Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, |
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G.R. No. 175350 |
Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* |
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Acting Chairperson, |
- versus - |
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BERSAMIN, |
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DEL CASTILLO, |
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VILLARAMA, JR., and |
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PERLAS-BERNABE,** JJ. |
SPECIAL STEEL
PRODUCTS, |
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INC. and AUGUSTO L.
PARDO, |
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Promulgated: |
Respondents. |
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June 13, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A
crossed check with the notation account payee only can only be deposited in
the named payees account. It is gross
negligence for a bank to ignore this rule solely
on the basis of a third partys oral representations of having a good title
thereto.
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the October 13, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
62425. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the May 4, 1998 Decision of the
SO ORDERED.[1]
Factual Antecedents
Respondent
Special Steel Products, Inc. (SSPI) is a private domestic corporation selling
steel products. Its co-respondent
Augusto L. Pardo (Pardo) is SSPIs President and majority stockholder.[2]
International
Copra Export Corporation (Interco) is its regular customer.[3]
Jose
Isidoro[4] Uy, alias Jolly Uy (Uy), is an Interco employee, in charge of the
purchasing department, and the son-in-law of its majority stockholder.[5]
Petitioner
Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable or bank) is a private domestic
corporation engaged in banking[6] and is the depository bank
of Interco and of Uy.
In
1991, SSPI sold welding electrodes to Interco, as evidenced by the following
sales invoices:
Sales Invoice No. 65042
dated February 14, 1991 for P325,976.34[7]
Sales Invoice No. 65842
dated April 11, 1991 for P345,412.80[8]
Sales Invoice No. 65843
dated April 11, 1991 for P313,845.84[9]
The due dates for these invoices were March 16, 1991
(for the first sales invoice) and May 11, 1991 (for the others). The invoices provided that Interco would pay
interest at the rate of 36% per annum in case of delay.
In
payment for the above welding electrodes, Interco issued three checks payable
to the order of SSPI on July 10, 1991,[10] July 16, 1991,[11] and July 29, 1991.[12] Each check was crossed with the notation
account payee only and was drawn against Equitable. The records do not identify the signatory for
these three checks, or explain how Uy, Intercos purchasing officer, came into
possession of these checks.
The
records only disclose that Uy presented each crossed check to Equitable on the
day of its issuance and claimed that he had good title thereto.[13] He demanded the deposit of the checks in his
personal accounts in Equitable, Account No. 18841-2 and Account No. 03474-0.[14]
Equitable
acceded to Uys demands on the assumption that Uy, as the son-in-law of
Intercos majority stockholder,[15] was acting pursuant to
Intercos orders. The bank also relied
on Uys status as a valued client.[16] Thus, Equitable accepted the checks for
deposit in Uys personal accounts[17] and stamped ALL PRIOR
ENDORSEMENT AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENT GUARANTEED on their dorsal portion.[18] Uy promptly withdrew the proceeds of the
checks.
In
October 1991, SSPI reminded Interco of the unpaid welding electrodes, amounting
to P985,234.98.[19] It reiterated its demand on January 14, 1992.[20] SSPI explained its immediate need for payment
as it was experiencing some financial crisis of its own. Interco replied that it had already issued
three checks payable to SSPI and drawn against Equitable. SSPI denied receipt of these checks.
On
August 6, 1992, SSPI requested information from Equitable regarding the three
checks. The bank refused to give any
information invoking the confidentiality of deposits.[21]
The
records do not disclose the circumstances surrounding Intercos and SSPIs
eventual discovery of Uys scheme.
Nevertheless, it was determined that Uy, not SSPI, received the proceeds
of the three checks that were payable to SSPI.
Thus, on June 30, 1993 (twenty-three months after the issuance of the
three checks), Interco finally paid the value of the three checks to SSPI, plus
a portion of the accrued interests.
Interco refused to pay the entire accrued interest of P767,345.64
on the ground that it was not responsible for the delay. Thus, SSPI was unable to collect P437,040.35
(at the contracted rate of 36% per annum) in interest income.[22]
SSPI
and its president, Pardo, filed a complaint for damages with application for a
writ of preliminary attachment against Uy and Equitable Bank. The complaint alleged that the three crossed
checks, all payable to the order of SSPI and with the notation account payee
only, could be deposited and encashed by SSPI only. However, due to Uys fraudulent
representations, and Equitables indispensable connivance or gross negligence,
the restrictive nature of the checks was ignored and the checks were deposited
in Uys account. Had the defendants not
diverted the three checks in July 1991, the plaintiffs could have used them in
their business and earned money from them.
