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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, - versus - MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 152662
Present: CARPIO,
Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 13, 2012 |
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PEREZ, J.:
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C.
Malolos.
The
fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153
against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.[3]
Culled
from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On
16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22
against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint
alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine
Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00)
in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment.
On
5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five
days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend
Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil
action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On
2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the
suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action
respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved,
private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On
5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations
for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance
of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC
Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint
filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently,
two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed
against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on
7 June 2000.
On
17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and
to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon
City. She alleged that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
The
presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order
dated 5 October 2000.
On
26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC,
Branch 218, Quezon City.
In
a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon
City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed
on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court
itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded
before the latest amendment. The
criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not
yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the
proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September
1997 yet.
WHEREFORE,
the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal
Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]
Dissatisfied
with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review[5] on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In
a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000,
this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.
On
26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent
and private complainant to comment on the petition.
In
a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of
RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and
89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already
prescribed.
In
reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx
this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the
latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was
notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject
checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to
Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter
part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before
the proper court.
The informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February
2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326,
as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes[7]
the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the
complaint or information with the proper court.
Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed
on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before
that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a
violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of
Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both
ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8] likewise applies
to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.[9]
The
OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the OSG, while it admits that
Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763
dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of
special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the
court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of
prescription of the offense charged.[10] It submits that the filing of the
complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner
further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine
laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia
v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that
the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the
judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,[12]
the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding
the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner
contends that in a catena of cases,[13]
the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office
for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive
period. It therefore concluded that the
filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was
still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the
criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as
amended.
In
her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition
of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the
decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to
the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent
reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the
City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special
law.
Respondent
contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous
premises. She claims that the cases
relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal
Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)[14]
and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.[15]
Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of
BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act
No. 3326, as amended. She submits that
a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal
ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The
key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the
affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially,
we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the
petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002
decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the
record. A perusal of the record reveals
that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of
the CA decision. It was also observed
that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket
Division of the OSG.
With
regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred
in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely,
the law reads:
SECTION 1.
Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
xxx.
SECTION
2. Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a
special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the
guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited
case of People v. Olarte,[16]
this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even
if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on the merits. This
ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.[17] when
it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends
the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Respondents contention
that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is
bereft of merit. There is no more distinction
between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to
the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes
v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio Company
Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held
that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the
Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton,
Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24]
which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled
that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before
the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do
not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond
their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency
of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual
finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995 is the reckoning
date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such
being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private
complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period
granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against
respondent on 16 September 1997. The
cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the
meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question. The matter was
raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the
petition to suspend proceedings. It was
only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the
violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was
respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which
motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing
in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,[25]
it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to
initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite
complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12
March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
SO
ORDERED.
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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice |
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WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice Chairperson |
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[1] Rollo, pp. 33-66.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 162-170.
[3] Id. at 169.
[4] Rollo, p. 133.
[5] Id. at 134-167.
[6] Id. at 169.
[7] G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 277.
[8] Id.
[9] CA rollo, pp. 167-168.
[10] Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1997
Rules of Criminal Procedure
[11] Supra
note 7 at 284-285.
[12] Supra.
[13] Calderon-Bargas v. RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 162, G.R. Nos. 103259-61, 1 October 1993, 227 SCRA 56; Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, 30 May 1983, 122 SCRA 538; Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112584, 23 May 1997, 272 SCRA 563.
[14] Article 91. Computation of prescription of
offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall
not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
[15] Section 1. Institution of criminal actions.Criminal actions
shall be instituted as follows:
xxx
xxx
The institution of the
criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of
the offense charged unless otherwise
provided in special laws.
[16] G.R.
No. L-22465, 28 February 1967, 19 SCRA 494, 500.
[17] 207
Phil 471, 477 (1983).
[18] Supra
note 7.
[19] 328
Phil. 1272 (1996).
[20] Supra
note 13.
[21] 483
Phil. 568 (2004)
[22] G.R. No. 168662, 19 February 2008,
546 SCRA 303.
[23] G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008,
567 SCRA 354, 415-416.
[24] G.R. No. 167571, 25 November 2008, 571 SCRA 549, 562.
[25] Supra note 16.