Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND
DIVISION
|
SALVADOR O. MOJAR, EDGAR B. BEGONIA, Heirs of the late JOSE M.
CORTEZ, RESTITUTO GADDI, VIRGILIO M. MONANA, FREDDIE RANCES, and EDSON D.
TOMAS, Petitioners, - versus - AGRO
COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC., et
al.,[1] Respondents. |
G. R. No. 187188 Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson,
BRION, PEREZ,
SERENO,
and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: June
27, 2012 |
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D E
C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the entire
proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102201, in which
it issued its Decision dated 21 July 2008 and Resolution dated 16 March 2009.[2]
Statement of
Facts and of the Case
Petitioners
were employed as security guards by respondent and assigned to the various
branches of the Bank of Commerce in Pangasinan, La Union and Ilocos Sur.
In separate Office Orders dated 23 and
24 May 2002, petitioners were relieved from their respective posts and directed
to report to their new assignments in Metro Manila effective 3 June 2002. They,
however, failed to report for duty in their new assignments, prompting respondent
to send them a letter dated 18 June 2002. It required a written explanation why
no disciplinary action should be taken against them, but the letter was not
heeded.
On 15 February 2005, petitioners filed
a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent and the Bank of Commerce,
Dagupan Branch, before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioners
claimed, among others, that their reassignment was a scheme to sever the
employer-employee relationship and was done in retaliation for their pressing
their claim for salary differential, which they had earlier filed against
respondent and the Bank of Commerce before the NLRC. They also contended that
the transfer to Manila was inconvenient and prejudicial, since they would incur
additional expenses for board and lodging.
On 22 May 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
rendered a Decision[3] finding that petitioners
were illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to
reinstate all the complainants to their former assignment in Pangasinan with
full backwages and if reinstatement is no longer possible, to pay separation
pay of one month for every year of service each of the seven complainant
security guards. (A detailed computation
of the judgment award is attached as Annex A.)[4] (Italicized in the
original)
On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LAs ruling, with the modification that the Complaint
against the Bank of Commerce was dismissed.[5] The
dispositive portion provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of Agro
Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc. is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Appeal of Bank of Commerce is GRANTED for being impressed with merit.
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated May 22, 2006 by DISMISSING the complaint against Bank of
Commerce-Dagupan. All other dispositions of the Labor Arbiter not so modified,
STAYS.[6]
On
23 January 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Extension to file a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA. In a Resolution dated 20 February 2008, the latter
granted the Motion for Extension, allowing respondent until 10 February 2008
within which to file its Petition. On 9 February 2008, respondent filed its
Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court.
On
30 June 2008, the CA issued a Resolution noting that no comment on the Petition
had been filed, and stating that the case was now deemed submitted for
resolution.
On
21 July 2008, the CA rendered its Decision. Finding merit in the Petition, it found
the Orders transferring petitioners to Manila to be a valid exercise of
management prerogative. The records were bereft of any showing that the subject
transfer involved a diminution of rank or salaries. Further, there was no
showing of bad faith or ill motive on the part of the employer. Thus,
petitioners refusal to comply with the transfer orders constituted willful
disobedience of a lawful order of an employer and abandonment, which were just
causes for termination under the Labor Code. However, respondent failed to
observe the due process requirements in terminating them. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the NLRC dated July 31, 2007 and October 31, 2007[,]
respectively, in NLRC NCR CA No. 046036-05 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaints of private respondents for illegal dismissal are hereby DISMISSED. However, petitioner is
ordered to pay private respondents the sum of ₱10,000.00 each for having
violated the latters right to statutory due process.[7]
On
1 August 2008, petitioner Mojar filed a Manifestation[8]
before the CA, stating that he and the other petitioners had not been served a
copy of the CA Petition. He also said that they were not aware whether their
counsel before the NLRC, Atty. Jose C. Espinas, was served a copy thereof,
since the latter had already been bedridden since December 2007 until his demise
on 25 February 2008.[9]
Neither could their new counsel, Atty. Mario G. Aglipay, enter his appearance
before the CA, as petitioners failed to get [the] folder from the office of
Atty. Espinas, as the folder can no longer be found.[10]
Thereafter,
petitioners filed a Motion to Annul Proceedings[11] dated
9 September 2008 before the CA. They moved to annul the proceedings on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that the NLRC Decision had already
attained finality, since the Petition before the CA was belatedly filed, and the
signatory to the Certification of non-forum shopping lacked the proper
authority.
In a
Resolution dated 16 March 2009, the CA denied the Motion to Annul Proceedings.
Hence,
this Petition.
