[G.R. No. 147589. February 18, 2003]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY vs. COMELEC

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 18 2003.

G.R. No. 147589 (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (under the Acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary general, Mohamad Omar Fajardo vs. Commission on Elections, et al.)

G.R. No. 147613 (Bayan Muna vs. Commission on Elections, et al.)

This Court’s Resolution, dated December 17, 2002, ORDERED the Commission on Elections, its chairman and members to show cause why (1) they should not be held in contempt for issuing, without the knowledge or the approval of this Court:

a. Comelec Resolution No. NBC-02-001 dated November 6, 2002, in which Comelec “granted” APEC three seats; AKBAYAN, two seats; BUTIL, two seats; CIBAC, two seats; BUHAY, two seats; AMIN, one seat; ABA, one seat; COCOFED, one seat; NCIA, one seat; PM, one seat; and SANLAKAS, one seat

b. Comelec Order dated November 22, 2002, ordering the immediate proclamation of the additional nominees of APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN

c. Comelec Resolution No. NBC-02-002 dated November 26, 2002, which proclaimed the following nominees as winners in the May 14, 2001 party-list elections

APEC Edgar L. Valdez

Sunny Rose A. Madamba

BUTIL Leonila Chavez

CIBAC Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin

AKBAYAN Mario J. Aguja

and (2) to explain why they cavalierly disregarded the formula for computing the winners among the qualified party-list participants, a formula which the Court painstakingly devised in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections.[1]

The Antecedents

These issuances of Comelec were made despite the Temporary Restraining Order issued on May 9, 2001 (even before the elections were held), in which this Court “DIRECTED [Comelec] to refrain from proclaiming any winner” in the party-list elections until further orders.

It will be recalled that in its June 26, 2001 Decision, the Court remanded the case to Comelec with the limited authority “to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the [eight] guidelines enunciated in this Decision.” Comelec, after submitting two (2) partial and one (1) final Compliance Reports dated July 27, 2001, August 22, 2001 and September 27, 2001, respectively, manifested that it had fully complied with this “Court’s directive of June 26, 2001.”

In these Compliance Reports, Comelec recommended inter alia that the following had failed to meet the 8-point guidelines set forth in our June 26, 2001 Decision and were thus disqualified: Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), LAKAS-NUCD UMDP, Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), Abag Promdi (PROMDI) and Veterans Federation Party (VFP). This Court unanimously affirmed Comelec’s recommendation.

Despite the recommendation in these Compliance Reports and this Court’s affirmation thereof, Comelec in an inexplicable volte face promulgated a post facto 6-page “Resolution” on April 9, 2002. Comelec “decreed” therein that the foregoing political parties, except VFP, were “bona fide party-list candidates QUALIFIED under Republic Act 7941 and the eight-point guidelines issued by the Supreme Court.” This inexplicable Comelec Resolution prompted the four political parties (LDP, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, NPC and PROMDI) to ask this Court to order their proclamation.

In denying the Motion, this Court, in its Resolution dated October 8, 2002, took the occasion to admonish the Commission on Elections as follows:

1. After submitting its three Compliance Reports, it “had no more jurisdiction to conduct, on its own volition, any more hearings for the purpose of again passing upon the matter remanded to it by this Court.”

2. Much less did it have the authority to “decree” the qualifications of the four movants after they had been disqualified by a formal Resolution of this Court upon recommendation of the poll body itself.

3. After submitting its Compliance Reports, Comelec “no longer had any authority to entertain” any motion or matter in connection with this case. “Decidedly, its power during the remand was limited and its delegated mandate expired upon the submission to and acceptance by this Court of the said Reports.”

4. “This errant and impudent flip-flopping of the Comelec is totally uncalled for. It merely destabilizes settled decisions, wastes the precious time of this Court, and unduly raises the expectations of the litigants.”

5. Citing Cabagnot v. Commission on Elections,[2] we cautioned Comelec that “inconsistent actions tend to denigrate public trust in [Comelec’s] objectivity and dependability as the constitutional body mandated to supervise elections x x x. We note that this is not the first time that Comelec has flip-flopped in its actions, thereby triggering needless resort to this Court to correct simple matters x x x.”

6. Finally, this Court plainly warned the poll body that its indiscretion and insistence on illegally acting on matters involved in this case, without this Court’s knowledge and approval, “borders on contempt of this Court.”

