SECOND
DIVISION
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner, -versus- BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., PATRIZIO EZRA,
GERONIMO V. NAZARETH, RUPERTO MAYUGA, SR., ROBERT SCHAARE, HENRY CARIAT,
REYNALDO FERRENAL AND JOHN DOES,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 171905 Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 20, 2012 |
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D E C I S I
O N
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83159 which affirmed the Securities
and Exchange Commission[2]
(SEC) Decision[3]
in SEC Case No. C-00194.
Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
Inc. (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines. It is a
national confederation of incorporated and unincorporated self-governing Evangelical
churches of different denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual counsel and
cooperation. It is the ecclesiastical
successor of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines, the Philippine
Methodist Church and the United Evangelical Church of the Philippines.[4]
Respondent
Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), formerly known as Bradford Memorial
Church, is likewise a religious corporation with a personality separate and
distinct from UCCP. It was organized at
the turn of the 20th century but it was incorporated only on 14
December 1979.
Respondents Patrizio Ezra, Geronimo Nazareth, Ruperto Mayuga,
Sr., Robert Schaare, Henry Cariat, Reynaldo Ferrenal and other John Does are members
of BUCCI.
The following historical background briefly summarizes
the relationship between UCCP and BUCCI, viz:
On May 25, 1948, The
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. was formally organized. The
five ancestor churches were the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian
Church, the Church of Christ (Disciples) and the Congregational Churches. These churches traced their lineage back to
the early Christian Church.
Early on, at the
turn of the century, the proponents of these churches came as missionaries,
spreading the faith as ardent offsprings of the Reformation. Aimed at converting Roman Catholics,
Buddhists, Hindus and spirit worshippers to the Protestant faith, these
missionaries had organized the Evangelical Union by 1901, until it was
superseded by a forerunner of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines.
During th[o]se
times, the precursor of Bradford Memorial Church, the Presbyterian mission came
to the Philippines. It was organized by
the early missionaries of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. through its
Board of Foreign Missions. In 1909, it
was alleged to have acquired real properties in the Philippines funded by one Matilda
R. L. Bradford from whom the congregation attributed its name, in recognition
of her efforts for the church.
While not all
churches in the Evangelical Union were equally strong in their desire for
organic church union, such remained as a goal of the organization. In 1921, it seemed that the plans for the
union of the five churches were not to materialize, so the movement widened its
activities to include all the Presbyterian churches and the Congregational
bodies in the Philippines.
After considerable
negotiations, four churches- the Presbyterian, the Congregational, the United
Brethren and the United Church of Manila were invited and an assembly was held
in Manila. On March 15, 1929, the basis
of Union was formally adopted and the United Evangelical Church came into
being.
The new church
grew in strength from year to year until the Second World War when a division
was created in the newly formed Evangelical Church in the Philippines.
In 1946,
immediately following the close of World War II, the Presbyterians and
Congregationalist Churches in the Visayas and Mindanao region under the Rev.
Leonardo Dia reconstituted the United Evangelical Church in the Philippines in
those areas. In view of this
development, the Bradford Memorial Church transferred its synodical connection
to the newly reorganized United Evangelical Church in the Philippines, and
thereafter, carried the name BRADFORD Evangelical Church.
A few years after
the war, it was thought wise not to push through with the church union. However, on May 25, 1948, a total of 167
delegates from three church bodies met at Ellinwood-Malate Church. They were the Evangelical Church, a
federation of evangelical churches operating in the Luzon area; the Philippine
Methodist Church (a split from the United Methodist-Episcopal Church) and the
United Evangelical Church in the Philipines, a federation of Presbyterian and
Congregationalist churches operating in the Visayas and Mindanao area. Each body reported that its constituted
divisions had voted to accept the basis of Union and to join the new
church. So on May 23-25, 1945, these
three major churches convened, organized and declared the new federation of
evangelical churches.
Thus, the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. or UCCP was born from the union of
these three major churches. Finally, on
April 12, 1949, the UCCP was registered with the Commission.
Thus, by
circumstance, the Bradford Evangelical Church transferred its synodical
connection to and became a constituent Church of the UCCP.
