Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, - versus
- MANOLITO Q. TRIA,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 174809
Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, BERSAMIN,* ABAD, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: June 27, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated
The facts, as found by the CA, are as
follows:
Petitioner Duty Free Philippines Services,
Inc. is a manpower agency that provides personnel to Duty Free Philippines (DFP).
On
In an Audit
Report, dated January 16, 1998, it was revealed that 1,020 packs of
Marlboro bearing Merchandise Code No. 020101 under WRR No. 36-04032 were not
included in the condemnation proceedings held on December 27, 1996 and that
there were glaring discrepancies in
the related documents which indicate
a malicious attempt to conceal an
anomalous irregularity. The relevant Request for Condemnation was found to
have been fabricated and all signatories therein, namely, Ed Garcia,
Stockkeeper; Catherino A. Bero, DIU Supervisor; and Constantino L. Cruz, were
held accountable for the irregular loss
of the unaccounted Marlboro KS Pack of 5
After further investigation, it was
discovered that the subject merchandise was illegally brought out of the
warehouse and it was made to appear that in all the documents prepared said
goods were legally condemned on
Consequently, the Discipline Committee requested [respondent] to submit a
written reply/explanation regarding the findings in the Audit Report and the
allegations of Garcia.
[Respondent] denied his participation in the illegal transaction. Although he
admitted that he instructed Garcia to look for a van, it was for the purpose of
transferring the damaged merchandise from the main warehouse to the proper
warehouse for damaged goods.
On August 27, 1998, the DFP Discipline
Committee [DFPDC] issued a Joint
Resolution holding [respondent] GUILTY
OF DISHONESTY for (his) direct participation in the fake condemnation and
pilferage of the missing 1,020 Marlboro Pack of 5s cigarettes and orders
(his) DISMISSAL from the service for cause and for loss of trust and
confidence, with forfeiture of all rights and privileges due them from the
company, except earned salaries and leave credits.
On
Aggrieved, [respondent] filed a Complaint
against Petitioner for Illegal Dismissal and for payment of backwages,
attorneys fees and damages.[4]
On
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being
considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent company to
reinstate complainant to his former position with all the rights, privileges,
and benefits appertaining thereto, including seniority, plus full backwages
which as of P172,672.50. Further, the respondent is ordered to pay
complainant the equivalent of ten percent (10%) of the total backwages as and
for attorneys fees.
The claim for damages is denied for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed[7]
the LA decision, but deleted the award of attorneys fees. Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was also denied[8]
on
When
petitioner elevated the case to the CA, it denied for the first time the
existence of employer-employee relationship and pointed to DFP as respondents
real employer. The appellate court, however, considered said defense barred by
estoppel for its failure to raise the defense before the LA and the NLRC.[9] It nonetheless ruled that
although DFPDC conducted the investigation, petitioners dismissal letter
effected respondents termination from employment.[10] On the validity of
respondents dismissal from employment, the CA respected the LA and NLRC
findings and reached the same conclusion that respondent was indeed illegally
dismissed from employment.[11] Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution[12] dated September 21, 2006.
Undaunted,
petitioner elevates the case before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on the following
grounds:
THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER DFPSI IS LIABLE
FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND DECLARE THAT:
A.
DFPSI IS
THE DIRECT EMPLOYER OF RESPONDENT INSTEAD OF DUTY FREE
B.
THE
ISSUE AS TO WHO TERMINATED RESPONDENT WAS RAISED ONLY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN
IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE LIABILITY OF DFP, AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE
COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN
IT HELD THAT RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT WAS ILLEGALLY TERMINATED.[13]
Petitioner insists that the CA erred in not considering its
argument that it is not the employer of respondent. It likewise faults the CA
in not ruling on the liability of DFP as an indispensable party.
We
cannot sustain petitioners contention. In its Position Paper,[14]
petitioner highlighted respondents complicity and involvement in the alleged
fake condemnation of damaged cigarettes as found by the DFPDC. This,
according to petitioner, was a just cause for terminating an employee.
In its Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Appeal,[15]
petitioner insisted that there was basis for the termination of respondents
employment. Even in its Supplemental Appeal[16]
with the NLRC, petitioner reiterated its stand that respondent was terminated
for a just and valid cause and due process was strictly observed in his
dismissal. It further questioned the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision
allegedly because of strained relations between them.
With
the aforesaid pleadings submitted by petitioner, together with the
corresponding pleadings filed by respondent, the LA and the NLRC declared the
dismissal of respondent illegal. These decisions were premised on the finding
that there was an employer-employee relationship. [17]
Nowhere in said pleadings did petitioner deny the existence of said
relationship. Rather, the line of its defense impliedly admitted said
relationship. The issue of illegal dismissal would have been irrelevant had
there been no employer-employee relationship in the first place.
It was only in petitioners Petition
for Certiorari before the CA did it
impute liability on DFP as respondents direct employer and as the entity who
conducted the investigation and initiated respondents termination proceedings.
Obviously, petitioner changed its theory
when it elevated the NLRC decision to the CA. The appellate court, therefore,
aptly refused to consider the new theory offered by petitioner in its petition.
