Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
|
SpOUSES JESSE CACHOPERO and bema cachopero, Petitioners, - versus
- rachel celestial, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 146754
Present:
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.
Promulgated: March 21, 2012 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari[1]
seeking to vacate and set aside the September 4, 2000 Decision[2]
and January 19, 2001 Resolution[3]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 52655.
Petitioner Jesse
Cachopero, married to co-petitioner Bema Cachopero (spouses Cachopero), is the
younger brother of respondent Rachel Celestial (Celestial). Celestial owned an old residential house (old
house) situated on Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462 (hereinafter, Celestials
lot) at Poblacion 8, Midsayap, Cotabato, Philippines.[4] A major portion of this house stood on the
eastern part of the 344-square meter-lot (subject land) immediately adjoining
Celestials lot. The subject land was formerly
part of the Salunayan Creek that became dry as a result of the construction of
an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration.[5]
On July 21,
1989, Celestial filed an Ejectment case, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 711, against the spouses
Cachopero before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Midsayap.
In her
Complaint,[6]
Celestial alleged that the spouses Cachopero had been living in her house for
free and out of tolerance since 1973. Celestial
claimed that when the condition of the old house had become uninhabitable, she
decided to have it demolished. However,
the spouses Cachopero refused to vacate the premises.
In the meantime,
on August 10, 1989, Celestial and the spouses Cachopero entered into a
Compromise Agreement,[7]
the terms and conditions of which are quoted as follows:
That
Spouses Jesse Cachopero and Bema Cachopero, defendants in this case, are going
to vacate the premises in question and transfer the old house subject of this
ejectment case [to] the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462, located at
8, Midsayap, Cotabato, within eight (8) months from today, but not later than
April 30, 1990;
That
in transferring the old house subject of this suit to the back of Lot No.
2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462 of plaintiff, plaintiff shall shoulder all expenses
in dismantling said house and in the reconstruction of said house, plaintiff
binds herself to pay fifty (50%) percent of the costs of labor and expenses in
transferring the said house;
That
plaintiff is willing to give a two (2) meter wide exit alley on the eastern
portion of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462 and on the southern portion of
said lot as roadright-of-way up to the point of the NIA road on the west of Lot
No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462;
That
defendants hereby promise to remove all their improvements introduced fronting
the residence of the plaintiff before August 31, 1989; and the plaintiff shall
likewise remove all her existing improvements on the same area;
That
the parties are waiving their respective claims for moral damages, as well as
attorneys fees as appearing in the Complaint and Counter-Claim appearing in
their Answer in order to totally have this case amicably settled.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that Judgment be rendered
by this Honorable Court base[d] on the terms and conditions of this Compromise
Agreement.
Midsayap,
Cotabato, August 10, 1989.
On August 10,
1989, the MTC rendered a judgment, approving the Compromise Agreement, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
finding the Compromise Agreement to be in accordance with law and equity, the
same is hereby approved and judgment is rendered pursuant to, and in accordance
with the terms and conditions therein stipulated.[8]
On July 17,
1990, then Deputy Sheriff Benedicto F. Flauta issued the Sheriffs Return in
the above Ejectment case, viz:
Respectfully
returned to the Honorable Court, Municipal Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato the
herein attached original copy of the writ of Execution issued in the
above-entitled case with the information that:
1.
Defendants
Jesse and Bema is (sic) found to be out of the real estate property of the
plaintiff;
2.
The
boundary of the defendants and the plaintiff is distinct; and
3.
