Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
ELSA MACANDOG MAGTIRA, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 170964
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: March 7,
2012 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Petitioner
Elsa Macandog Magtira seeks in this petition for review on certiorari (filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) to reverse
the decision[1] and the resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 27252. The CA affirmed with
modification the joint decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 148, that found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of seven (7) counts of estafa penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The
records show that seven criminal informations for estafa were filed against the petitioner. Except for the amounts misappropriated and the
private complainants[4]
involved, the informations were similarly worded, as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the year
of 2000, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused received in trust
and for administration from complainant x x x as contribution to a Paluwagan in
the amount of x x x under [the] safekeeping of accused [Elsa] Macandog Magtira,
with the express and legal obligation on the part of the accused to return
and/or account for the same, but the accused far from complying with her
obligation with intent to gain, abuse of confidence and to defraud complainant,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said contribution
(Paluwagan) and/or the proceeds thereof x x x and despite repeated demands, the
accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount.[5]
The petitioner
entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges.[6]
Thereafter, the seven cases were tried jointly. The following facts were
established: first, the petitioner
was the custodian of the funds of the Paluwagan
where the private complainants were members;[7]
second, that demands were made
against the petitioner by the private complainants for the return of their
contributions in the Paluwagan; and third, the petitioner failed to meet the
private complainants demand for the return of their contributions.
During trial, the
petitioner denied misappropriating the contributions of the private
complainants. She claimed that she was robbed of the Paluwagan funds in the
early afternoon of February 28, 2000. By way of corroboration, the petitioner
presented a copy of an entry in the police blotter dated February 28, 2000 and
the affidavits of five individuals attesting to the robbery.[8]
From the evidence adduced, the RTC
convicted the petitioner of the crime charged and declared:
[I]t is clear to the Court that the accused is not
disputing in all the cases that (a) sizeable amount of money belonging to
different persons were received by her in trust or for administration,
involving the duty to make a delivery thereof to the owners; (2) that there is
a demand to her that same be returned but she cannot do so.[9]
The RTC explained that while the robbery of the entrusted
money is a valid defense against estafa,
the petitioners evidence of the robbery was wanting. The RTC observed that the
petitioners testimony was self-serving and inconsistent on some of the material
details of the robbery. The RTC also noted the petitioners failure to account for
and to deliver the contributions which were collected from the private complainants
after the robbery. Finally, the RTC found that the petitioners credibility
affected by her own demeanor of indifference during trial showed no semblance
of worry or [of] being concerned [10]
about the serious charges filed against her.
Dissatisfied with the RTCs decision, the petitioner elevated
her conviction to the CA which affirmed the findings of the RTC but modified the
penalty of imprisonment imposed. The CA held:
(1)
In Criminal Case No.
02-1766 where the amount of the fraud is P85,000.00, the incremental
penalty is six (6) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty
provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum plus six (6) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the
indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the
minimum penalty, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
(2)
In Criminal Case No.
02-1767 where the amount of the fraud is P65,000.00, the incremental
penalty is four (4) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty
provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum plus four (4) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the
indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the
minimum penalty, to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as the maximum penalty.
(3)
In Criminal Case No.
02-1768 where the amount of the fraud is P60,000.00, the incremental
penalty is three (3) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty
provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum plus three (3) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the
indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the
minimum penalty, to eleven (11) years of prision
mayor maximum, as the maximum penalty.
(4)
In Criminal Case No.
02-1769 where the amount of the fraud is P34,000.00, the incremental
penalty is one (1) year to be added to the maximum period of the penalty
provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum plus one (1) year of the incremental penalty. Hence, the
indeterminate penalty should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the
minimum penalty, to nine (9) years of prision
mayor medium, as the maximum penalty.
(5)
In Criminal Case No.
02-1770 where the amount of the fraud is P85,400.00, the incremental
penalty is six (6) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty
provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum plus six (6) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the
indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the
minimum penalty, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
(6)
In Criminal Case No.
02-1771 where the amount of the fraud is P100,000.00, the incremental
penalty of seven (7) years is to be added to the maximum period of the penalty
provided for by law, or eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum plus seven (7) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium, as the
maximum penalty.
(7)
In Criminal Case No.
02-1772 where the amount of the fraud is P153,000.00, the incremental
penalty is thirteen (13) years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty
provided by the law. The penalty cannot go beyond twenty (20) years as the law
provides that in no case shall the penalty be higher than reclusion temporal regardless of the amount of the fraud. Hence,
the indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as the
minimum penalty, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.[11]
(italics supplied)
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration;[12]
hence, the present petition.
The Issue
The
ultimate issue for consideration is whether the petitioner should be held liable
for the crimes of estafa. The
petitioner argues that the CA and the RTC erred in rejecting her argument that
no misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds was clearly established in the record.
