G.R. No. 155530.
PICOP Resources, Inc. v.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted
hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated
G.R. No. 155530. (PICOP
Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, National Labor Relations Commission (Fifth
Division), Francisco Galola, Jojet Camba, and Eddie Lumbocan).
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Private respondents are members of the PICOP Employees Association (PEAS_UFW)
who have been working for petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. since 1989 as casual
employees, but were never regularized. Together with 13 other employees, they
filed a complaint for illegal layoff, underpayment of wages and the payment of
monetary claims, CBA benefits, damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses against petitioner and Wilfredo Fuentes, claiming that they were
arbitrarily dismissed from employment on November 16, 1996. The complaint was
filed on October 19, 2000 by Zerapiu HK. Bullezer, Jr. as the duly authorized
representative of the members of the PEAS-UFW.
The labor arbiter rendered judgment in their favor and petitioner was
ordered to reinstate private respondents to their former or equivalent positions
without loss of seniority rights and to pay their claims in the total amount of
P434,99 1.16. Petitioner filed a partial appeal, which the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed in its resolution of
On
Petitioner challenged the NLRC resolution of September 14, 2001 in the
Court of Appeals, arguing that the Regional Arbitration Branch did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of private respondents Jojet Camba and Francisco
Galola as the two did not sign the complaint when it was filed and that the
claim for reinstatement of private respondents Jojet Camba and Eddie Lumbocan
had already prescribed. Petitioner also questioned the NLRC resolution of
In dismissing petitioner’s petition, the appeals court ruled that as a
result of petitioner’s failure to file the requisite motion for reconsideration
on time, the NLRC resolution of
PICOP apparently referred to a vehicular accident where one of its
lawyers figured in and almost claimed the life of a 12-year old boy (Ibid. 16).
Considering the seriousness of the injuries sustained by the child, PICOP’s
counsel had to be physically present at the
We find the vacuous argument of PICOP on this issue having all the
earmarks of an alibi. The explanation it offered is insufficient justification
to dispense with the jurisdictional requirement and inadequate to warrant the
relaxation of the 10-day period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. We do not dispute the fact that an accident befell its lawyer.
However, we cannot subscribe to PICOP’s contention that the presence of the
counsel at the hospital was required owing to the injuries sustained by the
12-year old victim. Surely, the task of attending to the hospital needs of the
child can very well be done by anyone not necessarily a lawyer, and even
granting that the counsel’s presence was required, it need not, certainly, be
round the clock. PICOP’s explanation concerning its failure to move for
reconsideration is not sufficient justification for dispensing with the rules
of procedure. In fact, it is not even among the recognized exceptions to the
above rule.
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals emphasized that
there was substantial compliance as private respondents remained the real
parties-in-interest and their participation was disclosed by the statements
made by the three named complainants, Ebale, Lumbocan, and Lapatha, that they
were filing the complaint in private respondents’ behalf. It explained that the
labor arbiter properly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of private
respondents upon the filing of the complaint and not only upon their signing of
the position paper. Their signatures on the position paper signified their
desire to be bound by the statements therein and not chiefly to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court, having done so earlier when the complaint was filed.
Petitioner then filed this present petition for review on certiorari
contending: (1) that the factual circumstances and substantial merits of the
case warrant a relaxation of the ten (10)-day period within which to file a
motion for reconsideration, if only to prevent a manifest injustice; (2) that
the Regional Arbitration Branch did not legally acquire jurisdiction over the persons
of private respondents Jojet Camba and Francisco Galola as they did not sign
the complaint; (3) that the special power of attorney attached to the complaint
and relied upon by the Court of Appeals could not have as its subject matter
the complaint filed in the present action as the said instrument referred to
cases already pending in the NLRC as of December 10, 1999, which was a year
before the complaint in the present case was filed; (4) that the claim for
reinstatement and payment of money claims of private respondents Jojet Camba
and Eddie Lumbocan have already prescribed; (5) that the evidence on record
established casual and contractual employment pursuant to Art. 280 of the Labor
Code; (6) that the pleadings filed by Zerapiu HK. Bullezer, Jr. should not be
considered because he was not authorized to practice law in the country; and
(7) that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the resolutions of the NLRC
dated September 14, 2001 and November 22, 2001 as the same were not supported
by substantial evidence.
After due consideration of the foregoing facts, the Court finds the
petition to be without merit.
First. Rule VII, Sec. 14 of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure[1]
provides that motions for reconsideration of any order, resolution, or decision
of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or
patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution, or decision and that only
one such motion from the same party shall be entertained. Rule VIII, Sec. 2(a)
states that the decisions, resolutions, or orders of the NLRC shall become
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the same.[2]
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner’s failure to file a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period rendered the resolution of
the NLRC final and executory.
Second. The determination as
to whether private respondents are regular employees or merely casual or
project employees is a question of fact. The labor arbiter found that
petitioner failed to show convincing proof that private respondents were mere
casual employees or that they were project employees whose services were
engaged for a specific undertaking and the completion of such undertaking was
made known to them prior to their engagement. This finding was affirmed, first
by the NLRC and later, by the Court of Appeals. Likewise, the factual finding
of the labor arbiter that the complaint of private respondents was not
time-barred was affirmed by the NLRC based on its evaluation of the evidence,
and later, by the appeals court. Petitioner has not presented evidence to
controvert these findings. Moreover, in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of
proving that the dismissal of the employee was for a valid and just or
authorized cause rests on the employer.[3]
Petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
As to whether Bullezer had the legal authority to file the complaint in
behalf of private respondents, the records show that the special power of
attorney, dated December 10, 1999, expressly granted Bullezer the authority to
institute actions pertaining to or as a consequence of their illegal lay-off.
While such power of attorney designates Bullezer as “[their] official and legal
representative for and in [their] behalf in relation to [their] case pending in
the NLRC,” the same can be made understood as also applicable to the present
case which is an offshoot of the other labor cases pending in the NLRC. The
fact that Bullezer is not a lawyer is of no consequence. What is important is
that his authority to represent them was never revoked and, hence, it must be
deemed to be continuing.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error.
Very
truly yours,
TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS
Clerk
of Court
By:
LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court