As the object of the pleadings is to
draw the lines of battle, so to speak, between the litigants, and to indicate
fairly the nature of the claims or defenses of both parties, a party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary to, or inconsistent, with its pleadings.[18] It is a matter of law
that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal. The case will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not
approached and resolved from a different point of view.[19]
The
review of labor cases is confined to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion.[20] The
alleged absence of employer-employee relationship cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.[21]
The resolution of this issue requires the admission and calibration of evidence
and the LA and the NLRC did not pass upon it in their decisions.[22]
We cannot permit petitioner to change its theory on appeal. It would be unfair
to the adverse party who would have no more opportunity to present further
evidence, material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been
aware earlier of the new theory before the LA and the NLRC.[23]
More so in this case as the supposed employer of respondent which is DFP was
not and is not a party to the present case.
In Pamplona Plantation Company v. Acosta,[24]
petitioner therein raised for the first time in its appeal to the NLRC that
respondents therein were not its employees but of another company. In brushing
aside this defense, the Court held:
x
x x Petitioner is estopped from denying that respondents worked for it. In the
first place, it never raised this defense in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
Notably, the defense it raised pertained to the nature of respondents
employment, i.e., whether they are
seasonal employees, contractors, or worked under the pakyaw system. Thus, in its Position Paper, petitioner alleged that
some of the respondents are coconut filers and copra hookers or sakadors; some are seasonal employees
who worked as scoopers or lugiteros;
some are contractors; and some worked under the pakyaw system. In support of these allegations, petitioner even
presented the companys payroll which will allegedly prove its
allegations.
By setting forth these defenses, petitioner, in effect, admitted that
respondents worked for it, albeit in different capacities. Such allegations are
negative pregnant denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial
facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied, and amounts
to an acknowledgment that respondents were indeed employed by petitioner. [25] (Emphasis supplied.)
Also in Telephone Engineering & Service Co.,
Inc. v. WCC, et al.,[26] the Court held that the lack of
employer-employee relationship is a matter of defense that the employer should
properly raise in the proceedings below. The determination of this relationship
involves a finding of fact, which is conclusive and binding and not subject to
review by this Court.[27]
In this
case, petitioner insisted that respondent was dismissed from employment for
cause and after the observance of the proper procedure for termination.
Consequently, petitioner cannot now deny that respondent is its employee. While
indeed, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by acts or omission of the parties,
petitioners belated denial that it is the employer of respondent is obviously
an afterthought, a devise to defeat the law and evade its obligations.[28]
It is a
fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are precluded from
entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the
proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for
reconsideration or on appeal.[29] Petitioner is bound by
its submissions that respondent is its employee and it should not be permitted
to change its theory. Such change of theory cannot be tolerated on appeal, not
due to the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness.[30]
As to the
legality of respondents dismissal, it is well settled that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised, the reason being that this Court is not a
trier of facts, and it is not for this Court to reexamine and reevaluate the
evidence on record.[31]
Findings of fact and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter as well as those of the
NLRC or, for that matter, any other adjudicative body which can be considered
as a trier of facts on specific matters within its field of expertise, should
be considered as binding and conclusive upon the appellate courts.[32]
Petitioner
dismissed respondent from employment based on the recommendation of the DFPDC
holding respondent guilty of dishonesty for his direct participation in the fake
condemnation and pilferage of the missing 1,020 Marlboro Pack of 5
cigarettes.[33]
Respondent was implicated in the anomalous transaction by his co-employees who
pointed to the former as the one who ordered the other suspects to look for a
vehicle that would be used to transport the subject cigarettes. This, according
to the DFPDC, was odd and strange. With this act alone and by reason of his
position, the DFPDC concluded, and affirmed by petitioner, that respondent
definitely had knowledge of the fake condemnation. From these circumstances,
petitioner sustained the findings of dishonesty and dismissed respondent from
employment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior
Associate Justice
(Per
Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
* Designated Acting Member in lieu
of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1241 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 33-41.
[2] Rollo, p. 44.
[3] Penned by Commissioner Tito F.
Genilo, with Presiding Commissioner
[4] Rollo, pp. 34-36.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 49-55.
[6]
[7] Embodied in a Decision dated
[8] CA rollo, pp. 35-37.
[9] Rollo, p. 37.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] CA rollo, pp. 59-72.
[15]
[16]
[17] CAPANELA v. NLRC, 311 Phil. 744, 755 (1995).
[18] Cocomangas Hotel Beach Resort v. Visca, G.R. No. 167045, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 705, 718; Manila Electric Company v. Benamira, G.R. No. 145271, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 331, 348-349.
[19]
[20] Magnolia Dairy Products Corp. v. NLRC, 322 Phil. 508, 516 (1996).
[21]
[22]
[23] China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 45985 and 46036, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 449, 458.
[24] G.R. No. 153193,
[25]
[26] 191 Phil. 663 (1981).
[27] Telephone Engineering & Service Co., Inc. v. WCC, et al., supra, at 669.
[28]
[29] Manila Electric Company v. Benamira, supra note 18, at 349.
[30]
[31]
[32] CAPANELA v. NLRC, supra note 17, at 755-756.
[33] Rollo, p. 35.
[34] Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales, 481 Phil. 73, 88 (2004).
[35] Century Canning Corporation v. Ramil, G.R. No. 171630, August 8, 2010, 627 SCRA 192, 202.