Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC OF THE Petitioner, - versus - HEIRS
OF DOROTEO MONTOYA, represented by BUENAVENTURA MONTOYA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 195137
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: June
13, 2012 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]
dated August 11, 2010 and Resolution[2]
dated December 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92125.
The facts leading to the filing of
this petition are undisputed.
On November 12, 2004, the respondents
filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagaytay City (MTCC) an Application[3]
for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 14839-B,
Cad-355 of the Tagaytay Cadastre, situated at Barangay Maitim II West, Tagaytay City and with an area of 16,854
square meters. In support of their
application docketed as LRC No. N-089-2004, the respondents alleged that: (a)
sometime in 1952, their father, Doroteo Montoya (Doroteo), purchased the
subject property from Feliciano Bayot (Feliciano); (b) they inherited the
subject property from Doroteo, who died in 1972; (c) on December 30, 1996, as
Doroteos heirs, they executed a Kasulatan
ng Labas ng Hukumang Pagsasalin ng Namatay sa Kanyang Tagapagmana; and (d)
from the time Doroteo died, they have been in possession of the property in the
concept of an owner and this is evidenced by the fruit-bearing trees they
planted on the property and the tax declarations in their names.
During trial, the respondents
presented the testimonies of Buenaventura Montoya (
The respondents also submitted twelve (12)
tax declarations to show that their predecessors-in-interest, Feliciano and
Doroteo, had been in possession of the property since 1940:
|
Tax Declaration No. |
Year |
Tax Declaration No. Cancelled |
|
01637 |
1948 |
369 |
|
C5900-A |
1955 |
01637 |
|
08143-A |
No Year Stated |
C5900-A |
|
015463-A-1 |
1966 |
06143-A |
|
017347-A |
1966 |
015463-A |
|
020487-A |
1969 |
017347-A |
|
020506-A |
1969 |
020487-A |
|
05483-B |
1974 |
020506 |
|
011-0624 |
1980 |
05483-B |
|
011-0380 |
1985 |
011-0624 |
|
011-0781 |
1994 |
011-0380 |
|
98-011-0861 |
1998 |
011-0781 |
|
ARPN-2001-020-00243 |
|
|
|
ARPN-020-00592 |
|
|
|
7559085 |
1999 |
|
|
0073606 |
2004 |
|
On June 6, 2008, the MTCC rendered a
Decision,[5]
granting the respondents application, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, this
Court hereby approves the application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Law that parcel of land described
as Lot No. 14839-B[,] Cad-355 Csd-04-028178-D, containing an area of SIXTEEN
THOUSAND [EIGHT] HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR (16,854) SQUARE METERS, more or less, in
the name of THE HEIRS [of] Doroteo Montoya represented by Buenaventura Montoya
at Barangay Talon, Amadeo, Cavite.
Once, this DECISION becomes final
and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue[.]
SO ORDERED.[6]
On August 26, 2008, the petitioner
moved for reconsideration.[7] According to the petitioner, assuming that
the respondents are relying on Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, their petition cannot prosper since the subject land was declared
alienable and disposable not on or before June 12, 1945 but only on March 15,
1982 per the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office Report dated
May 12, 2005. On the other hand, if the
respondents application for registration is anchored on Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529, they must prove that the property is alienable and disposable for the
entire period that they were in possession, which should not be less than
thirty (30) years. However, since the
subject property became alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the
respondents had yet to complete the prescriptive period of thirty (30) years at
the time they filed their application on November 12, 2004.
In an Order[8]
dated September 11, 2008, the MTCC denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals and Naguit,[9]
the MTCC ruled that the respondents had complied with the requirements of Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 as what is important is that the property had been
declared alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application.
On appeal to the CA, the findings of
the MTCC were affirmed and the respondents were deemed to have perfected a
registrable title over the subject property.
Citing Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic,[10]
the CA ruled that under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, it is not required that
the property be declared alienable and disposable prior to June 12, 1945. The
legal requirements are complied with if possession in the concept of an owner
commenced on or before June 12, 1945 and the property had been declared
alienable and disposable prior to the filing of the complaint.
The Supreme
Court, in the latest case of Heirs of
Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, discussed the
applicability of the provision of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
and had formulated one of the issues, which is applicable in the present case,
as follows:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should
the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of
the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the
applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
Said query was
answered in the following manner:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes
and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors[-]in[-]interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
x x x
Applying the
above ruling to the present case, appellees have established that they have
acquired ownership over the property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. Appellees and their predecessors-in-interest,
particularly Feliciano Bayot and Doroteo Montoya, have been in possession of
the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by appellees proved
that, indeed, they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property.[11]
(Citations omitted)
The CA also ruled that the respondents
had sufficiently proved that their possession and that of their
predecessors-in-interest were of the nature required by law.
