Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES
P. CONCEPCION,
Complainants, - versus - LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll.
MAYOR, JR., Respondent. |
A.C.
No. 7430
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, VILLARAMA, JR.,* PEREZ, SERENO,
and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February 15, 2012 |
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint[1] filed by Martin Lahm III and James P.
Concepcion (complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio
Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of
lawyers oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment[2]
to the complaint.
In a Resolution[3]
dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The
antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation[4]
dated September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On
September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.
x x x x
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of the International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved, however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze claim of moral and exemplary damages.
x x x x
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued by him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
x x x
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[5]
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance
of the status quo ante order lacks
factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority
to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3)
the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration
directed against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to
keep the status quo ante until the
expiration of David Edward Tozes employment contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.[6]
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-644[7]
which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors had
previously recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for
three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll.
Mayor, Jr..
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing
disposition,[8]
but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree
with the IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides
that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyers oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.
A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.[9] Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful
conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights
of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind
this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[10]
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court
to impose disciplinary sanction against the respondent as a member of the bar. However,
the grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the administrative
charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected with the discharge
of the respondents quasi-judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the
respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer entrusted to resolve labor
controversies. It is well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust
which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law
before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.[11]
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent
were based on his acts committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor
arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions
against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease
to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In
fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of
the bar on such grounds.[12]
In Atty. Vitriolo
v. Atty. Dasig,[13]
we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who
holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that
the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre,
Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her
favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office.
The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of
the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of
the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently
unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
x x x
A member
of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on
June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners
alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon
6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity
to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance
of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the
ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.[14]
(emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty.
Borres, Jr.,[15]
we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in his
capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against
judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government.
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan[16]
where the respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in
his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial
system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of
judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to
administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of
rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases.
As
a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not
always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a
judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error
was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.[17]
While
a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal
principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be
subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he
renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and
arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.[18]
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive
of gross ignorance of the law.[19]
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the
September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been
resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was
filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
is already in effect.
Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper cases, the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the
1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary
injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its
Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of
the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the
sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or
arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained
or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to
post a bond and writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order shall
become effective only upon the approval of the bond which shall answer for any
damage that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if it is finally determined
that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may
be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending
before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency
of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the
2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions, may
issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. (emphasis supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with
regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may
be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section
4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The
reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be
delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct
such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the
parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and
recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such delegation.
(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves
no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in violation of the said
rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the Investigating
Commissioner aptly ruled that:
The
respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the
basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
National Labor Relations Commission.
x
x x x
The
respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of
the 2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The first, states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a
preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the second, states [that]
Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application of preliminary
injunction or restraining order only in a delegated capacity.[20]
What made matters worse is the unnecessary
delay on the part of the respondent in resolving the motion for reconsideration
of the September 14, 2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the respondent on
his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of
the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent
deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.
On this score, the Investigating
Commissioner keenly observed that:
The
Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September
14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the
illegal dismissal case before the respondent.
Conspicuously,
Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David Edward
Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze will
render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and
August 2006-July 2007.
The
Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as
superintendent of International School of Manila until the resolution of the
formers Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since
the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School
Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the
respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Tozes Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Against the Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof would
result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted prejudice
to International School Manila.
x
x x x
At
the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal
case before him, there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment
Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila.
From
the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the
attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the
resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and
keep status quo ante until expiration
of David Edward Tozes Employment Contract with International School Manila
come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and
academic.
x
x x x
Furthermore,
the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the]
assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the
circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between
David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The respondents
lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him for more
than five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the
respondents disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence. Failure to decide a
case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the
erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges,
and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in
the disposition of cases undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary x x x. [21]
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up
to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction
from this Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
All told, we find the
respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor
arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into
prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now
proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Under
Rule 140[22]
of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of
the law is a serious charge,[23]
punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service.[24]
In
Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the
respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Additionally,
in parallel cases,[25]
a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of
suspension for six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended
that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident would be dealt with
more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of
Governors had previously recommended the respondents suspension from the
practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll.
Mayor, Jr.. This case, however, is still pending.
It cannot be gainsaid
that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon
lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those
in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant
public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy
burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest
of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge
of their official functions.[26]
At this point, the
respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,[27] thus:
Ignorance of the law is
the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be
at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and
rules will render them administratively liable. Where the law involved is
simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of
his court, respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of
the law.
When the inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent
and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that
the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse
of judicial authority.[28]
(citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyers oath and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING
that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished
the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator
who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and
likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as attorney.
SO
ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1195 dated February 15, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-7.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Spouses Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, 468 Phil. 329, 335 (2004), citing Re Administrative Case Against Atty. Occea, 433 Phil. 138 (2002).
[10] Office of the Court Administrator v. Liangco, A.C. No. 5355, December 13, 2011.
[11] Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations,
G.R. No. L-24864, April 30, 1985.
[12] Ali v. Bubong, 493 Phil. 172, 182 (2005), citing Reyes v. Gaa, 316 Phil. 97, 102 (1995).
[13] 448 Phil. 199 (2003).
[14]
[15] 511 Phil. 56 (2005).
[16] A.C. No. 6674, June 30, 2009, 591
SCRA 217.
[17] Dipatuan
v. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 48, 55.
[18]
[19] Cabili
v. Judge Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, September 6, 2011.
[21]
[22] Discipline
of Judges of regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan.
[23] Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court.
[24] Section
11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
[25] Amante-Descallar v. Ramas, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2142, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 23; Baculi
v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009, 586 SCRA 69; Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua, A.M. OCA IPI No.
07-2630-RTJ, A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2049, RTJ-08-2141 and RTJ-07-2093, April 23,
2010, 619 SCRA 59.
[26] Olazo v. Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December
7, 2010, 637 SCRA 1, 9.
[27] A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2063, RTJ-07-2064 and RTJ-07-2066, June 26, 2009, 591
SCRA, 51.
[28]