The
improvements introduced by the defendants fronting the residence of the
plaintiff is already outside the lot of the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE,
the undersigned had nothing to do except to return the said Writ of Execution
for whatever the Honorable Court may deem necessary and appropriate for both
parties.[9]
However, as the
portion of the house beyond Celestials lot was not demolished, Celestial filed
a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution, with a prayer to cite
the Deputy Sheriff in Contempt for not executing the Writ of Execution issued
on May 17, 1990.[10]
Since the MTC
had not yet received the Sheriffs Return, it ordered the Deputy Provincial
Sheriff to comment on the Motion and on August 16, 1990, the latter
complied. The pertinent portions of said
Comment are quoted as follows:
That
on May 30, 1990, the undersigned met one of the defendants at the premises of
the subject area and three days after, the same met the plaintiff in the same
area; the same informations were obtained which are top confidential except
that their boundary is distinct;
That the
defendants are no longer within the metes and bounds of the plaintiffs
property;
That Lot
No. 25[8]6-[G]-28 is the only base (sic) of this case and no other lots more;
and,
That the
defendants had complied [with] the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of
the Court.
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully submit, that he has
fully complied with the Writ of Execution issued by the Honorable Court in this
case.[11]
Based on the above, the MTC denied the Motion for the
Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution on August 30, 1990. The MTC likewise
denied Celestials Motion for Reconsideration on November 20, 1990, and
highlighted the fact that the agreement was for the spouses Cachopero to vacate
Celestials lot, which was the land subject of the Ejectment case. The MTC further said that it had no
jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.[12]
Celestial filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, of
Midsayap, Cotabato, praying that the MTC be ordered to issue an Alias Writ of Execution
in the Ejectment case and that the Sheriff be directed to enforce such Alias
Writ of Execution. Celestial furthermore prayed for the RTC to order the spouses
Cachopero to pay her damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs
of suit. This was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 051.[13]
In response, MTC Judge Nestor Flauta said that the old
house constructed on Celestials lot had already been demolished. Whatever remained undemolished were owned by
the spouses Cachopero, and were not put in issue in the Ejectment case. Thus, Judge Flauta averred, to order the
demolition of the undemolished improvements outside of the property of
[Celestial] would be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the [MTC].[14]
On July 27,
1992, the RTC conducted an ocular inspection to determine whether or not the
Compromise Agreement was executed in accordance with its terms.[15]
On March 20,
1997, the RTC issued an Order[16]
dismissing the petition for mandamus
for lack of merit. The RTC ratiocinated
in this wise:
Mandamus
does not lie where there was no right of petitioner which was excluded from
exercising and there is no duty on the part of respondent Judge to perform
(Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Bello, 10 SCRA 238).
The
law concedes to judges and courts the right to decide questions according to
their judgment and their understanding of the law and if their decision in that
regard is not correct or contrary to law, appeal, not Mandamus, is the
remedy. (Santiago Labor Union vs.
Tabique, 17 SCRA 286.)[17]
Acting on
Celestials Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC on September 1, 1997, rendered
an Order granting such motion, and setting aside its earlier Order of March 20,
1997.[18]
Meanwhile Jesse Cachopero
had already instituted a petition, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 070, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, assailing the orders of the Department of
Environment and Natural resources (DENR), which denied his Miscellaneous Sales
Application (MSA) over a portion of the subject land. This petition and Jesse Cachoperos
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, were denied by the RTC for lack of merit
and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Undaunted, Jesse Cachopero assailed the above orders in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, filed before the Court of
Appeals. This was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 45927.[19]
On February 3,
1999, the RTC rendered a Resolution,[20]
again dismissing Celestials petition for mandamus,
but on the ground that the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution in Civil Case
No. 711 depended on the outcome of Special Civil Case No. 070, which involved
the subject land that Jesse Cachopero had applied for.[21] The RTC said that the foregoing circumstance
is a supervening cause necessitating refusal to issue an alias writ of
execution.[22]
Celestial
brought this matter to the Court of Appeals and claimed that the RTC itself
found that part of the old house, subject of the compromise agreement, was
still standing or undemolished. Thus,
she posited the following issues for the Court of Appeals resolution:
1.
Can
the Honorable Regional Trial Court set a condition other than that provided
in the Judgment itself for the implementation and execution of the said
judgment in Civil Case No. 711?
