JAIME S. PEREZ,
both in his personal and official capacity as Chief, Marikina Demolition
Office, Petitioner, |
G.R.
No. 184478
Present: |
- versus - |
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA,
JR., and PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ. |
SPOUSES FORTUNITO
L. MADRONA and YOLANDA B. PANTE, Respondents. |
Promulgated: March 21, 2012 |
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VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking
to set aside the March 31, 2008 Decision[1]
and September 10, 2008 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 83675. The CA affirmed in toto the Decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The antecedents follow:
Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are
registered owners of a residential property located in
In 1999, respondents received the following letter dated
Owner Judge F.L. Madrona
G./ Gng. F.L. Madrona[:]
Ito
po ay may kinalaman sa bahay/istruktura na inyong itinayo sa (naturang lugar),
Bakod umusli sa Bangketa
Ang
naturang pagtatayo ng bahay/istruktura ay isang paglabag sa umiiral na
batas/programa na ipatutupad ng Pamahalaang Bayan ng
[] PD 1096
(
[ ] PD
772
(Anti-Squatting
Law)
[] Programa sa
Kalinisan at Disiplina sa Bangketa
[ ] RA
7279
(Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992)
[ ] PD
296
(Encroachment
on rivers, esteros, drainage channels and other
waterways)
[] RA 917 as
amended by Section 23, PD. No. 17, DO No. 4
Series
of 1987
(Illegally occupied/constructed
improvements within the road
right-of-way)
Dahil
po dito, kayo ay binibigyan ng taning na Pitong (7) araw simula sa pagkatanggap
ng sulat na ito para kusang alisin ang inyong istruktura. Ang hindi ninyo
pagsunod sa ipinag-uutos na ito ay magbubunsod sa amin upang gumawa ng
kaukulang hakbang na naa[a]yon sa itinatadhana ng Batas.
Sa
inyong kaalaman, panuntuan at pagtalima.
Lubos
na gumagalang,
(Sgd.)
JAIME S. PEREZ
Tagapamahala
As response, respondent Madrona sent petitioner a three-page letter[6] dated June 8, 1999 stating that the May 25, 1999 letter (1) contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and his property without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not expressly give petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.
On
More than a year later or on
In respondents injunction complaint, they alleged that (1) petitioners letters made it appear that their fence was encroaching on the sidewalk and directed them to remove it, otherwise he would take the corresponding action; (2) petitioners threat of action would be damaging and adverse to respondents and appears real, earnest and imminent; (3) the removal of their fence, which would include the main gate, would certainly expose the premises and its occupants to intruders or third persons; (4) petitioner has no legal authority to demolish structures in private properties and the laws he cited in his letters do not give him any authority to do so; (5) respondents enjoy the legal presumption of rightful possession of every inch of their property; (6) if petitioner accuses them of erroneous possession, he should so prove only through the proper forum which is the courts; (7) their fence is beside the sidewalk and the land on which it stands has never been the subject of acquisition either by negotiation or expropriation from the government; (8) petitioners intended act of demolition even in the guise of a road right of way has no factual or legal basis since there is no existing infrastructure project of the national government or Marikina City government; and (9) petitioners letter and his intended act of demolition are malicious, unfounded, meant only to harass respondents in gross violation of their rights and in excess and outside the scope of his authority, thereby rendering him accountable both in his personal and official capacity.
Respondents likewise sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner and all persons acting under him from doing any act of demolition on their property and that after trial, the injunction be made permanent. They also prayed for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On
On
On
On
On
Petitioner thereafter filed a petition
for certiorari[18]
before the CA assailing the default order. Thus, on
On
On
On
WHEREFORE,
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. As prayed for,
defendant Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Demolition Office of Marikina City, or
any person acting for and in his behalf as well as the successors to his
office, is permanently enjoined from performing any act which would tend to
destroy or demolish the perimeter fence and steel gate of the plaintiffs
property situated at Lot 22, Block 5,
Defendant
is further ordered to pay the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as
attorneys fees and Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos for the costs of suit.[25]
The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the peaceful and open possession of every inch of their property and petitioners threat to demolish the concrete fence around their property is tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners who are entitled to protection under the Constitution and laws. The RTC also ruled that there is no showing that respondents fence is a nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the communitys welfare, nor is there basis for petitioners claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to justify its summary demolition.
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On
Hence this petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE ACTION OF THE
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE [ERROR] IN
AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY THE
RESPONDENTS THE AMOUNTS OF TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) AS ATTORNEYS
FEES AND FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) AS COSTS OF SUIT.[26]
Essentially, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: (1) Did the trial court err in reinstating the complaint of respondents? (2) Are the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction present? and (3) Is petitioner liable to pay attorneys fees and costs of suit?
Petitioner argues that there was express admission of negligence by respondents and therefore, reinstatement of their dismissed complaint was not justified.
We disagree.
