COMELEC is empowered to register political parties [Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C.]
Necessarily, the power to act on behalf of a party and the responsibility for
the acts of such political party must be fixed in certain persons acting as its
officers. In the exercise of the power to register political parties, the
COMELEC must determine who these officers are. Consequently, if there is any
controversy as to leadership, the COMELEC may, in a proper case brought before
it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to register political parties.[8]
Again, even as Palmares was decided by way of minute resolution, the quoted portion was likewise cited in full by the Court in LDP,[9] thus leaving no doubt as to its value as precedent.
A more telling and consequential as precedent
on this point is Sumulong v. COMELEC,[10]
which concerned a leadership dispute within the Popular Front Party. The
COMELEC, then a newly-formed constitutional body, declined to pass upon the
question which of the competing factions was entitled to use the name Popular
Front Party “because this question in the opinion of this [COMELEC] properly
pertains to the courts of justice.”[11] The
Court expressly rebuffed the COMELEC, as it stressed the legal mandate of the poll
body “to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections” and “all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling
places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officers.”[12] The
Court, through Justice Laurel, explained:
Although the fourth part of the instructions refers to the question of "as to which of the two factions of the so-called Popular Front Party, one headed by Sumulong and the other headed by Abad Santos, is entitled to use the name Popular Front Party," — a matter which, in the opinion of the Commission on Elections, "pertains to the courts of justice" — the pleadings and the records disclose that the real question is as to who, upon the evidence presented, is the duly chosen and authorized head of the Popular Front Party and as such head is entitled to represent the directorate in the matter of the appointment of the third inspector of election to which the minority party is entitled under the law. The determination of this question of fact is necessarily involved in the appointment required to be made of the inspectors of election for the minority party. The appointing power must so ascertain, subject to the supervisory and reviewing authority of the Commission on Elections. For uniformity of action and in view of the urgency of the situation, this matter may now be speedily determined by the Commission in the public interest.[13]
The precedents make it clear that it
is the Constitution, the very same charter that guarantees the right of free
association, that establishes the awesome jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
political parties involved in the electoral process. The competency of the
COMELEC to regulate the internal affairs of political parties to a limited
extent is established by the Constitution. Hence, there is no need for a law to
expressly authorize the poll body to exercise such jurisdiction. It is in that perspective that the references
to American jurisprudence and doctrines should be seen, as there is no
constitutional equivalent to the COMELEC in the U.S. Federal Constitution.
Both Section 2(1) and 2(5), Article
IX-C clearly provide the linkage between the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
its mandate to oversee an orderly and fair elections. Such mandate tempers any
insistence that a political party must be left on its own devices in resolving
its leadership disputes, for if the inability of the party to engage in
self-reparation leaves a disorderly and unfair election as a consequence, it is
the entire electorate that suffers in the ultimate reckoning.
It cannot be denied that at the time
Drilon filed the petition with the COMELEC, the proximate relation between the leadership
dispute and the forthcoming electoral exercise already existed. By the time the
Court resolves this petition, the fact of the dispute could have already caused
repercussions in the orderly conduct of the 2007 national elections. The
so-called “Drilon wing” has already proclaimed its own senatorial candidates
affiliated with the “opposition bloc,”[14]
while the “Atienza wing” has reportedly coalesced with pro-administration
parties.[15] At the
very least, it is clear that the Drilon wing will seek entitlement to the
rights and privileges due the Liberal Party under the law. At worst, the
Atienza wing will compete with the Drilon wing for such rights and privileges.
Imagine the consequences if the Court had ruled that the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction over the present leadership dispute. As no definitive means is provided
as to how the leadership dispute would be resolved, two competing factions of
the Liberal Party will claim entitlement to all the rights and privileges due
the Liberal Party as a duly registered political party participating in the
2007 elections. It would have been unlikely that a resolution would ensue
before the May elections. The problems in the offing would conceivably extend
to such issues as which “legitimate faction” shall be entitled to copies of the
election returns, pollwatchers and such other rights and privileges provided in
the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws.
I concede that from the Constitution itself, the COMELEC should not wade
into every intra-party dispute that is presented to it. Sinaca v. COMELEC,[16]
which did not involve a leadership issue, is an example of such a case. However,
as presaged by precedents such as Sumulong,
Kalaw, Palmares and LDP, there
should be no doubt that where the dispute bears a proximate relation to the
exercise by the political party of its rights and privileges under the law with
respect to a national or local election, then the COMELEC may exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 2(1) or 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution. In
other words, where the dispute involves an issue of leadership within a
political party or any question the adjudication of which is essential to the
determination of whether a political party or which faction in representation
of the political party should be accorded the rights and privileges to which
political parties are entitled under the law, the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
the dispute.