The Petition raised the following arguments: (1) There was
no proof of service attached to the Motion for Extension to file a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA; thus, both the Motion and the Petition were mere
scraps of paper. (2) Respondent purposely intended to exclude petitioners from
the proceedings before the CA by omitting their actual addresses in the CA
Petition, a mandatory requirement under Section 3, Rule 46; in relation to
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Further, respondent failed to prove
the valid service of its CA Petition upon petitioners former counsel of
record. (3) The CA was grossly ignorant of the law in ignoring jurisprudence,
which states that when the floating status of an employee lasts for more than six
months, the latter may be considered to have been constructively dismissed.
On
3 September 2009, respondent filed its Comment on the Petition, pursuant to
this Courts 29 June 2009 Resolution. In its Comment, it argued that the CA
Decision had already become final and executory, inasmuch as the Motion to
Annul Proceedings, a procedural approach not provided for in the Rules, was
filed some 44 days after the service of the CA Decision on the counsel for
petitioners. Further, Atty. Aglipay had then no legal standing to appear as
counsel, considering that there was still no substitution of counsel at the
time he filed the Motion to Annul Proceedings. In any case, petitioners are
bound by the actions of their counsel, Atty. Espinas.
On
1 March 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring petitioners to file
their reply, which petitioners complied with on 26 April 2010. In their Reply,
petitioners state among others that the records of the CA case showed that
there was a deliberate violation of their right to due process. The CA Petition
did not contain the required affidavit of service, which alone should have
caused the motu proprio dismissal
thereof. Further, the instant Petition before this Court is an appropriate mode
to contest the CA Decision and Resolution, which petitioners contend are void
judgments. They also argue that there is no rule on the clients substitution
in case of the death of counsel. Instead, the reglementary period to file
pleadings in that case must be suspended and made more lenient, considering
that the duty of substitution is transferred to a non-lawyer.
On
30 March 2011, respondent filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case.
Petitioners likewise filed a Motion for Leave (For the Admission of the Instant
Comment on Private Respondents Motion for Early Resolution), stating that they
were joining respondent in moving for the early resolution of the case.
This Court will resolve the issues raised
in seriatim.
Actual
Addresses of Parties
Petitioners
contend that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the Petition before it,
as their actual addresses were not indicated therein as required under Section
3, Rule 46[12] of the Rules of Court,
and pursuant to Cendaa v. Avila.[13]
In the 2008 case Cendaa, this Court
ruled that the requirement that a petition for certiorari must contain the actual addresses of all the
petitioners and the respondents is mandatory. The failure to comply with that requirement
is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of a petition.
This
rule, however, is not absolute. In the 2011 case Santos v. Litton Mills Incorporated,[14]
this Court ruled that where the petitioner clearly mentioned that the parties
may be served with the courts notices or processes through their respective
counsels, whose addresses have been clearly specified as in this case, this act
would constitute substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3,
Rule 46. The Court further observed that the notice required by law is notice
to counsel if the party has already appeared by counsel, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
In
its Petition before the CA, respondent clearly indicated the following:
THE PARTIES
2.0. The petitioner AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE
AGENCY, INC. (hereafter petitioner AGRO), is a corporation existing under
Philippine laws, and may be served with process thru counsel, at his address
hereunder indicated; private respondents (1) SALVADOR O. MOJAR; (2) EDGAR B.
BEGONIA; (3) JOSE M. CORTEZ; (4) FREDDIE RANCES; (5) VIRGILIO MONANA; (6) RESTITUTU
[sic] GADDI; and, (7) EDSON D. TOMAS,
are all of age, and during the material period, were in the employ of petitioner
AGRO as security guards; said respondents may be served with process thru their
common counsel, ATTY. JOSE C. ESPINAS at No. 51 Scout Tuazon, Quezon City; on
the other hand, respondent National Labor Relations Commission, 1st
Division, Quezon City, is the agency having jurisdiction over labor disputes in
the Philippines and may be served with process at offices in Quezon City;[15]
The
foregoing may thus be considered as substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule
46. In any case, and as will be discussed further below, the CA had sufficient
reason to take cognizance of the Petition.
Affidavit of
Service
Section
3, Rule 46 provides that the petition for certiorari should be filed together
with the proof of service thereof on the respondent. Under Section 13, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court, if service is made by registered mail, as in this case,
proof shall be made by an affidavit of the person mailing and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office. Section 3, Rule 46 further provides that
the failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition.
Petitioners
allege that no affidavit of service was attached to the CA Petition. Neither is
there any in the copy of the CA Petition attached to the instant Petition. In
its Comment, respondent claims that petitioners through their counsel, Atty.