Through the years
the UCCP underwent major changes. Per
its Constitution published in April of 1980, it was apportioned into several
Conferences, delineated according to geographical areas as determined by the
General Assembly. Most of its local
congregations and conferences were also registered as separate entities for
greater autonomy such as the Cebu Conference Inc. and Bradford United Church of
Christ, Inc.
On December 14,
1979, Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) was incorporated as a
personality separate and distinct from UCCP.
Registered under SEC. Reg. No. 90225, its Articles of Incorporation
declare Bradford United Church of Christ as a Protestant Congregation. Among its original incorporators are herein
Respondents Patricio Ezra, Robert Schaare and Geronimo V. Nazareth. Furthermore, Article 3 of its original
articles of incorporation provides:
That its
incorporation is not forbidden by competent authorities or by the Constitution,
rules, regulations or discipline of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines and that of the Bradford United Church of Christ.[5]
UCCP has three (3) governing bodies namely: the
General Assembly, the Conference and the Local Church, each having distinct and
separate duties and powers. As a UCCP
local church located in Cebu, BUCCI belonged to the Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI)
with whom it enjoyed peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when BUCCI started
construction of a fence that encroached upon the right-of way allocated by UCCP
for CCI and Visayas jurisdiction.[6]
UCCP General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute.
On 7 April 1990, the Cebu Conference
Judicial Commission rendered a decision in favor of CCI.[7] This unfavorable decision triggered a series
of events[8]
which further increased the enmity between the parties and led to the formal
break-up of BUCCI from UCCP.[9]
In a Church Council Resolution dated 21 June 1992,
BUCCI disaffiliated from UCCP. The
effectivity of the disaffiliation was made to retroact to 16 September 1990
when BUCCI severed its ties from CCI. This disaffiliation was duly ratified by
BUCCIs members in a referendum held on 19 July 1992.[10]
Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws which provided for and effected its disaffiliation from
UCCP. SEC approved the same on 2 July
1993.[11]
Thereafter, UCCP filed before SEC a complaint/protest
for rejection/annulment of Amended Articles and Incorporation and Injunction,
docketed as SEC Case No. C-00194. UCCP
also prayed for the disallowance of the continued use of BUCCI as corporate
name.[12]
UCCP later on filed an Amended Complaint/Protest dated
8 March 1994, abandoning the original Complaint/Protest. The Amended
Complaint/Protest added BUCCI as one of the respondents; alleged that the
separate incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP
Constitution and By-laws; and sought to enjoin BUCCI and the respondents from
using the name BUCCI, both in its Amended Articles of Incorporation and its
dealings with the public, and from using its properties.[13]
On 27 January 2004, the SEC en banc dismissed UCCPs petition to declare as null and void the
amendments made to the Articles of Incorporation of BUCCI. SEC summarized UCCPs arguments into three
main issues, as follow:
1. Whether or not the separation of [BUCCI]
from [UCCP] is valid;
2. Whether or not the amendments to the
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of BUCCI made after it separated from
UCCP are valid; [and]
3. Whether or not private respondents are
entitled to the use of the name Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.(BUCCI).[14]
SEC defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself
from UCCP in recognition of its constitutional freedom to associate and
disassociate. SEC also pointed out that
since UCCP had used the fact of BUCCIs disaffiliation to consolidate its claim
over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case against BUCCI before
the RTC, UCCP cannot now deny the validity of said disaffiliation. Moreover, SEC found that UCCP is not the real
party in interest to question the amendments made by BUCCI to its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws. Finally, SEC
upheld the right of BUCCI to continue using its corporate name.
UCCP filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. On 17 June 2005, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the SEC.
On 16 September 2005, UCCP filed a motion to drop
BUCCI as respondent.[15]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied on
21 February 2006,[16]
UCCP filed the present appeal.
