Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
MANUEL
A. LUMAYOG, Petitioner, - versus - SPOUSES
LEONARD PITCOCK and CORAZON PITCOCK, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 169628 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: March 14, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
of the Court of Appeals Decision[2]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74482 dated
The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of P1,000 per month from September 22, 2000 until
the premises is vacated, and to pay attorneys fees.
The
facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Respondents
Spouses Leonard and Corazon Pitcock are the registered owners of a parcel of
land containing an area of 81,351 square meters, situated in Barangay Talisay,
On
September 22, 2000, respondents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City a complaint[4]
for unlawful detainer against petitioner, his wife and their nine (9) children
in view of their refusal to vacate, despite demand, a portion of the
barn/stable that they used as their temporary quarters, alleging that
petitioners employment as groom or sota
was terminated for just cause in March 2000; that only petitioner was allowed
by them, at his request, to use a
portion of the barn/stable as his temporary quarters, subject to the condition
that he would vacate the same when the space would be needed by respondents and
upon the termination of petitioners
employment; and that in October 1999, they found out that petitioner
allowed his wife and children to stay with him in his temporary quarters and
petitioner promised to relocate his wife and children outside the farm.
In
their Answer,[5]
petitioner, his wife and children alleged that four of the children (Randy,
Lina, Jeffrey and Veronica) were not residing on respondents property; that
Randy, Gerbel and Manuel, Jr. worked for respondents for many years, but only Manuel,
Jr. received compensation; that Lina,
Snooky and Wendy worked as housemaids for respondents, but they were not fully
compensated; that petitioner ceased to be a paid laborer of respondents in
1992, but he was made to work as a tenant and he and the immediate members of
his family planted different fruit-bearing trees; and that in view of the
tenancy relationship between the parties, the court had no jurisdiction over
the case.
On
December 21, 2001, the MTCC rendered a Decision[6]
in favor or respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
finding sufficient evidence to support the complaint for unlawful detainer,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against all
defendants Manuel Lumayog, Sr., Estrella Lumayog, Randy Lumayog, Manuel
Lumayog, Jr., Gerbel Lumayog, Marlon Lumayog, Veronica Lumayog, Jeffrey
Lumayog, Snooky Lumayog and Wendy Lumayog as follows:
1. Ordering all the aforementioned defendants to
vacate the barn/stable and to return possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
2.
Directing
the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the amount of P1,000.00
per month as reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of said premises
computed from September 22, 2000 until the same is vacated and possession is
returned to the plaintiffs;
3.
Ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the amount of P20,000.00
as and for attorneys fees plus an allowance of P2,000.00 per attendance
in court hearing or trial;
4.
Ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the cost of suit.[7]
The MTCC stated that defendants, petitioner herein and his
wife and children, were not being evicted from the land they claim to be
tilling as alleged in their Answer, but the premises in question was the
barn/stable of the racehorses of plaintiffs, respondents herein, allegedly
being occupied, illegally, by the defendants.
Nevertheless,
the MTCC stated that it was inclined to believe that defendants were not
tenants based on the following:
In their special
and affirmative defenses, defendants alleged that defendants Randy, Lina,
Jeffrey and Veronica are not residing and staying at the subject premises but
elsewhere in Bulacan and Cardona, Rizal, so they could not be considered
tenants. The other women defendants
worked as housemaids. Likewise, Randy
and Gerbel worked but no evidence was presented to show that they worked as
tenants. Manuel Lumayog, Jr. could not
be considered a tenant because he was substituted as the groom or sota in place of his father and was
being paid a salary.
Alex Mayor, a
witness for the defendants, states in paragraph 7 of his sinumpaang salaysay
(Exhibit 3) na ito ay personal kong
nalalaman dahil ako pa ang pinakiusapan ni Ka Maning na magtabas sa farm na
iyon at magtanim ayon sa kagustuhan ni G. Pitcock.[8]
The
main issue that the MTCC resolved was whether or not the plaintiffs,
respondents herein, have the right to eject the defendants petitioner
and his family from a portion of the barn/stable of the
plaintiffs which defendants are presently occupying.
The
MTCC found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the occupancy of
the barn/stable was by mere tolerance of respondents. It held that even if there was tacit consent
to petitioner and his familys occupancy thereof, the same may be lawfully
terminated as provided under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The decision
of the MTCC was affirmed, on appeal, by the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 12 in its
Decision[9]
dated December 1, 2002.
Petitioner
filed a petition for review of the decision of the RTC before the Court of
Appeals. On
The Court of
Appeals stated that as pointed out by petitioner himself, citing Sintos v. Court of Appeals,[11]
the essential elements of tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. However, the Court of
Appeals noted that petitioner failed to present any evidence to support the
existence of their alleged tenancy relationship with respondents.