A perusal of the respondents motion for reconsideration[27] of the order of dismissal reveals that there was no admission of negligence by respondents, either express or implied. Respondents only contended that (1) they were under the impression that it would be the RTC which would issue the order to continue the proceedings once it considers that the petition before the CA had already been disposed of with finality, and (2) their counsels records do not show that the CA had already issued an entry of judgment at the time the dismissal order was issued. They also only stated that they followed up with the CA the issuance of the entry of judgment but they were just told to wait for its delivery by mail. Petitioners imputation that respondents expressly admitted negligence is therefore clearly unfounded.
Additionally, as correctly found by both the RTC and the CA, it did not appear that respondent lost interest in prosecuting their case nor was their counsel negligent in handling it. Accordingly, there was no basis for the dismissal order and reinstatement of respondents complaint was justified.
As to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of injunction, petitioner claims that the requisites therefor are not present in the instant case. Petitioner contends that service of a mere notice cannot be construed as an invasion of a right and only presupposes the giving of an opportunity to be heard before any action could be taken. He also claims that it is clear from the records of the case that respondents concrete fence was constructed on a part of the sidewalk in gross violation of existing laws and ordinance and thus, they do not have absolute right over the same. According to petitioner, the encroachment is clearly apparent in the Sketch Plan of the government geodetic engineer as compared to the Location Plan attached to respondents complaint. He likewise contends that the clearing of the sidewalks is an infrastructure project of the Marikina City Government and cannot be restrained by the courts as provided in Presidential Decree No. 1818.[28] Lastly, petitioner points out that the trial court should not have merely relied on the testimonies of respondents alleging that his men were already in the subdivision and destroying properties on other streets to prove that there was urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ.
We disagree.
For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.[29] Here, the two requisites are clearly present: there is a right to be protected, that is, respondents right over their concrete fence which cannot be removed without due process; and the act, the summary demolition of the concrete fence, against which the injunction is directed, would violate said right.
If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have
encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after
respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents
supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily
without judicial intervention.[30]
Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC
Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when the nuisance is not a
nuisance per se, is well worth
mentioning. In said case, we ruled:
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or
one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso,
52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of
copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention. [Underscoring supplied.]
In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc.
v. Municipality of Tarlac where the appellant-municipality similarly argued
that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the
Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held: Suffice it to say that in
the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707)
must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to do.[31]
Respondents fence is not
a nuisance per se. By its nature,
it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure the property
of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed
out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents fence
indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted
for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at
most a nuisance per accidens, its
summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.
Regarding
the third issue, petitioner argues that he was just performing his duties and
as public officer, he is entitled to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official functions. Unless
there is clear proof that he acted beyond his authority or in evident malice or
bad faith, he contends that he cannot be held liable for attorneys fees and
costs of suit.
Respondents, for their part, counter that the presumption of regularity has been negated by the fact that despite their reply to the first notice, which put petitioner on notice that what he was doing was ultra vires, he still reiterated his earlier demand and threat of demolition. Having been warned by respondents that his acts were in fact violations of law, petitioner should have been more circumspect in his actions and should have pursued the proper remedies that were more in consonance with the dictates of due process. Respondents further pray for moral damages for the serious anxieties and sleepless nights they suffered and exemplary damages to serve as an example to other public officials that they should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.
We agree with respondents.
As respondents were forced to file a case against petitioner to enjoin the impending demolition of their property, the award of attorneys fees and costs of suit is justified. Clearly, respondents wanted to settle the problem on their alleged encroachment without resorting to court processes when they replied by letter after receiving petitioners first notice. Petitioner, however, instead of considering the points raised in respondents reply-letter, required them to submit the relocation plan as if he wants respondents to prove that they are not encroaching on the sidewalk even if it was he who made the accusation of violation in the first place. And when he did not get the proof he was requiring from respondents, he again sent a notice with a threat of summary demolition. This gave respondents no other choice but to file an injunction complaint against petitioner to protect their rights.
With regard to respondents claim for moral damages, this
Court rules that they are entitled thereto in the amount of P10,000.00 pursuant
to Article 2217[32]
of the Civil Code. As testified
to by respondents, they suffered anxiety and sleepless nights since they were
worried what would happen to their children who were left by themselves in
their Marikina residence while they were in Ormoc City if petitioner would make
real his threat of demolition on their fence.
We likewise hold that respondents are entitled to exemplary
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 to serve as an example to other
public officials that they should be more circumspect in the performance of
their duties.
WHEREFORE,
the March 31, 2008 Decision and P10,000.00
and exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson |
||
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice |
||
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
|
RENATO
C. CORONA Chief Justice |
* Designated
additional member per Special Order No. 1207 dated February 23, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-19. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Enrico A. Lanzanas concurring.
[2]
[3] Records, Folder I, pp. 222-232.
[4] Records, Folder II, p. 1.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Records, Folder I, pp. 3-11.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
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[18]
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[20]
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[25]
[26] Rollo, p. 32.
[27] Records, Folder I, pp. 189-191.
[28] Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining
Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural
Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government. Issued on
[29] Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Carantes, G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010, 621 SCRA 569, 578-579, citing City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng, G.R. No. 180206, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 88, 99.
[30] Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 174, 191.
[31]
[32] ART. 2217.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.