Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
PHILIPPINE
TOURISM G.R. No. 176628
AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus -
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT
& EQUIPMENT, INC., March 19, 2012
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
Before this
Court is a petition for certiorari,
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to annul the decision[1] dated
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism,
whose main function is to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract
with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for
the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects (PAR 60-66) for
a contract price of Fifty-Seven Million Nine Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six
Hundred Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94).
The civil works of the project commenced. Since AEI
was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered
into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF,
a duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course amounting to Twenty-Seven
Million Pesos (P27,000,000.00). The sub-contract agreement also provides
that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn,
PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.[3]
On P11,820,550.53),
plus interest, for the construction of the golf course. Within the period to file a
responsive pleading, PTA filed a motion for extension of time to file an
answer.
On
Despite
the RTCs liberality of granting two successive motions for extension of time, PTA failed
to answer the complaint. Hence, on
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff:
1.
The amount of Eleven Million, Eight Hundred
Twenty Thousand, Five Hundred Fifty Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P11,820,550.53),
representing defendants outstanding obligation, plus interest thereon of
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time the unpaid billings of plaintiff
were due for payment by the defendant, until they are fully paid.
2.
The amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as attorneys fees.
3.
The amount of One Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand,
Five Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (P128,529.14), as
filing fees and other costs of litigation.
4.
The amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00),
as moral damages.
5.
The amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (Pesos
(P150,000.00), as nominal damages, and
6.
The amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00),
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On
PTA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC for granting the motion for execution pending appeal. The CA
ruled in favor of PTA and set aside the order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal.
On
On
THE PETITION
The
petition cites three arguments: first,
that the negligence of PTAs counsel amounted to an extrinsic fraud warranting
an annulment of judgment; second,
that since PTA is a government entity, it should not be bound by the inactions
or negligence of its counsel; and third,
that there were no other available remedies left for PTA but a petition for
annulment of judgment.
OUR RULING
We find the
petition unmeritorious.
The
Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in actions before the court to
ensure an orderly disposition of cases. PTA cannot escape these legal
technicalities by simply invoking the negligence of its counsel. This practice,
if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods since every party
would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any liability. The rule is
that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm
of procedural technique[,]and unless such acts involve gross negligence that
the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had
been the latters acts.[6]
In LBC Express - Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo,[7] the Court held
that [g]ross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. This cannot be invoked
in cases where the counsel is merely negligent in submitting his required
pleadings within the period that the rules mandate.
It is
not disputed that the summons together with a copy of the complaint was
personally served upon, and received by PTA through its Corporate Legal
Services Department, on
There was no extrinsic fraud
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud
or deception practiced on him by his opponent.[9] Under
the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the acts of PTAs counsel to be constitutive
of extrinsic fraud.
The records reveal that the judgment of default[10]
was sent via registered mail to PTAs counsel. However, PTA never availed of
the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default.[11] Since
the failure of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent
acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in declaring PTA in default.
Annulment of judgment is not
the proper remedy
PTAs appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC
decision. Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a
recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.[12]
In
this case, appeal was an available remedy. There was also no extraordinary
reason for a petition for annulment of judgment, nor was there any adequate
explanation on why the remedy for new trial or petition for relief could not be
used. The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had withdrawn a properly filed
appeal and substituted it with another petition, when PTA could have merely
raised the same issues through an ordinary appeal.
PTA was acting in a proprietary
character
PTA
also erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity.
The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic
affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level
of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.[13]
Since
the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary
character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial
liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.
A special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is proper only when
there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy
Lastly, a
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only available in
cases when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is not a mode of
appeal, and cannot also be made as a substitute for appeal. It will not lie in
cases where other remedies are available under the law.
In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[14]
the Court had the occasion to state:
The general rule is that a [certiorari] will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. xxx
x x x x
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. [emphases supplied; citations omitted]
In
sum, PTA had the remedy of appealing the RTC decision to the CA and, thereafter,
to us. Under the circumstances, we find no adequate reason to justify the
elevation of this case to the CA and then to us, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for certiorari. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa; rollo, pp. 86-95.
[2] Dated
[3]
[4]
[5] Dated
[6] Labao v.
[7] G.R. No. 168215,
[8] Rollo, p. 28.
[9] City Government of
Tagaytay v. Guerrero, G.R. Nos. 140743, 140745 and 141451-52,
[10] Dated
[11] Rollo, p. 46.
[12] City Government of Tagaytay v.
Guerrero, supra note 8, at 51.
[13]
[14] 456 Phil. 755,
785-787 (2003).