2. Was it legal, lawful and proper
and did the Honorable Regional Trial Court act without or in excess and/or
grave abuse of discretion when it ordered and directed the execution of the
Judgment in Civil Case No. 711, subject to the outcome of Special Civil Case
No. 070, which is never a condition in the said judgment sought to be executed
in full? or
3.
Did
the Honorable Regional Trial Court, act without and in excess or abuse of
discretion and against the law and jurisprudence, in dismissing the petition
for Mandamus and making the issuance of a Writ of Execution subjected to the
outcome of Special Civil Case No. 070, which is never a condition made in said
Judgment sought to be executed?[23]
On September 4,
2000, the Court of Appeals came out with its Decision in favor of
Celestial. The fallo reads:
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution in Special Civil Case No. 051 dated February 3,
1999 is hereby set aside. As prayed for
by petitioner, respondent Judge is hereby directed to issue an alias Writ of
Execution in Ejectment Case No. 711 ordering the full and complete
implementation of the judicially approved compromise judgment.[24]
In finding merit
in Celestials appeal, the Court of Appeals said that a compromise judgment is
immediately executory and once judicially approved, has the force of res judicata between the parties, which
should not be disturbed except for the vices of consent or perjury. More importantly, the Court of Appeals held:
What
is involved in Ejectment Case No. 711 is only the material possession of the
lot litigated therein. In Special Civil
Case No. 070, what is involved is the issue of who between the parties therein
has a better right to purchase the lot of the public domain the pendency of
which may not abate the execution of the compromise judgment in Ejectment Case
No. 711.[25]
Resolving the spouses
Cachoperos Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reiterated its
position in its Resolution of January 19, 2001 and said:
Movants
may not be allowed to renege from their express undertaking to vacate the
premises and transfer the old house at the back of lot 2586-[G]-28 and/or to
remove all of their improvements from the premises in dispute embodied in the
judicially approved compromise in Ejectment Case No. 111. Reiterated here, for emphasis, is the Courts
previous holding that the pendency of Civil Case No. 070 (on appeal in the
Supreme Court) which calls for the determination of who between the litigants
possesses as superior right to purchase the land of the public domain will not
bar the execution of the executory compromise judgment.[26]
The spouses
Cachopero then elevated their case to this Court, praying that the Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution be vacated and set aside, and to declare that
the RTC was correct in dismissing the case for mandamus.
On May 30, 2002,
Celestial filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and/or a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction,[27]
alleging that while the case was pending in this Court, the spouses Cachopero
had been making constructions and had been planting trees and plants on the
subject land. Celestial claims that the
spouses Cachoperos actions will cause her great and grave injustice.
In the meantime,
CA-G.R. No. 45927, which was
originally Special Civil Case No. 070,
had already reached this Court upon Celestials pleading, after the Court of
Appeals granted Jesse Cachoperos petition, reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC, and ordered the DENR to process Jesse Cachoperos MSA.[28] Celestials
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 142595,
was denied for lack of merit by this Court on October 15, 2003.[29]
Issues
The following
are the issues presented by the spouses Cachopero for this Courts resolution:
1. Will
Mandamus lie to compel the Regional Trial Court to issue an alias Writ of
Execution to execute a compromise agreement which the Provincial Sheriff, the
Municipal Trial Court, and the Regional Trial Court ruled to have been properly
executed?
2. Will
Mandamus lie to compel the Regional Trial Court to eject Petitioners from the
land they occupy and applied for under MSA XII-6-1669 after demolition of the
contested house by virtue of a compromise agreement in an ejectment case?[30]
Discussion
The spouses
Cachopero are insisting that the Writ of Execution had been properly
implemented as they had already vacated Celestials lot, which according to
them, was the subject matter of the Ejectment case against them. They argue that to eject them also from the
subject land, which they applied for in the DENR, and which was put in issue in
Special Civil Case No. 070, and then G.R. No. 142595 before this Court, would
be going beyond what was agreed upon by the parties.
