Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST
DIVISION
|
PEOPLE
OF THE Plaintiff -Appellee, - versus - MARCIAL
BAYRANTE Y BOAQUINA, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R.
No. 188978 Present: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
Acting Chairperson, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and PERLAS-BERNABE,** JJ. Promulgated: June
13, 2012 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals
Decision[1]
dated November 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02778, entitled People of the Philippines v. Marcial
Bayrante y Boaquina, which affirmed with modification the Joint Judgment[2]
dated February 7, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch 31 in Criminal Case Nos. P-3286 & P-3287.
The trial court found appellant Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Articles
266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
The
facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed November 11, 2008 Decision of
the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On April 3, 2000, AAA[3]
filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pili, Camarines, two (2)
separate complaints against Accused-Appellant Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina for
the crime of Rape. Finding probable cause that the Accused-Appellant may have
committed the crimes charged, the Presiding Judge of the MTC ordered the filing
of the appropriate Information(s), to which the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor concurred.
Consequently, on September 4, 2002,
two (2) separate Informations were filed before the RTC charging the
Accused-Appellant of two (2) counts of Rape under Art. 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. The Information in Crim. Case
No. P-3286, which was raffled off to Br. 31, reads:
That on or about
8:00 oclock in the evening of February 19, 2002 at Brgy. Old San Roque, Pili,
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with lewd design using force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with his niece [AAA], a 20[-]year[-]old mental retardate whose mental age is 9
to 10 years of age, against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
The
other Information, which was raffled off to Br. 32 of the RTC and docketed as
Crim. Case No. P-3287, is similarly worded as to date, place, the elements of
the crime charged, and the persons involved, except for the time of the
commission of the crime, which is at about
10:00 oclock in the evening of February 19, 2002.
As
the cases involved the same parties, cause of action, and reliefs sought, a
consolidation thereof was decreed. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant, duly
assisted by counsel during the arraignment, pleaded not guilty to both charges.
After the pre-trial, proceedings on the merits ensued.
The Version of
the Prosecution:
AAA testified that at about 8:00
oclock in the evening of February 19, 2002, the Accused-Appellant brought her
to Poblacion, Pili, Camarines Sur, particularly to a house, which she described
to have many rooms. Thereat, the Accused-Appellant undressed her and himself,
laid on top of her, and inserted his penis inside her vagina, during which she
felt pain in her organ. She resisted the Accused-Appellants ravage acts by
kicking him several times, but was overcome with fear because he had a knife
about five (5) inches long. After an hour or so, or at about 9:00 or 10:00
oclock in the same evening, the Accused-Appellant again raped her by
undressing her and inserting his penis into her vagina. Again, she felt pain in
her vagina. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant threatened to kill her if she
told anyone about the incident.
AAA also testified, among others,
that the Accused-Appellant took her away from their house in one (1) evening of
February 2002 when her parents were then already asleep. They walked the
streets and later rode a Palces bus in which no other passengers were on board
as it was already nighttime.
BBB, mother of AAA, stated in open
court that the Accused-Appellant, who had been staying in their house, is AAAs
uncle because the Accused-Appellant and her husband, CCC, are first cousins.
Preliminarily, BBB testified that AAA, who was born on April 16, 1982, attained
an educational level of Grade 6 only because of her low comprehension and that
she cannot even be relied upon to run errands as she can only follow simple
instructions or tasks if well-explained to her. AAA is unlike any normal child
because she cries and scampers away when there are visitors around; she has
never attended any party, dance events, or any social gathering; and had poor
grades in school.
BBB also testified that the
Accused-Appellant disappeared in the evening of February 14, 2002, together
with her daughter, AAA. She and CCC looked for their whereabouts, but located
them only on February 20, 2002, in Poblacion, Pili, Camarines
At home, BBB interviewed her
daughter as to where the Accused-Appellant brought her, to which AAA replied
that she was brought to a certain place in Pili, Camarines Sur, where the
Accused-Appellant raped her twice and threatened to kill her if she told anyone
about the incident. Upon learning the same, she brought AAA to Dr. Pablo B.
Filio, Jr. (Dr. Filio) on the following day for a physical examination and,
thereafter, to Dr. Imelda Escuadra (Dr. Escuadra) for further check-up.
Dr. Escuadra, a Medical Specialist
II at the
Dr. Filio, an Assistant City Health
Officer in
Finally, Carlos Bayrante, an uncle
of the Accused-Appellant, corroborated BBBs testimony that at about 7:00
oclock in the morning of February 20, 2002, they saw AAA and the
Accused-Appellant together. He wondered why the two (2) were together, but he
did not bother to ask anyway.
