Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
MARCOS V. PRIETO,
Petitioner, -versus- THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Ninth Division), HON. ROSE MARY R. MOLINA-ALIM, In Her Capacity as Pairing Judge of Branch
67 of the RTC, First Judicial Region, Bauang, La Union, FAR EAST
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, now the
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, through ATTY. EDILBERTO B. TENEFRANCIA, and SPOUSES ANTONIO and MONETTE PRIETO,
Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 158597 Present: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Acting
Chairman, BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, VILLARAMA,
JR, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: June 18, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
Ratification or confirmation may
validate an act done in behalf of another without authority from the latter.
The effect is as if the latter did the act himself.
Antecedents
On October 27, 1997, the Spouses
Marcos V. Prieto (Marcos) and Susan M. Prieto filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Bauang, La Union a complaint against Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) and the Spouses Antonio Prieto (Antonio) and Monette Prieto to declare
the nullity of several real estate mortgage contracts.[1] The plaintiffs narrated that in January 1996, they
had executed a special power of attorney (SPA) to authorize Antonio to borrow
money from FEBTC, using as collateral their real property consisting of a parcel of land
located in Calumbaya,
Bauang, La Union (the property) and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 of the Registry of Deeds of La Union; that
defendant spouses, using the property as collateral, had thereafter obtained from
FEBTC a series of loans totaling P5,000,000.00, evidenced by promissory notes, and
secured by separate real estate mortgage contracts; that defendant spouses had failed to pay the
loans, leading FEBTC to initiate the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
mortgages; that the foreclosure sale had been scheduled on October 31, 1997; and
that the promissory notes and the real estate mortgage contracts were in the
name of defendant spouses for themselves alone, who had incurred the
obligations, rendering the promissory notes and the mortgage contracts null and
void ab initio.
The RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), and set a preliminary hearing on the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[2] The RTC eventually denied the application for
the writ of preliminary injunction on March 24, 1998;[3] it later denied as well the plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration of the denial of the application.[4]
On July 31, 2001 the RTC rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint,[5] ruling that although the name of plaintiff Marcos (as registered
owner) did not appear in the real estate mortgage contracts, Marcos could not be
absolved of liability because he had no right of action against the person with
whom his agent had contracted; that the mortgage contracts, even if entered
into in the name of the agent, should be deemed made in his behalf as the
principal because the things involved belonged to the principal; and that even assuming that
Antonio had exceeded his authority as agent, Marcos had ratified Antonios
action by executing the letter of acknowledgement dated September 12, 1996,
making himself liable under the premises.
Marcos received the decision on
August 28, 2001, and filed a motion for reconsideration on September 12, 2001,
the last day for him to do so under the Rules
of Court.[6] On November 19, 2001, the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration.[7]
Marcos received the denial of the motion on November 21, 2001, but he filed
his notice of appeal only on November 26, 2001.[8]
On December 11, 2001, the RTC denied due
course to the notice of appeal for having been filed four days beyond the
reglementary period for perfecting the appeal.[9]
Marcos sought the reconsideration of
the denial of due course to the notice of appeal, but the RTC still denied his
motion, reiterating that the failure to perfect an appeal rendered the decision
final and executory.[10]
On April 16, 2002, Marcos filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals (CA), imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC in disallowing his
notice of appeal.[11]
He argued that his notice of appeal had been filed only two days late,
and that the delay should be treated only as excusable negligence because at
that time, he had been deprived of clear thinking due to the pain and
disappointment he and his wife had suffered over the failure of the recent
medical procedures they had undergone.[12]
On
April 24, 2002, the CA Ninth Division, then composed of Associate Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. as Chairman, and Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
and Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III as Members, dismissed the petition for
certiorari, holding that Marcos had failed to perfect his appeal on time, and that,
consequently, the RTC did not commit any error or grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the challenged orders.[13]
Marcos sought reconsideration, but
the CA denied the motion for reconsideration on April 9, 2003.[14]
Hence, this appeal on certiorari.
The petition for review lacks merit.