Thus, the plaintiffs prayed for an award of actual damages consisting of
the unrealized interest income from the proceeds of the checks for the two-year
period that the defendants withheld the proceeds from them (from July 1991 up
to June 1993).[23]
In
his personal capacity, Pardo claimed an award of P3 million as moral
damages from the defendants. He
allegedly suffered hypertension, anxiety, and sleepless nights for fear that
the government would charge him for tax evasion or money laundering. He maintained that defendants actions
amounted to money laundering and that it unfairly implicated his company in the
scheme. As for his fear of tax evasion,
Pardo explained that the Bureau of Internal Revenue might notice a discrepancy
between the financial reports of Interco (which might have reported the checks
as SSPIs income in 1991) and those of SSPI (which reported the income only in
1993). Since Uy and Equitable were
responsible for Pardos worries, they should compensate him jointly and
severally therefor.[24]
SSPI
and Pardo also prayed for exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[25]
In
support of their application for preliminary attachment, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants are guilty of fraud in incurring the obligation upon which
the action was brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claim
sought to be enforced in this action.[26]
The
trial court granted plaintiffs application.[27] It issued the writ of preliminary attachment
on September 20, 1993,[28] upon the filing of
plaintiffs bond for P500,000.00.
The sheriff served and implemented the writ against the personal
properties of both defendants.[29]
Upon
Equitables motion and filing of a counter-bond, however, the trial court
eventually discharged the attachment[30] against it.[31]
Equitable
then argued for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of
action. It maintained that interest
income is due only when it is expressly stipulated in writing. Since Equitable and SSPI did not enter into any contract, Equitable is not liable for
damages, in the form of unobtained interest income, to SSPI.[32] Moreover, SSPIs acceptance of Intercos
payment on the sales invoices is a
waiver or extinction of SSPIs cause of action based on the three checks.[33]
Equitable
further argued that it is not liable to SSPI because it accepted the three
crossed checks in good faith.[34] Equitable averred that, due to Uys close
relations with the drawer of the checks, the bank had basis to assume that the
drawer authorized Uy to countermand the original order stated in the check
(that it can only be deposited in the named payees account). Since only Uy is responsible for the
fraudulent conversion of the checks, he should reimburse Equitable for any
amounts that it may be made liable to plaintiffs.[35]
The
bank counter-claimed that SSPI is liable to it in damages for the wrongful and
malicious attachment of Equitables personal properties. The bank maintained that SSPI knew that the
allegation of fraud against the bank is a falsehood. Further, the bank is financially capable to
meet the plaintiffs claim should the latter receive a favorable judgment. SSPI was aware that the preliminary
attachment against the bank was unnecessary, and intended only to humiliate or
destroy the banks reputation.[36]
Meanwhile,
Uy answered that the checks were negotiated to him; that he is a holder for
value of the checks and that he has a good title thereto.[37] He did not, however, explain how he obtained
the checks, from whom he obtained his title, and the value for which he received
them. During trial, Uy did not present
any evidence but adopted Equitables evidence as his own.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court [38]
The
RTC clarified that SSPIs cause of action against Uy and Equitable is for
quasi-delict. SSPI is not seeking to
enforce payment on the undelivered checks from the defendants, but to recover
the damage that it sustained from the wrongful non-delivery of the checks.[39]
The
crossed checks belonged solely to the payee named therein, SSPI. Since SSPI did not authorize anyone to
receive payment in its behalf, Uy clearly had no title to the checks and
Equitable had no right to accept the said checks from Uy. Equitable was negligent in permitting Uy to
deposit the checks in his account without verifying Uys right to endorse the
crossed checks. The court reiterated
that banks have the duty to scrutinize the checks deposited with it, for a
determination of their genuineness and regularity. The law holds banks to a high standard
because banks hold themselves out to the public as experts in the field. Thus, the trial court found Equitables
explanation regarding Uys close relations with the drawer unacceptable.[40]
Uys
conversion of the checks and Equitables negligence make them liable to
compensate SSPI for the actual damage it sustained. This damage consists of the income that SSPI
failed to realize during the delay.[41] The trial court then equated this unrealized
income with the interest income that SSPI failed to collect from Interco. Thus, it ordered Uy and Equitable to pay,
jointly and severally, the amount of P437,040.35 to SSPI as actual
damages.[42]
It
also ordered the defendants to pay exemplary damages of P500,000.00,
attorneys fees amounting to P200,000.00, as well as costs of suit.[43]
The
trial court likewise found merit in Pardos claim for moral damages. It found that Pardo suffered anxiety,
sleepless nights, and hypertension in fear that he would face criminal
prosecution. The trial court awarded
Pardo the amount of P3 million in moral damages.[44]
The dispositive portion of the trial
courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs Special Steel Products, Inc., and Augusto L. Pardo and against
defendants Equitable Banking Corporation [and] Jose Isidoro Uy, alias Jolly
Uy, ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the following:
1. P437,040.35
as actual damages;
2. P3,000,000.00
as moral damages to Augusto L. Pardo;
3. P500,000.00
as exemplary damages;
4. P200,000.00
as attorneys fees; and
5. Costs of
suit.
