Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
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COSMOS
BOTTLING CORP., Petitioner, - versus - WILSON
FERMIN, Respondent. x - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x WILSON B.
FERMIN, Petitioner, - versus - COSMOS
BOTTLING CORPORATION and CECILIA BAUTISTA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 193676 G.R. No. 194303 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 20, 2012 |
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D
E C I S I O N
SERENO,
J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated
cases, namely: (1) Petition for Review dated 26 October 2010 (G.R. No. 193676)
and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 dated 14 October 2010
(G.R. No. 194303).[1]
Both Petitions assail the Decision dated 20 May 2009[2]
and Resolution dated 8 September 2010[3]
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA). The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the
August 31, 2005 Decision and October
21, 2005 Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 043301-05 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Cosmos Bottling
Corporation is, in light of the foregoing discussions, hereby ORDERED to pay Petitioner his full
retirement benefits.
There
being no data from which this Court can properly assess Petitioners full
retirement benefits, the case is, thus, remanded to the Labor Arbiter only for
that purpose.
SO
ORDERED.
Wilson B. Fermin (Fermin) was a forklift
operator at Cosmos Bottling Corporation (COSMOS), where he started his
employment on 27 August 1976.[4]
On 16 December 2002, he was accused of stealing the cellphone of his fellow
employee, Luis Braga (Braga).[5]
Fermin was then given a Show Cause Memorandum, requiring him to explain why the
cellphone was found inside his locker.[6]
In compliance therewith, he submitted an affidavit the following day, explaining
that he only hid the phone as a practical joke and had every intention of
returning it to Braga.[7]
On 21 December 2002, Braga executed a
handwritten narration of events stating the following:[8]
(a)
At around 6:00 a.m. on
16 December 2002, he was changing his clothes inside the locker room, with
Fermin as the only other person present.
(b)
Braga went out of the
locker room and inadvertently left his cellphone by the chair. Fermin was left
inside the room.
(c)
After 10 minutes, Braga
went back to the locker room to retrieve his cellphone, but it was already
gone.
(d)
Braga asked if Fermin saw
the cellphone, but the latter denied noticing it.
(e)
Braga reported the
incident to the security guard, who thereafter conducted an inspection of all
the lockers.
(f)
The security guard
found the cellphone inside Fermins locker.
(g)
Later that afternoon,
Fermin talked to Braga to ask for forgiveness. The latter pardoned the former
and asked him not to do the same to their colleagues.
After conducting an investigation,
COSMOS found Fermin guilty of stealing Bragas phone in violation of company
rules and regulations.[9]
Consequently, on 2 October 2003,[10]
the company terminated Fermin from employment after 27 years of service,[11]
effective on 6 October 2003.[12]
Following the dismissal of Fermin from employment,
Braga executed an affidavit, which stated the belief that the former had merely
pulled a prank without any intention of stealing the cellphone, and withdrew
from COSMOS his complaint against Fermin.[13]
Meanwhile, Fermin filed a Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal,[14]
which the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed for lack of merit on the ground that the
act of taking a fellow employees cellphone amounted to gross misconduct.[15]
Further, the LA likewise took into consideration Fermins other infractions,
namely: (a) committing acts of disrespect to a superior officer, and (b)
sleeping on duty and abandonment of duty.[16]
Fermin filed an appeal with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the ruling of the LA[17]
and denied Fermins subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.[18]
Thereafter, Fermin filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA),[19]
which reversed the rulings of the LA and the NLRC and awarded him his full
retirement benefits.[20]
Although the CA accorded with finality the factual findings of the lower
tribunals as regards Fermins commission of theft, it nevertheless held that
the penalty of dismissal from service was improper on the ground that the said
violation did not amount to serious misconduct or wilful disobedience, to wit:
[COSMOS],
on which the onus of proving lawful
cause in sustaining the dismissal of [Fermin] lies, failed to prove that the
latters misconduct was induced by a perverse and wrongful intent, especially
in the light of Bragas Sinumpaang
Salaysay which corroborated [Fermins] claim that [Fermin] was merely
playing a prank when he hid Bragas cellular phone. Parenthetically, the labor
courts dismissed Bragas affidavit of desistance as a mere afterthought because
the same was executed only after [Fermin] had been terminated.
