Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
REMEDIOS
ANTONINO, Petitioner, - versus - THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF Respondents.
|
G.R. No. 185663 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: June 20, 2012 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Nature of the Case
This is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated May 26, 2008 and Resolution[2]
dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145.
Factual Antecedents
Since March 21, 1978, petitioner
Remedios Antonino (Antonino) had been leasing a residential property located at
On July 7, 2004, the parties executed
a document denominated as Undertaking Agreement[4]
where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the subject property for P39,500,000.00.
However, in view of a disagreement as to
who between them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale
did not proceed as intended.[5]
On
July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of
In
an Order[8]
dated December 8, 2004, the RTC dismissed Antoninos complaint on the grounds
of improper venue and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC, Antoninos complaint is
one for specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are personal
actions that should have been filed in the court of the place where any of the
parties resides. Antonino and Su reside
in Muntinlupa and
The instant case
is an action for specific performance with damages, a personal action, which
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides (Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules
of Court). Records show that
plaintiff is a resident of
The
RTC also ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over Antoninos complaint
in view of her failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Citing Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[10]
the RTC ruled that:
Anent the
non-payment of filing fees on the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that no
new assessment was made when the Amended Complaint was filed since there [were]
no additional damages prayed for. The
The Court is not
persuaded.
The Amended
Complaint, which the Court notes to have been filed at 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon or few hours after the initial complaint was filed, further prays
that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to sell his property located at
1623 Cypress, Dasmarias Village, Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to
plaintiff in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in their
agreement dated July 7, 2004 and ordering defendant to desist from selling his
property to any other party other than
plaintiff., which makes the instant case also an action for Specific
Performance in addition to the claim for Damages. However, the value of the described property
was not stated in the prayer and no docket fees were paid. Thus, following the ruling of the Supreme
Court in the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, the instant case is hereby
dismissed.[11]
On
December 23, 2004, Su filed an Omnibus Motion,[12]
praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, which Antonino caused to be annotated on the title
covering the subject property and the issuance of a summary judgment on his
counterclaims. Su, among others, alleged
the propriety of cancelling the notice of lis
pendens in view of the dismissal of the complaint and Antoninos failure to
appeal therefrom.
On
January 3, 2005, Antonino filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13]
claiming that her complaint is a real action and the location of the subject
property is determinative of its venue. Alternatively,
she submitted a certification issued by the Commission on Elections, stating
that she is a resident of
Antonino
thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] dated January 21, 2005, claiming that
there was due observance of the rules on motions. Antonino alleged that her motion for
reconsideration from the RTCs December 8, 2004 was set for hearing on January
7, 2005 and Su received a copy thereof on January 6, 2005. Antonino pleaded for
a liberal interpretation of the rules as Su was notified of her motion before
the hearing thereon and was not in any way prejudiced. She also reiterated her arguments for the
reinstatement of her complaint.
In
a Joint Resolution[16]
dated February 24, 2005, the RTC denied Sus Omnibus Motion and Antoninos
January 21, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC refused to cancel the notice of lis pendens, holding that:
It is quite
clear that the dismissal of the Amended Complaint was anchored on two grounds,
e.g. (1) for improper venue and (2) for non-payment of docket fee. It is elementary that when a complaint was
dismissed based on these grounds[,] the court did not resolve the case on the
merits. Moreover, a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case unless the docket fees are paid x x x. Thus, the cause of action laid down in the
complaint remains unresolved for proper re-filing before the proper court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court said: The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident
in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any
given time. x x x[17]
The
RTC maintained its earlier ruling that Antoninos Motion for Reconsideration
from the December 8, 2004 Order is pro-forma and did not suspend the running of
the period to file an appeal. The RTC
also reiterated that Antoninos complaint is a personal action such that the
proper venue therefore is either the City of
On
April 1, 2005, Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment.[18]
Antonino prayed for the nullification of
the RTCs Order dated December 8, 2004 dismissing her complaint, Order dated January
6, 2005 denying her motion for reconsideration and Joint Resolution dated February
24, 2005 denying her motion for reconsideration of the January 6, 2005 Order. According to Antonino, the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that her action
for the enforcement of the Undertaking Agreement is personal and when it
deprived her of an opportunity to pay the correct amount of docket fees. The RTCs grave abuse of discretion, Antonino
posited, was likewise exhibited by its strict application of the rules on
motions and summary denial of her motion for reconsideration.
In
its Decision[19]
dated May 26, 2008, the CA dismissed Antoninos petition. While the CA recognized Antoninos faulty
choice of remedy, it proceeded to resolve the issues she raised relative to the
dismissal of her complaint. Thus:
It should be
stressed that in this case, there is neither allegation in the petition, nor
sufficient proof adduced showing highly exceptional circumstance to justify the
failure of petitioner to avail of the remedies of appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedy through no fault attributable to [her] before
filing this petition for annulment of judgment. In Manipor v. Ricafort, the Supreme Court
held, thus:
If the
petitioner failed to avail of such remedies without sufficient justification,
he cannot avail of an action for annulment because, otherwise, he would benefit
from his own inaction or negligence.