The appellate
court drew attention to the Pre-Trial Order dated
Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals
in its Resolution[13]
dated
Hence,
this petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
II
WHETHER THE
SUPERVENING EVENT WHICH WAS THE SUBSEQUENT GRANT OF THE CERTIFICATE OF LAND
OWNERSHIP AWARD (CLOA) TO HEREIN PETITIONER WOULD EXEMPT THE LATTER FROM THE
COVERAGE OF RULE 70 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.[14]
Petitioner contends that in its Decision
dated
Petitioner
informs the Court that respondent Leonard Pitcock filed an application for the exclusion
of his property covered by TCT No. 69598 from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.
Petitioner submits that in an Order[15]
dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the herein Application for Exclusion from CARP coverage
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1993 involving a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 69598 located at Brgy. Talisay,
Petitioner contends that pursuant to the
DAR Order dated
Petitioner argues that by virtue of the
pronouncement of the DAR which discussed petitioners right as a tenant dating
back to the time of the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer, it is
but just that he be exempt from the coverage of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner contends that if the Court
finds that this ejectment case was properly filed, his subsequent ownership of
the land he had been tilling should be considered in determining the issue of
possession. He states that in an action
for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto, but when the issue of possession cannot be decided
without resolving the issue of ownership, the court may receive evidence upon
the question of title to the property for the purpose of determining the issue
of possession.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, providing
for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme Court, it is clearly
enunciated that only questions of law may be set forth.[19]
The question regarding respondents tenancy status is factual in nature, which
is not proper in a petition for review, where only questions of law may be
entertained.[20] The Court may resolve questions of fact
only in exceptional cases,[21]
which is not present here. The Court upholds the finding of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner failed to present any evidence to show that a tenancy
relationship existed between petitioner and respondents Spouses Pitcock. Jeremias
v. Estate of the late Irene P. Mariano[22]
held:
Claims that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure.
The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the
claimant to a security of tenure.
A tenant has been defined under Section
5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines, as a person, who, himself, and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latters consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder, under the share tenancy system, or
paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold system.
This Court had once ruled that self-serving
statements regarding tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship.
The fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a presumption
of the existence of agricultural tenancy.
Substantial evidence entails not only the presence of a mere scintilla
of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must
also be concrete evidence on record that is adequate to prove the element of
sharing. In fact, this Court likewise
ruled that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must
be presented; self-serving statements are deemed inadequate.[23]
In
respondents Supplemental Memorandum with Prayer for the Dismissal of the
Petition[24] filed on October 20, 2009, respondents brought to the attention of the Court that respondent
Leonard Pitcock filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,[25]
contending that public respondent DAR committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his application for
exclusion of their landholding from the coverage of the CARP, and seeking the reversal and nullity of the DAR Orders dated June 15, 2004 and January 11,
2007. The said case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97763 and entitled Spouses
Leonard and Corazon Pitcock v. Manuel Lumayog, Kilusang Mamamayan ng Batangas.
Respondents
contend that the issues presented for resolution by petitioner are now moot and
academic in view of the Court of Appeals decision dated
The evidence on record shows that the subject landholding
has been exclusively developed and devoted for livestock raising by the
petitioners from the date of their acquisition on
Even the tax declarations in the name of the petitioners
where the subject landholding was classified as cocoland and riceland are not
sufficient evidence to prove that the subject landholding was utilized for
agricultural purposes. There is no law
or jurisprudence that holds that the classification embodied in the tax
declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further
inquiry. Furthermore, the tax
declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a
land. Thus, we give more faith and
credence to the findings of the MARO, PARO and CLUPPI-2 that the land has been
utilized for livestock farming in the absence of any apparent irregularity in
the ocular inspections made on the subject property.
Moreover, the affidavits of petitioner Leonard Pitcock,
Cong. Espina and Alejandro Espiritu constitute substantial evidence of the
utilization of the subject land prior to the acquisition thereof by the
petitioners. These affidavits are
acceptable form of evidence and are considered as the affiants direct
testimonies which private respondent Lumayog failed to refute especially when,
in the affidavit of the petitioner Leonard Pitcock, it was stated that private
respondent Lumayog was working as groom at the Manila Polo Club when he was
hired by the petitioners as a groom for their race horses.
All told, the DAR Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he issued the assailed orders
including the subject landholding within the coverage of CARP on the basis of
the guidelines provided for in DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993,
which had been duly declared by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. The ruling in the cases of Luz
Farms and Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR was emphatic on the exemption from
CARP of land devoted to residential, commercial and industrial purposes without
any qualifications.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for
certiorari filed in this case is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated
Lumayogs
motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated September 24, 2008 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97763 was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[27]
dated
Lumayog
appealed the Court of Appeals Decision dated
Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced
in the petition for review on certiorari
of the Decision and Resolution dated 24 September 2008 and 25 February 2009,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 97763, the Court further
resolves to DENY the petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged
decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of this Courts
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.[28]
No
motion for reconsideration of the Minute Resolution was filed by Manuel Lumayog.