Thus, I agree that it was necessary for the COMELEC to ascertain which Constitution
of the Liberal Party is binding on it, as that is the only way to determine the
status of Drilon as Party President, and the validity of the election of the
Atienza slate.
II.
Even as the Constitution establishes the broad jurisdiction of the
COMELEC over leadership disputes, the exercise of such jurisdiction does not
correspond to an extraordinary grant of corrective powers to the poll body in
resolving the dispute. The internal affairs of political parties, which may
very well include leadership disputes, are sheltered by the constitutional
right to free association. The ability of the COMELEC to “interfere” in these
internal affairs, even if predicated on its broad constitutional jurisdiction,
is limited to those reliefs which are absolutely necessary in resolving the rights
and privileges due the political party with respect to a Philippine election.
I submit the following standards: (1) the COMELEC should exercise its jurisdiction only if the dispute
presented before it bears proximate relation to the rights and privileges
accorded to the political party under the election laws in view of its
participation in the elections; and (2)
the COMELEC should adjudicate the leadership dispute by simply evaluating the
evidence on record and applying the laws in point for the purpose of
determining which of the competing factions should be accorded the right to
claim such rights and privileges.
The basis of the second standard
is clear in law and jurisprudence. Section 8, Article III of the Bill of Rights
guarantees the right of the people “to form x x x associations x x x for
purposes not contrary to law.” Such right to free association becomes
especially compelling when it pertains to the right of people of common
interests, beliefs and aspirations to organize themselves into a political
party to better influence the polity. Our constitutional democracy was the
offspring of the rebellion against a system that had infringed on political dissent,
hence the particular guarantee that cherishes the inalienable right of
political organization acquires special reverence among the constitutional
values.
The Liberal Party is a privately organized political party, formed under
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association, which in turn bears
facets of the right to privacy.[17] As
such, State interference with the Party’s internal organization should be kept
at a minimum, and only when due.
It is when the Liberal Party seeks participation in a Philippine election
that a degree of state interference is due. The mechanics involved in the
conduct of a peaceful, orderly and honest electoral exercise in this country
necessarily requires a degree of state regulation of the participants thereto
in order that chaos would not ensue. As such, there is a system in place, also
recognized by the Constitution, that requires the accreditation of political
parties in order that they may be guaranteed certain rights and privileges,
such as the right to poll watchers or a copy of election returns. The
particular problem posed by leadership disputes consists in the determination
of which persons may exercise such
rights and privileges in behalf of the party. Left unresolved, the problem
would explode at election time itself, at a moment when the COMELEC is already
burdened with the task of overseeing the conduct of elections and the
tabulations afterwards. Since disorderly elections strike at the heart of
democratic governance, there is a necessary cession of certain political
guarantees such as free association for the preservation of an unimpeachable
election.
Still, it should not follow that the right of the State, through the
COMELEC, to ensure free, honest and orderly elections leads to the axiomatic
trampling of the rights of free association. If possible, the balance should be
drawn to accommodate both constitutional principles. It should only be when
there is no viable way to uphold the right of free association even as the
State regulates the electoral exercise, that the need arises to ascertain which
principle should prevail and which principle should yield.
When is the COMELEC, in adjudicating a leadership dispute, deemed as
infringing the right of free association? The boundary is breached when the
disputants themselves are compelled to perform an extra positive act or
explicit move for the purpose of resolving the controversy. The extent by which
the COMELEC may act in settling the impasse is limited to a dispassionate
recital of the correct state of facts based on the records and evidence before
it, as well as the corresponding legal principles that come into play following
the determined facts.
The precedents I cited tellingly
impart that that from the recognition of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
leadership disputes within political parties, it does not necessarily follow
that the COMELEC may exercise extraordinary powers of compulsion in order to
resolve such disputes.
The Court in Sumulong[18]
and Kalaw[19]
recognized that the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to resolve the leadership
question in a political party, particularly through the determination of the
critical factual predicates. Thus, Sumulong
observed that “[w]ho constitute the party directorate and who are its
authorized representatives for this purpose involve an ascertainment of fact
which must be made by the appointing power, subject to the supervisory and
reviewing authority of the Commission on Elections.”[20] However,
in a similar vein, the Court held in Kalaw
that “[the] ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for its acts and the resolution of such
controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided
into two wings under separate leaders each claiming to be president of the
entire party … involves questions of fact which should be examined and decided
by the respondent COMELEC and not by this Court.”[21]
In LDP,[22]
there was sufficient basis on the record for the COMELEC, and ultimately the
Court, to make the factual determination as to who between the LDP Party
Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign the certificates
of candidacy upon the competing claims of both sides. In concluding therein
that it was the LDP Party Chairman who held such right over the Secretary
General, the Court relied on the language of the party constitution and the facts
on record.
