[OCA IPI No. 04-1625-MTJ.
RE: CRISOSTOMO vs. SINGH
SECOND DIVISION
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
OCA IPI No. 04-1625-MTJ (Re: Estrella V. Crisostomo vs. Presiding Judge Maria Filomena Singh-Paulite of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 31, Quezon City.)
A Complaint-Affidavit dated 13 September 2004, was filed by Estrella V. Crisostomo charging Presiding Judge Maria Filomena Singh-Paulite with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law relative to Criminal Case No. 108982 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Armi Candelaria" for violation of Presidential Decree No. 651 (requiring registration of facts concerning the civil status of persons).
Complainant Crisostomo alleged that she
discovered her husband Alexander C. Crisostomo has an
illegitimate child with Armi Candelaria
whose birth was registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City. She avers that the birth certificate of the
child contained a false declaration that Armi Candelaria was married to her husband on
Eventually, and after several postponements, all upon the
instance of the prosecution, the decision dated
Before this Court, complainant alleges that the dismissal is against the evidence on record. She further avers that the promulgation of the assailed decision was postponed several times and that prior to the actual promulgation, the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably upon orders of the respondent judge, served "advance copies" of the said decision to the parties.
On
a. the instant
administrative complaint is not proper remedy to review or reverse the judgment
of acquittal in Criminal Case No. 108982 citing
b. the complainant has neither alleged nor submitted any evidence of malice, bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence; and, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed her duties prevails;
c. as a settled principle, a judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, absent any showing of bad faith, malice, corrupt purpose or a deliberate intent to do an injustice; and
d. the respondent's decision to acquit the accused was proper, considering the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Judge Paulite asserted that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused made the false entry in the birth certificate or that the false entry was already there when the accused signed the same. She added that the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
On the allegation that "advance copies" of the decision were dubiously released on 02 September 2004 or five (5) days prior to the actual promulgation, respondent judge contends that the release was made precisely to assure the parties that the promulgation was not being deliberately delayed, notwithstanding the several postponements, and that the case was in fact already resolved. She said copies of the decision were simultaneously released to and received by all the parties as shown in the acknowledgement receipt.
After study and evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the dismissal of the complaint, ratiocinating as follows:
The first issue in this administrative action dwells on an issue evidently judicial in nature since it involves the appreciation of evidence by the respondent judge. It bears stressing that a trial judge's impression on the testimony of witnesses and his appreciation of evidence presented before him are binding on the Court in the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or an obvious misapprehension of facts. The fact that the respondent's appreciation of the evidence differed from that of the complainant's — which could be biased — does not warrant the conclusion that the said judge has rendered an unjust judgment nor that she is ignorant of the law.
In order to hold a judge administratively liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown indubitably that the judgment
was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. For
liability to attach, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in
the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but,
most importantly, also be established that he was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive (De Guzman vs. Dy,
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1755,
...
The second issue relates to the release of the copies of the
Decision dated
"[T]he Decision had been prepared and signed as early as
…
"The only reason respondent released copies of the Decision to
all the parties on
This explanation responds to the issues regarding the delay in the
promulgation of the Decision dated
Respondent Judge Paulite states that she
"had the final version of the subject Decision printed in the morning of
Was such absence of the Public Prosecutor a valid reason for the
deferment of promulgation? We find that it served as sufficient ground for the
respondent Judge to reset the promulgation and, hence, the eventual
promulgation of the judgment on
It should be noted that nowhere under Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is there any mention of the presence or absence of the prosecution. In fact, Section 6 of Rule 120 clearly lays down the rule for promulgation of the judgment in absentia, when the same may proceed even in the absence of either or both the accused and the accused's counsel, without any word regarding the presence or absence of the prosecution. Jurisprudence abounds on the issue of absence of the accused and/or accused's counsel during promulgation of judgment (cf Pascua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. no. 140243, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 197, and related cases), but none directly deals with the question of the necessity of the Public Prosecutor's participation in such promulgation.
In the absence of a specific rule on the matter, therefore,
reference must be made to the general rule found in Section 5 of Rule 110 which
requires that "(A) 11 criminal actions commenced by complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor." In the case of People of the
Indeed, in this instance, the resetting was apparently at the instance of Assistant City Prosecutor Atanacio who admitted in his supporting Affidavit that on both 17 August 2004 and 2 September 2004, he informed the respondent court that he would be unable to attend the scheduled hearings (Annex A, Comment of Respondent Judge). Given that the Public Prosecutor controls the conduct of the prosecution, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 108982, who is the complainant in this administrative charge, cannot object if proceedings are reset at the request of the Public Prosecutor himself due to the latter's unavailability. At any rate, the record does not disclose that the private complainant objected to such resettings of the promulgation of judgment.
Lastly, we cannot but emphasize that the delay here, if any, was too insubstantial to qualify as "inefficiency," let alone "gross inefficiency," for inefficiency "implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service" (Suroza vs. Hernando, 110 SCRA 388 [1981]). There is no showing that respondent Judge is even remotely guilty of any of the foregoing. The fact that respondent Judge was ready with the judgment within the 30-day period required under the applicable rule negates such charge, because formal promulgation was delayed only for reasons beyond the control of respondent Judge and which are just under the circumstances, as found hereinabove.
Just as significant is the fact that where the Supreme Court has
penalized judges for gross inefficiency, the delay was for periods much longer
that the 20-day delay here. In Cueva vs. Villanueva
(305 SCRA 459 [1999]), it was one hundred days; in Reyes Garmsen
vs.
As for the supposed release of the advance copies of the decision, respondent Judge Paulite sufficiently established that such release on 2 September 2004 was not of "advance" copies of the Decision as the same was, by 17 August 2004, already signed and in the hands of the Clerk of Court, and the release was made simultaneously to all parties, not to one party alone, as evidence (sic) by the record, in particular, the acknowledgement receipt signed by all parties on page 6 of the original copy of the Decision.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the respondent Judge cannot be held liable for gross inefficiency by reason of any delay in the promulgation of the judgment in Criminal Case no. 108982.
As to the premature release of copies of the decision, same should not have been done by respondent judge. The fact that all the parties were furnished copies thereof is not the issue. What is in issue is the release of the copies of the decision prior to its promulgation. Rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court.[1] Prior thereto, said judgment may still be amended or changed by the judge.[2] Inasmuch as said judgment can still be amended or changed, it is only proper for respondent judge to have waited for its promulgation before sending out copies thereof in order to avoid any anomalous consequences that may arise on account of its early release. In one case,[3] the Supreme Court admonished a judge who prematurely released a decision prior to its promulgation.
We agree in the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator, save the premature release of the subject decision for which this Court ADMONISHES Judge Maria Filomena Singh-Paulite.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court