The Version of
the Defense:
The
Accused-Appellant testified that he and CCC are cousins and that he stayed in
the house of the latter and his [CCCs] family since October 2001 to help in
lumber-cutting. He denied forcing AAA into a relationship with him and added
that during his stay with CCCs family, he courted a female neighbor with whom
AAA later quarreled because [AAA] had feelings for him. He dissuaded her at
first, but AAA threatened to commit suicide if they do not become sweethearts.
He even consulted a friend for he entertained the idea that AAA might actually
carry out her threat to commit suicide. Also, on one occasion, AAA went inside
his bedroom and suggested that they should leave the place since her parents
will not approve of their relationship.
The Accused-Appellant further
testified that on or about February 9, 2002, he and AAA left the house, stopped
by at Baao and proceeded to Pili, Camarines Sur at about 5:00 or 6:00 oclock
the following morning. They first went to his friends house where AAA changed
her clothes and, later, to his uncles house in Minalabac, Camarines Sur, where
he left AAA because he had to go back to Baao to get his own clothes. He
returned to his uncles house in the afternoon of the same day and stayed there
with AAA for five (5) more days. While in Manapao, AAA suggested that they go
to the office of the Barangay Captain to execute an affidavit to the effect
that AAAs act of going with him was voluntary.
The Accused-Appellant further
testified that he and AAA went to Old San Roque when they learned that the
latters parents were looking for them. They checked in at El Alma Hotel in
Pili, Camarines Sur, where they spent the night and checked out of the
following morning on February 20, 2002. In the said morning, however, when they
went to the house of his cousin, William Raon (Raon), to pick up their
personal belongings, AAAs parents were there.
Marilyn Mendoza (
Raon, a Barangay Tanod in Old San
Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, testified that at about 6:30 in the morning of
February 19, 2002, he was in front of the store of his relative in Old San
Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, when the Accused-Appellant arrived together with a
woman (referring to AAA). He noticed that when the Accused-Appellant left some
things in the store, the latters right arm was placed on AAAs shoulder. When
he saw them again at about 5:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, in
front of the public market, the Accused-Appellants right arm was lazing on the
womans shoulder while the latter were leaning on the Accused-Appellants
shoulder. At around 7:00 oclock in the morning of even date, BBB and her
husband CCC approached him and sought his help in apprehending the
Accused-Appellant on the allegation that the latter raped their daughter. As
the Accused-Appellant was only about ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters away from
him, he called the former and told him to place his hands on his head. He then
conducted a body search, and thereafter, brought him to the police station in
Pili, Camarines Sur, for an investigation. The woman, who was with the
Accused-Appellant at the time, said that she will go with him at the police
station because they love each other.
Barangay Captain Zenaida Regis
(Brgy. Capt. Regis) of Barangay Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, testified that
on February 19, 2002, the Accused-Appellant, together with AAA, came to her
office requesting the preparation of an affidavit to the effect that AAA
voluntarily went with the Accused-Appellant. While interviewing AAA, Brgy.
Capt. Regis noticed that it took some time for AAA to answer the question of
whether or not she was forced to go with the Accused-Appellant. She qualified,
however, that AAA finally answered in the negative.[4] (Citations
omitted.)
After due proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. P-3286
and P-3287, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape that were charged against him. We quote the dispositive portion of the trial
courts Joint Judgment dated February 7, 2007 here:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused for TWO
(2) Counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
for each count. To pay [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count, or in the total amount of P250,000.00.
With
cost de oficio.[5]
Unperturbed, appellant elevated his
case to the Court of Appeals but the trial courts ruling was merely affirmed
with modification by the appellate court in its Decision dated November 11,
2008. The appellate court disallowed the
award of exemplary damages for the reason that the same may be awarded only
when one or more aggravating circumstances exist and that no such circumstance
is present in the case at bar. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) as
exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.[6]
Thus, appellant interposed this
appeal before this Court. He merely adopted
his Appellants Brief with the Court of Appeals and no longer filed a supplemental
brief on the belief that the Appellants Brief had adequately discussed all
matters that are pertinent to his defense. In the present appeal, he put forth a single
assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHOSE GUILT HAS NOT BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[7]
In his Brief, appellant maintains that AAA was his
lover and that she voluntarily eloped with him as evidenced by the affidavit she
signed before Brgy. Capt. Regis. Furthermore,
appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish the mental state of
AAA which is crucial to the charge that he raped a woman who is of the legal
age but otherwise deprived of reason. In
other words, he asserts that the prosecution was not able to prove that AAA
suffers from mental retardation. For
these reasons, appellant urges this Court to exculpate him from guilt.
We are not persuaded.