Aglipay can be charged with knowledge of the pendency of the CA Petition. It
says that on April 2008, Atty. Aglipay filed before the NLRC an Entry of
Appearance and Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.[16] However,
petitioners merely indicated therein that they were respectfully mov[ing] for
the execution pending appeal of the Labor Arbiters decision dated 22 May 2006
affirmed by the NLRC.[17]
There was no indication that they had been served a copy of the CA Petition. No
other proof was presented by respondent to show petitioners actual receipt of
the CA Petition. In any case, this knowledge, even if presumed, would not and
could not take the place of actual service and proof of service by
respondent.
In
Ferrer v. Villanueva,[18]
petitioner therein failed to append the proof of service to his Petition for Certiorari.
Holding that this failure was a fatal defect, the Court stated:
There is no question that petitioner herein was remiss
in complying with the foregoing Rule. In Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that with respect to motions, proof of service is a mandatory requirement.
We find no cogent reason why this dictum should not apply and with more reason
to a petition for certiorari, in view of Section 3, Rule 46 which requires that
the petition shall be filed together
with proof of service thereof. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
lack of proof of service is a fatal defect. The utter disregard of the Rule
cannot be justified by harking to substantial justice and the policy of liberal
construction of the Rules. Technical rules of procedure are not meant to
frustrate the ends of justice. Rather, they serve to effect the proper and
orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets. (Emphasis in the original)
Indeed,
while an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has been
made on the other party, it is nonetheless essential to due process and the
orderly administration of justice.[19]
Be
that as it may, it does not escape the attention of this Court that in the CA
Resolution dated 16 March 2009, the appellate court stated that their records
revealed that Atty. Espinas, petitioners counsel of record at the time, was
duly served a copy of the following: CA Resolution dated 20 February 2008
granting respondents Motion for Extension of Time to file the CA Petition; CA
Resolution dated 24 April 2008 requiring petitioners to file their Comment on
the CA Petition; and CA Resolution dated 30 June 2008, submitting the case for
resolution, as no comment was filed.
Such
service to Atty. Espinas, as petitioners counsel of record, was valid despite
the fact he was already deceased at the time. If a party to a case has appeared
by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel
or one of them, unless service upon the party is specifically ordered by the
court. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a
case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants
continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its
associates are still connected with the firm.[20]
It
is the duty of party-litigants to be in contact with their counsel from time to
time in order to be informed of the progress of their case. It is likewise the
duty of parties to inform the court of the fact of their counsels death.[21]
Their failure to do so means that they have been negligent in the protection of
their cause.[22] They cannot pass the
blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the
circumstances of the parties and their counsel.
Substitution
of Counsel
Petitioners
claim that Atty. Espinas passed away on 8 February 2008. They further claim
that he was already bedridden as early as December 2007, and thus they failed
to get any information whether [he] was served with a copy of the [CA
Petition].[23]
Petitioners
were negligent in the conduct of their litigation. Having known that Atty.
Espinas was already bedridden as early as December 2007, they should have
already obtained new counsel who could adequately represent their interests.
The excuse that Atty. Aglipay could not enter his appearance before the CA because
[petitioners] failed to get [their] folder from the office of Atty. Espinas[24]
is flimsy at best.
The
requirements for a valid substitution of counsel have been jurisprudentially
settled in this wise:
Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
established jurisprudence, a valid substitution of counsel has the following
requirements: (1) the filing of a written application for substitution; (2) the
client's written consent; (3) the consent of the substituted lawyer if such
consent can be obtained; and, in case such written consent cannot be procured,
(4) a proof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be
substituted in the manner required by the Rules. Where death of the previous
attorney is the cause of substitution of the counsel, a verified proof of the
death of such attorney (usually a death certificate) must accompany the notice
of appearance of the new counsel.[25]
The fact
that petitioners were unable to obtain their folder from Atty. Espinas is
immaterial. Proof of service upon the lawyer to be substituted will suffice
where the lawyers consent cannot be obtained. With respect to the records of
the case, these may easily be reconstituted by obtaining copies thereof from the
various courts involved.
Petitioners
allegedly went to the CA sometime prior to 31 July 2008, or the date of filing
of their Manifestation before the CA, to inquire about the status of their
case. Allegedly, they always visited the Court of Appeals for [the]
development of their case.[26] It
is doubtful that a person who regularly follows up the status of his case
before a court would not be told, first, that a petition has been filed against
him; and, second, that the courts resolutions have been sent to his counsel. It
is questionable why, knowing these matters, petitioners did not seek the
replacement of their counsel, if the latter was unable to pursue their case.