It must be pointed out, however,
that in labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be
strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the workingman, an
affidavit of desistance gains added importance in the absence of any evidence
on record explicitly showing that the dismissed employee committed the act
which caused the dismissal. While We cannot completely exculpate [Fermin] from
his violation at this point, We cannot, however, turn a blind eye and disregard
Bragas recantation altogether. Bragas recantation all the more bolsters Our
conclusion that [Fermins] violation does not amount to or borders on serious
or willful misconduct or willful disobedience to call for his dismissal.
Morever, [COSMOS] failed to prove
any resultant material damage or prejudice on their part as a consequence of
[Fermins] questioned act. To begin with, the cellular phone subject of the stealth
belonged, not to [COSMOS], but to Braga. Secondly, the said phone was returned
to Braga in due time. Under the circumstances, a penalty such as suspension
without pay would have sufficed to teach [Fermin] a lesson and for him to
realize his wrongdoing.
x
x x x x x x x x
On
another note, [COSMOS], in upholding the legality of [Fermins] termination
from service, considered the latters past infractions with [COSMOS], i.e. threatening, provoking,
challenging, insulting and committing acts of disrespect to a superior
officer/defiance to an instruction and a lawful order of a superior officer;
and, sleeping while on duty and abandonment of duty or leaving assigned post
with permission from immediate supervisor, as aggravating circumstances to his present violation [stealth (sic) of
a co-employees property]. We disagree
with Public Respondent on this matter.
The
correct rule is that previous infractions may be used as justification for an
employees dismissal from work in connection with a subsequent similar offense, which is obviously not
the case here. x x x. [21]
(Emphases in the original.)
COSMOS and Fermin moved for
reconsideration, but the CA likewise denied their motions.[22]
Thus, both parties filed the present Petitions for Review.
COSMOS argues, among other things, that:
(a) Fermin committed a clear act of bad faith and dishonesty in taking the
cellphone of Braga and denying knowledge thereof; (b) the latters recantation
was a mere afterthought; (c) the lack of material damage or prejudice on the part
of COSMOS does not preclude it from imposing the penalty of termination; and (d)
the previous infractions committed by Fermin strengthen the decision of COSMOS
to dismiss him from service.[23]
On the other hand, Fermin contends that
since the CA found that the penalty of dismissal was not proportionate to his
offense, it should have ruled in favor of his entitlement to backwages.[24]
It must be noted that in the case at bar,
all the lower tribunals were in
agreement that Fermins act of taking Bragas cellphone amounted to theft. Factual
findings made by administrative agencies, if established by substantial
evidence as borne out by the records, are final and binding on this Court,
whose jurisdiction is limited to reviewing questions of law.[25]
The only disputed issue left for resolution is whether the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal was appropriate. We rule in the affirmative.
Theft committed against a co-employee is
considered as a case analogous to serious misconduct, for which the penalty of
dismissal from service may be meted out to the erring employee,[26]
viz:
Article 282 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 282. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobendience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representatives in connection with his work;
x x x x x x x x x
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Misconduct involves the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be:
1. of grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant and
2. connected with the work of the employee.
In
this case, petitioner dismissed respondent based on the NBI's finding that the
latter stole and used Yusecos credit cards. But since the theft was not committed against petitioner itself but against
one of its employees, respondent's
misconduct was not work-related and therefore, she could not be dismissed for
serious misconduct.
Nonetheless, Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another in general or in specific detail. For an employee to be validly dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282, the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the employee.
A
cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or
omission attesting to an employees moral depravity. Theft
committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by
substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.[27]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the LA has already made a
factual finding, which was affirmed by both the NLRC and the CA, that Fermin
had committed theft when he took Bragas cellphone. Thus, this act is deemed
analogous to serious misconduct, rendering Fermins dismissal from service just
and valid.
Further, the CA was correct in ruling
that previous infractions may be cited as justification for dismissing an
employee only if they are related to the subsequent offense.[28]
However, it must be noted that such a discussion was unnecessary since the
theft, taken in isolation from Fermins other violations, was in itself a valid
cause for the termination of his employment.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the
award of financial compensation or assistance to an employee validly dismissed
from service has no basis in law. Therefore, considering that Fermins act of
taking the cellphone of his co-employee is a case analogous to serious
misconduct, this Court is constrained to reverse the CAs ruling as regards the
payment of his full retirement benefits. In the same breath, neither can this
Court grant his prayer for backwages.