Notwithstanding
the foregoing procedural infirmity, and in the interest of justice, we shall
look into the issues raised and decide the case on the merit.
x x x x
A perusal of the
allegations of the complaint unambiguously shows that petitioner seeks to
enforce the commitment of private respondent to sell his property in accordance
with the terms and conditions of their purported agreement dated July 7, 2004. By implication, petitioner does not question
the ownership of private respondent over the property nor does she claim, by
any color of title, right to possess the property or to its recovery. The action is simply for the enforcement of a
supposed contract, and thus, unmistakably a personal action.
x x x x
Guided by the above
rule (Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Court), petitioner should have filed the
case either in
Further, it is
important to note that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional
discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of jurisdiction as a
ground to annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion. Petitioner, by claiming grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, actually concedes and presupposes
the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case. She only assails the manner in which the trial
court formulated its judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It follows that petitioner cannot use lack of
jurisdiction as ground to annul the judgment by claiming grave abuse of
discretion. In this case where the court
refused to exercise jurisdiction due to improper venue, neither lack of
jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion is available to challenge the
assailed order of dismissal of the trial court.[20]
(Citations omitted)
Antonino filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 5,
2008. [21]
Issue
The sole issue for the resolution of
this Court is the propriety of Antoninos use of the remedy of a petition for
annulment of judgment as against the final and executory orders of the RTC.
Our Ruling
In Ramos v. Judge Combong, Jr.,[22]
this Court expounded that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available
under certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of
immutability of final judgments:
Annulment of
judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule
47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for
annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof
explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, i.e., extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable to the
notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of
judgment. Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or
cause involved therein should be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that
at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of
quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.[23]
(Citations omitted)
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,[24] this Court emphasized that only void judgments, by reason of
extrinsic fraud or the courts lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible to being
annulled.
The
law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are
ultimately void. Annulment of judgment
is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another
opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because
it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment
that is an absolute nullity to begin with.[25]
Apart
from the requirement that the existence of extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction should be amply demonstrated, one who desires to avail this
remedy must convince that the ordinary and other appropriate remedies, such as
an appeal, are no longer available for causes not attributable to him. This is clearly provided under Section 1, Rule
47 of the Rules of Court.
Antoninos
recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously flawed and the reasons are
patent. There is therefore no reason to
disturb the questioned issuances of the RTC that are already final and executory.
A
petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an appeal.
First, Antonino cannot pursue the
annulment of the various issuances of the RTC, primary of which is the Order
dated December 8, 2004, in order to avoid the adverse consequences of their
becoming final and executory because of her neglect in utilizing the ordinary
remedies available. Antonino did not
proffer any explanation for her failure to appeal the RTCs Order dated December
8, 2004 and, thereafter, the Order dated January 6, 2005, denying her Motion
for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2005. Knowledge of rudimentary remedial rules
immediately indicates that an appeal was already available from the Order dated
December 8, 2004, as this is a final order as contemplated under Sections 2, 3
and 5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and there was no legal compulsion for
Antonino to move for reconsideration. Nonetheless,
since there is no bar for her to file a motion for reconsideration so as to
give the RTC opportunity to reverse itself before elevating the matter for the
appellate courts review, appeal is the prescribed remedy from the denial of
such motion and not another motion for reconsideration. While Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court includes an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration in
the enumeration of unappealable matters, this Court clarified in Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.[26]
that such refers to a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and
the denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal is a final
order, therefore, appealable. Moreover,
a second motion for reconsideration from a final judgment or order is
prohibited, hence, can never interrupt the period to perfect an appeal.
The
RTC may have been overly strict in the observance of the three-day notice rule
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court contrary to liberal stance taken
by this Court in cases when the purpose of such rule can be achieved by giving
the opposing party sufficient time to study and controvert the motion.[27]
Justice and equity would thus suggest
that the fifteen-day period within which Antonino can appeal should be counted
from her receipt on January 7, 2005[28]
of the Order dated January 6, 2005 denying her Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 3, 2005. Unfortunately, even
liberality proved to be inadequate to neutralize the adverse consequences of
Antoninos negligence as she allowed such period to lapse without filing an
appeal, erroneously believing that a second motion for reconsideration is the
proper remedy. While a second motion for
reconsideration is not prohibited insofar as interlocutory orders are concerned,[29]
the Orders dated December 8, 2004 and January 6, 2005 are final orders.
In
fact, even if the period to appeal would be counted from Antoninos receipt of
the Order dated February 24, 2005 denying her second motion for
reconsideration, she interposed no appeal and filed a petition for annulment of
judgment on April 1, 2005 instead. This,
for sure, constitutes a categorical admission that the assailed issuances of
the RTC had already become final and executory in view of her omission to
perfect an appeal within the mandated period. By no means can her petition for annulment of
judgment prosper as that would, in effect, sanction her blatant negligence or
sheer obliviousness to proper procedure.
Let it be
stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the reliefs provided
for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of
judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must have failed
to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against
said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault
attributable to him. If he failed to
avail of those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot
resort to the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would
benefit from his own inaction or negligence.[30]
(Citation omitted)
Grave
abuse of discretion is not a ground to annul a final and executory judgment.