Comelec’s Explanation

In their “Compliance” dated January 14, 2003, the chairman and members of the Comelec explained that the poll body merely revised motu proprio Comelec Canvass Report No. 26 by reducing the total votes cast in the party-list elections from the 14,940,003, as reported in its Second Partial Compliance Report dated August 22, 2001, to 6,851,972. By this reduction, Comelec claimed that the list of qualified party-list winners had thereby expanded to the listing contained in the said Resolution dated November 6, 2002.

They further asserted that this Court had already lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO when it allowed Comelec to proclaim three BAYAN MUNA nominees on August 14, 2001 – one nominee each from AKBAYAN and BUTIL on August 24, 2001 and one nominee each from APEC and CIBAC on January 29, 2002.

Finally, they argued that they had not strictly followed the guidelines and formula in Veterans, because to do so “would result in a disproportionate distribution of seats.” Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, they maintained that “there are occasions when departure [from a decision of the Supreme Court] is rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law x x x.”

The Court’s Ruling

After careful deliberation, this Court finds the explanation of the honorable chairman and members of the Commission on Elections to be totally, completely and utterly unsatisfactory.

First. Plainly and clearly, Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue the three questioned Resolutions. The poll body knows or should have known this, because in several orders, especially in our Resolution of October 8, 2002, we expressly ruled that, after the submission of its three Compliance Reports, “it no longer had any authority to entertain” any motion or matter in connection with this case, unless expressly authorized by this Court.

Second. Assuming it still had jurisdiction to issue the questioned Resolutions, Comelec had no authority or power to modify or alter, even with the help of Black’s Law Dictionary, the final and executory Decisions of this Court, especially the carefully crafted rule on how to determine the winners in a party-list election as held in Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec.[3] It should also remember that in that case, this Court expressly reversed Comelec’s own formula for determining the party-list winners. A becoming regard for superior authority should have prevented the poll body from insisting on its own will. If a lower tribunal like the Comelec disagrees with our decisions, it may state its opinions or may even recommend, at the proper occasion and time, a change in the ruling. But it is constitutionally required, in the meantime, to follow our decisions whether it agrees with them or not. This is the rule of law. As it is, by their intransigence and disobedience, the chairman and members of Comelec have clearly placed themselves in contempt of this Court.

Third. Comelec’s claim that we have lifted our TRO – in regard to BAYAN MUNA, AKBAYAN, BUTIL, APEC and CIBAC – is specious and utterly without basis. Our Orders dated August 14, 2001, August 24, 2001 and January 29, 2001 partially lifted our TRO only to enable Comelec to proclaim the nominees referred to in those Orders: Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Masa for BAYAN MUNA; Loretta Ann P. Rosales for AKBAYAN; Benjamin A. Cruz for BUTIL; Ernesto C. Pablo for APEC; and Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva for CIBAC. Nowhere in those Orders did we authorize Comelec to proclaim anyone else.

Fourth. Comelec had no motu proprio authority to revise Canvass Report No. 26 after its Compliance Reports – to which this Canvass was included – had been approved by this Court. If at all, it should have merely recommended the revision thereof. By revising it motu proprio, Comelec arrogated unto itself the power to decide the legal issue of whether, by the disqualification of certain party-list participants, the votes cast in their favor should be deducted from the total votes cast. This issue is an important incident of this case, over which Comelec had no direct authority to rule, much less to do so without adequate hearing and due process accorded all the parties in this case.

Fifth. By issuing the questioned Resolutions, Comelec has confused and muddled the already difficult questions involved in these proceedings. By usurping the powers of this Court, the poll body has not only affronted the dignity and stature, but has also wasted the precious time and limited resources of the High Court in correcting these senseless errors. In the process, Comelec has deflected this Court’s attention from the important task of determining the real winners in the party-list elections, to the grave prejudice of these parties and of public interest.

Sixth. The Supreme Court has already repeatedly warned the Commission of its many flip-floppings, discourtesies and disobedience to this Court. In particular, our October 8, 2002 Resolution rebuked it, because its action – “decreeing” the four political parties earlier disqualified by this Court upon the poll body’s own recommendation – “border[ed] on contempt of court.” In the present incident, Comelec not only decreed without any authority the proclamation of additional nominees; worse, it actually proclaimed them. There is therefore absolutely no excuse – much less justification – for these brazen, illegal and contemptuous actions.

