Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
HEIRS OF
PACENCIA RACAZA, namely,
VIRGINIA RACAZA COSCOS, ANGELES RACAZA MIEL, RODRIGO
RACAZA, QUIRINO RACAZA, ROGELIO RACAZA, ERNESTA RACAZA and ROLAND RACAZA, Petitioners,
- versus - SPOUSES
FLORENCIO ABAY-ABAY, and
ELEUTERIA ABAY-ABAY,[1] Respondents. |
G.R. No. 198402
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: June
13, 2012 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This
resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer to Admit
Newly Discovered Evidence, filed by the Heirs of Pacencia Racaza,[2]
herein petitioners under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to assail the Decision[3]
dated September 8, 2010 and Resolution[4]
dated August 8, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 01095.
The Facts
As a
background, herein respondents Spouses Florencio and Eleuteria Abay-abay[5]
filed in July 1985 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City,
Bohol a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages
against several defendants that included Alexander Miel (Alexander), the
husband of herein petitioner Angeles Racaza Miel (collectively, the Miels). Subject of the complaint, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 3920, was the property covered by Tax Declaration No.
4501-663 and situated in Poblacion Ubay,
A residential lot bounded on the North by Emelia Garces (part); East by Emelia Garces; South by Rosario Garces, Esperanza Rosello, Matea de Japson; West by Toribio Reyes St., with an area of 600 square meters, more or less.[6]
Spouses Abay-abay alleged that they acquired the property
from the estate of one Emilia Garces by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 12, 1979, which was registered with the Register of Deeds on October 10,
1984. In mid-1984, however, therein
defendants began erecting residential houses on the subject property without
the knowledge and consent of Spouses Abay-abay.
The refusal of defendants therein to vacate the subject land despite
herein respondents demand prompted the latter to file the complaint with the
RTC. Alexander failed to file his answer
to the complaint, and was then declared in default by the trial court.
On May 30,
1988, the RTC rendered its judgment in favor of Spouses Abay-abay, and then
ordered the defendants therein to vacate the disputed property. A writ of execution was later issued by the
trial court to effect the removal of the structures, including the house of the
Miels, built on the property. When the
Miels failed to vacate the property despite their repeated promise to do so not
later than January 11, 1991, the RTC issued on January 14, 1991 an Order
directing the sheriff to immediately destroy and demolish the house of the
Miels.
On January
23, 1991, the petitioners then filed before the RTC their own complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4856, for quieting of title, recovery of possession
and damages against Spouses Abay-abay. As
the surviving heirs of Pacencia Racaza (Pacencia), petitioners claimed to be
the co-owners of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 45C1-313 under the
name of Pacencia and more particularly described as:
A parcel of land... bounded [on] the North by Seashore and Josefina Ruiz; on the South by Burgos St. and M. Garces; on the East by Public Land and on the West by Marciano Garces now Public Market... containing an area of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY square meters...[7]
Petitioners claimed to have had
actual, peaceful, continuous and public possession of the land, disturbed only
in 1985 when Spouses Abay-abay instituted Civil Case No. 3920. They also questioned the unjustified
demolition of their ancestral house, arguing that only Alexander, who had no
interest in the property, was impleaded in the case.
In their answer to the complaint, Spouses
Abay-abay invoked the valid judgment and writ of execution already issued in
Civil Case No. 3920. They also raised
the issues of estoppel and laches in view of the petitioners failure to
intervene in Civil Case No. 3920.
The Ruling
of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC
rendered its Decision[8]
dated April 4, 2005, which dismissed the complaint for lack of preponderance of
evidence, and affirmed Spouses Abay-abay's ownership and possession over the
subject property. The rulings of the
trial court were based on the following findings:
1 Defendants [herein respondents] evidence to the effect that defendants and [their] predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and ownership of the land under litigation since 1917 until the present has more evidentiary weight than that of plaintiffs [herein petitioners] whose tax declaration over a portion of the land claimed by defendants was issued in 1949;
2 The following undisputed facts negate plaintiffs claim over a portion of the land claimed by defendants as follows:
a) Plaintiff Angeles Racaza Miel, who received the complaint and summons in Civil Case No. 3920 involving the land in question before RTC, Branch 2, never informed her husband Alexander Miel, who was one of the defendants in that case, about such summons and complaint.
It is quite intriguing that, if indeed plaintiff Angeles Racaza Miel is one of the heirs of Paciencia Racaza[,] the alleged owner of a portion of the land in question, why did she not inform her co-heirs and intervene in that Civil Case No. 3920 when it was heard before RTC, Br. 2?
Such inaction of Angeles Racaza Miel infers the inanity of plaintiffs claim over a portion of the land in question.
x x x
c) Angeles or her husband[,] Alexander Miel never appealed the decision rendered by RTC, Branch 2 awarding the land under litigation in favor of defendant-spouses Florencio and Eleuteria Abay-abay.