The provision of law pertinent in this
case is Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is
committed
1.
By
a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a.
Through
force, threat or intimidation;
b.
When
the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c.
By
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d.
When
the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
2.
By
any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is settled in jurisprudence that, under the
foregoing provision of law, carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency
is considered rape because such a person is not capable of giving consent to a
sexual act.[8] In
a recent case, we had declared that in cases of rape involving a victim
suffering from mental retardation, proof of force or intimidation is not
necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual
congress between the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of
the victim.[9]
Previously in People
v. Dalandas,[10]
we described in detail the nature of mental retardation as well as its
different degrees as defined in the modern and the old intelligence quotient
(IQ) scales:
Mental
retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and
characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by standardized
tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily demands of the
individuals own social environment. Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a
slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired
learning capacity.
Although
mental retardation is often used interchangeably with mental deficiency,
the latter term is usually reserved for those without recognizable brain
pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their level of
intellectual function are illustrated, thus:
Mental Retardation
LEVEL DESCRIPTION
TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT
(IQ
RANGE)
I
Profound Below
20
II Severe 20-35
III Moderate 36-52
IV Mild 53-68
A normal mind is one which in
strength and capacity ranks reasonably well with the average of the great body
of men and women who make up organized human society in general, and are by
common consent recognized as sane and competent to perform the ordinary duties
and assume the ordinary responsibilities of life.
The traditional but now obsolescent
terms applied to those degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0-19, and a
maximum intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average
two-year old child; (b) imbecile by
an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent
to that of the average seven-year old child; (c) moron or feebleminded,
having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life
equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and
psychologists apply the term borderline intelligence to those with IQ between
70 to 89. In People v. Palma, we
ruled that a person is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female
who was suffering from a borderline mental deficiency.[11]
In the case at bar, the undisputed expert testimony
of Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a Medical Specialist II and officer-in-charge of the
Women and Children Protection Unit at the
In an attempt to discredit Dr. Escuadras testimony,
appellant argued that Dr. Escuadra admitted that the psychological test result
was only furnished to her by the psychologist who conducted AAAs psychological
exam and that the said psychologist was not presented in court.[13] We find this argument unmeritorious. What was clear from Dr. Escuadras testimony
was that her psychiatric evaluation yielded the same diagnosis as the
psychological examination with respect to the victims mental retardation.[14]
The presentation of the psychologist who conducted the psychological
examination could be dispensed with as the same would have merely been
corroborative.
In any event, notwithstanding the fact that the
determination of mental retardation is deeply rooted in medical psychology, we
had previously ruled that evidence other than a psychometric evaluation can
prove mental retardation or abnormality.[15]
Furthermore, we held that mental
retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence,
such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation of the trial court.[16]
We find no error on the part of the
Court of Appeals when it likewise gave weight to the testimony of BBB (AAAs
mother) regarding AAAs difficulties in school due to low comprehension and
failure to complete even simple chores.[17]
Even assuming purely for the sake of
argument that the mental retardation of the victim was not proven, we likewise
uphold the appellate court in finding that AAAs testimony adequately showed how
appellant utilized force and intimidation to succeed in having carnal knowledge
with her. AAA testified that she initially
resisted appellants carnal desire but was eventually overcome by the latter because
he used a knife to threaten her. At one
point in her testimony, AAA could not continue with her narration of the events
that transpired during the alleged rape incidents as she was overwhelmed by
emotion, even weeping on the witness stand. Consequently, it was necessary for the
trial court to call a recess in order to give AAA the chance to collect herself.
These were evident in the following
excerpts from the court transcript:
Pros. Solano:
Q Miss
Witness, sometime on February 19, 2002 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening do
you recall where were you?
A I was at
Centro Pili, sir.
Q You are
referring to Pili, Camarines Sur?
A Yes, sir.
Q Particularly
where in Pili, Camarines Sur were you at that time?
A In the
house.
Q Why were you
in that house located at Pili, Camarines Sur on that particular date and time?
A I was
brought there by Marcial.
Q When you
said Marcial you are referring to Marcial the accused in these two (2) cases?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way,
have you gone to El Alma Hotel?
Atty. Obias:
No basis, your honor.
Pros. Solano:
Preliminary, your honor.
Court:
Reform.
Pros. Solano:
Q As you were
there as you said tell us what happened?
A I was
undressed.
Q By whom?
A By Marcial,
sir.
Q After you
were undressed by Marcial, tell us what happened?
A He got on
top of me, sir.
Q After
Marcial Bayrante got on top of you as you said tell us what happened next?
Pros. Solano:
I will withdraw that question.