UCCP maintains that the issue on whether the
disaffiliation of respondents is valid is purely an ecclesiastical affair. It asserts that it has the sole power and
authority to declare and/or decide whether BUCCI or any of its local churches
could disaffiliate from it.[17] UCCP likewise restates that individual
respondents cannot validly effect amendments to BUCCIs Articles and By-Laws
nor to continue the use of BUCCIs name after they have disaffiliated from
UCCP. Moreover, UCCP asseverates that the
stringent requirements of the Corporation Code to effect amendments have not
been satisfied.[18]
UCCP also refutes the holding that BUCCI
no longer forms part of UCCP because the latter had filed several cases against
the former. UCCP explains that the
above-mentioned cases had been filed against individual respondents, and not
against BUCCI; and the inclusion of BUCCIs name in said cases were merely
circumstantial because at the time those cases were filed, individual
respondents were still acting and sabotaging the operation of BUCCI.[19] Lastly, UCCP criticizes SEC for its finding
that UCCP has no legal personality to prosecute the case before it. UCCP asserts that individual respondents were
its former members and BUCCI, the entity involved, is its member-local church.[20]
Respondents,[21]
on the other hand, counter that UCCPs new theorythat the determination of
membership to UCCP is a purely ecclesiastical affairis not and cannot be
allowed at this late stage of the proceedings.[22]
They maintain that the Court of Appeals and SEC are correct in ruling that
BUCCI had validly disaffiliated from UCCP and is entitled to continue in the
use of its name.[23]
As their third point, respondents assert
that the Court of Appeals and SECs finding that UCCP had no legal personality
to question the validity of the amendments to BUCCIs Articles and By-laws, is
in accord with law and settled jurisprudence.[24]
Finally, they point out that the
petition should be dismissed outright for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[25]
The
Court denies the Petition.
The issue is not a purely
ecclesiastical affair
Notably, UCCP invoked the jurisdiction of SEC when it
submitted for resolution the following issues:
1.
Whether
or not BUCCI is an organic component of UCCP subject to the latters
Constitution and By-laws;
2.
Whether
or not the referendum conducted by respondents on July and November 1992 were
valid;
3.
Whether
or not the supposed separation of BUCCI from UCCP is valid;
4.
Whether
or not the amendment of the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of BUCCI is
valid;
5.
Whether
or not private respondents are entitled to the use of the name BUCCI; and
6.
Whether
or not the use of the name BUCCI is confusingly similar with UCCP.[26]
Before the Court of Appeals, UCCP cited the following
as grounds for review:
I.
The
SEC committed serious reversible error in upholding as valid the amendments to
the constitution and by-laws of BUCCI when there was absolutely no evidence
proving that the strict requirements for amendments provided (sic) for under the new Corporation Code
were complied with;
II.
The
SEC committed serious reversible error in disregarding both testimonial and
documentary evidence of the petitioner proving that respondent did not comply
with the proper notice, deliberation of the issues and the 2/3 vote requirement
for validity of the amendments of its articles of incorporation;
III.
The
SEC committed serious reversible error in holding that petitioner UCCP does not
have the legal standing to question the amendments made to BUCCIs articles of
incorporation and by-laws after the latters separation from the petitioner.
Petitioners legal standing to file the case had never been the issue of the
case from the time of its filing, during the pre-trial conference, during the
trial on the merits, and in the respective memorandum filed by the parties in
this case; and
IV.
The
SEC committed serious reversible error in upholding respondents continued use
of the name BUCCI when in fact individual respondents by their very own acts
have expelled themselves from membership of the UCCP and its local church the
BUCCI.[27]
Failing to obtain favorable judgment from the SEC and
the Court of Appeals, UCCP now comes before the Court posing ostensibly a
question of law, that the determination of membership in UCCP is a purely
ecclesiastical affair, which theory strips SEC and the Court of Appeals of any
authority to rule on the issues voluntarily submitted to them by UCCP itself
for resolution.
Basic is the rule that a party cannot be allowed to
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief and later on
renounce or repudiate the same after it fails to obtain such relief.[28]
After voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice
of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.[29]
The Court has likewise consistently rejected the
pernicious practice of shifting to a new theory on appeal in the hope of a
favorable result. Fair play, justice and
due process require that as a rule new matters cannot be raised for the first
time before an appellate tribunal.[30]
Failure to assert issues and arguments
within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[31]
In any event, the Court believes that the matter at
hand is not purely an ecclesiastical affair.
An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns
doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for
the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed unworthy of membership.[32]
Based on this definition, an
ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its
members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation. To be
concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State
cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities attached with religious
significance.[33]
In the first place, relief from civil courts was
sought when the incident of disaffiliation occurred, in the face of UCCPs
assertions that it continues to recognize BUCCI as one of its local churches
and that it has the sole authority to determine the validity of the
disaffiliation.
