Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 17 2003.

G. R. No. 126551 (Hector T. Francisco, et al. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.)

RESOLUTION

The present petition for Certiorari assails the Court of Appeals Resolution of April 30, 1996 denying petitioners’ Motion for Third and Final Extension of Time “of five (5) working days” to file appellants’ brief as well as the September 27, 1996 Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Simplicio Changho filed a complaint against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sta. Cruz, Laguna for specific performance with damages[1] arising from the failure of petitioners to honor their contract to sell a portion of a parcel of land on which private respondent’s house had been constructed. The trial court rendered a decision on February 2, 1995 in favor of private respondent.[2] Petitioners filed a notice of appeal.

After the records of the case were received by the Court of Appeals on May 29, 1995,[3] notice was sent to petitioners’ counsel to file appellants’ brief within 45 days, which notice was received on November 2, 1995.[4]

On the expiration of the 45-day period to file their brief or on December 17, 1995, petitioners through counsel filed a Motion for Extension of 60 days from even date, giving as ground therefor “the heavy schedule of the[ir]... counsel in attending to his professional commitment.”[5] By Resolution of January 10, 1996, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners’ motion, hence, they had until February 15, 1996[6] to file their brief.

A day before the extended period to file brief was to expire or on February 14, 1996, petitioners filed by registered mail a Motion for Second Extension of Time to file brief, 30 days this time, from February 15, 1996, again citing “the heavy schedule of . . . counsel in attending to his professional commitment.”[7] The Court of Appeals, by Resolution of March 8, 1996, granted the motion but with a warning:

Defendants-appellants’ motion for extension of thirty (30) days from February 15, 1996 up to March 16, 1996 within which to file appellants’ brief is GRANTED for the last time.[8] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied).

Despite the warning that the second motion for extension was granted for the last time, petitioners filed on March 15, 1996, a day before the expiration of the last extended period, a Motion for Third and Last Extension of five (5) working days from March 16, 1996 (a Saturday) within which to file their brief, this time alleging that their counsel’s secretary had not reported for work for more than a week and their counsel, a solo practitioner, “had to do all the administrative work relative to his practice.”[9] They added though that their counsel had already prepared the “working draft” of the brief and the only thing left to be done was its revision and printing.[10]

On March 22, 1996, the last day of their requested 5-working day extension, petitioners filed their appellants’ brief.[11]

The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion for Third and Last Extension by Resolution of April 30, 1996.[12] Consequently, finding petitioners’ appeal brief to have been filed out of time, it dismissed the appeal in accordance with Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.[13]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] of the Court of Appeals’ April 30, 1996 Resolution, opposition to which was filed by private respondent who incorporated therein his “Motion to Expunge or Strike Out From the Records the Appeal Brief of Appellants Filed Beyond the Extended Period within which to File said Appeal Brief,”[15] but it was denied by Resolution of September 27, 1996[16] in this wise:

The Court believes appellants’ counsel had been given ample time to complete the appellants’ brief which could have been accomplished with the exercise of due care and diligence. A client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the case (Suarez vs. CA, 220 SCRA 273; Ilasco, Jr. vs. CA, 228 SCRA 413).

The petition is bereft of merit.

As indicated above, prior to the filing of their Motion for Third and Final Extension of 5 working days, petitioners were twice granted extensions by the Court of Appeals totalling 90 days. Such extended period, in addition to the original period of 45 days or a total of 135 days, indeed constituted sufficient time for petitioners to prepare and file their brief.

The grant of a 90-day extension was in fact very liberal, given the fact that the two motions for extension were anchored on the same ground – heavy schedule of counsel in attending to his professional commitment. It bears noting that when the Court of Appeals granted petitioners’ second motion for extension, it expressly stated in its resolution that it was granting the extension “for the last time.”[17] Such warning notwithstanding, still another motion for extension was filed, anchored on a ground too shallow to merit belief, too hackneyed to merit consideration – that counsel’s secretary had not reported for work for more than a week.

It cannot be gainsaid that petitioners’ motion for third and final extension was addressed to the discretion of the appellate court. Petitioners, however, have not shown that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not thus lie.

Appealing for a relaxation of the Rules, petitioners’ claim that their appeal is “highly meritorious,”[18] pointing out as errors of the trial court the following:

“I. . . . IN RULING THAT IN THE CASE AT BENCH, A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE EXISTS;

II. . . . IN RULING THAT THERE WAS UNILATERAL CANCELLATION BY THE APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS;

III. . . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE APPELLEE/PLAINTIFF IN ESTOPPEL;

IV. . . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE APPELLEE/PLAINTIFF INSTITUTED THE CASE BELOW AFTER RECEIVING THE DEMAND LETTER (EXHIBIT I) FROM APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS;

V. . . . IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND IN NOT AWARDING TO THE APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS THE RELIEF THEY PRAYED FOR.”[19]

While exceptions to the strict application of the Rules have been taken in highly meritorious cases, petitioners have not satisfactorily shown why liberality is warranted in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

[4] Id. at 9 (vide Registry Return Receipt stapled to flip side).

[13] Incorporated in Section 1(e) of the same Rule in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.