3 Another undisputed fact that would reveal that in connection with the decision rendered by RTC, Branch 2 in favor of defendant[s]-spouses Florencio and Eleuteria, plaintiff Angeles Racaza Miel and her original counsel in this case, Atty. Roberto Cajes promised before the said Court to vacate the subject land. Such act of plaintiff Angeles Racaza Miel is indicative of her agreement to the decision rendered by RTC, Branch 2 awarding the subject land to Florencio Abay-abay, Sr. and, thus, demolishes whatever claim she and her co-plaintiffs in the case at bench may have over the land in question, which is the subject matter of the above-entitled case.
Simply stated, the evidence as a whole adduced by the defendants is superior to that of the plaintiffs[].[9]
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the rulings
of the RTC via the assailed Decision[10]
dated September 8, 2010 and Resolution[11]
dated August 8, 2011. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
The Present
Petition
To support their petition, the
petitioners argue that: (1) the disputed property is a foreshore land
and thus, owned by the State; (2) the respondents were buyers in bad faith when
they purchased the unregistered land; and (3) the order to demolish their
property was inhuman and thus, unconstitutional.
As part of their petition, the
petitioners also ask this Court to admit as newly discovered evidence a
Certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of Bohol, and a cadastral map of Poblacion, Ubay, Bohol, purportedly to support
their claim that the subject property is a foreshore land which cannot be owned
by herein respondents.
This
Court's Ruling
We deny the
petition.
First, the petition raises questions
of fact which are beyond the coverage of a petition for review on certiorari. The settled rule is that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not this Courts function to analyze or
weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower court. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants.[12] This is in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, as amended, which reads:
Section 1. Filing
of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The
petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or
other provisional remedies and shall
raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time
during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, Section 5, Rule 45
provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirements on
the contents of the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. While jurisprudence provides
settled exceptions to these rules, the instant petition does not fall under any
of these exceptions.
On the same ground that petitions
under Rule 45 must not involve questions of fact, the petitioners prayer for
this Court to admit what they claimed to be newly discovered evidence is hereby
denied. The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of
factual issues.[13] While the Rules of Court allows the
introduction by parties of newly-discovered evidence, as in motions for new
trial under Rule 37, these are not to be presented for the first time during an
appeal. In addition, the term
newly-discovered evidence has a specific definition under the law. Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for
newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will
probably change the judgment.[14]
The two documents which the
petitioners seek to now present are not of this nature. Undeniably, the CENRO Certification and
cadastral map annexed to the petition could have been produced and presented by
the petitioners during the proceedings before the court a quo. Further to this, the petitioners purpose for
submitting the said documents is only to prove that the disputed property is a
foreshore land that should have been declared owned by the State. Thus, even granting that the documents may be
admitted at this stage, the certification and cadastral map fail to support the
petitioners claim of ownership over the disputed property. On the contrary, these documents only negate
their claim of ownership and better right to possess the land because foreshore
land is not subject to private ownership, but is part of the public
domain. In Republic of the
Philippines v. CA,[15]
we thus held:
When the sea moved towards the estate and tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs. Cabangis annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.[16] (Citations omitted)
We note that not even herein
petitioners, but the Republic of the
All told, this Court finds no justification to depart from
the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. The petitioners failed to present any cogent
reason that would warrant a reversal of the decision and resolution assailed in
this petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 8, 2010 and Resolution
dated August 8, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 01095 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO
L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per
Section 12, R.A. 296
The
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] The RTC Decision in Civil Case No.
4856 indicates that spouses Florencio, Sr. and Eleuteria Abay-abay have died on
August 22, 2002 and September 17, 2002, respectively. They were substituted by
their heirs in the proceedings.
[2] Also
referred to as Paciencia Racaza in some documents.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice
Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate Justices Agnes Reyes-Carpio and Eduardo
B. Peralta, Jr., concurring; rollo,
pp. 21-30.
[4]
[5] Also
referred to as Abayabay in some documents.
[6] Rollo, p. 22.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Supra
note 3.
[11] Supra
note 4.
[12] Vallacar
Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 281, 294,
citing Land Bank of the Philippines, v.
Monets Export and Manufacturing Corporation, 493 Phil. 327, 338 (2005).
[13] Titan
Construction Corporation v. David, Sr., G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010,
615 SCRA 362, 363, citing Soriano III v.
Yuzon, 247 Phil. 191 (1988).
[14] Cabarlo
v. People, G.R. No. 172274, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 236, 243, citing Amarillo v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil.
487, 497 (2003).
[15] 346 Phil. 637 (1997).
[16]
[17] See
Manese v. Velasco, G.R. No. 164024,
January 29, 2009, 577 SCRA 108, 114.