Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
|
ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY
JANE P. DULAY,
Petitioner, - versus
ABOITIZ
JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.,
Respondents. |
G.R. No.
172642 Present: PERALTA,
J., Acting Chairperson,* ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR.,** MENDOZA,
and PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ. Promulgated: June
13, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before
the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2]
dated July 11, 2005 and April 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 76489.
The factual and procedural antecedents
of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Nelson R. Dulay (Nelson, for brevity) was employed by [herein respondent] General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co-petitioner [herein co-respondent] Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in petitioners vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.
On August 13, 2000, or 25 days after the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCIs collective bargaining agent. Nelsons widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the grievance procedure was declared deadlocked as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow.
On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages.
On March 8, 2001, Joven Mar, Nelsons
brother, received P20,000.00
from [respondents] pursuant to article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a
Certification acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from
further liability. Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggregate
sum of Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) pursuant to [A]rticle 20 (A)1 of
the CBA x x x
x x x x
Merridy Jane averred that the P20,000.00 already received by Joven Mar should be considered advance payment of the total claim of US$90,000.[00].
[Herein respondents], on the other hand, asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of employer-employee relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latters death. Nelson also had no claims against petitioners for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion of his contract with GCI. They further alleged that private respondent is not entitled to death benefits because petitioners are only liable for such in case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract and the cause of his death is not work-related. Petitioners admitted liability only with respect to article 20(A)2 [of the CBA]. x x x
x x x x
However, as petitioners stressed, the same was already discharged.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
private respondent. It took cognizance of the case by virtue of Article 217 (a),
paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the existence of a reasonable causal
connection between the employer-employee relationship and the claim asserted.
It ordered the petitioner to pay P4,621,300.00,
the equivalent of US$90,000.00 less P20,000.00,
at the time of judgment x x x
x x x x
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that the proximate cause of Nelsons death was not work-related.
On appeal, [the NLRC] affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA but reversed the latters ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelsons death.[3]
Herein respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA contending that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the jurisdiction of
the NLRC over the case; in ruling that a different provision of the CBA covers
the death claim; in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the cause
of death is not work-related; and, in
setting aside the release and quitclaim executed by the attorney-in-fact and
not considering the P20,000.00 already received by Merridy Jane through her
attorney-in-fact.
On July 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby GRANTED and the case is REFERRED to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board for the designation of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or the constitution of a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for the
appropriate resolution of the issue on the matter of the applicable CBA
provision.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The CA ruled that while
the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves
the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As
such, jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not the labor
arbiter.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA
denied it in its Resolution of April 18, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether
or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
vests jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain
disputes regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
involving migrant or overseas Filipino workers. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned
Section amended Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code which, in turn, confers
jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over interpretation or implementation
of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies.
The pertinent provisions of Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provide
as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Article
217(c) of the Labor Code, on the other hand, states that:
x x x x
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
On
their part, respondents insist that in the present case, Article 217, paragraph
(c) as well as Article 261 of the Labor Code remain to be the governing
provisions of law with respect to unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Under
these provisions of law, jurisdiction remains with voluntary arbitrators.
Article
261 of the Labor Code reads, thus:
ARTICLE 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The petition is without merit.
It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special
law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, a careful reading of this
special law would readily show that there is no specific provision thereunder
which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances
regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by
petitioner, simply speaks, in general, of claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages. On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and
261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators
have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation
of collective bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant case
involves a situation where the special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject
in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular.[5]
In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint
filed with the NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as
death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that
this issue clearly involves the interpretation or implementation of the said
CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.
In any case, the Court agrees with
petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between the
parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA entered into by and between respondent GCI and
AMOSUP, the union to which petitioner belongs, provides as follows:
The Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration. The Company and the Union further agree that they will use their best endeavor to ensure that any dispute will be discussed, resolved and settled amicably by the parties hereof within ninety (90) days from the date of filing of the dispute or conflict and in case of failure to settle thereof any of the parties retain their freedom to take appropriate action.[6] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that
the parties, in the first place, really intended to bring to conciliation or
voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the interpretation or
application of the provisions of their CBA.
It is settled that when the
parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to
submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be
strictly observed.[7]
It may not be amiss to point out that
the abovequoted provisions of the CBA are in consonance with Rule VII, Section
7 of the present Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which
states that [f]or OFWs with collective bargaining agreements, the case shall
be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles 261 and 262
of the Labor Code. The Court notes that the said Omnibus Rules and Regulations
were promulgated by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and that these departments were mandated to
consult with the Senate Committee on Labor and Employment and the House of
Representatives Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs.
In the same manner, Section 29 of the
prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, promulgated by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), provides as follows:
Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures. − In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If the parties are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may at their option submit the claim or dispute to either the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If there is no provision as to the voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties, the same shall be appointed from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary action on cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of recruitment laws, rules and regulations involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino seafarers. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the above that the
interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation with their counterparts in the
respective committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well
as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving claims of
Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute to
either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration.
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative
bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force
of law, and are entitled to great respect.[8]
Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself.[9]
In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this rule.
The above interpretation of the DOLE,
DFA and POEA is also in consonance with the policy of the state to promote
voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor disputes.[10]
No less than the Philippine
Constitution provides, under the third paragraph, Section 3, Article XIII,
thereof that [t]he State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
Consistent with this constitutional
provision, Article 211 of the Labor Code provides the declared policy of the
State [t]o promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and
conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes.
On
the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that
the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76489 dated
July 11, 2005 and April 18, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
Third Division, Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
* Per Special Order No. 1228 dated June 6, 2012.
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1229 dated June 6, 2012.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Arturo G. Tayag and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; rollo, pp. 14-26.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Normanide B. Pizarro, concurring; id. at 109-111.
[3] Rollo, pp. 15-19.
[4] Id. at 25.
[5] See Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 11, 22-23.
[6] Records, p. 73.
[7] Vivero
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138938, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 268, 281.
[8] ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251, 288-289.
[9] Id; Landbank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 169903, February 29, 2012.
[10] Navarro III v. Damasco, G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 260, 264.