Contempt is broadly defined as “disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.”[4] Restrictively, it means despising “the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.”[5] It may be criminal or civil depending on its purpose. It is criminal if the “conduct is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially” or “an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.” It is civil if respondent fails “to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.”[6]

Simply put, if the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.

The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.[7]

Under our Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect. Direct contempt, which may be summary, is committed “in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.”

Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and hearing.[8] Disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt.[9] We quote Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, enumerating the acts punishable as indirect contempt, as follows:

“SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.”

While we appreciate the fact that the Comelec is a constitutional body tasked with the sacred duty of safeguarding the people’s right of suffrage, we sternly remind it that this Court, which is one of the great branches of government, is still the ultimate interpreter of the laws of the land, including those pertaining to elections. To arrogantly trifle with its authority as the final arbiter of all questions of law is to sow chaos and confusion in the administration of justice.

We note that Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra signed the November 6, 2002 Comelec Resolution but dissented subsequently from his colleagues, when he wrote vaguely – in the November 22, 2002 Order and November 26, 2002 Resolution, respectively – that the proclamation “must be in accordance with SC Decision on the matter” and “in accordance with pertinent SC Decision on the matter.”

On the other hand, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason Jr. concurred pro hac vice in the November 22, 2002 Order and the November 26, 2002 Resolution; and did not sign the November 6, 2002 Resolution because he was absent, on official business, when it was executed. He disclosed: “I concur pro hac vice, aware of the 29 January 2002 Decision of the SC” in the said issuances.

This being the case, the Court believes that the actions committed by both commissioners are less serious in degree when compared with those of their colleagues. Accordingly, a lesser penalty should be meted out to them.

Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, provides the penalties for indirect contempt as follows:

“SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. – If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the violation or a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.

“The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides.”

In Zarate v. Balderian,[10] we suspended for a month and fined for P5,000 a judge found guilty of issuing a manifestly erroneous order and for ignoring several Resolutions of this Court. In United BF Homeowners v. Sandoval-Gutierrez,[11] we imposed a fine of P10,000 on one of the complainants therein. His scurrilous attacks on the honor and integrity of respondent justice as well as the members of this Court undermined their capacity to render justice. A non-lawyer who used the title attorney in the pleadings he filed before the Court was ordered to pay a fine of P10,000 within 30 days from notice thereof or suffer imprisonment for one (1) month and one (1) day in In the Matter of the Application for Habeas Corpus of Maximino B. Gamido.[12] And in Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Hurled by Atty. Leonardo de Vera,[13] respondent lawyer was fined P20,000 for uttering remarks that had clearly been made to mobilize public opinion and to pressure this Court in the pending case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[14]

WHEREFORE, the Comelec chairman and members are hereby found GUILTY of CONTEMPT of the Supreme Court for willfully and knowingly issuing Comelec Resolutions dated November 6, 2002, November 22, 2002 and November 26, 2002; for degrading the dignity of this Court; for brazen disobedience to its lawful directives, in particular its Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001; and for delaying the ultimate resolution of the many incidents of this case, to the prejudice of the litigants and of the country.

Comelec Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos Sr., Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion and Mehol K. Sadain are each FINED in the sum of P20,000; Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr. are each FINED P5,000.

They are further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

(Panganiban, ponente, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo and Azcuna, JJ, concur in toto; Davide Jr., CJ, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza and Quisumbing, JJ, concur but vote to impose the penalty of reprimand only; Bellosillo, J., no part; Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave)

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

By:

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Assistant Clerk of Court

[4] Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643, October 8, 1996; Barrios v. Llamas, 98 SCRA 401, June 30, 1980.

[6] People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64, March 29, 1995.

[7] Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 287 SCRA 1, March 5, 1998; Paredes-Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 693, September 11, 1996; Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112, April 30, 1985; People v. Navarro, 121 SCRA 707, April 28, 1983; Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1, March 15, 1971; Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241, August 31, 1967; Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil 271, June 30, 1933; In re Kelly, 35 Phil 944, December 21, 1916.

[8] Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558, April 3, 2000.

[9] Panado v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 110, October 14, 1998; Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 688, February 26, 1997; Tinagan v. Perlas Jr., 22 SCRA 394, January 30, 1968.