Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
FELICIDAD STA. MARIA VILLARAN, WILFREDO STA. MARIA VILLARAN, DEOGRACIAS STA. MARIA and ROLANDO STA. MARIA, Petitioners,
- versus DEPARTMENT OF AGARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD and LORENZO MARIANO, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 160882
Present: VELASCO,
JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA,
ABAD,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ. Promulgated: March 7, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the October 20, 2003 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72388, as well as the November 25, 2003
Resolution[2]
which denied reconsideration. The
assailed decision dismissed the Rule 65 petition filed before the Court of
Appeals by herein petitioners who sought to set aside the January 16, 2001
decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
DARAB Case No. 7365. In turn, the latter
assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Office of the Regional Adjudicator
in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mariano in DARAB Case No. IV-DCN-R1-006-95 one
for the disqualification of herein petitioners as agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The facts follow.
Bernardo Sta. Maria had been a
tenant-tiller in Hacienda Jala-Jala
of the estate of the spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefina Tangco. By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
27, he was issued Certificates of Land Transfer in 1973 covering the three (3)
parcels of riceland subject of this case.
These certificates would then be the basis for the issuance of
Emancipation Patent Nos. A-035687, A-035685 and A-035159 and the corresponding
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. M-1677, M-1679 and M-1680 in the Register of
Deeds of Rizal.[3] Bernardo died on
The
controversy arose when Lorenzo allegedly entered the subject property following
the death of Bernardo, cultivated the same and appropriated the harvest all to
himself. Petitioners claimed they had
learned of it only in 1989, and that in the intervening period they admittedly
had left the subjects lands idle because of lack of enough rainfall that
season.[4] Lorenzo, however, asserted his entry was not
illegal, because he supposedly had been a long-time sub-tenant of Bernardo even
until the latters death.[5] Sometime in 1990, the conflict was brought to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) of Poblacion, Jala-Jala, Rizal.
No compromise emerged; hence, the BARC referred the matter to the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) before which, however, no conciliation
was likewise reached.[6] Exasperated, petitioners, on
On
Addressing
the petition and moving for dismissal thereof, petitioners countered that
Lorenzo had on several occasions been merely hired by their late father to haul
and spread seedlings on the subject property; that they had left the lands idle
as alleged but that the same was due to the unexpected lack of rain during the
planting season; that on the contrary, Lorenzo, after Bernardos death, had
entered the subject property by stealth and strategy and cultivated the same
for his exclusive benefit; and finally, that it was the regular courts, not the
DARAB, which had jurisdiction over the instant dispute inasmuch as Lorenzo was
a mere squatter or usurper.[10]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Directing the Register of Deeds for the
102 15,640 sq.m. A-035159 M-1680
85 7,977 sq.m. A-035685 M-1679
83 19,215 sq.m. A-035681 M-1677
of the Subdivision Plan Psd-04-030752 (OCT), all located at 1st District, Jala-Jala, Rizal which are registered in the name of Bernardo R. Sta. Maria;
2. Directing the local MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) of Jala-Jala, Rizal and PARO (Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer) of Rizal to reallocate the aforementioned lots described in the preceding paragraph to other qualified beneficiaries pursuant to existing law and pertinent guidelines;
3. Maintaining the petitioner in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject premises as a qualified potential PD 27 beneficiary [thereof];
4. Perpetually enjoining the respondents, Heirs of the late Bernardo R. Sta. Maria from disturbing the petitioners peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject premises.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioners
elevated the case to the DARAB, which, on
WHEREFORE,
finding no reversible error in the herein assailed decision of
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, alleging a denial of due process and partiality to their
disadvantage and, accordingly, sought that the decision of the Regional
Adjudicator be declared void upon those grounds.[13] The motion was denied on
Petitioners
then turned to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari[15]
under Rule 65. In it, they alleged that
the DARAB in this case had exhibited a want or excess of jurisdiction, first, in
entertaining the instant suit involving a squatter on one hand and agrarian
reform beneficiaries on the other; and, second, in affirming a void decision
that had been promulgated in violation of the due process clause. They likewise fault the DARAB in its
erroneous appreciation of the evidence and its manifest bias in favor of
Lorenzo.[16]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The
focal ground for the dismissal of the petition was the modality of recourse
taken by petitioners. The Court of
Appeals observed that the correct remedy from an adverse decision of the DARAB
is an appeal by petition for review, not a petition for certiorari, to be taken within 15 days from notice.[18] It likewise affirmed the uniform findings of
the Regional Adjudicator and the DARAB that the dispute arose from the supposed
tenancy relationship which existed between Bernardo and Lorenzo, hence, it came
under the competence of the DARAB to resolve.
Moreover, it noted that said relations between Lorenzo and Bernardo, as
well as the established fact that the supposed agrarian reform beneficiaries
had failed to personally cultivate the subject lands, were all contrary to the
mandate of the land grant. Finally, it dismissed the claim of denial of due
process.[19]
Petitioners
motion for reconsideration[20]
was denied.[21] Hence, this recourse to the Court.