Secondly, intertwined with the issue of the validity
of the disaffiliation is the question of whether BUCCI had the power under the
law to effect disaffiliation such that it should be given legal consequence and
granted recognition.
UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees
of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control
over all corporations. Even with their
religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal
and corporate.[34]
BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct
from UCCP, possesses the freedom to determine its steps.
UCCPs statement in its memorandum- [w]here else can
petitioner seek protection and relief x x x?[35]
is particularly telling. That UCCP sees
the need to turn to a body for relief is an admission that its authority over
BUCCI is not absolute and is actually more tenuous than alleged.
Thus, UCCP cannot rely on the Courts ruling as
restated in Long v. Basa,[36]
that in matters purely ecclesiastical, the decisions of the proper church
tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals.[37]
If in the case at bar, even with its highest
executive officials pronouncement that BUCCI is still recognized as its member-church,[38]
UCCP could not compel BUCCI to go back to its fold, then the alleged absolute ecclesiastical
authority must not be there to begin with.
In fact, Long
may be viewed as supportive of respondents case. Said case involved a churchs sole prerogative
and power to expel its individual members. Similarly, the case at bar concerns BUCCIs sole
prerogative and power as a church to disconnect ties with another entity. Such are decisions, that may have religious
color and are therefore ecclesiastical affairs, the Court must respect and cannot
review. It is worth mentioning that in Fonacier v. Court of Appeals,[39] the Court held that the amendments of
the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith
or abjuration, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the
power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts.
Conversely, the Court owes but recognition to BUCCIs
decision as it concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to
disaffiliate from another religious corporation via legitimate meansa secular matter well within the civil courts
purview.
Respondents Validly Effected the
Amendments
UCCP contends that
respondents have severed their UCCP membership and consequently, have lost
their BUCCI membership. As such, they have neither the power to bring about the
amendments to BUCCIs Articles of Incorporation nor right to continue the usage
of BUCCIs name.
The Church Council Resolution dated 21 June 1992, duly
ratified by BUCCIs members in a referendum, carried out BUCCIs corporate act
of disaffiliating from UCCP. By virtue
of this disaffiliation, BUCCI members, including respondents, severed their
ties from UCCP but maintained their membership with BUCCI. UCCPs contention that the severance of UCCP
ties amounts to severance of ties to the local church does not hold water.
Local church autonomy takes precedence in the UCCP
polity. Section 4 of the 1974 UCCP
Constitution provides:
SECTION 4. The autonomy of the local church or
congregation in matters pertaining to its life in its own particular community
shall be respected, consistent with its relation to the Conference,
Jurisdiction, and General Assembly.
According to respondent,
UCCP adopted a congregationalist system where a local church has the right to
govern itself by its own laws, rules and regulations for the furtherance of its
own general welfare and the freedom to practice its own faith and polity of
denominational origin.[40]
This congregationalist system was shown in the Basis of Union, the
Declaration of Union and UCCPs Constitution and By-laws.
Article IV of
the Basis of Union reads:
ARTICLE IV -- Church Practices and Worship: Congregations
may follow their customary practices and worship.[41]
Section 4,
Article VI specifically outlines the duties and powers of the local church:
(a)
Subject
only to the general laws and regulations of the Church, every local church or
congregation, shall, with its pastor, be responsible for watching over its
members, keeping its life pure, ordering its worship, providing Christian
education and proclaiming the Gospel[;] (b) Call a Pastor[;] (c) Recommend candidates
for the ministry[;] (d) Elect delegates to the Annual Conference.[42]
Statement IV
of Declaration of Union provides:
That by adoption
of the name UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES for this Church Union,
no right, interest, or title in and to their respective names by which the
uniting Churches have been identified and known, has been nor is surrendered,
but all such rights are specifically reserved against the claims of all
persons, associations and organizations whatsoever.[43]
As a matter of fact, the present UCCP
Constitution[44]
and By-laws continue to uphold this tradition of respecting local church
autonomy. The 2005 UCCP Amended
Constitution provides in Article II, Section 14:
Consistent with
the heritage and commitment of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
the autonomy of the Local Church shall be respected. The scope of such autonomy
shall be defined in the By-Laws.