Pros. Solano:
Q What
happened to Marcial Bayrante when you were already undressed, what did he do,
if any?
A He also
undressed himself, sir.
Q After
Marcial Bayrante undressed himself as you said, what next happened?
A (At this
juncture, the witness is crying.)
Court:
Q Why are you
crying?
A Because I
remembered what he did to me, your honor.
Q And so tell
us what did he do to you, the accused in this case?
A (No answer.)
Court:
Continue.
Pros. Solano:
Q You
testified earlier that you were undressed by the accused and he himself
undressed also and so what happened to his penis and your vagina, if any?
A (No answer.)
Atty. Obias:
Maybe, your honor we can suspend the
proceedings.
Court:
To give the private complainant
witness to regain composure as she is crying and cannot answer to the question
of the public prosecutor, the hearing is suspended for ten (10) minutes after
which we will resume the hearing of the same.
Hearing resumed
at 10:00 in the morning.
Pros. Solano:
Q Miss
witness, you testified that accused undressed you and after he undressed you he
also undressed himself, what happened next, if any?
A He inserted
his penis to my vagina.
Q So what did
you feel, if any?
A I felt
painful.
Q Now, at
about 10:00 oclock of the same night, February 19, 2002, where were you at
that time?
A I was still
at the house, sir.
Q Tell us what
happened, if any?
A Again, I was
undressed by accused.
Q After you were undressed again by the accused as
you said, what else happened, if any?
A Again he
inserted his penis to my vagina.
Q Again, what
did you feel?
A It was
painful, sir.
Q If you can
estimate the penis of the accused inserted to your vagina on February 19, 2002
at Pili, Camarines Sur as you can estimate these two (2) insertion was made by
the accused?
A (No answer.)
Q Now, after
the accused inserted his penis to your vagina at 8:00 oclock on February 19,
2002 in that house, what happened as you said was painful?
A I got
pregnant, sir.
Q And what
happened to your pregnancy?
A And so I
gave birth to a baby girl.
Q Do you know
the name?
A Yes sir,
Jose.
Court:
Q Where is now
the child?
A He died.
Q When did
your child died?
A Right after
my delivery, your honor.
Court:
Continue.
Pros. Solano:
Q Do you have
any death certificate?
A Yes sir, I
have. (At this juncture, the witness is producing her birth certificate.)
Q And so, as
far as you can recall miss witness during these two (2) incidents that the
penis of the accused inserted to your vagina, did you not resist?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what
happened to your resistance?
A I was
afraid.
Q Why were you
afraid?
A Because he
had with him a knife.
Q What kind of
knife, how long was it?
A (At this
juncture, the witness is demonstrating the length of the knife which is about
five (5) inches long including the handle.)
Court:
Q You said
that you resisted how did you resist?
A (No answer.)
Q You said
that when the accused inserted his penis to your vagina, how were you resisted?
A I was
kicking at him, your honor.
Q Was he hit
when you kicked him?
A Yes, your
honor.
Q How many
times did you kick him?
A Many times,
your honor.
x x x x
Court:
Q You said
that you were raped, do you recall where was that house where you were brought
by the accused located?
A There at
Pili, Camarines
Q Do you know
who owns that house?
A No, your
honor.
Q Can you
describe that house?
A Plenty of
rooms, your honor.
Q Does it has
name?
A I was not
able to see, your honor.
Q And you said
you bore a child that died right after you gave birth tell us the father of
your child?
A (At this
juncture, the witness is pointing to a man who when asked his name responded as
Marcial Bayrante.)[18]
In People
v. Manjares,[19] we reiterated the basic principles
that:
In
a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of
cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. x x
x.
That the victim suffers from a mental abnormality or
deficiency would not detract from the reliability of her testimony. We observed in a similar case that:
While
it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental retardate may be
difficult to determine, still, it can be ascertained by deducing from the
manner she testifies in court as to the surrounding facts of the crime
committed. For as long as her testimony is straightforward, candid and unflawed
by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, and her demeanor
is consistent with one who has been a victim of rape, bolsters her credibility
with the verity born[e] out of human nature and experience, thus, must be given
full faith and credit.
Moreover,
mental retardation per se does not
affect credibility. A mentally retarded [person] may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the
manner she can make them known to the court.[20]
In People v.