Defendant EBCs counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of factual and legal basis.
Likewise, the crossclaim filed by defendant EBC
against defendant Jose Isidoro Uy and the crossclaim filed by defendant Jose
Isidoro Uy against defendant EBC are hereby DISMISSED for lack of factual and
legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court denied Equitables motion for
reconsideration in its Order dated November 19, 1998.[46]
Only
Equitable appealed to the CA,[47] reiterating its defenses below.
Appealed Ruling of the Court of Appeals[48]
The appellate court found no merit
in Equitables appeal.
It
affirmed the trial courts ruling that SSPI had a cause of action for
quasi-delict against Equitable.[49] The CA noted that the three checks presented
by Uy to Equitable were crossed checks, and strictly made payable to SSPI
only. This means that the checks could
only be deposited in the account of the named payee.[50] Thus, the CA found that Equitable had the responsibility
of ensuring that the crossed checks are deposited in SSPIs account only. Equitable violated this duty when it allowed
the deposit of the crossed checks in Uys account.[51]
The
CA found factual and legal basis to affirm the trial courts award of moral
damages in favor of Pardo.[52]
It
likewise affirmed the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees in favor
of SSPI.[53]
Issues
1. Whether SSPI has a cause of
action against Equitable for quasi-delict;
2. Whether SSPI can recover, as actual damages,
the stipulated 36% per annum interest from Equitable;
3. Whether speculative fears and imagined
scenarios, which cause sleepless nights, may be the basis for the award of
moral damages; and
4. Whether the attachment of Equitables personal
properties was wrongful.
Our Ruling
SSPIs cause of action
This
case involves a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict. SSPI asserts that it did not receive prompt
payment from Interco in July 1991 because of Uys wilful and illegal conversion
of the checks payable to SSPI, and of Equitables gross negligence, which
facilitated Uys actions. The combined
actions of the defendants deprived SSPI of interest income on the said moneys
from July 1991 until June 1993. Thus,
SSPI claims damages in the form of interest income for the said period from the
parties who wilfully or negligently withheld its money from it.
Equitable
argues that SSPI cannot assert a right against the bank based on the
undelivered checks.[54] It cites provisions from the Negotiable
Instruments Law and the case of Development
Bank of Rizal v. Sima Wei[55] to argue that a payee,
who did not receive the check, cannot require the drawee bank to pay it the sum
stated on the checks.
Equitables
argument is misplaced and beside the point.
SSPIs cause of action is not based on the three checks. SSPI does not ask Equitable or Uy to deliver
to it the proceeds of the checks as the rightful payee. SSPI does not assert a right based on the
undelivered checks or for breach of contract.
Instead, it asserts a cause of action based on quasi-delict. A
quasi-delict is an act or omission, there being fault or negligence, which
causes damage to another. Quasi-delicts
exist even without a contractual relation between the parties. The courts below correctly ruled that SSPI
has a cause of action for quasi-delict against Equitable.
