Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
PRUDENTIAL
GUARANTEE AND
ASSURANCE EMPLOYEE LABOR Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE
AND ASSURANCE INC., and/or JOCELYN RETIZOS,
Respondents. |
|
G.R.
No. 185335 Present: PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,* ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ. Promulgated: June 13,
2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioners Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance Employee Labor Union (Union) and Sandy T. Vallota (Vallota) seeking to set aside the
September 16, 2008 Decision[1]
and November 10, 2008 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102699.
The Facts
Vallota commenced his employment with respondent
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) on
In August of 2005, Vallota was elected to the
Board of Directors of the
On
The inspection team proceeded to the IT
Department, and the EDP head, through PGAI network administrator Angelo
Gutierrez (Gutierrez), initiated the spot check of IT Department
computers, beginning with the one assigned to Vallota. After exploring the
contents of all the folders and subfolders in the My Documents folder,
Gutierrez apparently did not find anything unusual with Vallotas computer and
said Wala naman, saan dito? Retizos insisted, Nandyan yan,
and took over the inspection until she found a folder named MAA. She
then exclaimed, Heto oh! Ano to? Bakit may MAA dito? Retizos asked
Vallota, Are you working for MAA? Vallota replied, Hindi po, MAA
mutual life po yan na makikita po sa internet. Gutierrez saved a copy of
the contents of the MAA folder in a floppy disk.[3]
Sensing that Vallota was being singled out,
Apostol insisted that all the computers in the IT Department, including that of
Retizos, be also subjected to a spot security check. Later, at Retizos office,
and in the presence of Atty. Rillo, Vallota was informed that Retizos and Atty.
Rillo would print the files found in his computer under the folder MAA.
Vallota did not object. After the files were printed, Vallota and the Union
Secretary were asked to sign each page of the printout. Vallota, however, was
not given a copy of the printed file.
On
Vallota responded in writing on
In compliance with the deadline set, Vallota
submitted his reply-memorandum[10] dated
Meanwhile, the
Thus, the petitioners filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with claims for full backwages, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorneys fees. The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-00387-06.
On
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the dismissal of complainant
Vallota illegal and holding the respondents for the following:
1. to reinstate complainant
Vallota to his former position without loss of benefits and seniority rights.
2. to pay complainant
Vallota full backwages from the time of his dismissal until actual
reinstatement partially computed as of this date amount[ing] to ₱60,856.00 (₱18,400/mo. x 3 mos.
& 8 days).
3. to pay complainants
attorneys fee equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The LA held that PGAI failed to meet its burden
of evidence, and the conflicting claims of the parties were resolved in favor
of Vallota for failure of PGAI to adduce substantial evidence to support its
claim. The LA further held that the
dismissal was not commensurate to the misconduct complained of, especially
considering that it was Vallotas first offense.[15]
On the matter of the blank gate pass stored in
Vallotas computer, the LA found as satisfactory his explanation that Joseph
Tolentino (Tolentino), a PGAI employee, requested him, from time to
time, to print a gate pass whenever he had to bring tools outside of the
company premises. The LA cited Vallotas argument that it is quite odd [that]
despite the fact that the gate pass form was admitted by the respondents in
[their] Reply as their exclusive property, complainants possession of the same
was not considered x x x Possession of Company property without authorization.[16]
The LA further found that the respondents were
not able to establish that Vallota used company property for his personal
benefit. Nothing on record could show that he made an attempt to defraud his
employer. With regard to the charge that, without authorization, he misused or
removed company documents, the LA opined that if this were true, the
respondents should have conducted a thorough investigation to determine the liable
persons.[17]
Finally, the LA ruled that Vallota was denied due
process since the respondents refused to conduct a hearing, despite Vallotas
request, to thresh out the matters raised by him in his memoranda.[18]
The respondents filed their Memorandum of Appeal[19] dated
On
The respondents filed their Motion for
Reconsideration[21]
dated
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, respondents Motion for Reconsideration from the Resolution of
₱18,400 x 10 yrs. = ₱92,000.00
2
SO ORDERED.