Petitioners
stance is unchanged. They hinge the
present petition on their obstinate notion that Lorenzo was a mere squatter
or usurper of the subject property and that, therefore, the dispute is removed
from the jurisdiction of the agrarian agency which has thus rendered a void
decision on the controversy. They also
reiterate their supposed prejudice as they were allegedly denied due process
and yet were bound by the assailed decisions which had been rendered without
basis in the evidence on record.[22]
In
its abbreviated Comment[23]
on the petition, the DAR stands by the dismissal of the petition by the Court
of Appeals and prayed that inasmuch as petitioners resorted to an improper mode
of appeal from the DARAB, the instant petition deserves an outright dismissal.
The petition is utterly
unmeritorious.
We agree with
the Court of Appeals that petitioners have resorted to a wrong mode of appeal
by pursuing a Rule 65 petition from the DARABs decision. Section 60[24]
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 clearly states that the modality of recourse
from decisions or orders of the then special agrarian courts is by petition for
review. In turn, Section 61[25]
of the law mandates that judicial review of said orders or decisions are
governed by the Rules of Court. Section 60[26] thereof
is to be read in relation to R.A. No. 7902,[27]
which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to include exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions.[28] On this basis, the Supreme Court issued
Circular No. 1-95[29]
governing appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by
petition for review regardless of the nature of the question raised. Hence, the
Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that must govern the procedure for judicial
review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR as in this case. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,[30]
moreover, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by a
wrong or inappropriate mode warrants a dismissal.
Thus,
petitioners should have assailed the
Be that as it
may, we shall address the peripheral issues raised in the present petition for
clarity and perspective.
Petitioners
insist that a certiorari petition is
the proper relief from the assailed decision and resolution of the DARAB inasmuch
as the latter allegedly has gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the non-agrarian dispute in this case
where the disputants are agrarian reform beneficiaries and a mere usurper or
squatter.[32]
Concededly, the true nature of this
case seems to have been obscured by the incidents that ensued between the
formal demand to vacate was made by petitioners on respondent on
Thus, we revert to the origins of the
controversy at the BARC level, where the conflict between petitioners and
respondent has encountered a first attempt at resolution. We recall that at the said forum, respondent
has already sought validation of his rights as Bernardos sub-tenant. This fact
is affirmed in the
The Report also told that the
property had outstanding tax obligations in favor of the local government for
which both Bernardo and petitioners as his heirs should be held responsible.[40] Quite striking is the finding that for more
than ten (10) years or the period during which Bernardos landholdings were
being farmed by his own tenants none of herein petitioners had manifested to
the agrarian department their intention to take on and continue carrying out
the obligations attaching to the land grant.[41] In fact, none of them had coordinated with
the DAR even after Bernardos death on
The findings contained
in the said BARC Report indisputably place the present controversy within the
class of disputes over which the DAR exercises primary jurisdiction as provided
in Section 50[45] of R.A.
No. 6657. Agrarian disputes refer to any controversy relating to tenancy over
lands devoted to agriculture, among others.[46] The statutory vesture of power in the DAR is
to be read in conjunction with Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657, which defines an
agrarian dispute as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy
relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to
agriculture.[47]
We need not
belabor this point, inasmuch as jurisdiction is vested by law and is determined
by the material allegations in the complaint.[48] Indeed, when a court, tribunal or officer has
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction and, hence, all errors committed in the exercise of said
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules
and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil
action for certiorari.[49]
Thus, armed with the BARC Report
which itself states that no conciliation has been arrived at by the parties
previously, and following a failed attempt at conciliation before the MARO, Lorenzo
filed a petition against petitioners for their disqualification to become
agrarian reform beneficiaries with the Office of the Regional Adjudicator of
the DAR. Relying on the BARCs findings,
the Regional Adjudicator noted that, indeed, Bernardo had violated the terms of
his land grant when he employed sub-tenants in the cultivation of the subject
landholding[50] a
direct contravention of the prohibitions instituted in Section 27[51]
of R.A. No. 3844[52] and in
Section 24 (2)[53] of R.A.
No. 1199,[54] as
amended. These two provisions prohibit
an agricultural lessee or tenant from, among others, employing a lessee on the
landholding except in case of illness or incapacity where laborers may be
employed but whose services shall be on his account. It turned out also that
the Regional Adjudicator had found meritorious the BARC findings that Lorenzo
was only among other third parties in favor of whom the usufructuary rights
over the landholding had been surrendered by Bernardo; and that since Lorenzo
was the last sub-tenant to take possession of the landholding in the series of
relinquishments made by Bernardo following the issuance of his certificates of
land transfer in 1973, it was deemed proper to protect Lorenzos security of
tenure on the subject property.[55] This, especially since Lorenzos unrebutted
evidence is to the effect that he has been in continuous and actual possession
and cultivation of the disputed lands.[56]
These findings have been affirmed in
the ordinary course by both the DARAB and the Court of Appeals and, hence, are
no longer bound to be reevaluated by this Court. For, in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. We have time and again
ruled that the factual findings by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts because of the special
knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling
under their jurisdiction.[57]
Finally,
anent petitioners lamentation that they had been denied due process, we differ. In administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain ones side suffices to meet the requirements
of due process.[58] As we
held in Casimiro v. Tandog:[59]
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[60]
We, therefore, agree with the Court
of Appeals that
Petitioners contention x x x is bereft of merit. From the proceedings before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) up to the DARAB, petitioners were given all notices and chances to submit all necessary or required pleadings. From the Regional Adjudicator, they appealed to the DARAB and thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration x x x. All these show that they were given ample opportunity to present their side. Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioners.[61]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Edgardo F. Sundiam (deceased), concurring; rollo, pp. 44-52.