Second,
a petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction and cannot prosper on the basis of grave abuse of
discretion. By anchoring her petition
on the alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her
complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration, Antonino,
is, in effect, enlarging the concept of lack of jurisdiction. As this Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. G Holdings,
Inc.,[31]
lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the annulment of judgments pertains to
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. It does not
contemplate grave abuse of discretion considering that jurisdiction is
different from the exercise thereof. As ruled in Tolentino v. Judge Leviste:[32]
Jurisdiction is
not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there
is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper
subject of an appeal.[33]
(Citation omitted)
In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse
its discretion or err in dismissing Antoninos complaint. The RTC was correct in classifying Antoninos
cause of action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in the wrong
venue. Personal action is one that is
founded on privity of contracts between the parties; and in which the plaintiff
usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract,
or recovery of damages. Real action, on
the other hand, is one anchored on the privity of real estate, where the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or possession of real property or
interest in it.[34] Antoninos following allegations in her
amended complaint show that one of her causes of action is one for the enforcement
or consummation of a contract, hence, a personal action:
XII
On July 7, 2004, plaintiff and
defendant executed a document entitled Undertaking Agreement (copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex H) wherein defendant agreed to sell said property
to plaintiff who has leased said
property since March 21, 1978 up to the present with the plaintiff paying a downpayment of $50,000.00 US dollars
the following day, July 8, 2004.
x x x x
XIV
Defendant also
refused to accept the $50,000.00 US Dollars and was about to tear up the
document they previously signed the day before when plaintiff prevented him
from doing so.
XV
Consequently,
plaintiff discovered that defendant was already negotiating to sell the said
property to another Chinese national who incidentally is also one of
plaintiffs buyers.
x x x x
Premises considered, in the interest
of substantial justice, it is most respectfully prayed that after due hearing
that judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering
defendant to sell his property located at 1623
x x x x[35]
Antoninos cause of action is premised
on her claim that there has already been a perfected contract of sale by virtue
of their execution of the Undertaking Agreement and Su had refused to comply
with his obligations as seller. However,
by claiming the existence of a perfected contract of sale, it does not mean that
Antonino acquired title to the subject property. She does not allege otherwise and tacitly
acknowledges Sus title to the subject property by asking for the consummation
of the sale.
That
there is a private document supposedly evidencing the alleged sale does not
confer to Antonino title to the subject property. Ownership is transferred when there is actual
or constructive delivery and the thing is considered delivered when it is
placed in the control or possession of the buyer or when the sale is made
through a public instrument and the contrary does not appear or cannot be
clearly inferred.[36]
In other words, Antoninos complaint is
not in the nature of a real action as ownership of the subject property is not
at issue.
Moreover, that the object of the
alleged sale is a real property does not make Antoninos complaint real in
nature in the absence of a contrary claim of title. After a contract of sale is perfected, the
right of the parties to reciprocally demand performance, thus consummation, arises
the vendee may require the vendor to compel the transfer the title to the
object of the sale[37]
and the vendor may require the payment of the purchase price.[38]
The action to cause the consummation of
a sale does not involve an adverse claim of ownership as the vendors title is
recognized and the vendor is simply being asked to perform an act,
specifically, the transfer of such title by any of the recognized modes of
delivery.
Considering that the filing of the
complaint in a wrong venue sufficed for the dismissal thereof, it would be
superfluous to discuss if Antoninos non-payment of the correct docket fees
likewise warranted it.
At
any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of her complaint,
such had already become final and executory and will not be disturbed as it had
jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less, proved that there was extrinsic
fraud. Moreover, annulment of the
assailed orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies, such as an
appeal, were lost and were not availed of because of Antoninos fault. Litigation
should end and terminate sometime and somewhere. It is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.[39]
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit and the Decision dated May
26, 2008 and Resolution dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89145 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
|
ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando and Pampio A. Abarintos, concurring; rollo, pp. 28-35.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] 233
Phil. 579 (1987).
[11] Rollo, pp. 336-337.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Supra
note 1.
[20]
[21] Supra
note 2.
[22] 510
Phil. 277 (2005).
[23]
[24] 465
Phil. 39 (2004).
[25]
[26] G.R.
No. 145911, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 631.
[27] See
Preysler v. Manila Southcoast Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA, 636, 642-643.
[28] Rollo, p. 371.
[29] See Philippine National Bank v. Intestate
Estate of Francisco De Guzman, G.R. No. 182507, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA,
131, 139.
[30] Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas
(Bulacan), Inc., 456 Phil. 414, 421-422 (2003).
[31] 512
Phil. 253 (2005).
[32] 485
Phil. 661 (2004).
[33]
[34] Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434,
March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354, 365. (Citations omitted)
[35]
[36] See Asset Privatization Trust v. T.J.
Enterprises, G.R. No. 167195, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 481, 486.
[37] Civil Code of the
[38] Civil Code of the
[39] Republic of the Philippines v. G Holdings,
Inc., supra note 31 at 266.