The NLRC reasoned out that the respondents had
submitted substantial and sufficient evidence to prove that there existed
grounds for the PGAI to lose trust and confidence in Vallota. The NLRC also
found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the LA to disregard the
affidavits of Tolentino, Retizos and Allan Unson, as the LA himself did not set
a hearing for the purpose of cross-examining the said witnesses or verifying
the statements made in their affidavits. As reflected in the decretal portion,
although the NLRC ruled that the dismissal was valid, it still directed the
respondents to grant Vallota financial assistance of one-half (1/2) month pay
for every year of his ten (10) years of service.[24]
The petitioners moved for a reconsideration[25] of the
decision, but their motion was denied in a resolution[26] dated
Dejected, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari[27]
with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 102699. On
The petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied in a resolution dated
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
The
petitioners raise the following issues:
I
WHETHER
OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
GIVING LIBERALITY TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS['] FOUR BLATANT VIOLATIONS OF THE NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
II
WHETHER
OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACT THAT NO
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXIST[S] TO JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER VALLOTA. [28]
RULING OF THE COURT
First,
the allegation of grave abuse of discretion is misplaced, as this is an issue
appropriate for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. There is no question
that grave abuse of discretion or errors of jurisdiction may be corrected only
by the special civil action of certiorari. Such special remedy does not avail
in instances of error of judgment which can be corrected by appeal or by a
petition for review. Because the petitioners availed of the remedy under Rule
45, recourse to Rule 65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as a
substitute for appeal.[29]
Regarding illegal
dismissal, the core issues to be resolved here are: (1) whether Vallota was
validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence; and (2)
whether the requirements of procedural due process for termination were
observed.
Whether the petitioner
was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence
The Courts discussion in Mabeza v. National
Labor Relations Commission[30]
is instructive:
Loss of confidence as a just cause for
dismissal was never intended to provide employers with a blank check for
terminating their employees. Such a
vague, all-encompassing pretext as loss of confidence, if unqualifiedly given
the seal of approval by this Court, could readily reduce to barren form the
words of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Having this in
mind, loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees
occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the
employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money
or property. To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those
vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property
custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to
sign out for linen and other hotel property from the property custodian each
day and who has to account for each and every towel or bedsheet utilized by the
hotel's guests at the end of her shift would not fall under any of these two
classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by
evidence, would normally apply.
Illustrating this distinction, this Court, in Marina Port Services,
Inc. vs. NLRC, has stated that:
To be sure, every
employee must enjoy some degree of trust and confidence from the employer as
that is one reason why he was employed in the first place. One certainly does
not employ a person he distrusts.
Indeed, even the lowly janitor must enjoy that trust and confidence in
some measure if only because he is the one who opens the office in the morning
and closes it at night and in this sense is entrusted with the care or
protection of the employer's property.
The keys he holds are the symbol of that trust and confidence.
By the same token,
the security guard must also be considered as enjoying the trust and confidence
of his employer, whose property he is safeguarding. Like the janitor, he has access to this
property. He too, is charged with its
care and protection.
Notably, however,
and like the janitor again, he is entrusted only with the physical task
of protecting that property. The
employer's trust and confidence in him is limited to that ministerial
function. He is not entrusted, in the
Labor Arbiter's words, 'with the duties of safekeeping and safeguarding company
policies, management instructions, and company secrets such as operation
devices.' He is not privy to these
confidential matters, which are shared only in the higher echelons of
management. It is the persons on such levels who, because they discharge these
sensitive duties, may be considered holding positions of trust and
confidence. The security guard does not
belong in such category.
More importantly, we have repeatedly held
that loss of confidence should not be simulated in order to justify what would
otherwise be, under the provisions of law, an illegal dismissal. "It should not be used as a subterfuge
for causes which are illegal, improper and unjustified. It must be genuine, not
a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith."[31]
(Citations omitted. Emphases supplied.)
In
It is clear that Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an
employer to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and
confidence. The right of employers to
dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence is well established
in jurisprudence.
The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss
of trust and confidence is that the employee concerned must be one holding a
position of trust and confidence.
Verily, We must first determine if respondent holds such a position.
There are two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first
class consists of managerial employees.