Section 28,
Article III of the UCCP By-laws provides:
Section 28. Scope
of Local Autonomy: The primary locus of mission is the Local Church. Hence, the
UCCP upholds the autonomy of the Local Church particularly as to its right and
power to conduct its ministry free from outside control, provided the same is
in line with the Constitution, By-Laws and statues of the Church, thereby enabling
the Local Church to become effective instrument in the ministry and mission of
the Church and ensuring its positive contribution to the unity and
strengthening of the whole Church. Specifically, autonomy of the Local Church
includes the authority to do the following:
a. To call and support its Pastor and other
Church workers, keeping in mind the basic policy of the Church to call to its
ministry pastors and Church workers belonging to the UCCP, subscribing to the
UCCP Statement of Faith and paying allegiance to the Constitution, By-Laws and
statutes of the Church. Pastors, ministers and workers of other churches
affiliated with the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) may
be requested to serve in the Local Church with the prior written permission of
the General Assembly or the National Council, through the General Secretary;
b. To administer, maintain, encumber or
dispose of its personal or real properties pursuant to a resolution of its
Board of Trustees and approved by its Church Council and, where real properties
are involved, with the written consent of the General Assembly or the National
Council, through the General Secretary;
c. To invite pastors, ministers, workers and
lay leaders of other churches to speak, preach or otherwise enter into
fellowship with the Local Church, from time to time, in consonance with Article
II, Section 6, of the Constitution, provided that the authority and integrity
of the UCCP, as well as the unity of the Local Church, shall never be impaired
or compromised;
d. To nominate and elect its officers, in
accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws, and hold annual and such special
meetings as it may deem necessary and proper;
e. To admit qualified persons into the
membership of the Local Church, help ensure their nurture and spiritual
development, and promote and develop among them the idea of loving service,
stewardship and missionary outreach;
f. To celebrate its worship services that are
orderly and solemn, yet joyful and meaningful, reflective of the faith and life
of the Church and responsive to the needs of the community in terms of witness,
service and prophetic ministry;
g. To support the ministerial and lay
formation program of the Church and recruit, recommend and support candidates
for the ministry;
h. To adopt its own budget and financial
program and fulfill its obligations to the wider bodies; and
i.
To do
all things as it may deem wise, necessary and proper, without encroaching on
the prerogatives of, and interfering with, the wider Church bodies, ensuring at
all times that its action contribute to the unity and strengthening of the
whole UCCP.
From the
foregoing it can be gleaned that: UCCPs control and authority over its local
churches is not full and supreme; membership of the local churches in the UCCP
is voluntary and not perpetual; local churches enjoy independence and autonomy
and may maintain or continue church-life with or without UCCP.
Thus, under
the law and UCCP polity, BUCCI may validly bring about its disaffiliation from
UCCP through the amendment of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
Significantly,
SEC approved the amendments on 2 July 1993, which approval has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.[45] Government officials are presumed to
have regularly performed their functions and strong evidence is necessary to
rebut this presumption.[46]
In the absence of convincing proof to
the contrary, the presumption must be upheld.[47]
More
importantly, well-settled is the judicial dictum
that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as SEC, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court which is not
a trier of facts. Only upon clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion, or that such factual findings were
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record will this
Court step in and proceed to make its own independent evaluation of the facts. No cogent reason exists in the instant cases
to deviate from this settled rule.[48]
Anent the continued use by
respondents of BUCCI, the Court likewise sustains the rulings of SEC and Court
of Appeals. Pertinently, the Court of
Appeals ruled as follows:
As held in Philips Export B.V. vs. Court of Appeals [206 SCRA 457, 463], to
fall within the prohibition of the law, two requisites must be proven, to wit:
(1) that the complainant corporation acquired a prior right over the use of
such corporate name; and (2) the proposed name is either: (a) identical, or (b)
deceptively or confusingly similar to
that of any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law;
or (c) patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law.
The
respondent BUCCIs church history would show that it has a better right to use its
corporate name on the ground of priority of adoption. As thoroughly discussed
by the SEC in its assailed decision, the evolution of respondent BUCCI to what
it is today undoubtedly establishes that it had acquired the right to make use
of its corporate name.
