G.R. No. 139930 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT, JOSE R. ELEAZAR, JR., JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROLANDO P. DELA CUESTA, EMMANUEL M. ALMEDA, HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, NARCISO M. PINEDA, IAKI R. MENDEZONA, DANILO S. URSUA, TEODORO D. REGALA, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, ELEAZAR B. REYES, EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA, DOUGLAS LU YM, SIGFREDO VELOSO AND JAIME GANDIAGA.

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CONCURRING OPINION

 

 

BERSAMIN, J.:

 

I CONCUR with the Majority Opinion written by Justice Abad. Like him, I find and hold that the State already lost the right to prosecute respondents for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 by February 8, 1990, or ten years after UNICOM filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation.

 

Respondents were charged with violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for allegedly watering down the P495 million worth of no-par value stocks in UNICOM by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) with funds taken from the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). But the offense charged clearly prescribed upon the lapse of ten years from the date of its commission on February 8, 1980, the prescriptive period applicable to the offense charged.[1]

 

The issue of when to reckon the commission of the offense charged is not difficult to determine. I disagree that the commission of the offense should be reckoned from the filing of the 1980 General Information Sheet (GIS). Instead, I find it more logical to reckon the commission of the offense to the filing of the Amended Articles of Incorporation on February 8, 1980 in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Indeed, the Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock that UNICOM filed on September 17, 1979 involved the affected shareholdings.[2] The second page of the certificate clearly showed that UCPB had subscribed to 4,000,000 no-par value shares worth P495 million.[3] The certificate is significant because it reflected the very same shareholdings that respondents allegedly diluted by increasing UNICOMs capital stock from 10 million to one billion shares.

 

Although it did not reflect the subject investment of UCPB, the Amended Articles of Incorporation filed on February 8, 1980 is indisputably the only trustworthy evidence that proved the dilution. I note that the State itself presented the Amended Articles of Incorporation to establish its allegations because the Amended Articles of Incorporation showed that UNICOM had increased its capital stock to P1,000,000,000.00, divided as follows: 500,000,000 Class A voting common shares; 400,000,000 Class B voting common shares; and 100,000,000 Class C non-voting common shares, all having a par value of P1.00 per share.[4] The filing in the SEC and the subsequent approval by the SEC of the Amended Articles of Incorporation on February 8, 1980 indubitably consummated the unlawful transaction alleged in the information. Reckoning the prescription period from February 8, 1980 was really warranted by the records.

 

As to whether or not the criminal action prescribed as to Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. because his supposed absence from the country in the period from 1986 to 1991 had interrupted the running of the period of prescription, I respectfully submit that there was no interruption even assuming that said respondent had truly been absent from the country in that period.

 

The applicable rule for computing the prescriptive period of a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is Act No. 3326 (An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run).[5] The relevant provision is Section 2, which states:

 

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

 

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

 

It is noticeable that Section 2, supra, does not state the effect on the prescriptive period of an accuseds absence from the country.

 

Yet, the Minority insist that respondent Cojuangco, Jr.s purported absence from the country interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provides that [t]he term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. The Minority justify their insistence by relying on Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code that declares the Revised Penal Code to be supplementary to special laws unless such special laws should specially provide the contrary.

 

I cannot accept the Minoritys insistence. I certainly doubt that the omission by the Legislature from Act No. 3326 of the effect on the running of the prescriptive period of the absence of the accused from the country was an inadvertent drafting error on the part of the Legislature. As such, the omission does not give to the Court the license to apply Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code at will in order to supply the omission. Casus omissus pro habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been intentionally omitted.[6] It is settled that if cases should arise for which Congress has made no provision, the courts cannot supply the omission.[7] A casus omissus does not justify judicial legislation,[8] most particularly in respect of statutes defining and punishing criminal offenses.[9]

 

Bearing in mind that prescription is a matter of positive legislation and cannot be established by mere implications or deductions,[10] I construe the silence of Act No. 3326 on the effect of the absence of the accused from the country as a clear and undeniable legislative statement that such absence does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violations of special penal laws. In Romualdez v. Marcelo,[11] the Court clearly declared so, holding that Section 2, supra, was:

xxx conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:

 

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.[12]

This construction entirely precludes the application of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code even in a suppletory manner.