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 194303 is DENIED, while that in G.R. No. 193676 is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 20 May 2009 and Resolution dated 8
September 2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated 20 August 2004 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE
PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate
Justice |
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BIENVENIDO L.
REYES
Associate
Justice
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Senior
Associate Justice
(Per
Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] Resolution dated 17 November 2010 ordering the
consolidation of G.R. Nos. 193676 and 194303, rollo (G.R. No. 194303), pp. 144-145.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 193676), pp. 7-21; rollo
(G.R. No. 194303), pp. 26-39. Penned by CA Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam
and concurred in by Associate Justices Arturo G. Tayag and Priscilla J.
Baltazar-Padilla.
[3] Rollo (G.R. No. 193676), pp. 22-28; rollo
(G.R. No. 194303), pp. 40-45.
[4] Petition, rollo
(G.R. No. 193676), p. 40; Petition, rollo
(G.R. No. 194303), p. 15.
[5] Petition,
rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 41.
[6] Show Cause Memorandum dated 16 December 2002, rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 149; rollo (G.R. No. 194303), p. 66.
[7] Letter dated 17 December 2002, rollo (G.R. No. 194303), p. 76; rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p.163.
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 172.
[9] Stealing or pilfering the property, records,
documents or other effects of the company, or those of fellow employees or of
other persons within the premises of the Company, including those of company
customers and suppliers, or obtaining such properties, records, documents or
effects in a fraudulent manner. CA Decision, p. 2; rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 9; rollo
(G.R. No. 1984303), p. 27.
[10] The
Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the CA indicate 21 October 2003 as the date
of Fermins dismissal from employment, while the pleadings of the parties refer
to 2 October 2003. See CA Decision,
p. 2, rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 9;
Labor Arbiters Decision, rollo (G.R.
No. 193676), p. 186; Reply for Respondents (COSMOS), rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 157; Petition for Certiorari, rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 247.
[11] CA Decision, p. 2, rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 9; rollo
(G.R. No. 194303), p. 27.
[12] Petition,
rollo (G.R. No. 193676), p. 40;
Petition, rollo (G.R. No. 194303), p.
15; CA Decision, p. 6; rollo (G.R.
No. 193676), p. 13; rollo (G.R. No.
194303), p. 31.
[13] Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 October 2003, rollo (G.R. No. 194303), p. 60.
[14] Rollo (G.R. No. 194303), p. 53.
[15] Decision dated 20 August 2004 penned by Labor
Arbiter Waldo Emerson R. Gan, rollo (G.R.
No. 193676), pp. 184-198; rollo (G.R.
No. 194303), pp. 87-100.
[16] Id.
[17] Decision dated 31 August 2005 penned by Presiding
Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and concurred in by Commissioners Tito F. Genilo
and Romeo C. Lagman, rollo (G.R. No.
193676), pp. 207-213; rollo (G.R. No.
194303), pp. 116-121.
[18] Resolution 21 October 2005, rollo (G.R. No. 193676), pp. 243-244; rollo (G.R. No. 194303), pp. 127-128.
[19] Petition for Certiorari Under Rule 65 dated 5
January 2006, rollo (G.R. No.
193676), pp. 245-257; rollo (G.R. No.
194303), pp. 129-140.
[20] Decision dated 20 May 2009, rollo (G.R. No. 193676), pp. 7-21; rollo (G.R. No. 194303), pp. 26-39.
[21] Decision
dated 20 May 2009, rollo (G.R. No.
193676), pp. 16-17, 19; rollo (G.R.
No. 194303), pp. 34-35, 37.
[22] Resolution dated 8 September 2010, rollo (G.R. No. 193676), pp. 22-28; rollo (G.R. No. 194303), pp. 40-45.
[23] Petition for Review, pp. 6-17, rollo (G.R. No. 193676), pp. 44-55.
[24] Petition for Review on Certiorari Under Rule
45, pp. 7-10, rollo (G.R. No. 194303),
pp. 19-22.
[25] Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission, 524 Phil. 271, 279 (2006).
[26] John Hancock Life Insurance Corporation v.
Davis, G.R. No. 169549, 3
September 2008, 564 SCRA 92.
[27] Id.
at 96-98.
[28] Citing McDonalds (Katipunan Branch) v. Alba, G.R. No. 156382, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA
427, 436-437.