Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
RODEL LUZ y
ONG, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,[1]
Respondent. |
G. R. No. 197788 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February 29,
2012 |
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D
E C I S I O N
SERENO,
J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011[2]
and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement
of the Facts and of the Case
The
facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version
of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at
the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the
morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban
Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic)
while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside
their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost
in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were
issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that
the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he
was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket
of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a
nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size,
including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife;
that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that
after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4)
plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned
on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not guilty
to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003,
after which, trial ensued.
During
trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified
for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and
raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In
its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4]
the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs[5]
committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to
show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two
plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.
The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak,
self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn
over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and
destruction in accordance with law.
SO
ORDERED.[6]
Upon
review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On
12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October
2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4
January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner
raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i)
THE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii)
THE PRESUMPTION
OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED
UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii)
THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv)
THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that
there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he
was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never
consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner
had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute
that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police
Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an
ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders
thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not
wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police
officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part
of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the
latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation
of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other
words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said
Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
We find the Petition to
be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of
petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for
this reason, arrested.
Arrest
is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense.[10]
It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither
the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.[11]
Under
R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure
for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation
of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies
duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and
issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the
time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt
shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the
driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension
will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12]
provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct
of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not
apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the
following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations,
immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report
(TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the
driver or any of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3
Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of
the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3
Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In
Berkemer v. McCarty,[13]
the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be
considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does
not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal
arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the
motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It
ruled as follows:
It must be
acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the freedom
of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle.
Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policemans
signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. x x x
However, we
decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion
emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda
requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in
which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must
decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of
an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary
and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few
minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time
answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and
registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most
likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning
incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often
is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical
traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of
the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,
uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in
deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation
substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical
traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these
respects, the usual traffic stop is more
analogous to a so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1
(1968), than to a formal arrest. x x
x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are
subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of
ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
x x x x x x x x x
We are confident
that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is
settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as
a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal
arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a
motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is
subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for practical purposes, he
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis
supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the
motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene
of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that
he should have been apprised of his Miranda
rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the
functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner
here be considered under arrest at the time that his traffic citation was
being made.
It also appears that, according to
City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to
wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may
be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such
an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there
can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on
the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the
latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In
this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even
if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested
upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance
of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This
Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and
must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed
of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them.[14]
It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after
petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In
Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted
that the Miranda warnings must also
be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The
purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police
do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the inherently
compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which work
to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible to free
courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine,
after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes
are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that
petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down for a traffic
violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no
need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly
discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from
it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a
warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop
and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.[15]
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful
arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence
seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view.
It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket.
Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented
warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17]
It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is,
the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that
petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession
does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
that petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics
of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1)
the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a
secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5)
the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9)
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the
State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.[19]
In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police
station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless
search.
Neither does the search qualify under
the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police
officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe
that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles
v. Iowa,[21]
the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for
speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter,
this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the
car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown
search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from
the car or doing a patdown:
In
Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search incident
to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x
x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest
exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We
have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate
and weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic
citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest.
In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer
because of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that [t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the
arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A
routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and is
more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.
S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well
be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate
steps to destroy incriminating evidence).
This is not to
say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine
traffic stop.
It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in
this context may justify the minimal additional intrusion of ordering a
driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably
greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the
search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search
for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out
of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson,
supra, at 414; perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers upon
reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the passenger compartment of a
vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain
immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983);
and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any
containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U.
S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second
justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to
discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and
issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had
been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found
either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the
car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing
considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to
the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[23]
Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government.[24]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest
are inadmissible.[25]
The drugs are the very corpus delicti
of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
accused.[26]
WHEREFORE,
the Petition is GRANTED. The 18
February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming
the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th
Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless
his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.
A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
ARTURO D.
BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L.
REYES
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
[1]
The Petition was originally captioned as Rodel Luz y Ong v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, Hon. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Naga City. However,
under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petition must state the
full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as
respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as
petitioners or respondents.
[2]Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
[3] Rollo, p. 91.
[4] Docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087; rollo, pp. 90-102.
[5] See Section 11, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
[6] Rollo, p. 101.
[7] Rollo, p. 23.
[8] Id. at 96.
[9] People v. Saludes, 452 Phil. 719, 728 (2003).
[10] Rules of Court, Rule 113, Sec. 1.
[11] People v. Milado, 462 Phil. 411 (2003).
[12] PNPM-DO-DS-3-1 dated March 2010.
[13] 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
[14] Morales v. Enrile, 206 Phil. 466 (1983).
[15] People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 (1999).
[16] See People v. Macalaba, 443 Phil. 565 (2003).
[17] Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263 (2002).
[18] RTC Decision, rollo, p. 91.
[19] Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263 (2002).
[20] People v. Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003).
[21] 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
[22] People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729 (2003).
[23] 1987 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 2.
[24] Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 611.
[25] People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010.
[26] Id.