[G.R. No. 155076.
SECOND DIVISION
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of this
Court dated
G.R. No. 155076 (Luis Marcos P. Laurel vs. Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar, etc., et al.)
Before the Court are the Motion to Admit Petition-in-Intervention and the aforesaid Petition-in-Intervention filed by Atsushi Matsuura. He avers that he is a co-accused of Luis Marcos P. Laurel, the petitioner in the instant case, in the criminal case for theft entitled “People vs. Atsushi Matsuura, et al.” and docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-2425, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150.
The Amended Information filed against movant, the petitioner and seven other accused charges them with Theft committed as follows:
On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto in Makati City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone [sic] (PLDT), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, [sic] and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Petitioner Laurel filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash the
Amended Information contending that the ”international long distance calls” are
not personal property within the meaning of Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code; hence, the facts alleged in the amended information do not constitute an
offense. The RTC denied the said motion as well as petitioner Laurel’s motion
for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner
On
Petitioner Laurel filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging that the CA erred in holding that, under the allegations in the amended information, the property stolen is the “business” of respondent PLDT not the “international long distance calls.” He maintains that the text thereof shows that the prosecution refers to the “international long distance calls” as the object of the theft and not the “business” of respondent PLDT. He likewise contends that a “business” is not a personal property within the meaning of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution of
At this stage, on
2. That being the co-accused, herein movant has a legal interest in the matter of litigation, and in the success of herein petitioner, in the
present proceedings;
3. That the present proceedings involve the resolution of pure questions of law, i.e., whether or not there is a crime of theft of “international telephone calls;” and whether or not there is a crime of theft of the “business” of connecting “international phone calls;”
4. That in connection with the proceedings conducted by the Regional Trial Court below, herein movant intends to raise the following defenses: that he is not an officer or employee, nor involved in the business operations of Baynet Philippines, Inc. (Baynet), accused by PLDT of engaging in alleged illegal international Simple Resale (ISR) activities; that he is a director and stockholder of another company the NEXT-The Future Innovators, Inc (NTFI) engaged in providing business development services for Japanese nationals and which merely shares an office space with Baynet; and that he is being charged with a legally non-existent crime;
5. That the malicious prosecution by PLDT of herein movant for a non-existent crime has caused grave damage to movant, the closure of business, deprivation of means of livelihood, mounting costs for attorney’s and expenses of litigation, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, among other damages sustained;
6. That the undersigned attorney-at-law is the third counsel on record of herein movant; that the undersigned attorney had not yet entered his appearance at the time when co-accused and herein Petitioner Luis Marcos Laurel filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information in the Regional Trial Court below; that this explains, albeit it does not justify, why herein movant did not join his co-accused in the Motion to Quash at the first instance;
7. That in any case, in the interest of justice, equity and due process, herein movant hopes for the liberal application of the technical rules of procedure to the end that he may be granted ample opportunity to be heard in the resolution of the present proceedings on the merits;[2]
The motion is bereft of merit.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter of litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts only when the statutory conditions for the right to intervene are shown.[3] Thus, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[4] Under the above quoted rule, the following persons may intervene:
(1) Those who have a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
(2) Those who have an interest in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both;
(3) Those who are so situated as to be adversely affected by a destruction or other disposition of property in custody of the court or an officer thereof.[5]
Further, to allow intervention, [a] it must be shown that the movant has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or otherwise qualified; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second.[6]
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly observes in its Comment on the Motion to Admit Petition-in-Intervention and Petition-in-Intervention that “[b]eing a co-accused in Criminal Case No. 99-2425 subject of the instant petition is not one of the recognized grounds for intervention. For the Rules on Intervention specifically applies to the civil aspect of a case and not the criminal aspect.”[7]
Indeed, the movant does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to his assertion, the movant does not have any legal interest in the matter in litigation. What is contemplated in the rule is an interest which is actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant.[8] Here, the interest of movant as co-accused of the petitioner in the latter’s motion to quash, if he has any at all, is merely indirect and collateral.
Significantly, the movant, despite every opportunity to do so, did not file a motion to quash the information and/or amended information. Instead, he filed with the court a quo an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Suspension of Arraignment[9] and prayed therein for the conduct of a preliminary investigation and suspension of his arraignment. When the court a quo ordered the conduct of preliminary investigation, the movant, together with co-accused Nobuyoshi Miyake and Rolando Villegas, submitted therein a Joint Counter-Affidavit.[10] Thereafter, the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Resolution finding probable cause to sustain the information against the movant.[11] The latter did not appeal the aforesaid resolution. Movant was then arraigned after which he posted bail. He likewise participated in the pre-trial conference. Clearly, at no point until the filing of the instant motion for intervention did the movant question they sufficiency of the allegations in the amended information against him. To allow movant to intervene at this stage would be tantamount to allowing him to file a motion to quash when the period for him to file such pleading, i.e., at any time before entering his plea,[12] had long since lapsed.
To be sure, the rights
of the movant as co-accused in Criminal Case : No. 99-242 5 are amply protected
in the proceedings therein. Among others, movant enjoys the presumption of
innocence; hence, the prosecution has the burden to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. With the assistance of the counsel of his choice, the movant
can cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses as well as adduce evidence in his
defense. In case of conviction, he has the remedy of appeal. There is thus no compelling
reason to allow the movant to intervene in this case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion to Admit Petition-in-Intervention filed by Atsushi Matsuura
is DENIED for lack of merit. Time
attached Petition-in-Intervention is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA MAGAY-DRIS
Clerk of Court
[1] RolIo, p. 57.
[2]
[3] Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 752 (2001).
[4] Ibid.
[5]
FRANCISCO, RULES OF COURT, Vol. 1(2001), p. 615.
[6] Magsaysay-Labrador vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266 (1989).
[7]
[8] FRANCISCO, RULES OF COURT, Vol. I, p. 615 (2001).
[9] Rollo, p. 506.
[10]
[11]
[12] Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.