Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK,
SPOUSES SATURNINA BARIA &TOMAS CO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, METRO DISTRICT II,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 187021 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: January 25, 2012 |
X ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review under
Rule 45 assailing the March 31, 2008 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
The Facts
The factual and procedural backgrounds of this case
were succinctly recited by the CA in its decision as follows:
Sometime in 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama (Anama), and the
Respondent, Philippine Savings Bank (PSB), entered into a Contract to Buy, on
installment basis, the real property owned and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 301276 in the latters name. However, Anama defaulted in
paying his obligations thereunder, thus, PSB rescinded the said contract and
title to the property remained with the latter. Subsequently, the property was
sold by PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria and Tomas Co (Co Spouses) who, after
paying the purchase price in full, caused the registration of the same in their
names and were, thus, issued TCT No. 14239.
Resultantly, Anama filed before the
On
On
Aggrieved, Anama twice moved for the reconsideration of the
Dissatisfied, the petitioner questioned the RTC
Order before the CA for taking judicial cognizance of the motion for execution
filed by spouses Tomas Co and Saturnina Baria (Spouses Co) which was (1)
not in accord with Section 4 and Section 15 of the Rules of Court because it
was without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties; and (2) not in accord
with Section 6, Rule 15 in conjunction with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court because it lacks the mandatory affidavit of service.
On
The CA also stated that although a notice of hearing
and affidavit of service in a motion are mandatory requirements, the Spouses Cos
motion for execution of a final and executory judgment could be acted upon by
the RTC ex parte, and therefore, excused
from the mandatory requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court.
The CA was of the view that petitioner was not
denied due process because he was properly notified of the motion for execution
of the Spouses Co. It stated that the act of the Spouses Co in resorting to
personal delivery in serving their motion for execution did not render the motion
pro forma. It refused to apply a rigid application of the rules because it
would result in a manifest failure of justice considering that petitioners
position was nothing but an obvious dilatory tactic designed to prevent the
final disposition of Civil Case No. 44940.
Not satisfied with the CAs unfavorable disposition,
petitioner filed this petition praying for the reversal thereof presenting the
following
ARGUMENTS:
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE
REQUISITE NOTICE OF HEARING IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTIES NOT TO THE
CLERK OF COURT, THE LATEST (THEN) BEING GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO.
167103,
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE
REQUISITE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE IT SHOULD BE IN THE PROPER FORM AS PRESCRIBED
IN THE RULES AND IT SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE MOTION, THE LATEST (THEN) BEING
ELLO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 141255,
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE
APPROPRIATE ACTION ON THE FRAUD PERPETRATED UPON THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT-SPOUSES AND THEIR LEAD COUNSEL.
SINCE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT REFUSED TO TAKE
INTO CONSIDERATION THE RESPONDENT BANKS ACTION THAT OF:
ENGAGING IN A DAGDAG-BAWAS (LEGALLY INTERCALATION)
OPERATION OF A PORTION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES (TSN), OCTOBER
12, 1984, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 167, PASIG CITY, IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 44940, PAGES 54-55, AND
PRESENTING IT IN ITS APPELLEES BRIEF (IN THE
OWNERSHIP CASE, CA-G.R. NO. CV-42663, LIKEWISE, BEFORE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE
COURT) BY CITING IT ON PAGE 14 OF SAID BRIEF, AS IMPLIEDLY COMING FROM THE TSN
OF THE TRIAL COURT.
THINKING THAT THEIR FALSIFIED APPELLEES BRIEF WAS
MATERIAL IN SAID CA-G.R. NO. CV-42663.
IT COULD NOT RULE THAT THE SAME HAS BROUGHT ABOUT A
CRUCIAL MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES WHICH MAKES EXECUTION
INEQUITABLE (PUNCIA V. GERONA, 252 SCRA 424, 430-431), OR, IN THE WORDS OF
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL V. CA, G.R. NO. 75964,
Basically, petitioner argues that the respondents
failed to substantially comply with the rule on notice and hearing when they
filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC. He claims that the notice of hearing in the
motion for execution filed by the Spouses Co was a mere scrap of paper because
it was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the parties. Thus, the motion
for execution did not contain the required proof of service to the adverse
party. He adds that the Spouses Co and their counsel deliberately misserved
the copy of their motion for execution, thus, committing fraud upon the trial
court.
