Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 13 2005.

G.R. No. 131276 (Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Hon. Rumoldo R. Fernandez, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 54, and General Milling Corporation) and

G.R. No. 131684 (Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. General Milling Corporation.)

Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari: G.R. No. 131276 and G.R. No. 131684 where petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) seeks to reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 13, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42151; and the Decision[2] dated November 28, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42150.

The antecedent facts of these cases are as follows:

G.R. No. 131276

On November 26, 1993, the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now Philippine Export Zoning Authority (PEZA), filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City, against General Milling Corporation (GMC) and City Trust Banking Corporation (CTBC). EPZA alleged inter alia that GMC is the owner of several lots located in Mactan, Cebu held in trust by CTBC; and that the area to be expropriated will be used as an Economic Zone.

Meanwhile, on February 24, 1995, Republic Act No. 7915, abolishing the EPZA and creating the PEZA in its stead, was enacted into law.

GMC and CTBC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that PEZA has no authority to file a complaint for eminent domain. In an Order dated May 15, 1996, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. A copy of the Order was received by PEZA on May 22, 1996.

On June 3, 1996, PEZA filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.

On June 17, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying PEZA's motion for reconsideration. A copy of this Order was received by PEZA on June 26, 1996.

On July 5, 1996, PEZA filed with the RTC its Notice of Appeal. The trial court denied due course to the appeal in an Order dated July 29, 1996, holding that the Notice of Appeal was filed six (6) days late.

PEZA then filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42151. In its petition, PEZA admitted the late filing of its Notice of Appeal and blamed its former counsel for such lapse.

On October 13, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. It ruled that "the instant petition for certiorari can never be a substitute for a lost appeal."

G.R. No. 131684

On September 17, 1980, EPZA filed a complaint for eminent domain against GMC with the RTC, Branch 16, Lapu-Lapu City, docketed as Civil Case No. 490-L. The complaint alleges in part that pursuant to its charter under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 66, as amended, EPZA has the authority to expropriate a lot owned by GMC to be utilized as Export Processing Zone, after payment of just compensation.

On September 19, 1980, the trial court issued an Order granting EPZA's prayer for a Writ of Possession.

On June 15, 1981, the trial court issued an Order of Condemnation in favor of EPZA, subject to its payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.

On June 25, 1990, GMC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that EPZA has no actual need of the subject lot considering that since 1980, it has not developed the same. On April 30, 1991, the trial court issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 490-L without prejudice.

EPZA timely submitted a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated November 15, 1991, the trial court granted the same.

On December 11, 1995, GMC filed again a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 490-L on the ground that EPZA has not taken any action to prosecute its claim; and that it ceased to exist by virtue of the passage of Republic Act No. 7915 creating the PEZA.

On April 22, 1996, the trial court issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 490-L for the second time. A copy of this Order was received by counsel for PEZA on April 29, 1996.

On May 16, 1996, PEZA filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the trial court in its Order of September 6, 1996 for having been filed two (2) days late.

On October 4, 1996, PEZA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42150.

On November 28, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the assailed Order dated April 22, 1996 had become final and executory and PEZA's motion for its reconsideration, being two (2) days late, was correctly denied by the trial court.

The only issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that: (1) the trial court correctly denied due course to PEZA's Notice of Appeal in Civil Case No. 3007-L for having been filed late; and (2) the trial court correctly denied PEZA's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated April 22, 1996 (dismissing Civil Case No. 490-L) for having been filed two (2) days late.

We note that in the instant cases, petitioner PEZA admits that its Notice of Appeal in Civil Case No. 3007-L-and its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated April 22, 1996, dismissing Civil Case No. 490-L were both filed out of time. Petitioner now contends that the delay was due to the mistake or negligence of its former counsel, hence, excusable.

While we admire petitioner's candor, we find no room to relax our Rules.

Section 1, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, reads:

"SEC. 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. - Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:

x x x

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law."

The period for taking an appeal is specified in Section 3, Rule 41, of the same Rules, thus:

"SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order (emphasis supplied).

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed."

As stated earlier, in G.R. No. 131276, petitioner admits that its Notice of Appeal in Civil Case No. 3007-L was filed late. Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are absolutely indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and the orderly dispensation of justice by the courts. Accordingly, failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.[3] The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.[4] Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied with.[5]

Petitioner likewise admits in G.R. No. 131684 that its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated April 22, 1996 dismissing Civil Case No. 490-L was filed beyond the reglementary period. What this simply means is that in filing a late motion for reconsideration, petitioner had lost its period to appeal outright.

Public policy and sound practice demand that judgments or orders of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.[6]

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 131276 and 131684 are hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 13, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42151 and its Decision dated November 28, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42150 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices Gloria C. Paras (now retired) and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adelfuin-De la Cruz (now retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Alicia Austria-Martinez (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Roberto A. Barrios.

[3] Producers Bank of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812, 829 (2002).

[4] Neplum, Inc. vs. Orbeso, 433 Phil. 844, 867 (2002), citing Oro vs. Judge Diaz, 413 Phil. 416 (2001), Mercury Drug vs. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 567 (2000), Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 708 (1998).

[5] Neplum, Inc. vs. Orbezo, supra, citing Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 343 (1996), Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 553 (1995).

[6] Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 600, 607 (1998), citing Villaflor vs. Reyes, 22 SCRA 385 (1968).