Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
melchor l. lagua, Petitioner, - versus - THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and people of the philippines, Respondent.
|
G.R. No. 173390 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, DEL CASTILLO,* PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 27, 2012 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
In dismissing the present Petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we find no valid, justifiable reason for petitioners failure to file his appellants brief with the Court of Appeals (CA) that would warrant a reversal of the CA Resolutions dated 25 November 2005[1] and 17 May 2006.[2] To rule otherwise would make light of this Courts extraordinary certiorari jurisdiction, which operates only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate tribunal.[3]
On 11 April 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig rendered a Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H finding the accused petitioner guilty of homicide and sentencing him to 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years of reclusion temporal as maximum in each case. On 19 May 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. On 18 June 2003, he filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail Pending Appeal, which the CA granted without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General.[4] On 6 November 2003, an Order of release upon bond was issued in his favor by the Division Clerk of Court of the CA.[5]
On 14 October 2003, petitioner received the Order from the CA requiring, within 45 days from receipt thereof, or until 28 November 2003, the filing of his Appellants Brief.[6] He filed a Motion for Extension of another 45 days from 28 November 2003, or until 12 January 2004, within which to file the said brief. On 8 January 2004, he filed a Second Motion for Extension asking for an additional 45 days, which the CA granted with a warning that no further extension shall be allowed.[7] Thus, petitioner had 45 days from 12 January 2004 or until 26 February 2004.
Despite the two extensions, petitioner Lagua still failed to file his appellants brief. On 5 May 2004, the CA ordered him through counsel to show cause, within five days from receipt, why the appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. He again failed to submit his brief within the reglementary period and to comply with the Courts 5 May 2004 Resolution. Thus, on 1 September 2004, the CA issued a Resolution declaring the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissed pursuant to the Rules.
On 14 October 2004, petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Salvador Quimpo, manifested to the Court that he had already withdrawn as defense counsel for petitioner, but that he had failed to secure the latters conformity.[8] The following day, petitioner himself filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 September 2004 Resolution, requesting more time to secure the services of another counsel. On 20 October 2004, the Solicitor General, manifesting that accused-appellants abandonment of his appeal rendered the judgment of conviction final and executory, moved for his immediate arrest and confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.[9]
In its Resolution dated 9 February 2005, the CA stated that it had never received a Notice of Withdrawal from Atty. Quimpo, but nevertheless granted a 30-day period for petitioner and his new counsel to file a Notice of Appearance. Again, petitioner failed to comply. On 8 July 2005, the CA issued another Show Cause Order, directing him to explain within 10 days why he had not caused the appearance of his new counsel, and why the appeal should not be considered abandoned. Instead of filing a timely compliance, petitioners new counsel, Atty. Emerson Barrientos filed a Notice of Appearance on 8 March 2005 or almost a month after the Show Cause Order.
On 17 August 2005, the CA filed a Resolution stating that in the interest of justice, the Notice of Appearance was considered sufficient compliance with the Order of 8 July 2005. It granted the Motion for Reconsideration, set aside the Order of Dismissal issued on 1 September 2004, and gave petitioner and his new counsel a non-extendible period of 30 days within which to file the appellants brief.
Notwithstanding the new non-extendible period,
petitioner again failed to seasonably file his brief, prompting the CA to issue
the first assailed Resolution dated 25 November 2005, which, for the second time, declared his appeal
abandoned and accordingly dismissed. Roused from inaction, he filed another
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellants Brief on 19
December 2005, or 18 days after his
counsel received the 25 November 2005 Resolution.
In its second assailed Resolution issued on 17 May 2006, the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the Appellants Brief to be expunged from the records, viz:
Indeed the
present appeal has been dismissed twice by the Court because of
accused-appellants failure to file his brief. The present motion for
reconsideration of the second dismissal of the appeal was even filed three (3)
days beyond the reglementary period. Ineluctably, the dismissal of the present
appeal has become final and accused-appellant has lost his right to appeal.