Additionally, he claims that PSB falsified its
appellees brief by engaging in a dagdag-bawas (intercalation) operation in
pages 54 to 55 of the TSN, dated
Position
of the Spouses Co
The Spouses Co counter that the petition should be
dismissed outright for raising both questions of facts and law in violation of
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Spouses Co aver that petitioner
attempts to resurrect the issue that PSB cheated him in their transaction and that
the RTC committed a dagdag-bawas. According to the Spouses Co, these issues had
long been threshed out by this Court.
At any rate, they assert that they have
substantially complied with the requirements of notice and hearing provided
under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners allegations, a copy of the motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution was given to petitioner through his principal
counsel, the Quasha Law Offices. At that time, the said law office had not
formally withdrawn its appearance as counsel for petitioner. Spouses Co argue that what they sought to be
executed was the final judgment of the RTC duly affirmed by the CA and this Court,
thus, putting the issues on the merits to rest.
The issuance of a writ of execution then becomes a matter of right and
the courts duty to issue the writ becomes ministerial.
Position
of respondent PSB
PSB argues that the decision rendered by the RTC in
Civil Case No. 44940 entitled Douglas F. Anama v. Philippine Savings Bank,
et. al.[3]
had long become final and executory as shown by the Entry of Judgment made by
the Court on
As to the principal issue, PSB points out that the
notice of hearing appended to the motion for execution filed by the Spouses Co
substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules since petitioners
then counsel of record was duly notified and furnished a copy of the questioned
motion for execution. Also, the motion for execution filed by the Spouses Co
was served upon and personally received by said counsel.
The Court agrees with the Spouses Co
that petitioners allegations on the dagdag-bawas operation of the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes, the fraud perpetuated upon the Court by said spouses
and their lead counsel, the ownership, and falsification had long been
laid to rest in the case of Douglas
F. Anama v. Philippine Savings Bank, et. al.[4] For said reason, the Court cannot review
those final pronouncements. To do so would violate the rules as it would open a
final judgment to another reconsideration which is a prohibited procedure.
On the subject procedural
question, the Court finds no compelling
reason to stay the execution of the judgment because the Spouses Co complied with
the notice and hearing requirements under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15. Said
sections, as amended, provide:
SECTION 4.
Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set
for hearing by the applicant.
Every written
motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least
three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets
the hearing on shorter notice.
SECTION 5.
Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be
later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
SECTION 6.
Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of service thereof.
Pertinently, Section 13 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 13. Proof of
service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission
of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of
the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place, and manner
of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of
an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7
of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn
copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Elementary
is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of notice
and hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has
consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the above
requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted
upon. The rule, however, is not
absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte if these would not cause
prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid
requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.
The motion
for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied
that the judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final
and executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a
writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. This
right on the part of the Spouses Co and duty on the part of the RTC are based
on Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure provides, as follows:
Section 1. Execution
upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal
has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved,
the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of
the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the
entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when
the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution.
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. On motion of
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record
or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or
final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution
pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in
a special order after due hearing.
(b)
Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.A several, separate or
partial judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions as
execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. (2a) [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
As can be
gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion for execution
executed as a matter of right without the needed notice and hearing requirement
to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of Paragraph 2 of Section 1
and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse party. In the case of Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company,
Inc. v. Virginia D. Vda. De Hernandez,[5] it was written:
It
is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not
prescribe that a copy of the motion for the execution of a final and executory
judgment be served on the defeated party, like litigated motions such as a motion to dismiss
(Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial (Section 2, Rule 37), or a motion
for execution of judgment pending appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of which
instances a written notice
thereof is required to be served by the movant on the adverse party in
order to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application.
It is not
disputed that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had already
become final and executory. It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a
litigation may, at any time within five (5) years after the entry thereof, have
a writ of execution issued for its enforcement and the court
not only has the power and authority to order its execution but it is its
ministerial duty to do so. It has also been held that the court cannot refuse
to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it,
or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed,
after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact
or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties
which makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that the controversy
has ever been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that
the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been
paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without
authority. Defendant-appellant has not shown that she falls
in any of the situations afore-mentioned. Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable. Otherwise, as was said by this Court in Molina
v. de la Riva, a case could never end. Once a court
renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it
are deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter related to
the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely a ministerial phase of
adjudication. The nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing
party is fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally
ministerial.
In Pamintuan
v. Muoz, We ruled that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment
debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for execution.
Also of the
same stature is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right and the
granting of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. Otherwise
stated, once sought by the prevailing party, execution of a final judgment will
just follow as a matter of course. Hence, the judgment debtor need
not be given advance notice of the application for execution nor he afforded
prior hearing.