In
its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of the petition. The OSG maintains
that the elements constituting the crime of estafa
with abuse of confidence had been fully established by the prosecutions
evidence. The OSG insists that the petitioner failed to clearly prove by competent
evidence her affirmative defense of robbery. The OSG also insists that the
petitioners conduct in failing to inform all the members of the alleged
robbery bolsters the circumstance of her misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds. Lastly, the petitioners misappropriation of
the Paluwagan funds was substantiated
by her failure to deliver the Paluwagan funds
out of the contributions made by the private complainants after the robbery.
The petitioner subsequently filed a reply,
reiterating the arguments in her petition.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Preliminary consideration
A preliminary matter we have to
contend with in this case is the propriety of resolving one of the issues
raised by the petitioner who has appealed her judgment of conviction by way of a
Rule 45 review. A reading of the petition shows that the petitioner raises both
errors of law and of fact allegedly committed by the CA and the RTC in their
decisions. First, we are called to
determine whether a proper application of law and jurisprudence has been made
in the case. Second, we are also
called to examine whether the CA and the RTC correctly appreciated the evidence
to which the two courts anchor their conclusions.
As a rule, a Rule 45 review is confined
to the resolution of errors of law committed by the lower courts. Further, in a Rule 45 review, the factual
findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally held
binding and conclusive on the Court.[13]
We emphasize that while jurisprudence
has provided exceptions[14]
to this rule, the petitioner carries the burden of proving that one or more
exceptional circumstances are present in the case. The petitioner must
additionally show that the cited exceptional circumstances will have a bearing
on the results of the case.
The petitioner cites in this regard
the alleged misappreciation of the evidence committed by the CA and the RTC.
The petitioner contends that both courts disregarded her evidence, namely: the
affidavits of five individuals and the police blotter. She argues that she
should not be faulted for the non-presentation in court of the five individuals
who executed the affidavits which attested to the robbery since she was then
represented by a counsel de oficio.
She also argues that both courts disregarded the evidence of her reputation of
being a kind person of good moral character. She asserts that she delivered to
the private complainants their respective shares in the Paluwagan funds prior to the robbery.
She further argues that the
conclusions of the CA and the RTC were contrary to the Courts ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals[15] where it held that estafa cannot be committed through negligence or, as in this case,
where the explanation by the accused
raises reasonable doubt on whether the amount in question was misappropriated.
After a careful study of the records,
we find that the petitioners cited exceptional circumstances are more imagined
than real. We find no compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings of
the CA and the RTC in this regard.
Misappropriation as
an element of the offense of estafa connotes an act of using, or disposing of, anothers
property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon.[16] We have previously held that the failure to account
upon demand for funds or property held in trust without offering any
satisfactory explanation for the inability to account is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation.[17] We have also held that the demand for the return of the
thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account are
similarly circumstantial evidence that the courts can appreciate.[18]
As the CA and the RTC did, we find no
clear evidence establishing that the petitioner was actually robbed of the Paluwagan funds. In the first place, the
five individuals who executed the affidavits were not presented in court. While
the petitioner faults the counsel de
oficio for their non-presentation in court, we find no proof that her counsel
had been negligent in performing his legal duties. Incidentally, we also reject
this line of argument for two other reasons: first, it was raised only for the first time in the present appeal;
and second, it involves a factual
determination of negligence which is inappropriate under a Rule 45 review.
We additionally note from a facial examination
of the affidavits that the affiants were not even eyewitnesses to the robbery;
hence, their statements do not sufficiently prove the actual occurrence of the
robbery. More importantly, the
affidavits do not also establish with reasonable certainty that the petitioner
was actually robbed of the Paluwagan funds.
Moreover, we cannot give much
credence to the police blotter whose contents were mainly based on the statements
made by the petitioner to the police. If at all, it is evidence of what was
entered, not of the truth or falsity of the entry made. We give due respect to the evaluation made by
the RTC in this regard:
Thus, there seems to be a discrepancy as to
the time and number of persons (robbers) who entered the residence of the
accused. Further, the accused claims that there was a policeman who went to her
house who was called by her lessee (or lessor) but the accused cannot
remember his name.
But
then, the accused never testified as to whether the policeman investigated the
scene of the crime and some people in the vicinity. Surely at that hour, near
such market, where there are people in the vicinity, people will notice
strangers or other persons who enter the house of another or who leave the same
whether in a hurry or not.
The
accused even admitted that she was hesitant to report the matter to the police[.]
Why was the accused hesitant? She claims that the robber warned her that he
will harm her if she reports the incident. But immediately after the incident,
the accused reported the incident, but nothing happened to her up to the
present.[19] (underscoring supplied)
Besides, the petitioner failed to
explain her failure to account and to deliver the Paluwagan funds arising from contributions made by the private complainants after
the alleged robbery incident. On record are the positive and unrefuted
testimonies of the private complainants that they remitted contributions to the
petitioner even after the robbery. In other words, if the petitioner had in
fact been robbed of Paluwagan funds,
the robbery would not have affected the accounting and the delivery of the Paluwagan funds arising from the contributions made by the private complainants after the alleged robbery. As the
records show, despite the continued receipt of contributions from the private
complainants, the petitioner failed to account for, and to deliver, the Paluwagan funds.
