Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
NORMA DEL PRADO,
EULOGIA R. DEL PRADO,
NORMITA R. DEL PRADO and
RODELIA R. DEL PRADO, Petitioners, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 186030 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: March 21, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES,
J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to assail and set aside the
following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the case docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 and entitled Norma
Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado, Normita R. Del Prado and
Rodelia R. Del Prado v. People of the
1) the
Decision[1]
dated September 15, 2008 affirming with modification the decision and order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal
Case No. L-8015; and
2) the
Resolution[2]
dated January 6, 2009 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Decision of
September 15, 2008.
The
Factual Antecedents
This petition
stems from an Information for falsification under Article 172, in relation to
Article 171(4), of the Revised Penal Code filed against herein petitioners
Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado
(Norma), Normita Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado (Eulogia) and Rodelia[3]
Del Prado (Rodelia) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th
day of July, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of Lingayen, [P]rovince of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified,
execute[d] and cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by stating
and making it appear in said document that they were the only heirs of the late
Rafael del Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the accused well knew, that
Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is entitled to inherit from the
late Rafael Del Prado, and all the accused deliberately used the DEED OF
SUCCESSION to claim ownership and possession of the land mentioned in the DEED
OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion of the complainant Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim to
her damage and prejudice.
Contrary
to Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]
Upon
arraignment, the accused therein entered their plea of not guilty. After pre-trial conference, trial on the
merits ensued.
The
prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim (Corazon), private
complainant in the criminal case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del Prado
(Rafael) by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After Daisy died in 1956, the late Rafael
married Norma with whom he had five children, namely: Rafael, Jr., Antonio,
Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia.
The
late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979, Corazon, as a daughter
of the late Rafael, and Norma, as the late Rafaels surviving spouse and
representative of their five minor children, executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition of the Estate of Rafael Del Prado to cover the distribution of
several properties owned by the late Rafael, including the parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22848, measuring 17,624
square meters, more or less, and situated at Libsong, Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Per
agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a 3,000-square meter portion of the
land covered by OCT No. P-22848. This
right of Corazon was also affirmed in the Deed of Exchange dated October 15,
1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she executed with Norma.
Corazon,
however, later discovered that her right over the subject parcel of land was
never registered by Norma, contrary to the latters undertaking. The petitioners instead executed on July 19,
1991 a Deed of Succession wherein they, together with Rafael, Jr. and Antonio,
partitioned and adjudicated unto themselves the property covered by OCT No.
P-22848, to the exclusion of Corazon. The
deed was notarized by Loreto L. Fernando (Loreto), and provides in part:
WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July
1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,] SR., died intestate in the City of
ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-22848
A certain parcel of land (Lot No.
5518, Cad-373-D) Lingayen Cadastre, situated in Poblacion, Lingayen,
Pangasinan,
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name,
is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent;
x x x
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in
consideration of the premises and invoking the provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 1 of
the Rules of Court, the parties hereto do by these presents, agree to divide
and partition the entire estate above[-]described and accordingly adjudicate,
as they do hereby adjudicate the same among themselves, herein below specified
to wit:
x x x[5]
By virtue of the
said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-22848 was cancelled and several new titles were
issued under the names of Corazons co-heirs.
When Corazon discovered this, she filed a criminal complaint against now
petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia. Antonio and Rafael, Jr. had both died before
the filing of said complaint.
Among
the witnesses presented during the trial was Loreto, who confirmed that upon
the request of Norma and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of succession. He claimed that the petitioners appeared and
signed the document before him.
For
their defense, the petitioners denied having signed the Deed of Succession, or
having appeared before notary public Loreto.
They also claimed that Corazon was not a daughter, but a niece, of the
late Rafael. Norma claimed that she only
later knew that a deed of succession was prepared by her son Antonio, although she
admitted having executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of mortgagee
Prudential Bank over portions of the subject parcel of land already covered by
the new titles.
The
Ruling of the MTC
The MTC rejected
for being unsubstantiated the petitioners denial of any participation in the
execution of the deed of succession, further noting that they benefited from
the property after its transfer in their names.
Thus, on August 9, 2006, the court rendered its decision[6]
finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, sentencing them to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four months and one day
of prision correccional as
maximum. They were also ordered to pay a
fine of P5,000.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of fine.
Considering the
minority of Rodelia at the time of the commission of the crime, she was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, plus payment of fine of P5,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.
All
the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon in the amount of P10,000.00
as attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
Unsatisfied
with the MTCs ruling, the petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the
grounds of alleged gross error of law, irregularities during the trial, and new
and material evidence. To prove that
they did not intend to exclude Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael, the
petitioners cited their recognition of Corazons right to the estate in the
deed of extra-judicial partition, confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange,
joint affidavit and petition for guardianship of minors Rafael, Jr., Eulogia,
Antonio and Normita, which they had earlier executed.[7] Again, the petitioners denied having signed
the deed of succession, and instead insisted that their signatures in the deed
were forged.
The motion was denied
by the MTC via a resolution[8]
dated December 21, 2006, prompting the filing of an appeal with the RTC.
The
Ruling of the RTC
On
August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision[9]
affirming the MTCs decision, with modification in that the case against
Rodelia was dismissed in view of her minority at the time of the commission of
the crime. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated
August 9, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, but modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del Prado
as the case against her is hereby DISMISSED on account of her minority at the
time of the commission of the offense.
SO ORDERED.[10]
A
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the RTC via its resolution[11]
dated October 31, 2007. Hence, Norma,
Eulogia and Normita filed a petition for review with the CA.