Absence of such
advance notice to the judgment debtor does not constitute an infringement of
the constitutional guarantee of due process.
However, the
established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require that a
defendant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his day
in court should, after a judgment has been rendered against him, have a further
notice and hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken to reach his
property in satisfaction of the judgment. Thus, in the absence of a
statutory requirement, it is not essential that he be given notice before the
issuance of an execution against his tangible property; after the rendition
of the judgment he must take "notice of what will follow," no
further notice being "necessary to advance justice." [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
Likewise,
in the case of Leonardo Lim De Mesa v.
Hon. Court of Appeals,[6] it was stated:
In the present
case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of accounting had
already become final and executory. The execution thereof thus became a matter
of right on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, and is a
mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of the court. Once a
judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed
as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need not be given advance
notice of the application for execution nor be afforded prior hearings
thereon.
On the bases of
the foregoing considerations, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted correctly
in holding that the failure to serve a copy of the motion for execution on
petitioner is not a fatal defect. In fact, there was no necessity for such
service. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
At any rate,
it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution
of the Spouses Co. The records clearly
show that the motion for execution was duly served upon, and received by,
petitioners counsel-of-record, the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices, as
evidenced by a signed stamped received mark appearing on said pleading.[7]
The records are bereft of proof showing any written denial from petitioners
counsel of its valid receipt on behalf of its client. Neither is there proof
that the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices has formally withdrawn its
appearance as petitioners counsel-of-record. Considering that there is enough
proof shown on record of personal delivery in serving the subject motion for
execution, there was a valid compliance with the Rules, thus, no persuasive
reason to stay the execution of the subject final and executory judgment.
Moreover,
this Court takes note that petitioner was particularly silent on the ruling of
the CA that he was notified, through his counsel, of the motion for execution of
the Spouses Co when he filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTCs order
dated June 28, 2005, holding in abeyance said motion pending the resolution of
petitioners pleading filed before this Court. He did not dispute the ruling of
the CA either that the alleged defect in the Spouses Cos motion was cured when
his new counsel was served a copy of said motion for reconsideration of the
RTCs June 28, 2005 Order.[8]
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal
construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal
observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has
not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules
of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and
rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice.
In Somera
Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial
compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was
irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion
was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the
parties were duly notified.
Likewise, in Jehan
Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that
despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there
was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the
adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings
in opposition to the motion. The Court held:
This Court has
indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective
by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice
of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period
for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As an integral
component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the
Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is
for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse
party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion
before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be
heard.
The
test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to
study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which
it is based.[9]
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
Likewise,
in the case of KKK Foundation, Inc. v.
Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas,[10] this Court stated:
Anent the second issue, we
have consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered
a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive
and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy
of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that
motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with
these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are
exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully
shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is
not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the
interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the
motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court;
and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
A notice of hearing is an
integral component of procedural due process to afford the adverse parties a
chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such
notice, the adverse party is given time to study and answer the arguments in
the motion. Records show that while Angeless Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date
and time of the hearing. However, we still find that petitioner was not denied
procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution, the trial court issued an Order dated
The notice requirement is
not a ritual to be followed blindly.
Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanical and literal
application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural
rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding. [Emphases supplied]
At any
rate, it is undisputed that the
The Court agrees with the respondents
that petitioner mainly relies on mere technicalities to frustrate the ends of
justice and further delay the execution process and enforcement of the RTC Decision
that has been affirmed by the CA and this Court. The record shows that the case
has been dragging on for almost 30 years since petitioner filed an action for
annulment of sale in 1982. From the time
the Spouses Co bought the house from PSB in 1978, they have yet to set foot on
the subject house and lot.
To remand the case back to the lower court
would further prolong the agony of the Spouses Co. The Court should not allow
this to happen. The Spouses Co should
not be prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in their favor.
In another protracted case, the Court wrote:
As a final note, it bears to point out
that this case has been dragging for more than 15 years and the execution of
this Courts judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for almost ten years now
simply because De
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 103-113. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon.
[2]
[3] G.R. No.
128609,
[4]
[5] G.R. No.
[6] G.R. No. 109387,
[7] Rollo, p. 143.
[8]
[9] Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. v. Manila South Coast Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA 636, 643.
[10] G.R. No. 163785,
[11] Rollo, pp. 122-136.
[12] National Power Corporation v. Spouses Lorenzo L. Laohoo, G.R. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 580.
[13] Bernardo
De