They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay
down management policies and to hire, transfer suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions. The second class
consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. They are defined as those who in the normal
and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts
of money or property.
xxx
The second requisite is that there must be an act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence to be a
valid cause for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust and
founded on clearly established facts.
The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established
but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary.[33]
(Citations omitted. Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the first
question to be addressed is whether Vallota held a position of trust and
confidence. In previous cases, the following positions were classified under
the second class of holders of positions of trust and confidence: a
pharmaceutical companys district manager employed to handle
pharmaceutical products for distribution to medical practitioners and sale to
drug outlets,[34] a
bank manager,[35]
and an employee tasked with purchasing supplies and equipment.[36]
The position of a contract claims assistant tasked with monitoring enforcement of
contracts involving large sums of money was also classified to be analogous to
this second class of holders of positions of trust and confidence.[37]
Vallota was employed
by PGAI as a Junior Programmer assigned to the EDP Department. His functions
included the following:
-
Installation of PGAI System[38] on all
designated branches
-
Development of internal programs as required
by the organization
-
Handling and maintenance of all programs as
per advise.
-
Conduct[s] operation training on PGAI systems
on all PGAI branches
-
Generates and handles renewal list of all
applicable lines.
-
Generates and produces renewal notice of all
lines as required.
-
Generates paid premium production of all
agents.
-
Generates outstanding production reports of
all agents.
-
Generates report on top account executive per
I.T. supervisor instruction.
-
Generates and handle[s] data on top agents
per AE premium production.
-
Handles and maintains uploading system,
accounting data per advise, account receivable system, motor car policy system,
claims motor car system, check disbursement system, cash call system, R.I.
outgoing and incoming system, facultative systems.
-
All other task[s] as may be assigned to him
from time to time.[39]
Based on the
standards set by previous jurisprudence, Vallotas position as Junior
Programmer is analogous to the second class of positions of trust and
confidence. Though he did not physically handle money or property, he became
privy to confidential data or information by the nature of his functions. At a
time when the most sensitive of information is found not printed on paper but
stored on hard drives and servers, an employee who handles or has access to
data in electronic form naturally becomes the unwilling recipient of
confidential information.
Having addressed the
nature of his position, the next question is whether the act complained of
justified the loss of trust and confidence of Vallotas employer so as to
constitute a valid cause for dismissal. It must, thus, be determined whether
the alleged basis for dismissal was based on clearly established facts.
The act alleged to
have caused the loss of trust and confidence of PGAI in Vallota was the
presence in his computers hard drive of a folder named MAA allegedly
containing files with information on MAA Mutual Life
1.
MAA Mutualife Philippines, Inc. prospectus
consisting of five (5) pages
2.
MAA Mutualife Philippines, Inc. corporate
profile consisting of six (6) pages
3.
PGAI clients (sic) questionnaire consisting
of five (5) pages
4.
PGAI values and strategy
5.
PGAI Client Servising (sic): Proposed Service
Standard consisting of seven (7) pages
6.
PGAI Marketing Department Division consisting
of twenty (20) pages
6.1 Marketing
Department present set-up
6.2 Present Table of
Organization
6.3 How is the
market evolving? How does it affect PGAI?
6.4 The strategy of
change
6.5 Segmentation
6.6 Proposed Table
of Organization
6.7 Proposed PGA
Super Branch
6.7.a Objectives
6.7.b Accounts to be service
6.8 Proposed Chart
for the Retail Division
6.8.a Dual Objective
6.9 Marketing
Administration
6.10 Analysis of
Statistics
6.11 Proposed
Corporate Accounts Servicing Division
6.11.a Facts
6.11.b 2003 and 2004 Dealership
Production Statistics
6.11.c 2003 -2004 Budget Analysis
7. PGAI Marketing Division: An Analysis
& Proposed Solution consisting of seven (7) pages
8. PGAI Customer Service Commitment
consisting of six (6) pages
9.
Following such
discovery, Vallota was charged with the following violations of Company Rules
on Company Property:
1.
Possession of company property without
authorization;
2.
Securing or obtaining Prudential materials or
supplies fraudulently;
3.
Using Company equipment, property, or
material to perform or create something for personal gain or purpose; and
4.