The
Ruling of the CA
On September 15,
2008, the CA rendered its decision[12]
dismissing the petition and affirming the RTCs ruling, with modification as to
the imposable penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 10, 2007
and Order dated October 31, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Pangasinan,
in Crim. Case No. L-8015 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that appellants
Norma delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado and Normita R. Del Prado
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO
ORDERED.[13]
The motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA in its resolution[14]
dated January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved,
the petitioners appealed from the decision and resolution of the CA to this
Court, through a petition for review on certiorari[15]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The
Present Petition
The petitioners present
the following assignment of errors to support their petition:
A. WITH
DUE RESPECT, THE
B. WITH
DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT IN
SEVERAL DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE
PARTICIPATION OF COMPLAINANT MS. CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS SPECIFICALLY
NAMED AS AN HEIR WITH CORRESPONDING SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.
C. WITH
DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE GOOD
FAITH OF THE PETITIONERS WHICH NEGATES THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF
FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART.
D. WITH
DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE
PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN OVERCOME BY THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
E. WITH
DUE RESPECT [THE
To support their assigned
errors, the petitioners invoke the existence and contents of the several
documents which they had presented before the MTC, including the deed of
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Rafael Del Prado dated October 29,
1979, confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and petition in the
guardianship proceedings for the minor Del Prado children filed by Norma, in
which documents they claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is also
an heir of the late Rafael. Given these
documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with
falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of their decedent.
In sum, the issue for
this Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
petitioners conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said
petitioners defense that they never intended to exclude private complainant
Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael.
This
Courts Ruling
The
petition is bound to fail.
Only questions
of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
First, the questions
being raised by the petitioners refer to factual matters that are not proper
subjects of a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is the rule that in a petition for
review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. It is not this Courts function to analyze or
weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower court. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants.[17] This is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Section
1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The
petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or
other provisional remedies and shall
raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time
during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction between
a question of law and a question of fact is settled. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Such a question does not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them. On the other hand, there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another
and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[18]
Contrary
to these rules, the petitioners ask us to review the lower courts factual
finding on Carmens exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to reconsider
its contents and those of the other documentary evidence which they have
submitted with the court a quo, all
of which involve questions of fact rather than questions of law. In their assignment of errors, petitioners
even fully question the factual basis for the courts finding of their guilt. However, as we have explained in
Petitioners allegation that the Court
of Appeals grossly disregarded their Exhibits A, B, C, D and E, in
effect, asks us to re-examine all the [evidence] already presented and
evaluated as well as the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals. Thus, in Sotto v. Teves (86 SCRA 154 [1978]), [w]e held that the
appreciation of evidence is within the domain of the Court of Appeals because
its findings of fact are not reviewable by this Court (Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236 [1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80 [1988] and a long line of cases).
It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again.
Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower court. (Nicolas[,]
et al., v. CA, 154 SCRA 635 [1987]; Tiongco
v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 [1974]).
There
are recognized exceptions to this rule on questions of law as subjects of
petitions for review, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion,
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CAs findings are contrary
to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based, (9) when the acts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or
(11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[20] After a consideration of the petitioners
arguments, this Court holds that the present appeal does not fall under any of
these exceptions.
There can be no good faith on the part of the petitioners
since they knew of the untruthful character of statements contained in their
deed of succession.
Even granting that the
present petition may be admitted, we find no cogent reason to reverse the CA decision
appealed from, considering that the elements of the crime of falsification
under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof,
were duly proved during the proceedings below.
Said elements are as follows:
(a)
The offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
(b) The
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; and
(c)
The facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false.[21]
These elements are based
on the provisions of Art. 172, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised
Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical
minister. The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon
any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
x x x
4.
Making untruthful statements in narration of facts;
x x x
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.
The penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any
private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange
or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any
person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
x x x
The material document
claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of Succession dated July 19,
1991, the presentation of which before the Register of Deeds and other government
agencies allowed the cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the issuance of several
new titles in its stead. The first and third
elements were committed by the inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that
states, (w)hereas, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the
first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the
decedent.[22] The untruthfulness of said statement is clear
from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor
their defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29,
1979, the parties confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Normas
petition for guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is
the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael.
The obligation of the
petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of succession is clear,
taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The deed, which was transformed into a public
document upon acknowledgement before a notary public, required only truthful statements
from the petitioners. It was a legal requirement
to effect the cancellation of the original certificate of title and the issuance
of new titles by the Register of Deeds. The
false statement made in the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility normally
accorded to titles over properties brought under the coverage of land
registration, to the injury of Corazon who was deprived of her right as a
landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons who would rely on the land
titles issued on the basis of the deed.
We cannot subscribe to the
petitioners claim of good faith because several documents prove that they knew
of the untruthful character of their statement in the deed of succession. The petitioners alleged good faith is
disputed by their prior confirmation and recognition of Corazons right as an
heir, because despite knowledge of said fact, they included in the deed a
statement to the contrary. The wrongful
intent to injure Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed, showing a
desire to appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel of land. Corazon was unduly deprived of what was due
her not only under the provisions of the law on succession, but also under
contracts that she had previously executed with the petitioners.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated September 15, 2008 and Resolution dated January 6,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO
L. REYES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Isaias P.
Dicdican and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-45.
[2]
[3] Also
known as Rodilla Del Prado in other documents.
[4] CA
rollo, p. 121.
[5] Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[6] CA
rollo, pp. 157-166.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Supra
note 1.
[13]
[14] Supra
note 2.
[15] Rollo, pp. 17-30.
[16] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[17] Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig,
G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011.
[18] Guzman v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009, 597 SCRA 499, 509.
[19] G.R.
No. 75450, November 8, 1990, 191 SCRA 218, 223.
[20] Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation,
G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011.
[21]
Galeos v. People, G.R.
Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 485, 506, citing Fullero v. People, G.R. No. 170583,
September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 97, 114.
[22] CA
rollo, p. 114; rollo, p. 36.