As
to whether or not BUCCI is confusingly or deceptively similar to UCCP, We find
in the negative. In determining the existence of confusing similarity in
corporate names, the test is whether the similarity is such as to mislead a
person using ordinary care and discrimination.[49]
Furthermore, Section 2,
Article I of the UCCP Constitution[50]
states that, All local churches and church-owned entities shall bear
prominently the name: United Church of Christ in the Philippines. For this
reason, BUCCI is evidently distinct from UCCP and from all other UCCP local
churches and church-owned entities.
SEC
and Court of Appeals correctly ruled that UCCP has no locus standi to question
the amendments to BUCCIs Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
The doctrine of locus
standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately
discussed by this Court in a number of cases. The doctrine requires a litigant
to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a real party in interest,
which is defined as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[51]
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. And by real interest
is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.[52]
A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the
defendant is not a real party in interest.[53]
After a review of the evidence on record, the SEC,
which the Court of Appeals affirmed, correctly ruled that UCCP, not being a
member of BUCCI, is not the proper party to question the validity of the
amendments of the latters Articles of Incorporation and By-laws. While UCCP stands to be affected by the
disaffiliation, the same is admitted and accepted by UCCPs polity by the very
establishment of its liberal structure.
Petition
failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure
We highlight the fact that when UCCP filed the
original complaint before the SEC, only individual respondents were
impleaded. UCCP then amended the
complaint to include BUCCI, only to drop it as respondent after the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision, purportedly to show that it was merely going
after individual respondents. We agree
with respondents that failure to implead BUCCI as respondent in the instant
case constitutes a blatant disregard of Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court,[54]
but also renders the assailed decision final and executory and all subsequent
actions on the petition are void considering that BUCCI is an indispensable
party.[55] We cannot countenance this disingenuous
practice of shifting to a new theory on appeal in the hope of obtaining a
favorable result.[56]
Essentially, the three main issues raised by UCCP
before the SEC and the Court of Appeals[57]
are the very same issues presented for our resolution. Finding no serious errors to warrant a
reversal of the assailed Decision, We affirm.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17
June 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Senior
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D.
BRION MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias
P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Enrico A. Lanzanas and Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 39-48.
[2] Comprised of Chairperson Lilia R.
Bautista and Commissioners Fe Eloisa C. Gloria and Joselia J. Poblador.
[3] Dated 27 January 2004. Rollo,
pp. 60-74.
[4] Id. at 40.
[5] Id. at 61-63.
[6] Id. at 359.
[7] Id. at 63-64.
[8] First, Rev. Patricio Ezra, the
Administrative Pastor and spiritual leader of Bradford was stripped of his
authority to administer the sacraments.
Second, An Unlawful Detainer Case was filed by UCCP and CCI against
BUCCI and Ezra, et al. before the MTC-Cebu.
On the other side of the conflict, a labor case was filed by Respondent
Ezra against UCCP. Id. at 360.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 64.
[13] Id. at 363.
[14] Id. at 64-65.
[15] Id. at 173-174.
[16] Id. at 47-48.
[17] Id. at 22 and 24.
[18] Id. at 27-33.
[19] Id. at 35.
[20] Id. at 33-36.
[21] Memorandum dated 19 April 2007, id.
at 347-410.
[22] Id. at 372-381.
[23] Id. at 381-391.
[24] Id. at 391-395.
[25] Id. at 395-409.
[26] Id. at 374.
[27] Id. at 375.
[28] Huertas v. Gonzalez, 491 Phil. 441, 454 (2005); Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty Corporation, 447
Phil. 531, 548 (2003).
[29] Cloma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100153, 2 August 1994,
234 SCRA 665, 673.
[30] Tan Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93640, 7 January 1994,
229 SCRA 151, 165.
[31] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), 491
Phil. 317, 346 (2005).
[32] Pastor
Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission, 371 Phil. 340, 353 (1999).
[33] Id.