It bears
stressing that accused-appellant cannot simply trifle with the rules of procedure
on the pretext that his life and liberty are at stake. For appeal is a mere
statutory privilege to be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law granting the privilege.[10]
x x x.
Petitioner comes to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in declaring the appeal abandoned, pointing to the negligence and errors of his counsel as the cause of the two-year delay in coming up with the brief. Petitioner reasons that there would be no prejudice to the People if his appeal is reinstated, and that he has a good defense that can lead to his acquittal.
We dismiss the Petition.
The certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is rigorously streamlined, such that Rule 65 only admits cases based on the specific grounds provided therein. The Rule applies if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The independent action for certiorari will lie only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proven to exist. Grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.[11]
In the present case, petitioner would have us strike down the Resolutions of the CA declaring his appeal as abandoned for purportedly being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Yet, far from committing the grievous error petitioner presents it to be, the CA merely exercised the authority expressly granted to it under Rule 124, which we quote below:
Sec. 8. Dismissal
of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The appellate court
may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the
appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within
the time prescribed by this rule, except in case the appellant is represented
by a counsel de oficio.
Petitioner was represented by private counsel (and not counsel de oficio) to whom the CA had granted multiple extensions: two for Atty. Quimpo; and two for Atty. Barrientos, whose Notice of Appearance was submitted a month after the Show Cause Order of 8 July 2005. As for Atty. Quimpo, he filed his Manifestation more than a month after the CA had first issued the dismissal. It was only because of the plea for compassion in petitioners Motion for Reconsideration that the CA granted him another 30 days in order to secure the services of another lawyer. Again, petitioner failed to comply. Both he and the new counsel, Atty. Barrientos, also failed to comply with the second Show Cause Order.
Yet again, the CA allowed Atty. Barrientos Notice of Appearance and considered it substantial compliance with the second Show Cause Order. Out of the CAs liberality, petitioner was given another 30 days to come up with the Appellants Brief. This he failed to submit, prompting the CA, for the second and final time, to declare his appeal as abandoned. Even then, his Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellants Brief was filed 18 days after his counsel received the CA Resolution.
In his Petition, Lagua bewails the negligence and mishandling by his two previous counsels as the reason for the delay, which has lasted for more than two years. However, it is clear from the facts that despite the liberality and consideration afforded to him by the CA, he is by no means blameless. More importantly, his excuse cannot serve as a substitute for the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 65. It does not amount to any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of discretion that may be attributable to the appellate court. Under the circumstances, the CA was well within the authority granted to it under the cited rule.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.[12] Otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit, so long as counsel could allege its own fault or negligence to support the clients case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.
The
rationale for this rule is reiterated in the recent case Bejarasco v. People:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the
counsels acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural
technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained,
holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental
to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such
that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is
regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself.
It is the
clients duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be
informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to
merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being
taken care of is not enough.[13]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
As clients, petitioners should have maintained contact with their
counsel from time to time, and informed themselves of the progress of their
case, thereby exercising that standard of care which an ordinarily prudent man
bestows upon his business.
Even in the absence of the petitioners negligence, the rule in this
jurisdiction is that a party is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. In the
earlier case of Tesoro v. Court of
Appeals, we emphasized
It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is
bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard
to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded
differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds
were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end
to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.
Thus, with the ordinary remedy of appeal lost through the petitioners
own fault, we affirm that no reversible error was committed in the dismissal of
the petition by the appellate court.[14]
Petitioner was granted bail, and he had all the time to contact
his counsel or follow up on the appeal himself. He is similarly responsible for
procuring the services of new counsel after having been told of Atty. Quimpos
withdrawal. Yet he offered no explanation why it took him so long to apprise
Atty. Barrientos of the case, or why they had repeatedly failed to comply with
the CAs Orders after several extensions. As he has lost the ordinary remedy of
appeal because of his own laxity, we cannot allow him to haphazardly take
advantage of the remedy of certiorari.
