Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, - versus - ALIAS KINO LASCANO (at
large) and ALFREDO DELABAJAN alias TABOYBOY, Accused. ALFREDO DELABAJAN, Appellant. |
G.R. No. 192180
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: March 21,
2012 |
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DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal, filed by
Alfredo Delabajan (appellant), from
the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 25,
2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00228. The CA decision affirmed with
modification the November 26, 2001 decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count.
The RTC Decision
In its November 26, 2001 decision,
the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
of rape. It gave credence to the testimony of AAA[3]
that alias Kino Lascano and the appellant
took turns in raping her. According to the trial court, the victim recognized
her assailants through their respective voices. The trial court held that a
public accusation by a blind Filipina whose virtue has been unblemished is
worthy of belief. It also disregarded the appellants alibi, as he failed to
show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and to pay the victim the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages, also for each count.[4]
The CA Decision
On intermediate appellate review, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of qualified rape. It held that the
appellant actively participated with Kino in raping AAA; he tied the victims
hands, and then held her feet when Kino was raping her. In addition, AAAs
testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Ethel Simeon. The
appellate court also rejected the appellants alibi in light of the victims
positive declaration, and for the appellants failure to show that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis.[5]
Our Ruling
We dismiss the appeal, but modify the
counts of rape committed and the awarded indemnities.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
For a charge of rape to prosper under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove
that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accompanied such act through force,
threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented.[6]
In
her September 20, 2000 testimony, AAA narrated in detail how the appellant and
Kino threatened to kill her, and then took turns in raping her. AAA explained
that she recognized her assailants through their respective voices. We
emphasize that the victim, although blind, knew the identities of her two
assailants because they were her neighbors. AAA explained that Kino and the
appellant often went to her residence in Sitio
Maraga-as because they were the friends of her brother. Notably, the appellant
admitted that he talked to AAA on many occasions.
We view AAAs testimony to be clear,
convincing and credible considering especially the corroboration it received
from the medical certificate and testimony of Dr. Simeon. Our examination of
the records shows no indication that we should view the victims testimony in a
suspicious light. It bears stressing that identification of an accused by his
voice has been accepted, particularly in cases where, as in this case, the
victim has known the perpetrator for a long time;[7]
for the blind voice recognition must be a special sense that has been developed
to a very high degree. Besides, it is
inconceivable that a blind woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or
ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek
justice for the wrong done to her. Thus, to us, the prosecution positively
established the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code. First, the appellant and
Kino succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim. AAA was steadfast in
her assertion that both the appellant and Kino had raped her, as a result of
which, she felt pain. She also felt that something sticky came out of the appellants
and Kino private parts. Second, the
assailants employed force, threat and intimidation in satisfying their bestial
desires. According to AAA, the appellant and Kino threatened to kill her if she
refused to obey them.
The Presence of Conspiracy
We
agree with the CA that the appellant and Kino conspired in sexually assaulting
AAA. Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose.[8] In
the present case, the acts of Kino and of the appellant clearly indicate a
unity of action: (1) Kino and the appellant entered the
victims house at around 9:00 p.m.; (2) Kino and the appellant ordered the
victim to lie down, and threatened to kill her if she refused to do so; (3) Kino
undressed AAA, while the appellant tied her hands; (4) the appellant held AAAs
feet, while Kino inserted his penis into the victims private parts; and (5)
the appellant raped AAA afterwards.
Clearly,
the appellant and Kino performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common purpose or design to commit
the felony. Thus, they are liable for two (2) counts of rape on
account of a clear conspiracy between them, shown by their
obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the rapes. Each
of them is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him but also for the rape committed by the
other as well.
The Appellants Defenses
We reject the appellants claim that
he was gathering coconuts in Sitio Pasakayon
on the date and time of the rapes. It is settled that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak and easily fabricated, particularly when it is corroborated
only by the wife of
the appellant, as in this case. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper,
it is not enough to prove that the appellant was somewhere else when the
offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far
away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[9]
In the present case, the appellant
admitted that Sitio Pasakayon is just
a 30-minute walk from Sitio
Maraga-as. Considering how near he was to the place where the crime was
committed, the appellants alibi cannot be given any
value. Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for the appellant to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the rapes.
The Court also finds unmeritorious
the appellants contention that AAA had been instigated by Wawing Lascano to
falsely testify against him. The appellant alleged that Wawing was mad at him
because he struck the latters pigs. Aside from being uncorroborated, we find
this claim implausible as the victim has no relation at all to Wawing. It is
inconceivable that a young girl would be willing to drag her honor to a
merciless public scrutiny, and expose herself and her family to scandal upon the
mere command and instigation of a complete stranger.
The Other Rapes Not Proven With Moral Certainty
As earlier stated, the CA convicted
the appellant of six (6) counts of qualified rape. After a meticulous reading
of the records, we sustain the appellants conviction for only two (2) counts
of rape. It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and
distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[10]
The prosecutions evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that
the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellants presumption
of innocence.[11]
AAAs testimonies on two of the sexual abuses were explicit, detailing the participations of the
appellant and Kino, and clearly illustrating all the elements of the crime. However, AAAs statements that the appellant and Kino each raped
her three times were too general and clearly inadequate to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that each accused committed two other succeeding rapes. Her
testimonies were overly generalized and lacked specific details on how the
other rapes were committed. We stress that a witness is not permitted to make
her own conclusion of law; whether the victim had been raped is a conclusion
for this Court to make based on the evidence presented.[12]
The Proper Penalty
Under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed whenever the rape is
committed by two or more persons. Since reclusion
perpetua and death are two indivisible penalties, Article 63[13]
of the Revised Penal Code applies; when there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, as in this case, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. The lower courts were, therefore, correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on the appellant.
It
bears noting that under Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code,
the death penalty shall be imposed when the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party
at the time of the commission of the crime. However, the information in the
present case merely stated that the victim was blind; it did not specifically
allege that the appellant knew of her blindness at the time of the commission
of the rape. Hence, we cannot impose the death penalty on the appellant.
The Civil Indemnities
The
award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that
rape took place. Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims
without need of proof other than the fact of rape, under the assumption that
the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.
Therefore, this Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages, based on prevailing jurisprudence.[14]
In
addition, we likewise award exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
for each count of rape.[15]
The award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code
to set a public example or correction for the public good.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00228 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) Alfredo Delabajan is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape; and (b) he is
further ordered to pay the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO
L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; rollo, pp. 4-12.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 23-32.
[3] Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[4] CA rollo, p. 32.
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] People v. Caada, G.R. No. 175317, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 388.
[7] See People v. Bandin, G.R. No. 176531, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 633, 639; People v. Reynaldo, 353 Phil. 883, 893 (1998); and People v. Calixtro, 271 Phil. 317, 328 (1991).
[8] People v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 176637, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 651, 657.
[9] People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301, 329 (2004).
[10] See People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, May 30, 2011.
[11] See People of the Philippines v. Henry Arpon y Juntilla, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011.
[12] People v. Matunhay, G.R. No. 178274, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 307, 319.
[13] Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
[14] See People of the Philippines v. Bernabe Pangilinan y Crisostomo, G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011; People of the Philippines v. Marcelo Perez, G.R. No. 191265, September 14, 2011; and People of the Philippines v. Alex Condes y Guanzon, G.R. No. 187077, February 23, 2011.
[15] See People of the Philippines v. Vicente Publico y Amodia, G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011.