Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
PHILBAG INDUSTRIAL
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - PHILBAG WORKERS
UNION-LAKAS AT GABAY NG MANGGAGAWANG NAGKAKAISA, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 182486
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 20, 2012 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D
E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
seeking the reversal of the decision dated
The Antecedents
Edwin
Mauricio and Zharralyn Camacho were employees of the petitioner, Philbag
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation (company),
until their dismissal in the second half of 2004. They worked as cutter and circular
loom operator, respectively. They were members of the respondent, Philbag Workers
Union-Lakas at Gabay ng Manggagawang Nagkakaisa (union), the exclusive bargaining representative of the companys
rank-and-file employees. The union had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the company.
Mauricio and Camacho protested their
dismissal, prompting the union and the company to convene the CBAs grievance
machinery in an effort to resolve the matter at plant level. Unable to reach a
settlement, they agreed to have the dispute resolved through voluntary
arbitration. In a submission agreement,[4]
they asked Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Angel
L. Ancheta to resolve the dispute. The union, through its President, Danilo
Caete, represented Mauricio and Camacho.
The
Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings
Mauricio
The union alleged before VA Ancheta
that Mauricios dismissal arose from a scheme devised by the companys cutters
to make their work easier. It involved unwinding the textile from the rolled
bulk before they work on it, the length of the material to be determined by the
cutter concerned. The cutters take turns in unwinding the textile from the
roll.
Allegedly, on May 24, 2004, at around
5:00 a.m., Mauricio was at his turn unwinding the textile from the roll. At a
distance, Anneliza Reinoso, the cutting supervisor, saw that Mauricio was not
cutting the textile. She then concluded that Mauricio was not doing his job.
Reinoso reported the incident to management on
On
May 26, 2004, Mauricio received a memorandum from management[6]
directing him to explain in writing why he should not be dismissed for
violating Section 3 of the company rules and regulations.[7]
Section 3 states that commission of any of the offenses listed thereunder shall
be given three demerit points. Offense no. 5 in the list involves [i]dling or
wasting company working hours or loitering on company time. Dressing up,
washing up, or wasting time after punching in or before punching out.[8]
In a written statement dated
Mauricio was dismissed on
Camacho
The
company terminated Camachos employment on
Section A, Rule # 1 - Absence without
official leave (AWOL) for not more than two (2) consecutive days (equivalent to
2 demerit points each)
-
AWOL [on]
Section E, Rule # 1 - Absence without
official leave (AWOL) for six (6) or more consecutive days (equivalent to 12
demerit points each)
-
AWOL [on]
Concentrating
on the second heavier charge, the union alleged that Camacho suffered from
abdominal pain and slight bleeding on March 3, 2004, compelling her to go to
Clinica Marquez[12] in
On
On
In
a memo dated
Through
another memo dated May 17, 2004,[18]
the company informed Camacho that she had already incurred fourteen (14)
demerit points for her AWOL on February 16, 2004 (two demerit points) and her
AWOL from March 15 to 21, 2004 (12 demerit points), which warranted her
dismissal from the service. On
Camacho
accused the company of bad faith, contending that she incurred her absences
upon the advice of Dr. Marquez for her to take pregnancy rests.
To
avoid liability, the company maintained that both Mauricio and Camacho violated
company rules on employee discipline, thereby incurring demerit points that
justified their separation from the service. It pointed out that Mauricio was
observed idling and wasting company time for two hours on
The
company further alleged that on May 11, 2004, Camacho reported for work and
presented a medical certificate (dated March 15, 2004) to be countersigned by
the company doctor. The doctor refused to countersign the certificate because
it was past Camachos sickness period of
The Voluntary Arbitration Decision
In
his decision of September 15, 2004,[20]
VA Ancheta declared Mauricio and Camachos dismissal valid. However, in view of
their length of service to the company and for humanitarian consideration, he
awarded them financial assistance: P20,000.00 to Mauricio and P15,000.00
to Camacho.
With
the ruling, VA Ancheta upheld the companys prerogative to impose disciplinary
action on its employees who violate company rules and regulations. The union
sought relief from the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, contending that VA Ancheta committed grave abuse of discretion
for his failure to appreciate the facts of the case and to apply existing law
and jurisprudence.
The CA Decision
On
In
Mauricios case, the CA found Reinosos report not credible despite the companys
insistence that she
could not have
fabricated the report. It noted two
elements in the report which made it dubious: (1) it was dated
The
CA wondered why Reinoso reported the incident one month after its occurrence.