Celestial on the
other hand, claims that G.R. No. 142595 has no bearing on this case. She asseverates that it was clear not only
from the Sheriffs own return, but also from the ocular inspection conducted by
the RTC, that the old house, which was the subject matter of the compromise
agreement, was only partially demolished.
We affirm the
Court of Appeals.
A petition for mandamus, under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
SEC. 3. Petition
for mandamus.
When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
The writ of mandamus is aimed to compel a
respondent, who failed to execute his/her legal duty, or unlawfully excluded
another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office, to perform the act
needed to be done in order to protect the rights of the petitioner.[31] Simply put, mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial, as opposed to a discretionary, duty.[32]
In Tay v. Court of Appeals,[33]
this Court elucidated on when a writ of mandamus
may issue, to wit:
In order
that a writ of mandamus may issue, it
is essential that the person petitioning for the same has a clear legal right
to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. It neither confers
powers nor imposes duties and is never issued in doubtful cases. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.[34]
In addition, mandamus applies as a remedy when the petitioners right is founded
clearly in law and is not doubtful.[35]
In the case at
bar, Celestials petition for mandamus
is anchored on her rights emanating from the Compromise Agreement she executed
with the spouses Cachopero.
Article 2028 of
the Civil Code defines a compromise as follows:
A compromise is a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced.
Article 2037 of
the Civil Code provides for the effects of a compromise agreement, to wit:
A compromise has upon the parties
the effect and authority of res judicata;
but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
Expounding on
the concept of compromise agreements, this Court, in Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr.,[36]
said:
[W]e have time and again ruled
that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid contract which is the law between
the parties. It is a contract perfected
by mere consent, whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has the force of
law and is conclusive between the parties, and courts will not relieve parties
from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out
to be unwise. x x x.[37]
Likewise, in Philippine National Oil Company-Energy
Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) v. Abella,[38]
this Court pronounced:
Prevailing
case law provides that a compromise once approved by final orders of the court
has the force of res judicata between
the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or
forgery. Hence, a decision on a
compromise agreement is final and executory. Such agreement has the
force of law and is conclusive on the parties.
It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the
parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules. Judges
therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce
it. Hence, compromise agreements duly
approved by the courts are considered the decisions in the particular cases
they involve.[39]
The terms of the
compromise agreement involved herein are clear and unequivocal. The spouses Cachopero agreed to vacate
Celestials lot and transfer the old house to the land at the
back of Celestials lot. While it
has been shown that the spouses Cachopero had already removed part of the old
house, Jesse Cachopero himself admitted, during the ocular inspection done by
the RTC, that part of the old house beyond Celestials lot were not demolished
nor removed, to wit:
COURT:
Q This house here which is now remain
standing in the lot enclosed with bamboo fence, was it existing at the time of
the filing of the complaint between you and defendants at the time the decision
was rendered?
JESSE
CACHOPERO:
A Yes, your Honor.
x x x x
ATTY.
AGDEPPA:
That the roofing is a part of the
old house that was brought down when the second story was destroyed, your
Honor.
x x x x
COURT:
There is a structure which has been
destroyed and above the remaining structure of which a shade of galvanized iron
was made. Yes
JESSE
CACHOPERO:
A part of the second floor which was
lowered down.
COURT:
Another questions This structure
here was already existing during the time of the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court?
JESSE
CACHOPERO:
Yes, your Honor.
ATTY.
AMPARO:
When the two story building was
demolished, how did the remaining portion looks like?
JESSE
CACHOPERO:
It looks like a bahay kubo, sir.
ATTY.
AMPARO:
When the building was demolished,
what improvement did you introduce?
JESSE
CACHOPERO:
The walling made of rough wood, sir.
ATTY.
AMPARO:
How about this wall on the other
side of the remaining structure?
JESSE
CACHOPERO:
It is part of the old building, sir.
x x x x
COURT:
In other words it has already been
paid for the expenses of the demolition.
Why was the other parts of the
building not included in the demolition which was made at the instance of the
plaintiff?
