Republic of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA), Petitioner, - versus - RURAL BANK OF
KABACAN, INC., LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, LEOSA NANETTE AGDEPPA and MARCELINO
VIERNES, MARGARITA TABOADA, PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH ORTIZ, represented by LINA
ERLINDA A. ORTIZ and MARIO ORTIZ, JUAN MAMAC and GLORIA MATAS, Respondents. |
G. R. No. 185124 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, PEREZ, SERENO, REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ.* Promulgated: January 25,
2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal of the 12 August 2008 Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision and 22 October 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196.
The
assailed issuances affirmed with modification the 31 August 1999 Judgment
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Judicial Region, Kabacan,
Cotabato. The RTC had fixed the just compensation for the value of the land and
improvements thereon that were expropriated by petitioner, but excluded the
value of the excavated soil. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is
represented in this case by the National Irrigation Authority (NIA).
The
Facts
NIA
is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is primarily responsible for irrigation
development and management in the country. Its charter was amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 552 on 11 September 1974 and P.D. 1702 on 17 July
1980. To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain.[1]
NIA
needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the
Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08 September 1994, it filed with the
RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of
three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters.[2]
The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 61 and was assigned to RTC-Branch
22. The affected parcels of land were the following:
1)
Lot No. 3080 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-61963 and registered under the Rural Bank of
Kabacan
2)
Lot No. 455 covered by TCT No. T-74516
and registered under the names of RG May, Ronald and Rolando, all surnamed Lao
3)
Lot No. 3039 registered under the name
of Littie Sarah Agdeppa[3]
On 11 July 1995, NIA filed an Amended Complaint to
include Leosa Nanette A. Agdeppa and Marcelino Viernes as registered owners of
Lot No. 3039.[4]
On 25 September 1995, NIA filed a Second Amended
Complaint to allege properly the area sought to be expropriated, the exact
address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof. NIA further
prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties
after depositing with the Philippine National Bank the amount of
₱19,246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.[5]
On 31 October 1995, respondents filed their Answer
with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim.[6]
They alleged, inter alia, that NIA
had no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because it was not a
sovereign political entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their
properties, because there was an abandoned government property adjacent to
theirs, where the project could pass through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer
owned by the Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of their expropriated
properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that should
have placed its value at ₱5 million; and that NIA never negotiated with
the landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing
permanent and irreparable damages to their properties valued at ₱250,000.[7]
On 11 September 1996, the RTC issued an Order
forming a committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the
expropriated
properties to establish the just compensation to be paid to the owners. The
committee was composed of the Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 22 as chairperson
and two (2) members of the parties to the case.[8]
On 20 September 1996, in response to the
expropriation Complaint, respondents-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda, Portia
Charisma Ruth Ortiz, Lina Erlinda Ortiz, Mario Ortiz, Juan Mamac and Gloria
Matas filed their Answer-in-Intervention with Affirmative and Special Defenses
and Counter-Claim. They essentially adopted the allegations in the Answer of
the other respondents and pointed out that Margarita Tabaoda and Portia
Charisma Ruth Ortiz were the new owners of Lot No. 3080, which the two acquired
from the Rural Bank of Kabacan. They further alleged that the four other
respondents-intervenors were joint tenants-cultivators of Lot Nos. 3080 and
3039.[9]
On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order
stating it would issue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the determination of the fair market
value of the properties, subject of the expropriation proceedings.[10]
The lower court later amended its ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ
of Possession in favor of NIA.[11]
On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a
Commissioners Report[12]
to the RTC stating the following observations:
In
the process of ocular inspection, the following were jointly observed:
1)
The
area that was already occupied is 6x200 meters which is equivalent to 1,200 square
meters;
2)
The
area which is to be occupied is 18,930 square meters, more or less;
3)
That
the area to be occupied is fully planted by gmelina trees with a spacing of 1x1
meters;
4)
That
the gmelina tress found in the area already occupied and used for [the] road is
planted with gmelina with spacing of 2x2 and more or less one (1) year old;
5)
That
the gmelina trees found in the area to be occupied are already four (4) years
old;
6)
That
the number of banana clumps (is) two hundred twenty (220);
7)
That
the number of coco trees found (is) fifteen (15).[13]
The report, however, stated that the committee
members could not agree on the market value of the subject properties and
recommended the appointment of new independent commissioners to replace the
ones coming from the parties only.[14]
On 22 October 1996, the RTC issued an Order[15]
revoking the appointments of Atty. Agdeppa and Engr. Mabang as members of the
committee and, in their stead, appointed Renato Sambrano, Assistant Provincial
Assessor of the Province of Cotabato; and Jack Tumacmol, Division Chief of the
Land Bank of the PhilippinesKidapawan Branch.[16]
On 25 November 1996, the new committee
submitted its Commissioners Report to the lower court. The committee had agreed
that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated should be ₱65
per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR). As regards the improvement on the properties, the report recommended the
following compensation:
a. ₱200
for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4) years old
b. ₱150
for each gmelina tree that are more than one (1) year old
c. ₱164
for each coco tree
d.