First of all, Marcos submits that the
CAs assailed resolution promulgated on April 9, 2003 was signed only by Associate
Justices Vasquez and Reyes, Jr.; that Associate Justice Guaria III as the third
Member did not sign the resolution; that the absence of Associate Justice
Guaria IIIs signature revealed the lack of unanimity in the voting, rendering
the resolution null and void pursuant to
Section 4 of the 1999 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals;[15] and that the CA should then have
constituted a new Division of five Members by selecting two additional Associate
Justices by raffle.[16]
We
find the submission of Marcos to be without basis. Contrary to his submission, Associate
Justice Guaria III expressly concurred in the resolution in question, as borne
out by the copy itself of the assailed resolution promulgated on April 9, 2003 attached
to the petition for review as Enclosure A.[17] Marcos could not have missed the
signature of Associate Justice Guaria III because it prominently appeared on
the copy of the assailed resolution beneath that of Associate Justice Vasquez
and beside that of Associate Justice Reyes, Jr.
Secondly,
Marcos contends that the CA erred in rejecting his petition for certiorari because his notice of appeal
in the RTC had been tardy by only two days, but his tardiness could be excused.
We cannot sustain the contention of
petitioner. He himself conceded that his filing of the notice of appeal had
been tardy by two days. Thereby, he was aware that he had lost his right to
appeal the RTCs decision. As such, the petition for certiorari he thereafter filed in the CA was designed to substitute
his loss of the right to appeal.
The CA justified its rejection of the
petition for certiorari in the
following manner:
Admittedly, petitioner received the Decision in Civil Case No. 1114-BG dated July 31, 2001 on August 28, 2001 and filed his motion for reconsideration on the 15th day, or on September 12, 2001. Petitioner received the denial of his motion for reconsideration on November 21, 2001, thereby leaving him with only one (1) day to perfect an appeal. Unfortunately, the notice of appeal was submitted only on November 26, 2001, or four (4) days beyond the reglementary period.
To justify the late filing of his appeal, petitioner ratiocinated that on November 22, 2001, the last day of appeal, he brought his wife to Manila for an embryo transfer and returned to San Fernando, Pampanga, on November 25, 2001. Other than the bare allegations of the petitioner, however, the pretended excusable neglect remained unsupported and uncorroborated. Worthy of note still is that the notice of appeal submitted mentioned nothing about the embryo transplant. Worse, the notice of appeal misleadingly averred that petitioner is giving notice of his intention to appeal to this Court from the judgment entered therein by this Court on 19th November 2001, which was received by plaintiffs on 21st day of November 2001, thereby making it appear that the notice of appeal was indeed filed on time, stating that what he received on November 21, 2001 was the Decision dated July 31, 2001, not the denial of the reconsideration.
Apropos, when the trial court denied the notice of appeal, it did not commit any error nor grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged orders. No capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment nor arbitrary or despotic manner exists in the issuance of the assailed orders.
Not only that, petition for certiorari presupposes that petitioner is left with no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law like an appeal or a petition from relief of judgment. Notably, petitioner failed to avail of the petition for relief of judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and just like in an appeal, certiorari cannot be made a substitute for such remedy.
On
the plea for application for the liberality rule, it must be stressed that
there are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those
setting the period for perfecting an appeal.
Doctrinally entrenched is that the right of appeal is a statutory right
and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or
rules. The Rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within
the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and appeal
in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment
of the court final and executory. Just
as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his or her case. (Videogram Regulatory Board vs. Court of
Appeals 265 SCRA 373 [1996]; Cabellan vs. Court of Appeals 304, SCRA 119
[1999]; Demata vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 690 [1999)].
Consequently,
failing to perfect an appeal within the time and manner specified by law,
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much
less entertain the appeal (Pedrosa
vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373 [1996]).
Timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even the
Supreme Court can trifle with. (Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi,
Jr., 230 SCRA 9 [1994]).[18]
We
can only sustain the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari. The general rule is that a timely appeal is the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of
the judgment on the merits. This is true even if one of the errors to be
assigned on appeal is the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court
rendering the judgment over the subject matter, or the exercise of power by
said court is in excess of its jurisdiction, or the making of its findings of
fact or of law set out in the decision is attended by grave abuse of discretion.[19] In other words, the perfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory because the failure to
perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the judgment final as to
preclude the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment.[20] We stress, too, that the statutory
nature of the right to appeal requires the appealing party to strictly comply
with the statutes or rules governing the perfection of the appeal because such statutes
or rules are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
are instituted in favor of an orderly discharge of judicial business. In the
absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their relaxation, therefore,
the statutes or rules should remain inviolable.[21]
And, thirdly, petitioners appeal
would still not succeed even if the Court now extends to him the retroactive
application of the fresh period rule
enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[22]
and reckon the perfection of his appeal from the date of his receipt of
the denial of his motion for reconsideration, thus rendering his notice of
appeal timely.
The complaint was anchored on the supposed
failure of FEBTC to duly investigate the authority of Antonio in contracting
the exceptionally and relatively immense[23] loans amounting to P5,000,000.00.
Marcos alleged therein that his property had thereby become unlawfully
burdened by unauthorized real estate mortgage contracts,[24] because the loans and the mortgage
contracts had been incurred by Antonio and his wife only for themselves, to the
exclusion of petitioner.[25] Yet, Marcos could not deny that under
the express terms of the SPA,[26] he had precisely granted to Antonio
as his agent the authority to borrow money, and to transfer and convey the
property by way of mortgage to FEBTC; to sign, execute and deliver promissory
notes; and to receive the proceeds of the loans on the formers behalf. In
other words, the mortgage contracts were valid and enforceable against
petitioner, who was consequently fully bound by their terms.
Moreover, even if it was assumed that
Antonios obtaining the loans in his own name, and executing the mortgage
contracts also in his own name had exceeded his express authority under the
SPA, Marcos was still liable to FEBTC by virtue of his express ratification of Antonios
act. Under Article 1898 of the Civil Code,
the acts of an agent done beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the
principal unless the latter expressly or impliedly ratifies the same.[27]
In
agency, ratification is the adoption or confirmation by one person of an act
performed on his behalf by another without authority. The substance of ratification
is the confirmation after the act, amounting to a substitute for a prior
authority.[28]
Here, there was such a ratification by Marcos, as borne out by his execution of
the letter of acknowledgement on September 12, 1996,[29]
whose text is quoted in full, viz:
12 Sept. 1996 (handwritten)
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST
COMPANY
San Fernando
La Union
Gentlemen:
It is my/our understanding that
your Bank has granted a DISCOUNTING Line/Loan in favor of SPS.
ANTONIO & MONETTE PRIETO over my/our real property located in Calumbayan,
Bauang, La Union and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No./s. 40223
of the Registry of Deeds for La Union.
This confirms that the said property/ies was/were offered as collateral
(illegible) SPS. ANTONIO & MONETTE PRIETOS line/loan with my/our
consent, and that I/we agree with all the terms and conditions of the mortgage
executed on the same. I/we further confirm that the proceeds of the aforesaid Discounting
Line line/loan was released to SPS. MONETTE & ANTONIO PRIETO for
his/her its own benefit.
We thank you for your support to
SPS. MONETTE & ANTONIO.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
ATTY. MARCOS PRIETO[30]
But Marcos insists that the letter
of acknowledgment was only a mere letter (written) on a mimeographic paper a
mere scrap of paper, a document by adhesion.[31]
The Court is confounded by
Marcos dismissal of his own express written ratification of Antonios act. Being
himself a lawyer, Marcos was aware of the import and consequences of the letter
of acknowledgment. The Court cannot agree with his insistence that the letter was
worthless due to its being a contract of adhesion. The letter was not a
contract, to begin with, because it was only a unilateral act of his. Secondly,
his insistence was fallacious and insincere because he knew as a lawyer that even
assuming that the letter could be treated as a contract of adhesion it was
nonetheless effective and binding like any other contract. The Court has
consistently held that a contract of adhesion was not prohibited for that
reason. In Pilipino Telephone Corporation
v. Tecson, [32] for instance, the Court said that contracts of
adhesion were valid but might be occasionally struck down only if there was a
showing that the dominant bargaining party left the weaker party without any
choice as to be completely deprived of an opportunity to bargain effectively.