RACHEL
CELESTIAL:
Because he objected and according to
him (Jesse Cachopero) it is beyond my property, your Honor.[40]
It is clear from
the records and the facts of this case that the real reason Celestial wanted to
eject the spouses Cachopero from the subject land is to reclaim the use of such
land for herself. This can be gleaned
from the fact that in their compromise agreement, she was willing to shoulder
the expenses of transferring the old house to the area at the back of her own
lot. This fact runs counter to her claim
that she was ejecting her brother and his wife from the old house due to its
dilapidated and uninhabitable condition. However, Celestials intention has nothing to
do with the validity of the compromise agreement, which the spouses Cachopero
freely signed, and on which the MTC based its judgment.
This Court
agrees with the Court of Appeals that Special Civil Case No. 070, which became
G.R. No. 142595 when it was elevated to this Court, has nothing to do with the
case before us. The spouses Cachopero anchor
their right on the MSA that they filed with the DENR over the subject land,
whereas this case concerns the compromise agreement they executed with Celestial.
Although
Celestials petition in G.R. No. 142595 was denied, and the Court of Appeals
ruling ordering the DENR to process the spouses Cachoperos MSA over the
subject lot was affirmed, what is
involved herein is the transfer of the old house from the subject land, and not
the subject land itself. However, the
spouses Cachopero have not shown this Court that their MSA had indeed been
approved.
Unless the spouses Cachopero can show this Court that there
is a supervening event, which occurred after the judgment of the MTC, and which
brought about a material change in their situation vis--vis that of Celestial, the latter has the right to have the
compromise agreement executed, according to its terms.[41]
This Courts pronouncements in Silverio,
Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc.,[42] are
instructive, and we quote as follows:
To justify the stay of immediate
execution, the supervening events must have a direct effect on the matter
already litigated and settled. Or, the
supervening events must create a substantial change in the rights or relations
of the parties which would render execution of a final judgment unjust,
impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution in
the interest of justice.[43]
We find that no such supervening events exist in this case
so as to justify the stay of the execution of Civil Case No. 711.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED and
the September 4, 2000 Decision and January 19, 2001 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52655 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
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ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice |
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* Per Special Order No. 1207 dated February 23, 2012.
[1] Under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 20-26; penned by Associate
Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring.
[3] Id.
at 27.
[4] Id.
at 37.
[5] Celestial v. Cachopero, 459 Phil. 903,
911 (2003).
[6] Rollo, pp. 28-31.
[7] Id.
at 35-36.
[8] Id.
at 36.
[9] Id.
at 41.
[10] Id.
at 42.
[11] Id.
at 51.
[12] Id.
at 32-33.
[13] CA
rollo, p. 50.
[14] Rollo, p. 49.
[15] Id.
at 88-96.
[16] Id.
at 52-53.
[17] Id.
at 53.
[18] Id.
at 101.
[19] Celestial v. Cachopero, supra note 5 at 916.
[20] Rollo, pp. 97-100.
[21] Id.
at 11.
[22] Id.
at 99.
[23] CA
rollo, p. 29.
[24] Rollo, p. 26.
[25] Id.
at 25.
[26] Id.
at 27.
[27] Id.
at 275-281.
[28] Celestial v. Cachopero, supra note 5 at
915-916.
[29] Id. at 931.
[30] Rollo, p. 8.
[31] Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Hon. Amante, Jr., 501 Phil. 86, 102 (2005).
[32] Albay Accredited Constructors Association v.
Honorable Ombudsman Desierto, 516 Phil. 308, 325 (2006).
[33] 355
Phil. 381 (1998).
[34] Id. at 397.
[35] Manalo v. PAIC Savings Bank, 493 Phil.
854, 860 (2005).
[36] 501 Phil. 228 (2005).
[37] Id.
at 239.
[38] G.R.
No. 153904, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 549.
[39] Id.
at 565-566.
[40] Rollo, pp. 151-155.
[41] Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc., 504 Phil. 150,
161-162 (2005).
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
at 162.