₱270 for each banana clump[17]
On 03 December 1997, the committee submitted to the
RTC another report, which had adopted the first Committee Report, as well as the
formers 25 November 1996 report. However, the committee added to its
computation the value of the earthfill excavated from portions of Lot Nos. 3039
and 3080.[18]
Petitioner objected to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the
computation of the value of the land.[19]
The
Ruling of the Trial Court
On 31 August 1999, the RTC promulgated its Judgment,[20]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
IN VIEW of all the foregoing considerations, the court finds and so holds that
the commissioners have arrived at and were able to determine the fair market
value of the properties. The court adopts their findings, and orders:
1.
That
18,930 square meters of the lands owned by the defendants is hereby
expropriated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines through the National
Irrigation Administration;
2.
That
the NIA shall pay to the defendants the amount of ₱1,230,450 for the
18,930 square meters expropriated in proportion to the areas so expropriated;
3.
That
the NIA shall pay to the defendant-intervenors, owners of Lot No. 3080, the sum
of ₱5,128,375.50, representing removed earthfill;
4.
That
the NIA shall pay to the defendants, owners of Lot No. 3039, the sum of
P1,929,611.30 representing earthfill;
5.
To
pay to the defendants the sum of ₱60,000 for the destroyed G-melina trees
(1 year old);
6.
To
pay to the defendants the sum of ₱3,786,000.00 for the 4-year old
G-melina trees;
7.
That
NIA shall pay to the defendants the sum of ₱2,460.00 for the coconut
trees;
8.
That
all payments intended for the defendant Rural Bank of Kabacan shall be given to
the defendants and intervenors who have already acquired ownership over the
land titled in the name of the Bank.[21]
NIA, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the Decision of the RTC to
the CA, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 65196. NIA assailed the trial
courts adoption of the Commissioners Report, which had determined the just
compensation to be awarded to the owners of the lands expropriated. NIA also
impugned as error the RTCs inclusion for compensation of the excavated soil
from the expropriated properties. Finally, it disputed the trial courts Order
to deliver the payment intended for the Rural Bank of Kabacan to
defendants-intervenors, who allegedly acquired ownership of the land still
titled in the name of the said rural bank.[22]
The
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 12 August 2008, the CA through its Twenty-First
(21st) Division, promulgated a Decision[23]
affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It ruled that the committee
tasked to determine the fair market value of the properties and improvements
for the purpose of arriving at the just compensation, properly performed its
function. The appellate court noted that the committee members had conducted ocular
inspections of the area surrounding the expropriated properties and made their
recommendations based on official documents from the BIR with regard to the
zonal valuations of the affected properties.[24]
The CA observed that, as far as the valuation of the improvements on the
properties was concerned, the committee members took into consideration the provincial
assessors appraisal of the age of the trees, their productivity and the inputs
made.[25]
The appellate court further noted that despite the Manifestation of NIA that
it be allowed to present evidence to rebut the recommendation of the
committee on the valuations of the
expropriated properties, NIA failed to do so.[26]
The assailed CA Decision, however, deleted the
inclusion of the value of the soil excavated from the properties in the just
compensation. It ruled that the property owner was entitled to compensation
only for the value of the property at the time of the taking.[27]
In the construction of irrigation projects, excavations are necessary to build
the canals, and the excavated soil cannot be valued separately from the land
expropriated. Thus, it concluded that NIA, as the new owner of the affected
properties, had the right to enjoy and make use of the property, including the
excavated soil, pursuant to the latters objectives.[28]
Finally, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling
that recognized defendants-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda and Portia Charisma
Ruth Ortiz as the new owners of Lot No.