The Court cannot tolerate habitual failure to follow the
procedural rules, which are indispensable for the orderly and speedy
disposition of justice. Otherwise these rules would be rendered useless.[15]
In Polintan v. People, the Court of
Appeals gave the petitioner therein a
total of 75 days to submit his Appellants Brief, but he failed to do so. In
that case, the accused Polintan filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Appellants Brief. This Court affirmed the CA Resolution declaring his appeal
abandoned, after finding his excuses too flimsy to warrant reversal.
In the present case,
accused Lagua was given more time, not
only to file his Appellants Brief, but also to secure new counsel to
adequately prepare the appeal. The CA issued two Show Cause Orders and two
Resolutions declaring the appeal as abandoned. Despite these issuances, his
second Motion for Reconsideration was filed 18 days after his receipt of the
second and final CA Resolution. To our mind, this delay is indicative of sheer
laxity and indifference on his part, for which he has lost the statutory right
of appeal. Even during the intervening period after counsel has withdrawn,
litigants are expected to be vigilant and conscious of the status of their
cases, viz:
The appellate
court committed no error therefore in dismissing the appeal.
Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their
inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for
their counsels utter inaction and gross indifference and neglect in not having
filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same. They
could not even claim ignorance of the appellate courts notice to file brief
since it had required withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their written
conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and certainly they must
have ascertained from him as well as new counsel the status of their appeal which
accounts for Atty. Valentes repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal
for the granting of sufficient time for new counsel to file the brief. They had
almost a year thereafter to make sure that their new counsel did attend to
their appeal and did file the brief.[16]
In Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang
v. Gaviola,[17] the Court made a clear finding of
negligence on the part of the lawyer handling the petitioners case, but
nevertheless affirmed the denial of the appeal. It confirmed that the petitioner
was bound by his counsels negligence. It ruled that the right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory
privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law.
Neither can we deem petitioner Laguas Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellants Brief as substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. In Cario v. Espinoza,[18] the appellate court rightly disallowed the submission of the Appellants Brief after a delay of seven months. In this case, it took petitioner almost two years from 26 February 2004 (after the CA gave him a second non-extendible period of 45 days) to finally submit his Appellants Brief on 19 December 2005.
Lastly, it is erroneous for petitioner to declare that there would be no prejudice to the People if his appeal is reinstated.[19] The judgment of conviction having attained finality, respondent is now entitled to execution as a matter of right. This Court has recently declared:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded, for the immediate enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the full execution of final and executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a strict observance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence.[20] x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is DISMISSED. The assailed
Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals on 25 November 2005 and 17 May 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27423
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
(Per
Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act 1948, as amended)
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 27 June 2012 in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion due to prior action in the Court of Appeals.
[1] In CA-G.R. CR No. 27423, penned by Associate Justice Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis, and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga
and Fernanda Lampas Peralta; rollo, pp.
37-38.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate
Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Mario L. Guaria III, rollo, pp. 39-42.
[3] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
[4] Rollo, p. 78.
[5] Id. at 80.
[6] Id. at 81.
[7] Id. at 86.
[8] Id. at 89-90.
[9] Id. at 91-91.
[10] Id. at 42.
[11] Beluso v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450.
[12] Sapad v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 478, 483 (2000).
[13] G.R. No. 159781, 2 February
2011, 641 SCRA 328, 330-331.
[14] 524 Phil. 752, 760-761 (2006).
[15] Polintan v. People, G.R. No. 161827, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 111.
[16] Villasis v. CA, 158 Phil.
335, 340-341 (1974).
[17] G.R. No. 156809, 4 March 2009, 580 SCRA 565, 573.
[18] G.R. No. 166036, 19 June
2009, 590 SCRA 43.
[19] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[20] Pahila- Garrido v. Tortogo,
G.R. No. 156358, 17 August 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 558.