Tax Declaration
Number 01637-A showed that the property was declared for taxation purposes on
November 14, 1947 by Feliciano Bayot, the predecessor-in-interest of appellees,
wherein the area of the property was 32,732 square meters. The said tax declaration cancelled Tax No.
369, which was issued earlier than November 14, 1947, for the same states 1940.
Tax Declaration No. 01637-A was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. C5900-A by
virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on May 31, 1954 and the tax thereon began in
1955 and the same was declared in the name of Doroteo Montoya, the father of
appellees herein. Records further showed
that thereafter, several tax declarations were issued in the name of the late
Doroteo Montoya, from Exhibit Q to Exhibit Z, wherein the total land area of
32,732 square meters was reduced to 21,071 and further to the present size of
16,854 square meters due to the two deeds of sale executed by Doroteo Montoya
in favor of Marcial Montoya.
Although tax declarations and realty
tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of
the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government.[12]
(Citations omitted)
The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution[13]
dated December 21, 2010.
The petitioner would want this Court
to reverse and set aside the adverse issuances of the CA and dismiss the
respondents attempt to register the subject property in their names. The petitioner claimed that: (a) the
respondents cannot register the property under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529
as they failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed
the property openly, continuously and exclusively under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; (b)
there is no evidence that Feliciano, from whom Doroteo allegedly purchased
property sometime in 1952, possessed and occupied the same in the manner
prescribed by law;[14]
(c) the respondents cannot tack their possession to that of Feliciano, assuming
that he possessed the property in the concept of an owner, without credible
proof that a valid transfer of rights actually took place between Feliciano and
Doroteo;[15]
(d) there is no proof that Doroteo exercised acts of dominion over the
property;[16]
(e) the tax declaration in Felicianos name is for the year 1947, belying the
allegation that he was already in possession of the property on or before June
12, 1945; (f) there was an annotation at the back of the tax declaration for
the year 1947 stating that tax under said declaration begins with year 1940
but the CA erred in immediately concluding that Feliciano was already occupying
the property in the concept of an owner as early as 1940 when there is no
explanation as to why the tax declarations issued prior to 1947 were not
presented in evidence;[17]
(g) the twelve (12) tax declarations, being sporadic and intermittent assertions
of ownership for a period of sixty-five (65) years, negate the claim that the
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the property openly,
continuously, exclusively and notoriously;[18]
(h) in the absence of evidence that the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest performed definite acts of ownership over the
property, the tax declarations do not prove that the respondents had acquired a
registrable title;[19]
(i) neither can the respondents register under Section 14(2) as they have not acquired
title over the subject property by prescription; and (j) only patrimonial
properties of the State are susceptible to being acquired by prescription and
there is no evidence that the subject property, while alienable and disposable,
can be considered as patrimonial by reason of an express declaration that it is
no longer intended for public service or development of national wealth.[20]
The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the correctness of the conclusions made by the CA and the MTCC. According to the respondents, they had
acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529. The respondents alleged that:
(a) Feliciano and Doroteo occupied and possessed the subject property in the
concept of an owner as evidenced by the tax declarations in their names; (b) Feliciano
was already in possession of the property as early as 1940 as shown by the tax
declarations in his name; (c) the various plants and fruit-bearing trees on the
property conclusively prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
possessed and occupied the property in the manner prescribed by law; (d) the
testimonies of Buenaventura and Juan adequately describe the nature and
character of their possession; and (d) tax declarations may not pass as
conclusive evidence of ownership but they are, at least, proof that the holders
thereof have an adverse claim over the property.
Our Ruling
The respondents categorically stated
that they seek to register the subject property in their name under Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, which provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
For the respondents to rightfully
claim that they have acquired an imperfect title worthy of judicial
confirmation under the aforecited provision, it is incumbent upon them to prove
that: (a) the land is alienable and (b) their possession and occupation must be
in the manner and for the period prescribed by law.[21] The respondents must prove by means of clear
and convincing evidence that since June 12, 1945 or earlier, they and their
predecessors-in-interest performed acts of dominion as anyone would naturally do
over his property.[22]
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, governs the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. It is clear
under Section 48(b) thereof, which applies exclusively to agricultural lands of
the public domain,[23] that possession is not enough. In order to emphasize the necessity for
actual possession and exclude fictional or constructive possession, Section
48(b) speaks of possession and occupation. As explained by this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba:[24]
The
law speaks of possession and
occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction.[25] (Citations omitted)
It does not matter whether the
applicant for registration has been in possession and occupation only after
June 12, 1945 for the requirements for confirmation of title is deemed complied
with as his predecessors-in-interests possession and occupation that date back
to June 12, 1945 or earlier are tacked to his.