Misuse or removal from company premises
without proper authorization of Prudential records or confidential information
of any nature.[41]
Vallota and the
Union argue, among others, that (1) the respondents failed to prove by
substantial evidence that Vallotas position did not allow him to access
confidential information and that the data found in his computer had been used
for his personal gain; (2) Vallota did not deliberately get the files from
other departments; instead, such files were acquired in the process of fixing
diskettes and printing information as requested by his co-employees; (3) no
evidence was presented to prove that Vallota sold or was about to sell
corporate documents to MAA Mutual Life Corporation or to any company; and (4)
the respondents refusal to convene a grievance machinery was a clear abuse of
management prerogative.[42]
The respondents, on
the other hand, counter that Vallota admitted ownership of the files found in
his computer. They also argue that it was the Data Center Technical Support
Staff, and not the Junior Programmer, who handled recovery/fixing/printing of
files of the nature of those found in Vallotas possession; that it was a
remote possibility that the Junior Programmer would be directly requested to
assist employees, since the Methods Analyst would have been the designee for
such task; that Vallotas functions as Junior Programmer did not include
matters relating to web development; that under standard IT procedure and
company practice, the employees who requested assistance from the IT Department
were required to fill up a Job Request Form (JRF), which was then
submitted for prior approval by the IT Head; that Retizos, as IT Head, could
not recall signing or approving any request pertaining to the recovered PGAI
files; that Vallota could not produce a single JRF when he was asked to do so
and explained the lack of JRFs by stating that such file repairs, file recovery,
or printing jobs were merely little favors and that such were considered as
company practice; and that he, however, refused to reveal the names of the
employees who had sought assistance in the fixing/printing/recovery of the PGAI
files.[43]
The respondents aver
that Vallota also had in his computer the PGAI Gate Pass Form template,[44]
a company property that could not be copied, stored, or reproduced without
company permission. They also claim that Vallota was guilty of using company
equipment, property or material to perform or create something for personal
gain or purpose. MAA files, alleged to be highly confidential and sensitive,
were found in Vallotas computer which he explained were downloaded from the
MAA website outside of company premises merely for information. Upon searching
the MAA website, however, they (respondents) did not find any of the said
files. They also found that the MAA website was accessible only to certain
users and was not open to the public as claimed by Vallota. Given all of these,
the respondents concluded that Vallotas possession of the PGAI and MAA files
appeared to be part of a plan to take advantage of the said documents for
personal gain.[45]
While the law and
this Court recognize the right of an employer to dismiss an employee based on
loss of trust and confidence, the evidence of the employer must clearly and
convincingly establish the facts upon which the loss of trust and confidence in
the employee is based.[46]
To be a valid ground
for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach
of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is
done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.[47]
It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness,
whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would remain eternally at
the mercy of the employer.[48]
Further, in order to constitute
a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and show
that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working
for the employer.[49] Such ground for dismissal has never been intended to afford an occasion
for abuse because of its subjective nature.[50]
It must also be
remembered that in illegal dismissal cases like the one at bench, the burden of
proof is upon the employer to show that the employees termination from service
is for a just and valid cause.[51] The employers case succeeds or fails on the
strength of its evidence and not the weakness of that adduced by the employee,[52]
in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in
favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them.[53] Often described as more than a mere scintilla,[54] the quantum of proof is
substantial evidence which is understood as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[55] Failure of the employer to discharge the
foregoing onus would mean that the dismissal is not justified and, therefore,
illegal.[56]
In this case, there
was no other evidence presented to prove fraud in the manner of securing or
obtaining the files found in Vallotas computer. In fact, aside from the
presence of these files in Vallotas hard drive, there was no other evidence to
prove any gross misconduct on his part. There was no proof either that the
presence of such files was part of an attempt to defraud his employer or to use
the files for a purpose other than that for which they were intended. If
anything, the presence of the files reveals some degree of carelessness or
neglect in his failure to delete them, but it is an extremely farfetched conclusion
bordering on paranoia to state that it is part of a larger conspiracy involving
corporate espionage.