The
checks that Interco issued in favor of SSPI were all crossed, made payable to
SSPIs order, and contained the notation account payee only. This creates a reasonable expectation that
the payee alone would receive the proceeds of the checks and that diversion of
the checks would be averted. This
expectation arises from the accepted banking practice that crossed checks are
intended for deposit in the named payees account only and no other.[56] At the very least, the nature of crossed
checks should place a bank on notice that it should exercise more caution or
expend more than a cursory inquiry, to ascertain whether the payee on the check
has authorized the holder to deposit the same in a different account. It is well to remember that [t]he banking
system has become an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a
vital role in the economic life of every civilized society. Whether as mere passive entities for the
safe-keeping and saving of money or as active instruments of business and
commerce, banks have attained an [sic] ubiquitous presence among the people,
who have come to regard them with respect and even gratitude and, above all,
trust and confidence. In this
connection, it is important that banks should guard against injury attributable
to negligence or bad faith on its part. As
repeatedly emphasized, since the banking business is impressed with public
interest, the trust and confidence of the public in it is of paramount
importance. Consequently, the highest
degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and
performance are required of it.[57]
Equitable
did not observe the required degree of diligence expected of a banking institution
under the existing factual circumstances.
The
fact that a person, other than the named payee of the crossed check, was
presenting it for deposit should have put the bank on guard. It should have verified if the payee (SSPI) authorized the holder (Uy) to present
the same in its behalf, or indorsed it to him.
Considering however, that the named payee does not have an account with
Equitable (hence, the latter has no specimen signature of SSPI by which to
judge the genuineness of its indorsement to Uy), the bank knowingly assumed the
risk of relying solely on Uys word that he had a good title to the three
checks. Such misplaced reliance on empty
words is tantamount to gross negligence, which is the absence of or failure to
exercise even slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care, evincing
a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them.[58]
Equitable contends that its knowledge that Uy
is the son-in-law of the majority stockholder of the drawer, Interco, made it
safe to assume that the drawer
authorized Uy to countermand the
order appearing on the check. In other
words, Equitable theorizes that Interco reconsidered its original order and
decided to give the proceeds of the checks to Uy.[59] That the bank arrived at this conclusion
without anything on the face of the checks to support it is demonstrative of
its lack of caution. It is troubling
that Equitable proceeded with the transaction based only on its knowledge that
Uy had close relations with Interco. The
bank did not even make inquiries with the drawer, Interco (whom the bank
considered a valued client), to verify Uys representation. The banking system is placed in peril when
bankers act out of blind faith and empty promises, without requiring proof of
the assertions and without making the appropriate inquiries. Had it only exercised due diligence,
Equitable could have saved both Interco and the named payee, SSPI, from the
trouble that the banks mislaid trust wrought for them.
Equitables
pretension that there is nothing under the circumstances that rendered Uys
title to the checks questionable is outrageous.
These are crossed checks, whose manner of discharge, in banking
practice, is restrictive and specific.
Uys name does not appear anywhere on the crossed checks. Equitable, not knowing the named payee on the
check, had no way of verifying for itself the alleged genuineness of the
indorsement to Uy. The checks bear
nothing on their face that supports the belief that the drawer gave the checks
to Uy. Uys relationship to Intercos
majority stockholder will not justify disregarding what is clearly ordered on
the checks.
Actual damages
For its role in the conversion of the checks, which
deprived SSPI of the use thereof, Equitable is solidarily liable with Uy to
compensate SSPI for the damages it suffered.
Among
the compensable damages are actual damages, which encompass the value of the
loss sustained by the plaintiff, and the profits that the plaintiff failed to
obtain.[60] Interest payments, which SSPI claims, fall
under the second category of actual damages.
SSPI
computed its claim for interest payments based on the interest rate stipulated
in its contract with Interco. It
explained that the stipulated interest rate is the actual interest income it
had failed to obtain from Interco due to the defendants tortious conduct.
The
Court finds the application of the stipulated interest rate erroneous.
SSPI
did not recover interest payments at the stipulated rate from Interco because
it agreed that the delay was not Intercos fault, but that of the
defendants. If that is the case, then
Interco is not in delay (at least not after issuance of the checks) and the
stipulated interest payments in their contract did not become operational. If Interco is not liable to pay for the 36%
per annum interest rate, then SSPI did not lose that income. SSPI cannot lose something that it was not
entitled to in the first place. Thus, SSPIs claim that it was entitled to
interest income at the rate stipulated in its contract with Interco, as a
measure of its actual damage, is fallacious.