3080 and held that they were thus entitled to just compensation. The appellate
court based its conclusion on the non-participation by the Rural Bank of
Kabacan in the expropriation proceedings and the latters Manifestation that it
no longer owned Lot No. 3080.[29]
On 11 September 2008, the NIA through the OSG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the 12 August 2008 Decision, but that motion was
denied.[30]
Aggrieved by the appellate courts Decision, NIA now
comes to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The
Issues
The following are the issues proffered
by petitioner:
The Court of appeals seriously erred in affirming the trial courts
finding of just compensation of the land and the improvements thereon based on
the report of the commissioners.
The court of appeals erred in ruling that the payment of just
compensation for lot no. 3080 should be made to respondents margarita taboada
and Portia charisma ruth Ortiz.[31]
The Courts Ruling
On the first
issue, the Petition is not meritorious.
In expropriation proceedings, just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but
the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation
and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[32] The constitutional limitation of just compensation is
considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the
property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government.[33]
In the instant case, we affirm the
appellate courts ruling that the commissioners properly determined the just
compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties were expropriated
by petitioner.
The records show that the trial court
dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just
compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee
members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the
expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the
kinds and the number of improvements on the properties.[34] When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the
land and the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of
disinterested members to carry out the task of determining the value of the
land and the improvements.
The new committee members even made a
second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data
from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties,
interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as
distance from the highway and the nearby town center.[35] Further, the committee members also considered Provincial
Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June
1999, and which provide for the value of the properties and the improvements
for taxation purposes.[36]
We can readily
deduce from these established facts that the committee members endeavored a
rigorous process to determine the just compensation to be awarded to the owners
of the expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us to,
oversimplify the process undertaken by the committee in arriving at its
recommendations, because these were not based on mere conjectures and
unreliable data.
In National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal,[37] this Court emphasized that the just-ness of the compensation could
only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the
value of the condemned property. The reliable and actual data we referred to in
that case were the sworn declarations of realtors in the area, as well as tax
declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR. In disregarding the Committee Report
assailed by the National Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled thus:
It is
evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any
actual and reliable basis. First, the market values of the subject propertys
neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative
documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax
declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the
contiguous residential dwellings and commercial establishments. The report also
failed to elaborate on how and by how much the community centers and
convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondents property. Finally,
the market sales data and price listings alluded to in the report were not even
appended thereto.
As correctly
invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners report of land prices which is not based
on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by
the court.
The trial
court adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners hook, line, and sinker.
It did not even bother to require the submission of the alleged market sales
data and price listings. Further, the RTC overlooked the fact that the
recommended just compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than
two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which
usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where
the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint. Clearly, the recommended just compensation in the commissioners
report is unacceptable.[38]
In the
instant case, the committee members based their recommendations on reliable
data and, as aptly noted by the appellate court, considered various factors
that affected the value of the land and the improvements.[39]
Petitioner, however, strongly objects to
the CAs affirmation of the trial courts adoption of Provincial Ordinance No.
173. The OSG, on behalf of petitioner, strongly argues that the recommendations
of the committee formed by the trial court were inaccurate. The OSG contends
that the ordinance reflects the 1999 market values of real properties in the
Province of Cotabato, while the actual taking was made in 1996.[40]
We are not persuaded.
We note that petitioner had ample
opportunity to rebut the testimonial, as well as documentary evidence presented
by respondents when the case was still on trial. It failed to do so, however. The issue raised
by petitioner was adequately
addresses by the CAs assailed Decision in this wise:
A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the second set of
Commissioners, with Atty. Marasigan still being the Chairperson and Mr.
Zambrano and Mr. Tomacmol as members, was not arbitrary and capricious in
performing the task assigned to them. We note that these Commissioners were
competent and disinterested persons who were handpicked by the court a quo due to their expertise in
appraising the value of the land and the improvements thereon in the province
of Cotabato. They made a careful study of the area affected by the
expropriation, mindful of the fact that the value of the land and its may be
affected by many factors. The duly appointed Commissioners made a second ocular
inspection of the subject area on 4 September 1997; went to the BIR office in
order to get the BIR zonal valuation of the properties located in Carmen,
Cotabato; interviewed adjacent property owners; and took into consideration
various factors such as the location of the land which is just less than a
kilometer away from the Poblacion and half a kilometer away from the highway
and the fact that it is near a military reservation. With regard to the
improvements, the Commissioners took into consideration the valuation of the
Provincial Assessor, the age of the trees, and the inputs and their
productivity.