Moreover, contrary
to the respondents allegations, the MAA files found in Vallotas computer, the
prospectus and corporate profile, are not sensitive corporate documents. These
are documents routinely made available to the public, and serve as means to
inform the public about the company and to disseminate information about the
products it sells or the services it provides, in order that potential clients
may make a sound and informed decision whether or not to purchase or avail of
such goods and services.
If anything, the
presence of the files would merely merit the development of some suspicion on
the part of the employer, but should not amount to a loss of trust and
confidence such as to justify the termination of his employment. Such act is not of the same
class, degree or gravity as the acts that have been held to be of such
character. While Vallotas act or omission may have been done carelessly, it
falls short of the standard required for termination of employment. It does not
manifest either that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for
his employer.
Termination of
employment is a drastic measure reserved for the most serious of offenses. When
the act complained of is not so grave as to result in a complete loss of trust
and confidence, a lower penalty such as censure, warning, or even suspension,
would be more circumspect. This is of particular significance here where during
Vallotas ten years of service to PGAI, not once was he ever warned or
reprimanded for such printing services.
Whether the procedural due
process requirements for termination were observed
The
petitioners allege that Vallota was denied due process of law, as the records
of the case clearly show that his request for an administrative hearing was
denied without reason by PGAI. Citing Rule 1, Section 2(d) of the Implementing
Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code, the petitioners argue that a hearing or
conference must be conducted to afford the employee an opportunity to respond
to the charge, and to present or rebut evidence presented against him. The
petitioners are of the position that the unjustified refusal of PGAI to conduct
a hearing violated the said provision of the Rules implementing the Labor Code,
as well as Vallotas right to defend himself before an impartial investigating
body.[57]
The Court explained the concept of
the opportunity to be heard in the case of Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company:[58]
After receiving the first notice apprising him of the
charges against him, the
employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a
letter, memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support
thereof, like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time
records) and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may
prepare his explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative
or counsel. He may also ask the employer to provide him copy of records
material to his defense. His written explanation may also include a request
that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a
formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist
substantial evidentiary disputes[59]
or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of
employment pretermination procedure. To this extent, we refine the
decisions we have rendered so far on this point of law.
This interpretation of Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI of the Labor Code reasonably implements the ample opportunity to be
heard standard under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code without unduly
restricting the language of the law or excessively burdening the employer. This
not only respects the power vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment to
promulgate rules and regulations that will lay down the guidelines for the
implementation of Article 277(b). More importantly, this is faithful to the
mandate of Article 4 of the Labor Code that [a]ll doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the
hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
(a) ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity
(verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and
submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or
some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b) a formal hearing or
conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or
substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires
it, or when similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the ample opportunity to
be heard standard in the Labor Code prevails over the hearing or conference
requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis original. Underscoring supplied.)[60]
In
this case, the two-notice requirement was complied with. By the petitioners
own admission, PGAI issued to Vallota a written Notice of Charges &
Preventive Suspension (Ref. No. AC-05-02) dated
Given,
however, that the petitioners expressly requested a conference or a convening
of a grievance committee, following the Courts ruling in the Perez
case, which was later cited in the recent case of Lopez v. Alturas Group of
Companies,[61]
such formal hearing became mandatory. After PGAI failed to affirmatively
respond to such request, it follows that the hearing requirement was not
complied with and, therefore, Vallota was denied his right to procedural due
process.
In light of the above discussion,
Vallota is entitled to reinstatement and backwages, reckoned from the date he
was illegally dismissed until the finality of this decision in accordance with
jurisprudence.[62]
In view of the strained relations
between Vallota and PGAI, however, it is not in the best interest of the
parties, nor is it advisable or practical to order reinstatement. Where
reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an
alternative. It must be stressed,
however, that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs:
backwages and reinstatement, which are separate and distinct. In Golden Ace
Builders v. Tagle,[63]
it was written:
Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided
are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer
feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer,
separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement
is no longer viable, and backwages.
The normal consequences of respondents illegal
dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and
payment of backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the
date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an
option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is
in addition to payment of backwages. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Velasco v. National Labor Relations Commission, emphasizes:
The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may
avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical
or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated. (Emphasis
in the original; italics supplied)
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment
of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when
the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment
liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment.
On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable
obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.[64]
(Emphasis, underscoring and comments in the original.)