More
importantly, the provisions of a contract generally take effect only among the
parties, their assigns and heirs.[61] SSPI cannot invoke the contractual
stipulation on interest payments against Equitable because it is neither a
party to the contract, nor an assignee or an heir to the contracting
parties.
Nevertheless,
it is clear that defendants actions deprived SSPI of the present use of its
money for a period of two years. SSPI is
therefore entitled to obtain from the tortfeasors the profits that it failed to
obtain from July 1991 to June 1993. SSPI
should recover interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum,[62] this being an award for
damages based on quasi-delict and not for a loan or forbearance of money.
Moral damages
Both the trial and appellate courts awarded Pardo P3
million in moral damages. Pardo claimed that he was frightened, anguished, and
seriously anxious that the government would prosecute him for money laundering
and tax evasion because of defendants actions.[63] In other words, he was
worried about the repercussions that defendants actions would have on
him.
Equitable
argues that Pardos fears are all imagined and should not be compensated. The bank points out that none of Pardos
fears panned out.[64]
Moral damages are recoverable only when they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[65] Both the trial and appellate courts found
that Pardo indeed suffered as a result of the diversion of the three
checks. It does not matter that the
things he was worried and anxious about did not eventually materialize. It is rare for a person, who is beset with
mounting problems, to sift through his emotions and distinguish which fears or
anxieties he should or should not bother with.
So long as the injured partys moral sufferings are the result of the
defendants actions, he may recover moral damages.
The
Court, however, finds the award of P3 million excessive. Moral damages are given not to punish the
defendant but only to give the plaintiff the means to assuage his sufferings
with diversions and recreation.[66] We find that the award of P50,000.00[67] as moral damages is
reasonable under the circumstances.
Equitable to recover amounts from Uy
Equitable
then insists on the allowance of their cross-claim against Uy. The bank argues that it was Uy who was
enriched by the entire scheme and should reimburse Equitable for whatever
amounts the Court might order it to pay in damages to SSPI.[68]
Equitable
is correct. There is unjust enrichment
when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another.[69] In the instant case, the fraudulent scheme
concocted by Uy allowed him to improperly receive the proceeds of the three
crossed checks and enjoy the profits from these proceeds during the entire time
that it was withheld from SSPI.
Equitable, through its gross negligence and mislaid trust on Uy, became
an unwitting instrument in Uys scheme.
Equitables fault renders it solidarily liable with Uy, insofar as
respondents are concerned. Nevertheless,
as between Equitable and Uy, Equitable should be allowed to recover from Uy
whatever amounts Equitable may be made to pay under the judgment. It is clear that Equitable did not profit in
Uys scheme. Disallowing Equitables
cross-claim against Uy is tantamount to allowing Uy to unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of Equitable. For this
reason, the Court allows Equitables cross-claim against Uy.
Preliminary attachment
Equitable
next assails as error the trial courts dismissal of its counter-claim for
wrongful preliminary attachment. It maintains that, contrary to SSPIs
allegation in its application for the writ, there is no showing whatsoever that
Equitable was guilty of fraud in allowing Uy to deposit the checks. Thus, the trial court should not have issued
the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of SSPI. The wrongful attachment
compelled Equitable to incur expenses for a counter-bond, amounting to P30,204.26,
and caused it to sustain damage, amounting to P5 million, to its
goodwill and business credit.[70]
SSPI
submitted the following affidavit in support of its application for a writ of
preliminary attachment:
I, Augusto L. Pardo, of
legal age, under oath hereby depose and declare:
1. I am one of the plaintiffs
in the above-entitled case; the other plaintiff is our family corporation,
Special Steel Products, Inc., of which I am the president and majority
stockholder; I caused the preparation of the foregoing Complaint, the
allegations of which I have read, and which I hereby affirm to be true and
correct out of my own personal knowledge;
2. The corporation and I have a
sufficient cause of action against defendants Isidoro Uy alias Jolly Uy and
Equitable Banking Corporation, who are guilty of fraud in incurring the
obligation upon which this action is brought, as particularly alleged in the
Complaint, which allegations I hereby adopt and reproduce herein;
3. There is no sufficient
security for our claim in this action and that the amount due us is as much as
the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims;