Thus, it could not be said that the schedule of market values in
Ordinance No. 173 was the sole basis of the Commissioners in arriving at their
valuation. Said ordinance merely gave credence to their valuation which is
comparable to the current price at that time. Besides, Mr. Zambrano testified
that the date used as bases for Ordinance No. 173 were taken from 1995 to 1996.[41]
Moreover,
factual findings of the CA are generally binding on this Court. The rule admits
of exceptions, though, such as when the factual findings of the appellate court
and the trial court are contradictory, or when the findings are not supported
by the evidence on record.[42] These exceptions, however, are not present in the instant case.
Thus, in the absence of contrary
evidence, we affirm the findings of the CA, which sustained the trial courts Decision
adopting the committees recommendations on the just compensation to be awarded
to herein respondents.
We also uphold the
CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in
the payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the
value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties, contrary
to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the
soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just
compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what
the owner actually loses. Such value could
only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.
In National
Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al.,[43] we held that rights over lands are indivisible, viz:
[C]onsequently, the CAs findings which upheld those of the trial court
that respondents owned and possessed the property and that its substrata was
possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be
disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains
the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property
similarly belongs to respondents. This
conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under
it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and
subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation.
Thus, the ownership of land
extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
xxx xxx xxx
Registered landowners may
even be ousted of ownership and possession of their properties in the event the
latter are reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are
characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such owners, they are
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, petitioners argument that the
landowners right extends to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their
practical interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory would limit the right to the sub-soil
upon the economic utility which such area offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the landowners right extends to
such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or
enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more
interest protected by law.
Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial courts
Decision when it ruled thus:
We
agree with the OSG that NIA, in the construction of irrigation projects, must
necessarily make excavations in order to build the canals. Indeed it is
preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not only for the value of the land
but also for the soil excavated from such land when such excavation is a
necessary phase in the building of irrigation projects. That NIA will make use
of the excavated soil is of no moment and is of no concern to the landowner who
has been paid the fair market value of his land. As pointed out by the OSG, the
law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface area only.
Further, NIA, now being the owner of the expropriated property, has the right
to enjoy and make use of the property in accordance with its mandate and
objectives as provided by law. To sanction the payment of the excavated soil is
to allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the land at the time
when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public
improvements.[44]
On the second
issue, the Petition is meritorious.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which
had awarded the payment of just compensation intended for Lot No. 3080 registered
in the name of the Rural Bank of Kabacan to the defendants-intervenors on the basis of the non-participation of the
rural bank in the proceedings and the latters subsequent Manifestation that it
was no longer the owner of that lot. The
appellate court erred on this matter.
It should be
noted that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds.[45]
In this kind of proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in their
evaluation of the just compensation to be awarded to the owner of the
expropriated property.[46]
Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate court to rely on the Rural Bank of
Kabacans mere declaration of non-ownership and non-participation in the
expropriation proceeding to validate defendants-intervenors claim of
entitlement to that payment.
The law imposes certain legal requirements in order
for a conveyance of real property to be valid. It should be noted that Lot No.
3080 is a registered parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-61963. In order for the reconveyance of real property
to be valid, the conveyance must be embodied in a public document[47]
and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds where the property is
situated.[48]
We have scrupulously examined the records of the
case and found no proof of conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership of Lot
No. 3080 from its registered owner, the Rural Bank of Kabacan, to
defendants-intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the name of the
said rural bank. It is not disputed that the bank did not participate in the
expropriation proceedings, and that it manifested that it no longer owned Lot
No. 3080. The trial court should have nevertheless required the rural bank and
the defendants-intervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to the conveyance
of the subject lot. The court cannot rely on mere inference, considering that
the payment of just compensation is intended to be awarded solely owner based
on the latters proof of ownership.
The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67,
Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides thus:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting
claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums
awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the
benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto.