This has been the consistent ruling
in the award of separation pay to illegally dismissed employees in lieu of
reinstatement, in addition to the award of backwages.
Finally, Vallota, having been
compelled to litigate in order to seek redress, is entitled, as he had prayed
early on, to the award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total
monetary award.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The September 16, 2008 Decision and November
10, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102699 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated March 31,
2006 is REINSTATED but MODIFIED to the effect that, in addition
to backwages, petitioner Sandy T. Vallota is entitled to be awarded separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service in lieu of
reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C
A T I O N
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. No. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
*
Per Special Order No. 1228 dated
** Designated Acting Member in lieu
of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1229 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 53-76.
Fourteenth Division. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III and Associate
Justice Sesinando E. Villon, concurring.
[2] Id. at 50-51.
[3] Id. at 54-55
[4] Id. at 324-326.
[5] Id. at 359.
[6] Id. at 327-330.
[7] Id. at 331.
[8] Id. at 332.
[9] Id. at 333.
[10] Id. at 334-335.
[11] Id. at 336.
[12] Id. at 337.
[13] Id. at 286-300.
[14] Id. at 300.
[15] Id. at 296-297.
[16] Id. at 297.
[17] Id. at 298.
[18] Id. at 298-299.
[19] Id. at 221-253.
[20]
[21] Rollo, pp. 211-219.
[22] Id. at 199-207.
[23] Id. at 180-188.
[24] Id. at 187.
[25] Id. at 189-198.
[26] Id. at 177-178.
[27] Id. at 144-175.
[28] Id. at 18.
[29] Cebu Womans Club v. de la Victoria, 384 Phil. 264, 270 (2000).
[30] 338 Phil. 386 (1997).
[31] Id. at
395-397, citing General Bank and Trust Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 135
SCRA 569, 578 (1985).
[32] G.R. No.
167449,
[33] Id. at
205-206, citing Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 113774,
[35] Lopez v.
Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 176800,
[36]
[37] Abel v.
Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 178976,
[38] Also referred to as the legacy system.
[39] Rollo, pp. 8-9.
[40] Id. at 325.
[41] Id. at 325.
[42]
[43]
[44] The template was blank and did not contain the
necessary signatures.
[45] Rollo,
p. 57.
[46] Samillano v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 333 Phil. 658, 667 (1996), citing Imperial
Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 101527, January 19, 1993, 217 SCRA
237.
[47] AMA Computer
College, Inc. v. Garay, G.R. No. 162468, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 312,
316, citing Brent Hospital, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117593, July 10,
1998, 292 SCRA 304, 310.
[48] Id. at 316-317,
citing Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737, 760.
[49] Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, 527 Phil. 230, 243 (2006), citing Fujitsu Computer
Products Corporation of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737,
760.
[50] AMA Computer
College, Inc. v. Garay, G.R. No. 162468, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 312,
supra note 48 at 317, citing Brent Hospital, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
117593, July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 304, 310.
[51] Functional, Inc. v. Granfil, G.R. No. 176377, November 16, 2011, citing Harborview Restaurant v. Labro, G.R. No. 168273, April 30, 2009, 587
SCRA 277, 281.
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55] Id., citing Oriental
Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Bastol, G.R. No. 186289, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 352, 377.
[56] Id., citing Tacloban
Far East Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182320, September 11, 2009,
599 SCRA 662, 670.
[57] Rollo, pp. 490-491.
[58] G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110, also
cited in Lopez v. Alturas Group of Companies, G.R. No. 191008, April 11,
2011, 647 SCRA 568, 574-575.
[59] Citing Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (Brennan J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974) (Marshall J., dissenting).
[60] Perez v.
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009,
584 SCRA 110, 126-127.
[61] G.R. No. 191008,
[62] DUP Sound Phils v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168317, November 21, 2011, citing Javellana,
Jr. v. Belen, G.R. Nos. 181913 & 182158, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 342,
353-353, and Cabatulan v. Buat, G.R. No. 147142, February 14, 2005, 451
SCRA 234, 247.
[63] G.R. No. 187200,
[64] Id. at 289-290, citing Macasero
v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, G.R. No. 178524, January 30,
2009, 577 SCRA 500.