4. We are ready and able to put
up a bond executed to the defendants in an amount to be fixed by the Court[,]
conditioned on the payment of all costs[,] which may be adjudged to
defendants[,] and all damages[,] which they may sustain by reason of the
attachment of the court, should [the court] finally adjudge that we are not
entitled thereto.[71]
The complaint (to which the supporting affidavit
refers) cites the following factual circumstances to justify SSPIs
application:
6. x x x Yet, notwithstanding
the fact that SPECIAL STEEL did not open an account with EQUITABLE BANK as
already alleged, thru its connivance with defendant UY in his fraudulent scheme
to defraud SPECIAL STEEL, or at least thru its gross negligence EQUITABLE
BANK consented to or allowed the opening of Account No. 18841-2 at its head
office and Account No. 03474-0 at its Ermita Branch in the name of SPECIAL
STEEL without the latters knowledge, let alone authority or consent, but
obviously on the bases of spurious or falsified documents submitted by UY
or under his authority, which documents EQUITABLE BANK did not
bother to verify or check their authenticity with SPECIAL STEEL.[72]
x x x x
9. On August 6, 1992,
plaintiffs, thru counsel, wrote EQUITABLE BANK about the fraudulent
transactions involving the aforesaid checks, which could not have been
perpetrated without its indispensable participation and cooperation, or gross
negligence, and therein solicited its cooperation in securing information as to
the anomalous and irregular opening of the false accounts maintained in SPECIAL
STEELs name, but EQUITABLE BANK malevolently shirking from its responsibility
to prevent the further perpetration of fraud, conveniently, albeit
unjustifiably, invoked the confidentiality of the deposits and refused to give
any information, and accordingly denied SPECIAL STEELs valid request, thereby
knowingly shielding the identity of the ma[le]factors involved [in] the
unlawful and fraudulent transactions.[73]
The above affidavit and the allegations of the
complaint are bereft of specific and definite allegations of fraud against
Equitable that would justify the attachment of its properties. In fact, SSPI admits its uncertainty whether
Equitables participation in the transactions involved fraud or was a result of
its negligence. Despite such uncertainty
with respect to Equitables participation, SSPI applied for and obtained a
preliminary attachment of Equitables properties on the ground of fraud. We believe that such preliminary attachment
was wrongful. [A] writ of preliminary
attachment is too harsh a provisional remedy to be issued based on mere abstractions
of fraud. Rather, the rules require that
for the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual
circumstances manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud upon the
creditor at the time of the execution of their agreement in that said debtor
had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay the creditor.[74] No proof was adduced tending to show that
Equitable had a preconceived plan not to pay SSPI or had knowingly participated
in Uys scheme.
That the plaintiffs eventually obtained a judgment in
their favor does not detract from the wrongfulness of the preliminary
attachment. While the evidence warrants
[a] judgment in favor of [the] applicant, the proofs may nevertheless also establish
that said applicants proffered ground for attachment was inexistent or
specious, and hence, the writ should not have issued at all x x x.[75]
For such wrongful preliminary attachment, plaintiffs
may be held liable for damages. However,
Equitable is entitled only to such damages as its evidence would allow,[76] for the wrongfulness of
an attachment does not automatically warrant the award of damages. The debtor still has the burden of proving
the nature and extent of the injury that it suffered by reason of the wrongful
attachment.[77]
The
Court has gone over the records and found that Equitable has duly proved its
claim for, and is entitled to recover, actual damages. In order to lift the wrongful attachment of
Equitables properties, the bank was compelled to pay the total amount of P30,204.26
in premiums for a counter-bond.[78] However, Equitable failed to prove that it
sustained damage to its goodwill and business credit in consequence of the
alleged wrongful attachment. There was
no proof of Equitables contention that respondents actions caused it public
embarrassment and a bank run.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed October 13, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62425 is MODIFIED by:
1. REDUCING the award of
actual damages to respondents to the rate of 6% per annum of the value of the three checks from July 1991 to
June 1993 or a period of twenty-three months;
2. REDUCING the award of
moral damages in favor of Augusto L. Pardo from P3,000,000.00 to P 50,000.00; and
3. REVERSING the dismissal
of Equitable Banking Corporations cross-claim against Jose Isidoro Uy, alias Jolly Uy. Jolly Uy is hereby ORDERED to REIMBURSE
Equitable Banking Corporation the amounts that the latter will pay to
respondents.