It asked how the company can make an intelligent investigation when Reinoso did
not even mention the date when the incident occurred. If Mauricio and four of
his co-employees stopped working for two hours why did Reinoso not do anything
about it? In view of these lapses, the CA considered Reinosos report a mere
afterthought. It concluded that the company failed to prove its allegation that
Mauricio violated Section B(5) of its rules and regulations.
With
respect to Camacho, the CA acknowledged that indeed, she did not report for work from March 15 to 21, 2004
(7 days), without filing a leave of absence. It was not convinced, however,
that she deliberately disregarded the company rules on the matter.
The CA thus ruled that Mauricio and
Camacho were illegally dismissed. Accordingly, it ordered the company to pay them
backwages and separation pay as it considered reinstatement to be no longer
viable due to the passage of time. The company moved for reconsideration,
reiterating essentially the same arguments it raised before the CA and, additionally,
contending that the case has become academic since it had already ceased
operations due to serious business losses. The CA denied the motion. It
rejected the companys business closure defense, holding that Mauricios and
Camachos monetary awards could still be pursued during liquidation, pursuant
to Section 122 of the Corporation Code. More importantly, it reminded the
company that the two employees were dismissed without just cause and,
therefore, not covered by Article 283 of the Labor Code under which, an
employer who closes its business due to serious financial losses is not
required to grant separation pay to the dismissed employees.
The
Parties Positions
The Company
Aside from the petition itself,[23]
the company submitted a comment (to the unions reply)[24]
and a memorandum.[25]
It prays for the nullification of the
CA rulings on the grounds that: (1) the CA had no jurisdiction over the
petition for review as it was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period; (2)
the CA committed a misapprehension of the facts and the evidence; and (3) the
CA erred in directing the payment of backwages and separation pay.
On its first assignment of error, the
company argues that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. It contends that under Article 262-A of the Labor Code, the
award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators
shall be final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy of
the award or decision by the parties.
The company points out that as
alleged by the union in its petition with the CA, it received a copy of VA
Anchetas decision on
On
the dismissal of Mauricio and Camacho, the company reiterates essentially the
same arguments it presented to the CA on why it had to terminate their
employment. With respect especially to Camacho, it insists that her going on absence
without official leave (AWOL) from
Lastly,
the company faults the CA for awarding backwages to Mauricio and Camacho (from
the date the wages were withheld up to the finality of the CA decision), as
well as separation pay. It considers the award erroneous because it ceased
operations on
Mauricio and Camacho
Mauricio and Camacho, through the union comment[29] and
memorandum,[30] ask
that the companys appeal be dismissed for lack of merit, with the following
arguments:
First. The reglementary period for the
filing of a petition for review of the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is
15 days from receipt of the denial of the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, not 10 days from
receipt of the voluntary arbitrators decision under the Labor Code. As
admitted by the company itself, it filed the petition within the 15-day period.
In any event, the company is estopped from raising the issue as it failed to raise
it before the CA.
Second. The CA committed no reversible
error in declaring Mauricio and Camachos dismissal illegal. In Mauricios case,
it is not true that he was idling or wasting company time in the morning of
With respect to Camacho, there is likewise no truth to the
companys allegation that she merely asked her aunt, Maquiling, to call the
company about her (Camachos) absence from
Third. Mauricio and Camacho, having been
illegally dismissed, are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.
Reinstatement and backwages are separate and distinct from each other. Since
the company is no longer in operation, however, they are amenable to the payment
of separation pay in addition to the payment of backwages.
The Courts Ruling
The Procedural Issue
The companys argument that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the case has no leg to stand on. It had already raised
the issue with the CA, although based on a different legal premise. In its comment on the petition of the union[31]
before the CA, the company prayed that the petition be dismissed for late
filing (which would result in making VA Anchetas decision final and executory)
by reason of the unions failure to file it within the 15-day period under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.[32]
Parenthetically, it also asked that the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit. The CA granted the petition, without resolving the procedural issues. The
company then moved for reconsideration,[33]
without questioning the non-resolution of the procedural issues it raised, especially the petitions late filing, in
effect submitting to the CAs jurisdiction. The CA declared:
x x x x
We note that Philbag in their Comment pointed
out several procedural lapses on the part of the
In
light of what transpired in the CA, the company cannot now be heard repudiating
the CAs authority to resolve the case. In Marquez
v. Secretary of Labor,[35]
the Court said:
[A]fter voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court x x x. [I]t is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
x x x x
[W]hile the rule has been applied to estop
the plaintiff from raising the issue of jurisdiction, it has likewise been applied
to the defendant and more specifically, to the x x x employer in a labor case.