[2] Rollo, p. 54.
[3] See Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. M-1677, M-1679 and M-1680 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal which cover respectively parcels of land measuring 19,215 sq. m. (Lot No. 83); 7,977 sq. m. (Lot No. 85); and 13,640 (Lot No. 102), records, pp. 13-17.
[4] See RARAD Decision, records, pp. 334-336.
[5]
[6]
[7] Letter dated
[8] The petition was docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-RI-006-95; id. at 1-4.
[9] Records, pp. 1-4.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 123-132.
[14]
[15] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72388, CA rollo, pp. 2-29.
[16] CA rollo, pp. 15-27.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Rollo, pp. 22-32.
[23]
[24] SEC.
60. Appeals. − An appeal may be taken from the decision of the
Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision;
otherwise, the decision shall become final.
An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals,
or from any order, ruling or decision of DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a
petition for review with the Supreme Court within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision.
[25] Sec.
61. Procedure on Review. − Review by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall be governed by the Rules of Court. x x
x.
[26] Supra note 24.
[27] AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION NINE OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 129, AS AMENDED, KNOWN AS THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980, approved:
on
[28] Section
1. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
shall exercise:
x x x x
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
[29] Dated
[30] GUIDELINES TO BE
OBSERVED IN APPEALS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS AND TO THE SUPREME COURT, dated
[31] Po v. Dampal, G.R. No. 173329, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 627, 633-634, citing Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165910, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 78, 100.
[32] Rollo, pp. 23-26.
[33] The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 316 in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pililla, Rizal. See the
[34] See CA rollo, pp. 209-216, 208.
[35] The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 494-M in the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, records, pp. 146-150.
[36] See Complaint for Recovery of Possession, rollo, p. 199, and the Judgment rendered in the forcible entry case, records, p. 205.
[37] Rollo, pp. 148-150.
[38] Records, p. 229-231.
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45] SEC.
50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. − The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agricultural (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure
and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or
controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with equity and the merits of
the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to
achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the
production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue
subpoena, and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs
through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the
power to punish direct and indirect contempt in the same manner and subject to
the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court .
Representatives of farmer leaders shall be allowed to
represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their organizations in any
proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, that when there are two
or more representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should
choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group before any
DAR proceedings.
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory.
[46] Rivera v. Santiago, G.R. No. 146501, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 113, 122, cited in the fairly recent case Octavio v. Perovano, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 574, 584.
[47] See Octavio v. Perovano, supra, at 584-585, citing Amurao v. Villalobos, G.R. No. 157491, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 464, 474.
[48] Soriano v. Bravo, G.R. No. 152086. December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 403, 421-422, citing Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, G.R. No. 162890, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 743.
[49] Agapito Rom, et al., v. Roxas & Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 169331,
[50] Records, p. 341.
[51] Section 27. Prohibitions to Agricultural Lessee. x x x
x x x x
(2) To employ a sublessee on his landholding: provided, however, that in case of illness or temporary incapacity he may employ laborers whose services on his landholding shall be on his account.
[52] AN ACT TO ORDAIN THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE
AND TO INSTITUTE LAND REFORMS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING THE ABOLITION OF
TENANCY AND THE CHANNELING OF CAPITAL INTO INDUSTRY, PROVIDE FOR THE NECESSARY
IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES, APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
approved
[53] Section 24. Prohibitions to tenant. x x x
x x x x
(2) It shall be unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a sub-tenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work required of him under this Act, except in cases of illness or any temporary incapacity on his part, in which eventuality the tenant or any member of his immediate farm household is under obligation to report such illness or incapacity to the landholder. Payment to the sub-tenant, in whatever form, for services rendered on the land under this circumstance, shall be for the account of the tenant.
[54] AN ACT TO GOVERN THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN LANDHOLDERS AND TENANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS (LEASEHOLDS AND
SHARE TENANCY), approved
[55] Records, pp. 340-341.
[56]
[57] Octavio v. Perovano, supra note 46, at 585, citing Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142359, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 109, 130-131.
[58] Autencio v. City Administrator Maara and the City of Cotabato, G.R. No. 152752, January 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 46, 55, cited in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Samson, G.R. Nos. 161910, 161930 June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 500, 509.
[59] G.R. No.
146137,
[60]
[61] CA rollo, p. 333.