Additionally,
the Court hereby REVERSES the
dismissal of Equitable Banking Corporations counterclaim for damages against Special
Steel Products, Inc. This Court ORDERS Special Steel Products, Inc. to
PAY Equitable Banking Corporation actual damages in the total amount of P30,204.36, for the wrongful
preliminary attachment of its properties.
The rest of the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
* Per Special Order No.
1226 dated May 30, 2012.
** Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30,
2012.
[1] Rollo, p. 47.
[2] Records, p. 247.
[3] Id. at 248.
[4] Also referred to in the records as
Isidro.
[5] RTC Decision, p. 2; rollo, p. 50.
[6] Records, p. 247.
[7] Id. at 301.
[8] Id. at 306.
[9] Id. at 307.
[10] Check No. 032909 for P422,788.98; id. at
298.
[11] Check No. 032974 for P313,845.84; id. at
299.
[12] Check No. 033060 for P441,505.30; id. at
300.
[13] The dorsal portions of the check contained a
stamp, which read Special Steel Product By: ___ and the blank portion had the
initials TM. For clarity, Equitable
does not claim that it accepted the checks on the bases of these indorsements
hence its authenticity was not in issue.
Equitable maintains that it proceeded on the assumption that Uy was
acting on behalf of the drawer, Interco.
[14] Records, pp. 91, 428-429.
[15] Id. at 44 and 478.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 479.
[18] Id. at 298-300.
[19] Id. at 308-309, 311.
[20] Id. at 312.
[21] Id. at 117-118, 250.
[22] Id. at 251.
[23] Id. at 120.
[24] Id. at 251-252.
[25] Id. at 252.
[26] Id. at 15.
[27] Id. at 16.
[28] Id. at 32.
[29] Id. at 30.
[30] Id. at 40-42.
[31] Id. at 57-70.
[32] Id. at 46-47.
[33] Id. at 47.
[34] Id. at 45.
[35] Id. at 51.
[36] Id. at 48-51.
[37] Id. at 91-92.
[38] Rollo, pp. 49-58; penned by Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo.
[39] RTC Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 54-55.
[40] Id. at 7-8; id. at
55-56.
[41] Id. at 9; id. at
57.
[42] Id. at 10; id. at 58.
[43] Id. at 10; id. at 58.
[44] Id. at 9-10; id. at
57-58.
[45] Id. at 10; id. at 58.
[46] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[47] CA rollo, pp. 12-33.
[48] Rollo, pp. 35-48; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and
concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr.
[49] CA Decision, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 42-43.
[50] Id. at 9-10; id. at
43-44.
[51]
[52] Id. at 12-13; id. at 46-47.
[53] Id. at 13; id. at 47.
[54] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 17-18, 10-12; rollo, pp. 121-122, 114-116.
[55] G.R. No. 85419, March 9,
1993, 219 SCRA 736.
[56] Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89802, May 7, 1992,
208 SCRA 465, 468-469.
[57] Security Bank and Trust Company v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R. Nos. 170984 & 170987,
January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 407, 416-417.
[58] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. BA Finance Corporation, G.R.
No. 179952, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 620, 635.
[59] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 21; rollo, p. 125.
[60] Civl Code, Art. 2200; Cantemprate v. CRS
Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171399, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 492,
514-515.
[61] Civil Code, Art.
1311.
[62] Security Bank and Trust Company v. Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation, supra note 57.
[63] Records, p. 251.
[64] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 14; rollo, p. 118.
[65] Civil
Code, Art. 2217.
[66] Lorzano v. Tabayag, G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012.
[67] Go v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 168842, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 107,
112 and 118.
[68] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 128.
[69] Allied Banking Corporation v. Lim Sio Wan, G.R. No. 133179, March 27, 2008, 549 SCRA 504, 524, citing Tamio v. Ticson, 485 Phil. 434, 443
(2004).
[70] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 22-23; rollo, pp. 126-127.
[71] Records, p. 15.
[72] Id. at 2-3.
[73] Id. at 4.
[74] Tanchan v. Allied Banking Corporation, G. R. No. 164510, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA
512, 532. (Emphasis supplied)
[75] Carlos v. Sandoval, 508 Phil. 260, 286 (2005), citing Philippine
Charter Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil. 74, 80 (1989).
[76] Yu v. Ngo Yet Te, G.R. No. 155868, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 423, 435.
[77] Id..
[78] Records, pp. 432-433.