Arpon,[21] we
discussed the jurisprudential principle of affording great respect and even
finality to the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses:
Time and again, the Court has held
that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve
great respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the
advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her
"furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath"
are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and
sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are
telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which,
if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [Court
of Appeals].[22]
We
further agree with the Court of Appeals that AAAs emotional outburst on the
witness stand strengthens the trustworthiness of her testimony. According to jurisprudence, the crying of a
victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge
with the verity borne out of human nature and experience.[23]
In
a seemingly desperate effort to secure an acquittal, appellant maintains that
the alleged rape could not have occurred because both he and AAA were lovers. In other words, he proffers the sweetheart
theory as a defense but his assertion is bereft of substantial proof. The appellate court did not err in finding that
the testimony of the witnesses presented by appellant utterly failed to satisfactorily
prove the alleged romantic relationship.
Witness
Marilyn Mendozas testimony revealed that it was only appellant who claimed
that AAA was his sweetheart and that AAA never spoke to her much less told her
that both she and appellant were romantically involved with each other.[24]
Likewise, witness William Raons
testimony is afflicted with the same infirmity. He merely averred that he saw appellants arm
on AAAs shoulder and from that fact assumed that they had a relationship. Still he admitted in open court that he had no
personal knowledge of the purported love affair between appellant and AAA.[25]
Neither
could the purported affidavit signed by AAA before Brgy. Captain Regis be
relied upon by appellant. All that the
affidavit stated was that AAA voluntarily went with [appellant][26]
but such statement does not preclude that any sexual relation between them was
not consensual. Moreover, given AAAs mental state, it was highly doubtful that
she understood the significance of the affidavit that she signed or that she
signed it voluntarily. We note, too, Brgy.
Captain Regiss testimony that (a) it was appellant who insisted on the
execution of the affidavit[27]
and (b) the reason AAA was asked to sign the affidavit was so that appellant
would have no responsibility or liability as regards AAA.[28]
We
have previously held that:
For the [sweetheart]
theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship must be proven by
convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his
claim to be self-serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the
Court, there should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a
substantiation by tokens of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts,
pictures and the like.[29]
Significantly,
this Court has decreed that even if the alleged romantic relationship were
true, this fact does not necessarily negate rape for a man cannot demand sexual
gratification from a fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext
of love because love is not a license for lust.[30]
As
to the civil liability, we affirm the trial courts award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages for each count of simple rape that appellant had been proven
to have committed. However, we disagree
with the Court of Appeals decision to delete the trial courts award of
exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
In
consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary
damages are awarded in order to set a public example and to protect hapless individuals
from sexual molestation, we agree with the trial court regarding the propriety
of the award of exemplary damages but increased the same from Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 11,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02778 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) Appellant
Marcial Bayrante is ordered to pay Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages for each count of SIMPLE RAPE, and
(2) Appellant
Marcial Bayrante is further ordered to pay the private offended party interest
on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson, First Division
WE CONCUR:
Associate
Justice
|
MARIANO C. Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
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ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate
Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
* Per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.
** Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-22; penned
by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with Associate Justices Edgardo P.
Cruz and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 20-29.
[3] In compliance with the rulings of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419) and People v. Ching (G.R. No. 177150, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 117), applying provisions of Republic Act No. 7610, Republic Act No. 9262 and the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children (A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC), the Court of Appeals withheld the real names of the victim and members of her immediate family and replaced them with initials.
[4] Rollo, pp. 3-11.
[5] CA rollo, p. 29.
[6] Rollo, p. 21.
[7] CA
rollo, p. 50.
[8] People v. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011.
[9]
[10] 442 Phil. 688 (2002).
[11]
[12] TSN,
August 8, 2003.
[13] CA
rollo, p. 60.
[14] TSN,
August 8, 2003, p. 6.
[15] People v. Almacin, 363 Phil. 18, 28 (1999).
[16] People v. Dumanon, 401 Phil. 658,
669-670 (2000).
[17] Rollo, p. 14.
[18] TSN,
March 16, 2004, pp. 6-13.
[19] G.R. No. 185844, November 23, 2011, citing People v. Felan, G.R. No. 176631, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 449, 452 and People v. Bongat, G.R. No. 184170, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 496, 505-506.
[20] People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 188855, December
8, 2010, 637 SCRA 672, 685.
[21] G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011, citing People v. Condes, G.R. No. 187077, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 312, 322-323.
[22]
[23] People v. Atadero, G.R. No. 183455,
October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 327, 342.
[24] TSN,
June 29, 2006, pp. 16-20.
[25] TSN,
May 6, 2005, pp. 14-16.
[26] CA rollo, p. 69.
[27] TSN, August 16, 2005, pp. 9 and 16.
[28]
[29] People v. Dahilig, G.R. No. 187083, June
13, 2011, 651 SCRA 778, 788.
[30] People v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 176740, June
22, 2011, 652 SCRA 535, 548.
[31] See
People v. De la Paz, G.R. No. 182412, November 28, 2011; People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 185206,
August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 437, 450.