 

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 expressly provides only one instance in which the prescriptive period is interrupted, that is, when criminal proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.[13] In that regard, the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription.[14] Hence, the prescriptive period for criminal violations of R.A. No. 3019 is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman either receives a complaint, or initiates its own investigation of the violations.[15]

 

Herein, the running of the 10-year prescriptive period was tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman actually received the complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. Although the records do not bear the date of receipt by the Office of the Ombudsman, I am nonetheless sure that the date was definitely not March 1, 1990, when the complaint was wrongly filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Rather, the date could only be after October 2, 1990, when the Court promulgated the decision in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[16] simply because that decision was what caused the PCGG to transfer the wrongly-filed complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman in order to commence the criminal prosecution.[17] To recall, the Court said in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government that it would be more in the interest of a just and fair administration of justice if the PCGG was prohibited from conducting a preliminary investigation and instead to just allow the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and take appropriate action.[18] Yet, by that time (i.e., October 2, 1990), prescription had already set in (as of February 8, 1990).

 

I cannot subscribe to the Minoritys submission that the period of prescription should run from the date of discovery instead of the date of the commission of the offense.

The transaction in question was evidenced by public instruments and records. There is good authority for the view that when the offense has not been concealed, such as when it is evidenced by public documents or is a matter of public record open to inspection, the State will not be permitted to plead ignorance of the act of the accused in order to evade the operation of the Statute of Limitations.[19] Nor may we presume a connivance among respondents from the fact that the boards of directors of UNICOM and UCPB had interlocking members who might have effectively concealed the transaction from the public in order to justify the reckoning from the date of discovery. As Justice Abads Majority Opinion sufficiently indicates, this case was not like a criminal prosecution based on the secretive granting of behest loans as to which reckoning the period from the date of discovery of the offense would be justified. The transaction in question had already left the boardrooms of both UCPB and UNICOM when the SEC approved the increase in capitalization. In People v. Sandiganbayan,[20] the Court applied the date-of-commission rule as the start of the reckoning because the illegal transaction involved had passed the hands of several public officials. Here, the fact that the increased capitalization was approved and certified by no less than the SEC, the government agency established to protect both domestic and foreign investments and the public,[21] called for the use of the date-of-commission rule.

 

Having interlocking directors between UNICOM and UCPB was insignificant considering that the transaction in question was not done only within the two corporations, but involved the participation of the SEC, a third party with the express duty to ensure the legality of corporate transactions like increased capitalization.

 

Lastly, I need to remind that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted.[22] As between Section 2 of Republic Act No. 3326 and Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, the former is controlling due to its being more favorable to the accused. This interpretation also accords most with the nature of prescription as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.[23] More than being an act of grace, prescription, as a statute of limitation, is equivalent to an act of amnesty, which shall begin to run upon the commission of the offense rather than upon the discovery of the offense.[24]

 

I VOTE to deny the petition.

 

 

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

 



[1] Prior to March 16, 1982, the applicable prescriptive period for all offenses punishable under Republic Act No. 3019 was ten years (Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3019). Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 (which took effect upon its approval on March 16, 1982) raised the period of prescription to fifteen years.

[2] Rollo, pp. 80-83.

[3] Id., p. 81.

[4] Rollo, p. 92.

[5] Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 585, 597-598; Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109376, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 655, 663.

[6] Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, G.R. No. 169435, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 71, 94; Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 196, 205.

[7] Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U.S. 55, 66 (1898).

[8] Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 543 (1925).

[9] Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of Laws (2008), p. 59 citing Broadhead v. Holdsworth, L.R. 2 Ex. Div. 321 and State v. Peters, 37 La. Ann. 730.

[10] Hermanos v. Dela Riva, G.R. No. L-19827, April 6, 1923.

[11] G.R. No. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 497 SCRA 89.

[12] Quoting Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 388, 394.

[13] See People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 123; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130817, August 22, 2001, 363 SCRA 489.

[14] Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 303; Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541.

[15] People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 123, 134.

[16] G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226.

[17] Rollo, pp. 43-44.

[18] Supra, note 16, at p. 257.

[19] I Feria & Gregorio, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, 1958 First Edition, pp. 666-667, citing People v. Dinsay, 40 O.G. No. 18, 63.

[20] G.R. No. 101724, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 241, 246-247.

[21] See P.D. No. 902-A.

[22] People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597, 608-609.

[23] Bergado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84051, May 19, 1989, 173 SCRA 497, 503; Sinaon v. Sorogon, G.R. No. L-59879, May 13, 1985, 136 SCRA 407, 410.

[24] People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101724, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 241, 247.