Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
DOLORES T.
ESGUERRA, G.R. No. 173012
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus -
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
VALLE VERDE COUNTRY CLUB,
INC. and ERNESTO VILLALUNA, June 13, 2012
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before this
Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1]
filed by petitioner Dolores T. Esguerra (Esguerra), from
the
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On
On
The Valle Verde Management found out the following day
that only the proceeds from the Tanay
Room had been remitted to the
accounting department. There were also unauthorized charges of food on the
account of Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio, one of the participants. To resolve the
issue, Valle Verde conducted an investigation; the employees who were assigned
in the two function rooms were summoned and made to explain, in writing, what
had transpired.[6]
On March 6, 2000, Valle Verde sent a memorandum to
Esguerra requiring her to show
cause as to why no disciplinary action should
be taken against her for the
non-remittance of the Ballrooms sales.
Esguerra was placed under preventive suspension with pay, pending investigation.[7]
In her letter-response, Esguerra denied having committed
any misappropriation. She explained that it had been her daughter (who was
assigned as a food checker) who lost the money.[8]
To settle the matter, Esguerra paid the unaccounted amount as soon as her
daughter informed her about it. Esguerra also explained the unauthorized
charging of food on Judge Bonifacios account. She alleged that Judge Bonifacio
took pity on her and told her to take home some food and to charge it on his
account.
Valle Verde found Esguerras explanation unsatisfactory
and, on
THE LABOR ARBITERS RULING
Esguerra filed a complaint[10]
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal. In her P2,016.66, rice
subsidy in the amount of P1,100.00, and ten percent (10%) attorneys
fees in the amount of P311.66.[11]
THE NLRCS RULING
Esguerra appealed the case to the NLRC.[12]
In its December 27, 2002 decision, the NLRC modified the decision and only
awarded P143,000.00 as separation pay, equivalent to one-half () month
for every year of service,[13]
after taking into account Esguerras long years of service and absence of
previous derogatory records.
Esguerra filed a partial motion for reconsideration,[14]
while Valle Verde filed its own motion for reconsideration.[15]
In its
THE CA RULING
Aggrieved, Esguerra elevated her case to the CA via a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari. In
its
Esguerra filed the present petition after the CA
denied[16]
her motion for reconsideration.[17]
THE PETITION
Esguerra
argues that the appellate court erred in ruling that she had been validly
dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. She alleges that she
was only a regular employee and did not occupy a supervisory position vested
with trust and confidence. Esguerra also questions the manner of dismissal
since Valle Verde failed to comply with procedural requirements.
THE ISSUE
The core issue boils down to whether the CA erred in
affirming the NLRCs decision and resolution.
OUR RULING
The petition
is without merit.
Under the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful
dismissal of an employee are two-fold[:] the substantive
and the procedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal be for a just or authorized cause, the rudimentary requirements
of due process notice and hearing must, likewise,
be observed x x x. Without the
concurrence of the two, the termination would x x
x be illegal[;] employment is a property right of which one cannot be deprived of
without due process.[18]
There was valid notice
and hearing
We
fail to find any irregularities in the service of notice to Esguerra. The memorandum
dated
In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company,[20] the Court underscored the
significance of the two-notice rule in dismissing an employee:
To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employers decision to dismiss the employee. [emphases and italics ours].[21]
Contrary to Esguerras allegation,
the law does not require that an intention to terminate ones employment should
be included in the first notice. It is enough that employees are properly
apprised of the charges brought against them so they can properly prepare their
defenses; it is only during the second notice that the intention to terminate
ones employment should be explicitly stated.
a) "ample opportunity to be heard" means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
b)
a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only
when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes
exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances
justify it.
c) the "ample opportunity to be heard" standard in the Labor Code prevails over the "hearing or conference" requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.[22]
In sum, the existence of
an actual, formal "trial-type" hearing, although preferred,
is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee's right to be heard. Esguerra was able to present her defenses; and only
upon proper consideration of it did Valle Verde send the second memorandum
terminating her employment. Since Valle Verde complied with the two-notice requirement,
no procedural defect exists in Esguerras termination.
Esguerra occupied a
position of trust and confidence
We now dwell on the substantive aspect of Esguerras
dismissal. We have held that there are two (2) classes of positions of trust
the first class consists of managerial employees, or those vested with the
power to lay down management policies; and the second class consists of
cashiers, auditors, property custodians or those who, in the normal and routine
exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.
[23]
Esguerra
held the position of Cost Control Supervisor and had the duty to remit to the
accounting department the cash sales proceeds from every transaction she was assigned
to.[24] This is not a routine task that a regular
employee may perform; it is related to
the handling of business expenditures or finances. For this reason, Esguerra occupies a position of
trust and confidence a position enumerated in the second class of positions
of trust. Any breach of the trust imposed upon her can be a valid cause for
dismissal.
In Jardine Davies, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[25] we held that loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment can
be invoked when an employee holds a position of responsibility,
trust and confidence. In order to constitute a just cause
for dismissal, the act complained of must be related to the performance of the
duties of the dismissed employee and must show that he or she is unfit to
continue working for the employer for violation of the trust reposed in him or
her.
We find no merit
in the allegation that it was Esguerras daughter who should be held liable. She
had no custody of the cash sales since it was not part of her duties as a food
checker. It was Esguerras responsibility to account for the cash proceeds; in
case of problems, she should have promptly reported it, regardless of who was
at fault. Instead, she settled the unaccounted amount only after the accounting
department informed her about the discrepancy, almost one month following the
incident. Esguerras failure to make the proper report reflects on her irresponsibility
in the custody of cash for which she was accountable, it was her duty to
account for the sales proceeds, and she should have known about the missing
amount immediately after the event.
We cannot favorably
consider Esguerras explanation about the unauthorized charging on Judge
Bonifacios account. It is highly unethical for an employee to bring home food
intended to be sold to customers. At any rate, her explanation is self-serving
and cannot be believed; the numerous written testimonies of the other co-workers
never even mentioned it.
WHEREFORE, we
hereby DENY the petition for lack of
merit. Costs against Dolores T. Esguerra.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] Under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 8-25.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, and concurred in by Associate Justice Marina L.
Buzon and Associate Justice
[3]
[4] After serving for about twenty (20) years; id. at 118.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Docketed
as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-05960-2000; id.
at 117.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Supra note 3.
[17] Rollo, pp. 37-45.
[19] Supra note 7.
[20] G.R. No. 152048,
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Rollo, p. 35.
[25] G.R. No. 76272,