Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
JUANA COMPLEX
I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN,
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO
C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON,
NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and NELSON A. LOYOLA,
Petitioners, - versus - FIL-ESTATE
LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE
ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, ENRIQUE
RIVILLA, MICHAEL E.
JETHMAL and MICHAEL
ALUNAN,
Respondents. x-------------------------------------------x FIL-ESTATE
LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE
ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION,
Petitioners, - versus - JUANA COMPLEX
I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN,
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON,
NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and NELSON A. LOYOLA,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No.
152272 G. R. No. 152397 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ. Promulgated: March 5, 2012 |
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DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing
the July 31, 2001 Decision[1] and February
21, 2002 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543, which annulled and set aside the March 3, 1999 Order[3] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Bian, Laguna (RTC), granting the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and upheld
the June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order[4] denying
the motion to dismiss.
The
Facts:
On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners
Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana
Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA,
et. al.), instituted a complaint[5] for damages,
in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and
motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of
the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate
Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development
Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency and their respective
officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular
commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of
Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as
La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years;
that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz
Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the
said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable
but Fil-estate excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the
Municipal Government and the Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter
failed to repair the road to make it passable and safe to motorists and
pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused
damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to
them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow
streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard; and that its
permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered
use of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the
immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and
intimidating them in their use of
On
Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to
determine the propriety of the issuance of a WPI.
On February
26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss[7] arguing that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. On
On
On
The RTC then issued its
Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul (1) the Order dated
On
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
partially GRANTED. The Order dated
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated
a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been
using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was
violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC
ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that
the case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be
represented were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as
parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove
their clear and present right over
Hence, these petitions for review.
In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court,
raising the following issues:
(A)
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS REQUIRED
TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.
(B)
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO SATISFY THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.[15]
In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate,
et al. anchor their petition on the following issues:
I.
The Court of
Appeals declaration that respondents Complaint states a cause of action is contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence.
II.
The Court of
Appeals pronouncement that respondents complaint was properly filed as a
class suit is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
III.
The Court of
Appeals conclusion that full blown trial on the merits is required to
determine the nature of the
JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action. They, however, disagree with the CAs
pronouncement that a full-blown trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that
during the hearing on the application of the writ of injunction, they had
sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a public road and that commuters and
motorists of their neighboring villages had used this road as their means of
access to the San Agustin Church, Colegio De San Agustin and to SLEX in going
to Metro Manila and to Southern Tagalog particularly during the rush hours when
traffic at Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights Entry/Exit was at its worst.
JCHA, et al. argue that
Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when
it voided the WPI because the public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently
proven and, as residents of San Pedro and Bian, Laguna, their right to use La
Paz Road is undeniable.
In their Memorandum,[17] Fil-Estate,
et al. explain that
Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the
annulment of the WPI was proper since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have
a clear right over
Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the
complaint did not sufficiently contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of
action. They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an
allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the pleading.
They likewise argue that the complaint was
improperly filed as a class suit for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the
commuters and motorists they are representing have a well-defined community of
interest over
The
Courts Ruling
The issues for the Courts
resolution are: (1) whether or not the complaint states a cause of action; (2)
whether the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit; and (2) whether
or not a WPI is warranted.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a
cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(1) the
legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right.[18]
The question of whether the complaint states a cause
of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the
defendant.[19] Thus, it must contain a concise statement of
the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.[20] To be taken into account are only the material
allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other
matters aliunde are not considered.[21]
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the
prayer of said complaint.[22] Stated
differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant.[23]
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations
in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA,
et al.s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly
instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so
numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them
which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to
fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit
of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a
class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the
parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to
court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all
concerned.[24]
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits
all commuters and motorists who use
The subject matter of the instant
case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the
Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section
3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lays down the rules for the issuance thereof.
Thus:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the
relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance
of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or
non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a
person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
A
writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and adjudicated.[25]
The requisites for its issuance are: (1)
the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2)
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[26]
For the writ to issue, the right sought to
be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to be
clear and positive.[27]
This means that
the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right
to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.[28]
In
the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie
proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right
to the use of
Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent
Judge, private respondents failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and
unmistakable right over the
Consequently,
the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can fully prove
their respective positions on the issues.
Due process considerations dictate that the assailed
injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits but merely an order for the
grant of a provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard. The hearing on the application for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is separate and distinct from the
trial on the merits of the main case. [29] The
evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or
complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an
idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision
of the case on the merits.[30] There
are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the trial which may not be
obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive
writ.[31] Moreover,
the quantum of evidence required for one is different from that for the other.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C
A T I O N
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo
(G.R. No. 152272), pp.
164-178. Penned by then Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member
of this Court) with Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Associate
Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] Rollo (G.R. No. 152272),
pp. 117-143.
[5]
[6] Rollo
(G.R. No. 152397), pp. 272-275.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo
(G.R. No. 152272), pp. 144-148; rollo (G.R. No. 152397), pp. 139-143.
[11] Rollo
(G.R. No. 152272), pp. 95-116.
[12]
[13] CA rollo,
pp. 2-57.
[14] Rollo
(G.R. No. 152272), p. 178.
[15]
[16] Rollo (G.R. 152397), p. 17.
[17] Rollo (G.R. No. 152272),
pp. 314-351.
[18] Makati Stock Exchange, Inc.
v.
[19] Goodyear Philippines, Inc. v.
Sy, 511 Phil. 41, 49 (2005).
[20] Jimenez, Jr. v. Jordana,
486 Phil. 452, 465 (2004).
[21] Supra note 19 at 50.
[22] Misamis
Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, 505 Phil. 181, 189, (2005).
[23] Makati Stock Exchange, Inc.
v. Campos, supra note 18 at
126-127.
[24] Oscar M. Herrera, I Remedial
Law, 2000 ed., 390.
[25] City of Naga v. Asuncion,
G. R. No. 174042, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 528, 544.
[26] Talento
v. Escalada, Jr., G.R.
No. 180884,
[27] Del
Rosario v. Court of Appaels, 325 Phil. 424, 432, (1996).
[28] Filipino Metals Corporations
v. Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry, 502 Phil. 191, 201 (2005).
[29] Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 327
Phil. 1, 48, (1996).
[30] Landbank
of the
[31] Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 407 Phil. 856, 867, (2001).
[32] Supra
note 29.