That exception did not apply here, for, verily,
Marcos, being a lawyer, could not have been the weaker party. As the tenor of
the of acknowledgment indicated,
he was fully aware of the meaning and sense of every written word or phrase, as
well as of the legal effect of his confirmation thereby of his agents act. It is axiomatic that a mans act, conduct and
declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him,[33]
for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth,
and it is his fault if they do not.[34]
WHEREFORE,
the Court AFFIRMS the resolution
promulgated by the Court of Appeals on April 24, 2002; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO
ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] Records, pp. 1-5.
[2] Id., p. 31.
[3] Id., pp. 93-94.
[4] Id., pp. 129-133.
[5] Id., pp. 236-246.
[6] Id., pp. 247-261.
[7] Id., p. 313.
[8] Id., p. 314.
[9] Id., p. 316.
[10] Id., pp. 327-328.
[11] Rollo, pp. 197-216.
[12] Id., pp. 211-214 (the petitioners wife underwent in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer).
[13] Id., pp. 243-246.
[14] Id., p. 27.
[15] Section 4. Quorum and Voting in
Sessions.
xxx
b. The presence of all members of a Division shall constitute
a quorum and their unanimous vote shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision or resolution. In case failure to have a unanimous vote, a Special Division
of five members shall be constituted in the manner provided in Section 6
hereof.
[16] Section 6. Division of Five.
Whenever the members of a Division fail to reach a unanimous vote, its chairman
shall direct the Raffle Committee to designate by raffle two (2) additional
members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5). The
selection of the two (2) additional members shall be on a rotation basis. The
concurrence of a majority shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision
or resolution. (n)
[17] Supra, note 11, p. 27.
[18] Id.,
pp. 244-245.
[19] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. JANCO Environmental Corp., G.R. No. 147465, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 320, 329.
[20] Ko v. Philippine National Bank, G. R. Nos. 169131-32, January 20,
2006, 479 SCRA 298; Air France Philippines v.
Leachon, G.R. No. 134113, October 12, 2005, 472 SCRA 439; Remulla v. Manlongat, G.R.
No. 148189, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 226, 233; Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
127275, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 442, 448; Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October
24, 2000, 344 SCRA 202; Dayrit v.
Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 140316, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA
117, 125; Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao
v. Director of Lands, 34 Phil 623; Estate
of Cordoba v. Alabado, 34 Phil. 920; Bermudez
v. Director of Lands, 36 Phil. 774.
[21] See, for instance, Almeda v. Court of Appeals, July 16, 1998, 292 SCRA 587, 593-595, where the Court emphasized that: The timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court can trifle with.
[22] G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633. In this case, we ruled that aggrieved party wishing to appeal an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from the receipt of the order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
[23] Supra, note 11, p. 51.
[24] Supra, note 1, p. 3.
[25] Id., p. 7.
[26] Id., pp. 8-10.
[27] Article 1898. If the agent contracts in the
name of the principal, exceeding the scope of his authority, and the principal
does not ratify the contract, it shall be void if the party with whom the agent
contracted is aware of the limits of the powers granted by the principal. In
this case, however, the agent is liable if he undertook to secure the principals
ratification. (n)
[28] Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v. Linsangan, G.R. No. 151319, November 22, 2004, 443 SCRA 377, 394.
[29] Supra, note 1, p. 48.
[30] Id., p. 48.
[31] Supra, note 11, p. 214.
[32] G.R. No. 156966, May 7,
2004, 428 SCRA 378,
381.
[33] Rule 130, Rules of Court, provides:
Section
26. Admissions
of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. (22)
[34] United States v. Ching Po, 23 Phil.
578.