The said Minute Resolution dated
The
Courts denial of the petition in G.R. No. 186986 renders the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97763 final and executory. Petitioner cannot
find support in the DAR Order dated June 15, 2004 to establish his tenancy
relationship with respondents Spouses Pitcock, since the issue resolved therein
was not the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioner and
respondents, but whether or not the subject property of respondents may be
excluded from the coverage of the CARP pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No.
9, Series of 1993. Contrary to
petitioners allegation, the DAR Order dated
More
importantly, the Court notes that in the Complaint, the premises
from which petitioner and his family were sought to be ejected was the
barn/stable of respondents. Thus, the MTCC stated:
x x x The allegations in the complaint clearly show
that [the] instant case is for unlawful detainer xxx. The premises in question
in this case is the barn/stable of the racehorses of the plaintiffs allegedly
being occupied, illegally, by the defendants.
Defendants are not being evicted from
the land they claim to be tilling as alleged in their Answer x x x.
x x x x
x x x [T]he court is inclined to believe that
defendants are not tenants as defined under Republic Act No. 3844 nonetheless the court must resolve only the issues
pertinent to this case. After a perusal of the case, the court finds that there
is sufficient evidence to prove that the occupancy of the barn/stable by the
defendants is by mere tolerance of the plaintiffs. Even if there was tacit
consent to defendants occupancy, the same may be lawfully terminated as
provided under Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. x x x[29]
(Emphasis supplied.)
It
must be pointed out that the Pre-trial Order[30]
dated October 8, 2001 of the MTCC stated that both parties
agreed to stipulate, among others, that (1) respondents, in 1988, bought a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 69598, situated in Barangay Talisay, Lipa
City, for commercial livestock, including the breeding and raising of horses
used in polo games; and (2) respondents caused to be constructed perimeter
fences and built buildings consisting of a farm house, employees quarters and
barn/stable for their racehorses. Therefore, petitioner and his family admitted the existence of
the barn/stable in the subject property, which property they also admitted was
owned by respondents. The MTCC ruled that
the occupancy of the barn/stable by petitioner was by mere tolerance of
respondents; hence, it ordered petitioner and his family to vacate the same and
to pay monthly rent in the amount of P1,000.00 from
To
reiterate, the issue on whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between
petitioner and respondents, which is raised before this Court, is factual in
nature. This Court is not a trier of facts. The factual finding of the lower
courts and the Court of Appeals that no tenancy relationship existed between
petitioner and respondents is conclusive upon this Court.
Further, the
supervening event which was the grant of the Certificate of Land Ownership
Award to petitioner does not exempt petitioner from the coverage of Rule 70
(Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer) of the Rules of Court, as the premises involved in this case is the barn/stable
of the racehorses of the respondents being occupied, illegally, by the petitioner,
which premises are located at the western portion of the property, while
the area allegedly planted with crops and occupied by petitioner is located at the northeastern
and eastern portions of the property.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 74482 dated
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO
A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria
III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo,
pp. 113-117.
[3] Annex A, records, p. 7.
[4] Entitled
Spouses
Leonard Pitcock and Corazon Pitcock v. Manuel Lumayog, Sr., Estrella Lumayog,
Randy Lumayog, Lina Lumayog, Manuel Lumayog, Jr., Gerbel Lumayog, Marlon
Lumayog, Veronica Lumayog, Jeffrey Lumayog, Snooky Lumayog and Wendy Lumayog.
[5] Records, p. 53.
[6] Rollo, pp. 75-83.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] 316 Phil. 278, 284 (1995).
[12] CA rollo, p. 30.
[13] Rollo,
p. 123.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Tayco
v. Heirs of Concepcion Tayco-Flores, G.R. No. 168692, December 13, 2010,
637 SCRA 742, 747.
[20] Pascual
v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 675, 682 (2001).
[21] Tayco
v. Heirs of Concepcion Tayco-Flores, supra
note 19.
[22] G.R. No. 174649,
[23]
[24] Rollo,
pp. 208-212.
[25] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[26] Rollo,
pp. 224-225.
[27]
[28]
[29] MTCC Decision, id. at 81-82.
[30] Records, p. 127.
[31] Rollo,
pp. 99-104.
[32] See the DAR Order dated June 15, 2004, id. at
124-128, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 24, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97763, id. at 213-226. (Emphasis supplied.)