Thus, it is of great importance that there exists well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence that the applicants predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession and occupation of the property sought to be registered since
June 12, 1945.
This Courts review of the records of
this case reveals, rather unfortunately, that Felicianos purported possession
and occupation of the subject property had not been convincingly established to
have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The only evidence that the respondents
were able to present to prove that Feliciano occupied and possessed the subject
property from 1940 until he sold the same to Doroteo in 1952 is the tax
declaration for the year 1947, which bears the note to the effect that realty
tax payments were paid under the same declaration since 1940. This annotation cannot be relied upon in the
absence of an explanation why the tax declarations for the years previous to
1947 cannot be presented. Without the
need for an elaborate extrapolation, this annotation, by itself, is far from
being the credible and competent evidence that the law requires in proving when
possession and occupation actually started.
A tax declaration, much less a tax declaration the existence of which is
proved by means of an annotation, is not a conclusive evidence of ownership, which
is, at best, only a basis for inferring possession.[26] However, inference cannot support a claim of
imperfect title as it is far from the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence
required under prevailing jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, even assuming that
Feliciano had been in possession and occupation of the subject property since
1940, this Court finds that the respondents had not sufficiently demonstrated
that his supposed possession and occupation were of the nature and character
contemplated by law. None of the
witnesses presented by the respondents testified as to what specific acts of
ownership were exercised by Feliciano on the subject property and their general
statements on the matter are mere conclusions of law and do not qualify as
competent evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation.
Alconaba[27] was resolved against the
applicants as their claim of possession and occupation that began in 1940 is
based on unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions. Specifically:
In any
case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and occupation by their
predecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as testified to by Carmencita) or since
1949 (as testified to by Mauricio and declared in respondents' application for
registration) are hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
required in cases of this nature. Proof
of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate their
claim. They cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession. Even granting that the
possession by the respondents' parents commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove
that their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[28]
(Citations omitted)
This Court finds no reason to decide
this case differently. Similar to the
parties in Alconaba, the respondents
failed to account for any act of occupation, development, cultivation or
maintenance over the property done by Feliciano for the length of time that he
was supposedly in possession. The
respondents may have alleged that there are various plants and fruit-bearing
trees on the property but they did not present any proof that these supposed
manifestations of ownership are attributable to Feliciano. Neither the existence of these plants and
trees their numbers unspecified decisively show that the subject property
was actively and regularly cultivated and maintained not merely casually or
occasionally tended to.
The CA and the MTCC clearly erred in
relying on pieces of evidence that are clearly wanting. It is plainly patent and there is no
gainsaying that the respondents failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners from June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Considering
the proven tendency of the courts to be imprudent and their lack of sagacity
when it comes to land registration cases, the advice at circumspection
previously issued by this Court deserves reiteration:
Both
under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. To be granted,
they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would
be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with
favor. It is a basic assumption of our
polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it
retains its rights over the same as dominus.[29] (Citations omitted)
To serve the
ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Constitution, the State
promotes an equitable distribution of alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain to deserving citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration court must, therefore,
exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding an application for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over such lands so that the public
domain may not be raided by unscrupulous land speculators.[30]
(Citation omitted)
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 11, 2010 and
Resolution dated December 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
92125 are SET ASIDE. The respondents application for registration
of Lot No. 14839-B, Cad-355 of the Tagaytay Cadastre is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
|
ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per
Section 12, R.A. 296)
The
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] 489
Phil. 405 (2005).
[10] G.R.
No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
[11] Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[12]
[13] Supra
note 2.
[14] Rollo, pp. 23-27.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] See Mistica v. Republic, G.R. No. 165141,
September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 401, 411, citing Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, March 12, 2008, 548 SCRA 160,
167-168.
[23] See Director of Lands v. Judge Santiago,
243 Phil. 355, 363 (1988).
[24]
471 Phil. 607 (2004).
[25]
[26]
[27] Supra
note 24.
[28]
[29] Santiago v. De los Santos, 158 Phil.
809, 816 (1974).
[30] Supra
note 24, at 613.