The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought,
coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or
quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation
of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case
and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys
jurisdiction [underscoring ours].
The Merits of the Case
Under
the law, the burden of proving that the termination of employment was for a
valid or authorized cause rests on the employer.[36]
Failure to discharge this burden would result in an unjust or illegal dismissal,[37]
as aptly pointed out by the CA. We find such a failure on the part of the
employer in this case.
In
Mauricios case, the companys submissions fall short of establishing that he
was indeed not doing his job as cutter on
Early
on the day in question, Reinoso, the companys cutting supervisor, allegedly
saw from a distance that Mauricio and four other employees were not cutting the
textile and, therefore, not doing their jobs. Reinoso submitted an incident
report to the company on
We
share the CAs reservations on Mauricios dismissal. The companys evidence on
his alleged infraction does not substantially show that he violated company
rules and regulations to warrant his dismissal. Reinosos report on Mauricio not
doing his job on May 24, 2004 came one month after the alleged incident, thus
inviting the CAs suspicion on its veracity. Also, as the CA observed, why did Reinoso
not confront Mauricio and the four others she caught idling, if they had indeed
been not doing their work. It is surprising that she did not call their
attention about the incident considering that she
was their supervisor.
Reinosos delayed report casts doubt on
the companys case against
Mauricio. In Sevillana v. I.T. (International)
Corporation, et al.,[41]
the Court stressed that the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary, and
founded on clearly established facts to warrant a dismissal. The petition must
fail with respect to Mauricio.
We
have the same conclusion in relation to Camacho. Like Mauricio, the company
terminated Camachos employment for having incurred more than the allowed
demerit points to remain in the service. The company rules and regulations did
not define the demerits system of employee discipline, but after a reading of
the document,[42] we gather
that an employee is meted demerit points for committing any of the offenses
listed under GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, Sections A, B, C,
D and E of the company rules and regulations.
As
the records show, the company charged Camacho of having been on AWOL from March
15-21, 2004 (7 days). It refused to recognize the medical certificate presented
by Camacho for the period as it was not countersigned by the company doctor.
She was thus meted 12 demerit points, enough to warrant her dismissal under
Section E above, item 1 of which provides that being on AWOL for six or more
consecutive days shall be given 12 demerit points. Under the title DISCIPLINARY
ACTION of the company, any employee who has been given 12 demerit points under
Section E, or a total of 12 demerit points under Sections A to D, within a
12-month period, shall be separated from the service. The company factored in
Camachos earlier AWOL infraction (
There
is no dispute that Camacho was absent from work from
A
judicious evaluation of the facts shows that Camacho did not deliberately
disregard the company rules. She did comply with the said policy although
quite belatedly. Nonetheless, We do
not find any valid reason for the company doctor to refuse to countersign the
subject medical certificate since it was properly signed by the physician of
Camacho and bears all the earmarks of regularity in its issuance and hence, is
entitled to full probative value. Besides, said company doctor could have
easily verified the facts stated therein. In fact, Camacho had been absent from
3 to 14 of March 2004 due to abdominal pain and slight bleeding and the medical
certificate covering the said period was duly countersigned by the company
doctor. The same is true with the Medical Certificate dated
Moreover,
it is interesting to note that Philbag did not include the period from 22 March
to
It
is obvious that the company overstepped the bounds of its management
prerogative in the dismissal of Mauricio and Camacho. It lost sight of the
principle that management prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with
due regard to the rights of the workers in the spirit of fairness and with
justice in mind.[44]
In
sum, we find Mauricio and Camachos dismissal without a valid cause and,
therefore, illegal.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against Philbag Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-28; filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Ibid.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Not Clinica Enriquez as cited by the Voluntary Arbitrator and the CA.
[13] Rollo, p. 102; Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Marquez.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Supra note 2.
[22]
[23] Supra note 1.
[24] Rollo,
pp. 276-283; dated
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Supra note 2.
[34]
[35] 253 Phil. 329, 335-336 (1989), citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
[36] LABOR CODE, Article 277(b).
[37] National
Bookstore, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 235, 243 (2002).
[38] Supra note 8.
[39] Supra note 10.
[40] Supra note 2 at 40.
[41] 408 Phil. 570, 586 (2001).
[42] Rollo, pp. 119-125.
[43] Supra note 2 at 42.
[44] Unicorn
Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte, 486 Phil. 493, 505 (2004).