But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either
the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.
Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the
trial courts Order to award payment of just compensation to the
defendants-intervenors. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080.
Despite the fact that the lot was covered
by TCT No. T-61963 and was registered under its name, the Rural Bank of Kabacan
manifested that the owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but the defendants-intervenors;
however, it presented no proof as to the conveyance thereof. In this regard, we
deem it proper to remand this case to the trial court for the reception of
evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled to
receive the payment of just compensation.
WHEREFORE,
the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The 12 August 2008 CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 65196, awarding just compensation to the defendants as owners of
the expropriated properties and deleting the inclusion of the value of the
excavated soil, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.
A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
*
Designated as acting Member
of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order
No. 1174 dated January 9, 2012.
[1] Presidential Decree No. 552 - Amending
Certain Sections of Republic Act Numbered Thirty-Six Hundred and One, Entitled,
"An Act Creating the National Irrigation Administration"
SECTION 1. Section 2, Republic Act Numbered Thirty-six
Hundred and One, is hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To acquire, by any mode of acquisition, real and personal
properties, and all appurtenant rights, easements, concessions and privileges,
whether the same are already devoted to private or public use in connection
with the development of projects by the NIA;
The National
Irrigation Administration is empowered to exercise the right of eminent domain
in the manner provided by law for the institution of expropriation proceedings.
[2]
Rollo, p. 67.
[3] Rollo, p. 50.
[4] Id. at 72-74.
[5] Id. at
83.
[6] Id. at 86.
[7] Id. at 88-98.
[8] Id. at
104.
[9]
Id. at 52.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at
53.
[12] Id. at 102-103. The Commission
was composed of Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Br. 22
of Kabacan, Cotabato as chairperson; and members Atty. Littie Sarah Agdeppa
(respondent) for the landowners and Engr. Abdulasis Mabang for NIA (petitioner).
[13] Rollo, p. 103.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at
177.
[16] Id. at
54.
[17] Id. at
105-106.
[18] Id. at
107-108.
[19] Id. at
17.
[20] Id. at
109.
[21] Id. at
114-115.
[22] Rollo, p. 56.
[23] CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196
dated 12 August 2008, penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaez and concurred
in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Mario V. Lopez.
[24] Rollo, p. 58.
[25] Id. at
59.
[26] Id.
[27] Id. at 61.
[28] Id. at
62.
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 64-65.
[31] Rollo, p. 20.
[32] National Power Corporation v. Teresita Diato-Bernal, G.R. No.
180979, 15 December 2010, 638 SCRA 660, citing Republic v. Libunao, 594 SCRA 363(2009).
[33] Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Property
Registration Decree And Related Laws (Land Titles And Deeds) 581 (2000).
[34] Rollo, p. 58.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37]
Supra note 32.
[38] Id. at 668-669.
[39] Rollo, p. 60.
[40] Id. at
24-26.
[41] Id. at 58-59.
[42] The Republic of the Philippines represented by the
National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 147245, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 516.
[43] National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, G.R.
No. 168732, 29 June 2007, 526 SCRA 149,
159-160.
[44] Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[45] National Power Corporation v. Spouses Dela Cruz, G.R.
No. 156093, 02 February 2007, 514 SCRA 56.
[46] Supra,
note 38.
[47] Civil
Code of the Philippines:
Art. 1358. The following
must appear in a public document:
(1) Acts and contracts
which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property
or of an interest therein a governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;
[48] P.D.
1529:
CHAPTER
XII
Forms
Used in Land Registration and Conveyancing
SECTION 112. Forms in Conveyancing. The Commissioner
of Land Registration shall prepare convenient blank forms as may be necessary
to help facilitate the proceedings in land registration and shall take charge
of the printing of land title forms.
Deeds,
conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and other voluntary
instruments, whether affecting registered or unregistered land, executed in
accordance with law in the form of public instruments shall be registrable:
Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons
executing the same in the presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise
sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the
person or persons executing the same before a notary public or other public
officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where the instrument so
acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon
acknowledgment is written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated,
each page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the page where
the signatures already appear at the foot of the instrument, shall be signed on
the left margin thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and
their witnesses, and all the pages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact
as well as the number of pages shall be stated in the acknowledgment. Where the
instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of
two or more parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in
said acknowledgment.