Further, despite their manifestation that, sometime prior to 31 July 2008, they
were already aware that the case had been submitted for resolution, they still waited
until 9 September 2008 or until they allegedly had knowledge of the CA
Decision before they filed the Motion to Annul Proceedings.
In
Ampo v. Court of Appeals,[27]
this Court explained the vigilance that must be exercised by a party:
We are not persuaded by petitioners argument that he
was not aware that his counsel had died or that an adverse judgment had already
been rendered until he received the notice of promulgation from the RTC of
Butuan City on April 20, 2005. Time and again we have stated that equity aids
the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Petitioner should have
taken it upon himself to periodically keep in touch with his counsel, check
with the court, and inquire about the status of the case. Had petitioner been
more prudent, he would have found out sooner about the death of his counsel and
would have taken the necessary steps to prevent his present predicament.
x x x x
x x x xx
Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all
they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief
will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The
circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner only has himself to
blame. Neither can he invoke due process. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy. Where a party, such as petitioner, was afforded this
opportunity to participate but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.
In
this case, petitioners must bear the fruits of their negligence in the handling
of their case. They may not decry the denial of due process, when they were
indeed afforded the right to be heard in the first place.
Substantive
Issue: Illegal Dismissal
Petitioners argue that they were
illegally dismissed, based on the 1989 case Agro
Commercial Security Services Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.,[28] which
holds that when the floating status of employees lasts for more than six (6)
months, they may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from the
service.
Unfortunately,
the above-mentioned case is not applicable here. In Agro, the service contracts of the security agency therein with
various corporations and government agencies to which the security guards were
previously assigned were terminated, generally due to the sequestration of
the said offices. Accordingly, many of the security guards were placed on floating
status. Floating status means an indefinite period of time when one does not
receive any salary or financial benefit provided by law.[29] In
this case, petitioners were actually reassigned to new posts, albeit in a
different location from where they resided. Thus, there can be no floating
status or indefinite period to speak of. Instead, petitioners were the ones who
refused to report for work in their new assignment.
In
cases involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not
sever the employment relationship between the security guards and their agency.
Employees have the right to security of tenure, but this does not give them such
a vested right to their positions as would deprive the company of its
prerogative to change their assignment or transfer them where their services,
as security guards, will be most beneficial to the client.[30]
An
employer has the right to transfer or assign its employees from one office or
area of operation to another in pursuit of its legitimate business interest,
provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and
other privileges; and the transfer is not motivated by discrimination or bad
faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient
cause.[31]
While
petitioners may claim that their transfer to Manila will cause added expenses
and inconvenience, we agree with the CA that, absent any showing of bad faith
or ill motive on the part of the employer, the transfer remains valid.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 21 July 2008 and Resolution dated 16 March 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102201
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO
L. REYES
Associate Justice
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended)
[1] While the caption of the Petition indicates et. al., no other respondent is named.
[2] Both the Decision dated 21 July 2008 and Resolution dated 16 March 2009 were penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) and Sixto C. Marella, Jr.; rollo, pp. 26-35 and 36-39.
[3] Penned by Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores; rollo, pp. 45-49.
[4] Id. at 48-49.
[5] Penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and concurred in by Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L. Go; rollo, pp. 52-56.
[6] Id. at 56.
[7] Rollo, p. 34.
[8] Id. at 192-193.
[9] In their Manifestation, petitioner Mojar states that Atty. Espinas passed away on 25 February 2008. However, in the Petition, petitioners state that he passed away on 8 February 2008. Notably, no death certificate has been presented by them.
[10] Id. at 192.
[11] Rollo, pp. 40-44.
[12] Rules of Court, Rule 46, Sec. 3, provides:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
x x x x x x x x x
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
[13] G.R. No. 168350, 31 January 2008, 543 SCRA 394.
[14] G.R. No. 170646, 22 June 2011, 652 SCRA 510.
[15] Rollo, p. 65.
[16] Id. at 225-228.
[17] Id. at 225.
[18] G.R. No. 155025, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 97, 102.
[19] Ang Biat Huan Sons Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154837, 22 March 2007, 518 SCRA 697.
[20] Salting v. Velez, G.R. No. 181930, 10
January 2011, 610 SCRA 124.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Rollo, p. 192.
[24] Id.
[25] Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 413, 425-426 (1997).
[26] Rollo, p. 17.
[27] 517 Phil. 750, 755-756 (2006).
[28] 256 Phil. 1182 (1989).
[29] Id.
[30] Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, G.R. No. 160940, 21 July 2008, 559 SCRA 110.
[31] Salvaloza v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 182086, 24 November 2010, 636 SCRA 184.