[34] See 76 CJS 738 (as cited in
Respondents Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 377-378) which states that religious corporations has two
entities: legal corporation and the religious association; See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, 51 Phil. 420 (1928) citing the rule formulated by the Court of
Appeals of South Carolina in the case of Harmon
v. Dreher (Speers Eq., 87), to the effect that: Where a civil right depends
upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries
the civil right and nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of
which the civil right has arisen as it finds them, and accepting those
decisions as matters adjudicated by another jurisdiction. The proposition thus
stated in Harmon v. Dreher has
subsequently been considered from different points of view by many able courts,
and it has uniformly been looked upon as a sound and correct statement of the
law in cases where it is of proper application. Among decisions in which said rule has been
quoted with approval are Watson v. Jones
(13 Wall 679; 20 Law. ed., 666); Lamb v.
Cain (129 Ind., 486; 14 L. R. A., 518; 29 N. E., 13); and White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends v.
White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends (89 Ind., 136). This case also
states that courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such
matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the complete
separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil
courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an
ecclesiastical nature.
[35] Rollo, p. 331.
[36] 418 Phil. 375 (2001).
[37] Id. at 397 citing United States v. Canete, 38 Phil. 253 (1918).
[38] UCCP General Secretary Bishop
Hilario Gomez stated that: The secession of BUCCI is not sanctioned by the
national leadership of the UCCP and that the UCCP still recognizes BUCCI as its
member but with a different set of officers led by Mr. Cedric Bao-as. Rollo,
pp. 58-59.
[39] 96 Phil. 417 (1955)
citing (45 Am. Jur. 748-752, 755); restated in Taruc v. Bishop De la Cruz, 493 Phil. 293 (2005).
[40] 66 Am. Jur. 2d Religious Societies
[i]n a congregational church polity, the local church is independent,
autonomous, and the highest authority in all matters of doctrine and
usage. Also, it is characterized by its
freedom to act in any matter, in accordance with the will of a majority of its
membership, conditioned only on rules and procedures prescribed by the internal
law of its own constitution and by-laws.
See Viravonga v. Samakitham, 372
Ark. 562, 279 S.W. 3d 44 (2008); Central
Coast Baptist Assn. v. First Baptist Church of Las Lomas, 171 Cal. App. 4th
822, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100 (6th Dist. 2007), review granted and
opinion superseded on other grounds, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 171 P. 3d 2 (Cal.
2007) and dismissed, remanded and ordered published, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 701, 202
P. 3d 1089 (Cal. 2009); Rector, Wardens
and Vestrymen of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of
Georgia, Inc., 305 Ga. App. 87, 699 S.E. 2d 45 (2010), cert. granted, (Jan.
13, 2011); Bridgeforth v. Thornton, 847
N.E. 2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Seldon
v. Singletary, 284 S.C. 148, 326 S.E. 2d 147 (1985).
[41] Records, Folder 3, p. 1260.
[42] Id. at 1259-1260.
[43] Id. at 1256.
[44] As amended in 2005.
[45] Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules
on Evidence, provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable
presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x
x x x
(m)
That official duty has been regularly performed;
[46] Autencio v. City Administrator Maara, 489 Phil. 752, 758 (2005).
[47] People v.
Roldan,
G.R. No. 98398, 6 July 1993, 224 SCRA 536, 543.
[48] Columbus
Philippine Bus Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 417
Phil. 81, 99 (2001).
[49] Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[50] UCCP 1996 Constitution.
[51] Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, 14 March 2008,
548 SCRA 485, 501-502.
[52] Shipside
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981, 998 (2001) citing Ibonilla v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No. 97463, 26 June 1992, 210
SCRA 526, 529-530.
[53] Tanpingco
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76225, 31 March 1992, 207 SCRA
652, 656-567.
[54]
Sec. 4. Contents of petition.
─ The
petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a)
state the full name of the appealing
party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of
the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of
the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified
true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk
of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such
material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain
a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph
of Section 2, Rule 42. (Emphasis supplied).
[55] Rollo,
p. 395.
[56] Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v. Marcopper Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 170738, 30 October 2009, 604 SCRA
719, 731 citing Big AA Manufacturer v. Antonio, 519 Phil. 30, 39
(2006).
[57] (1) Whether the disaffiliation by
BUCCI from UCCP is valid; (2) Whether the amendments made on the Articles and
By-Laws by individual respondents are valid; and (3) Whether BUCCI may continue
to use its corporate name. Rollo, pp. 64-65.