The Petitioners Conviction
We now go to the crux of the present
appeal and determine whether the evidence adduced warrants the petitioners
conviction of the crime charged.
The offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence has the following
elements under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:
(a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of
such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the
offender.[20]
We find that all the above elements
are present in the present case, having been established by the prosecutions
evidence and by the petitioners own admissions. The first
element was established by the evidence showing that the petitioner
received various sums of money from the private complainants to be held in
trust for them under the Paluwagan operation.
The petitioner admitted that she was under obligation, at a fixed date, to
account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds
to the private complainants in the sequential order agreed upon among them. The
second element was established by
the evidence that the petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private complainants on the agreed time of delivery. The third and fourth elements of the
offense were proven by evidence showing that the petitioner failed to account for
and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private complainants despite
several demands made upon her by the private complainants. Each of the private complainants
testified as to how they were prejudiced when they failed to receive their
allotted Paluwagan funds.
Given the totality of evidence, we uphold the conviction of the
petitioner of the crime charged.
The Penalty
The decisive factor in
determining the criminal and civil liability for the crime of estafa depends
on the value of the thing or the amount defrauded.[21] With respect to the civil aspect of the
case, the petitioner
filed a manifestation[22] which showed the satisfaction of her civil
monetary liability with six (6) out of the seven (7) private complainants.
Anent her criminal liability, the evidence shows that the amount
of money remitted by the private complainants to the petitioner all exceeded
the amount of P22,000.00. In this regard, the first paragraph of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the appropriate penalty if
the value of the thing or the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00:
1st. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. [italics ours]
As provided by law, the
maximum indeterminate penalty when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00
is pegged at prision mayor in
its minimum period or anywhere within the range of six (6) years and one (1)
day to eight (8) years, plus one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 of the amount
defrauded but not to exceed twenty years. In turn, the minimum indeterminate
penalty shall be one degree lower from the prescribed penalty for estafa,
which in this case is anywhere within the range of prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods or six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months.[23] Applying this formula, we
affirm the penalty imposed by the CA as it is
fully in accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY
the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM
the decision dated November 10, 2005 and the resolution dated January 10,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27252, finding petitioner Elsa
Macandog Magtira GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Dated November 10, 2005. Penned by
Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Josefina Guevara-Salonga; rollo, pp. 39-55.
[2] Dated January 10, 2006; id. at 57.
[3] Dated February 7, 2003 in Criminal
Case Nos. 02-1766 - 02-1772. The Joint
Decision was penned by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel; id. at 67-103.
[4] They are: (1) Alfredo Martinez, (2) Cherry Bondocoy, (3) Rebecca Zoleta, (4) Maria Ester Binaday, (5) Saturnina Zaraspe Perez, (6) Emerita Velasco, and (7) Domingo Venturina.
[5] Rollo,
pp. 58-64.
[6]
[7]
[8] First, the affidavits of Felipe Macandog
and Segundo Macariola stated that they found the petitioner bound and gagged
inside her house on February 28, 2000. Second, the joint affidavit of spouses
Reynaldo and Marina Ainza attested that together with the petitioners lessor,
Nilo Lopez, they went to the house of the petitioner and saw her lying on the
floor and untied; while the room was in disarray. Upon the lessors instruction,
the spouses sought police assistance. Lastly,
Nilo Lopez averred in his affidavit that he immediately went to the house of the
petitioner after being informed of the robbery. That upon his instruction, the
police was called.
[9] Rollo, p. 89.
[10] Id. at 93.
[11]
[12] Supra note 2.
[13] Iron Bulk Shipping Phil., Co., Ltd. v.
Remington Industrial Sales Corp., 462 Phil. 694, 703-704
(2003).
[14] They are:
(1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record. (Dueas v. Guce-Africa, G.R. No. 165679, October 5, 2009, 603 SCRA
11, 20-21.)
[15] G.R. No. 102784, April 7, 1997, 271 SCRA 12, 22.
[16] Aw v. People, G.R. No. 182276,
March 29, 2010, 617 SCRA 64, 77.
[17]
[18]
[19] Supra note 3, at 92.
[20] Aw v. People, supra note 15, at 75.
[21] Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 172820,
June 23, 2010, 621 SCRA 538, 552.
[22] Rollo, pp. 194-198 and 225. The Acknowledgment Receipts were issued by
(1) Alfredo Martinez, (2) Cherry Bondocoy (received by Cielo Anduque), (3)
Rebecca Zoleta, (4) Maria Ester Binaday, (5) Saturnina Zaraspe Perez (wife of
Aniceto Perez); and (6) Emerita Velasco. The petitioner is still paying Maria
Venturina on installment basis.
[23] People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 302.