Republic of the
Supreme
Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent. |
G. R. No. 187512 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 13, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
This
is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January
2009[1]
and 3 April 2009[2] issued
by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent
spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda)
met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics
company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married
at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth
of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric
Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda
claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he
had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a
Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to
Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision
declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had
failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her
well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29
June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the
case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction
over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding,
in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate
court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[3]
the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41
of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion
was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.[4]
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues
1.
Whether the CA seriously erred in
dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2.
Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming
the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under
Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented
Our
Ruling
1.
On whether the
CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision
of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary
appeal
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009,
the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[5]
the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for
the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family
Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The
decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to
question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code,
an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage
under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for
under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary
Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238
and 247, which provide:
Art. 238. Until
modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply
in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings.
Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to
technical rules.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.
Further, Article 253 of the Family
Code reads:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3
hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the
Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death
is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately
final and executory.
In
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[6]
the Republic likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of
respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse.
The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice
of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary
Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are immediately
final and executory.
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to
set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar,
let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous
for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course
thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and
should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban,
who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG
should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition
for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by
the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic
v. Jomoc,[7] issued
a few months later.
In Jomoc, the
RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her
absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the
RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the
Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under
the Rules of Court,[8] a
record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings
cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court
clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule
72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since
its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage,
petitioners action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family
Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering
that this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was
not required to file a record on
appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics
argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded
our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino.
As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court
in Jomoc did not expound on the
characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino
expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal
as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding
for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended
to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the
bar.
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:[9]
This
case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine
our previous decisions thereon.
Article
238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the
Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this
Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In
turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules
in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3
hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In
plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory.
By
express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows
that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41
of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with
the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of
the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering
judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate
the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in
dismissing the Republics Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment
on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was
immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2.
On whether the
CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence
that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the
ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a
well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly
required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco,[10]
United States v. Biasbas[11]
and Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Alegro[12]
as authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco,
petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the RTCs
grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his
absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon
after giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working
as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the
ground that respondent was not able to establish
his well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead, as required by
Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this
provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil
Code.[13]
The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the
absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be
dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code
provision prescribes a well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead
before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted
by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for
four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been
able to prove the existence of a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
is already dead, the Court in Nolasco
cited United States v. Biasbas,[14]
which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required in searching for
a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise
due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering
his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the
only basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of
the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not
been able to prove a well-founded belief that his spouse was already dead.
The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following
criteria for determining the existence of a well-founded belief under Article
41 of the Family Code:
For
the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The
spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define
what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that es menester que su creencia sea firme se
funde en motivos racionales.
Belief
is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may
be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in
a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits,
conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control
the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it
tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions, competence [sic] evidence on
the ultimate question of his death.
The
belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether
or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes
omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present
case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent
search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony.
In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.
Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the
Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end,
but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken.
Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on
the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her well-founded
belief that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition
to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled in law than that when
a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law.[15]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23
January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.
A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L.
REYES
Associate
Justice
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1]Rollo, pp. 30-33. The Court of Appeals
Fifth Division Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 was penned by Justice Remedios
A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and
Normandie B. Pizarro.
[2] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[3]489 Phil. 761 (2005).
[4] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[5]Supra note 3.
[6] Supra note 3.
[7] 497 Phil. 528 (2005).
[8] The case cited Rule 41, Sec.
2(a), which reads:
SEC.
2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal.The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record -on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Underscoring supplied.)
[9] G.R. No. 161062, 31 July 2009,
594 SCRA 560.
[10] G.R. No. 94053, 17 March 1993,
220 SCRA 20.
[11] 25 Phil. 71 (1913).
[12] 513 Phil. 391
(2005).
[13] Art.
83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
[14] The case originated from a
bigamy suit against defendant Biasbas, whose defense was that he contracted a
second marriage on the good faith belief that his first wife was already dead.
[15] Chan-Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, 25 February 2010, 613 SCRA 592.