However, LDP reflects not only
the correct attitude of the Court, but also the wrong-headed approach enacted
by the COMELEC which significantly was rebuked by the Court. The COMELEC in LDP had allowed for the official
recognition of two wings within the LDP rather than resolving which of the two
wings was actually entitled to “represent” the party in the 2004 elections.
This novel resolution was struck down by the Court, relying on a
straightforward determination of which of the two “wings”, under the party
constitution, bore the authority to authenticate the candidates of the
political party. The “Solomonic” solution of the COMELEC entailed additional
steps other than a singular determination of the facts and laws involved in
order to resolve the leadership dispute at hand.
III.
I agree with the opinion of Justice Garcia when it upholds the COMELEC’s conclusions that Senator Drilon
can no longer be legally deemed as the Party President, and that the Atienza
slate was not legally elected to Party offices either. These conclusions were derived
from the evaluation of the COMELEC of the evidence presented by the parties
before it, in conformity with the long-recognized role of the poll body as a
trier of fact.
I wish to dwell upon the issue pertaining to Senator Drilon’s claim of
present incumbency as party president, which in turn hinges on the valid
ratification of amendments to the party constitution. With respect to Senator
Drilon’s claims before the COMELEC that he is entitled to remain as Party
President, the duty falls upon his side to prove the factual basis that
establishes this argument. In particular, he would have to prove that the
Liberal Party Constitution was indeed amended in 1999 and 2004.
It should be borne in mind that the enactment of the constitution of a
political party does not require the concurrence of any government body,
including the COMELEC, before it can be implemented. Indeed, any legislation
that would require a political party to submit its constitution for approval to
the COMELEC or any other arm of government would be unconstitutional, noxious
as it would be to the constitutional guarantee of free association. Yet since a
party constitution does not necessitate any imprimatur from the COMELEC, there
can be no prima facie assumption
entertained by the COMELEC that a constitution presented to it has indeed been
duly ratified or amended.
If there is no dispute raised before the COMELEC as to the validity of a
party constitution or its amendments, then the poll body should take in such
unanimity as sufficient proof that the party charter has indeed been duly
ratified or amended. However, if, as in this case, competing factions of a
political party do present varying claims as to whether a particular
constitution has been amended or ratified, the COMELEC is well empowered and
obligated to require the parties to submit proof of their respective claims,
and to evaluate the evidence following the appropriate legal guidelines under
the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
In the present dispute, both parties do admit the existence of the same
Liberal Party Constitution prior to the said 1999 and 2004 amendments, referred
to in the record as the Salonga Constitution. The question lies in the valid
ratification of these two sets of amendments, to which the Drilon camp attests
while the Atienza side disputes the same. While affidavits have been presented attesting
to the ratification of said amendments[23],
there are also affidavits disclaiming such ratification on the claim that no
quorum having been attained to ratify such amendments. Upon such circumstance,
it was but proper for the COMELEC to prefer more definitive proof from the
Drilon wing that the amendments were indeed ratified. However, outside of the
affidavits, no proof at all was submitted establishing the ratification of the
1999 amendments. On the other hand, the evidence submitted to prove the
ratification of the 2004 amendments was the minutes of the meeting of the
National Executive Council on
required by
the Salonga Constitution.[24]
However, in light of the contrary allegation that the quorum requirement was
not met during the meeting, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for having insisted
on more conclusive proof, such as the attendance sheet during the said meeting.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
[5]Supra note 3 at 2-3. It was Kalaw who questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the leadership dispute in her answer. The COMELEC denied Kalaw’s motion to declare the case terminated. The case reached the Court on Kalaw’s petition. The Court dismissed her petition on the ground that the “conflict involves questions of fact which should be examined and decided by the respondent COMELEC and not by this Court.”
[9]Supra note 1 at 676-677.
[12]Id. Emphasis supplied. In Sec. 2(3), Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the word “administrative” modifying “decisions” which appeared in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions was removed. It now reads in part: “(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections . . .”
[14]See e.g., http://www.liberalparty.ph/news/News_LP2007/LP%20proclaims%20Kiko%
20and%20Noynoy.html, Last visited,
[15]See
“Defensor: Rivalries at local level could affect Team Unity victory”, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=67532,
Last visited,
[19]Supra note 3.
[23]Particularly the affidavits executed by Senators Jovito Salonga, Wigberto Tañada, Governor Raul Daza and Secretary Florencio Abad
[24]Notably, the Salonga Constitution required a 2/3rds approval of the Executive Committee, the National Executive Council having been an innovation of the 1999 amendments.