Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
ANTONIO MENDOZA, Petitioner, -
versus - FIL-HOMES REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 194653
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO,
and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February 8, 2012 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Antonio Mendoza (Mendoza) assailing
the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2010 and Resolution[2] dated November 24, 2010 issued by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104394 entitled Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of
Lipa, Branch 12 and Antonio Mendoza.
On June 13, 2000, the spouses Roberto and Rebecca Beltran (Spouses
Beltran) filed a complaint for specific performance, demolition of improvements
with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0272, with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lipa City against Mendoza, alleging that the latter constructed
a residential house which encroached on their property identified as Lot Nos.
37 and 7, Block 12 of the City Park Subdivision, Barangay Maraouy, Lipa City.
Thereupon, Mendoza filed a third-party complaint for subrogation,
indemnity and damages against Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation (Fil-Homes),
claiming that it was the latter which caused him to wrongfully construct a big
portion of his house on Spouses Beltrans property. Trial proper ensued
thereafter.
On July 17, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering P100,000.00
as attorneys fees, P500,000.00 as moral damages and P60,000.00
as cost of litigation.
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated March 22, 2005, affirmed
the July 17, 2003 Decision of the RTC albeit with the following modifications:
(1) Fil-Homes was ordered to pay Mendoza actual and compensatory damages in the
amount of P1,323,554.30 upon the demolition of the latters house; and
(2) the amount of moral damages was reduced to P100,000.00. The
foregoing disposition of the CA became final as the parties therein did not
interpose an appeal therefrom.
Herein petitioner then moved for the partial execution of the
March 22, 2005 CA Decision with regard to the payment of attorneys fees, moral
damages and the cost of litigation. On April 16, 2007, the RTC issued an Order
directing the issuance of a writ of execution against herein respondent.
Accordingly, on May 2, 2007, the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC issued the
corresponding writ of execution.
On August 30, 2007, the respondent paid the petitioner the amount
of P260,000.00 corresponding to the attorneys fees, moral damages and
the cost of litigation awarded to the latter. On September 3, 2007, the Sheriff
which implemented the writ, submitted to the RTC a Sheriffs Return stating
that the writ of execution had been fully satisfied insofar as the award for
attorneys fees, moral damages and the cost of litigation.
On March 31, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the
RTC informing the said court that, on August 30, 2007, Spouses Beltran had
executed a declaration and acknowledgment attesting that the judgment in their favor
had already been fully settled and paid. Apparently, the respondent gave Spouses
Beltran a parcel of land they owned in exchange for the lot encroached upon by
the petitioners house.
On April 22, 2008, the petitioner, having demolished the portion
of his house which encroached upon the Spouses Beltrans lot, moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the respondent for the payment of actual
and compensatory damages in the amount of P1,323,554.30. The respondent
opposed the said motion, alleging that the petitioner had been informed,
through the formers March 31, 2008 Manifestation, that it had fully settled
the judgment in favor of Spouses Beltran.
On May 14, 2008, Spouses Beltran, through their counsel, confirmed
that they indeed executed the August 30, 2007 declaration and
acknowledgment which attested to the satisfaction of the judgment in their
favor.
On June 10, 2008, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the
petitioner, directing the deputy sheriff to enforce the judgment against the
respondent for the payment of actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P1,323,554.30.
The respondent sought a reconsideration of the said June 10, 2008 Order but it
was denied by the RTC in its Order dated July 8, 2008.
Thus, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the orders dated June 10, 2008 and July 8,
2008.
The Ruling of the CA
On July 30, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,[3]
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The RTC Orders dated June
1[0], 2008 and July 8, 2008, respectively, are SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC decision in Civil Case No. 2000-0272 dated July 17, 2003, as affirmed
with modification by this Courts 15th Division in CA G.R. CV No.
80817 on March 22, 2005, is hereby declared fully satisfied and the case is deemed closed and terminated.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The CA held that, although execution of a final decision is merely
ministerial, to allow the execution of the judgment for the payment of actual
and compensatory damages against the respondent would be inequitable since the
petitioner caused the demolition of the said portion of his house in bad faith.
The CA explained that actual and compensatory damages may
only be awarded to the petitioner in the event that the latter is ordered to
demolish the said portion of his house.
In turn, the demolition of the said portion of the petitioners
house is contingent upon the event that the petitioner fails to pay the value
of the portion of the Spouses Beltrans lot which is encroached by the
petitioners house. The CA pointed out that Spouses Beltran made no demand for
the payment of the value of the said portion of their lot and, thus, there was
no reason for the petitioner to cause the said demolition.
Further, the CA intimated that, when the petitioner commenced the
demolition of the portion of his house on April 2, 2008, he had already been
informed by the respondent that it had already fully satisfied the judgment in
favor of the Spouses Beltran on August 30, 2007.
The petitioner sought a reconsideration[5]
of the said July 30, 2010 Decision but it was denied by the CA in its November
24, 2010 Resolution.[6]
The Present
Petition
Undaunted, the petitioner instituted the instant petition for
review on certiorari asserting the
following arguments: (1) the CA committed reversible error in its application
of the law and committed grave error in its appreciation of facts; (2) the CA
committed reversible error in holding that the petitioner was in bad faith when
he demolished his house; (3) the CA erred in holding that the payment made by the
respondent in favor of the Spouses Beltran made the enforcement of the writ of
execution no longer feasible; and (4) the CA erred in ruling that the RTC
issued its orders dated June 10, 2008 and July 8, 2008 with grave abuse of
discretion.[7]
In its Comment,[8]
the respondent asserted that the instant petition ought to be denied as it
merely raised factual questions. In any case, the respondent claimed that the
petitioner caused the demolition of his house in bad faith and an order
directing Fil-Homes to pay actual and compensatory damages to the petitioner would
be unjust and inequitable.
In
sum, the issue for this Courts resolution is whether the CA erred in denying
the execution of the judgment for the payment of actual and compensatory
damages in favor of the petitioner.
This
Courts Ruling
The petition is denied.
The issue presented by the instant case is not novel. In FGU Insurance Corporation v.
Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher
court has become final and executory and has been returned to the lower court,
the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the
decision and issuing the writ of execution. In addition, a final and
executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief not
originally included. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party
is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court's
ministerial duty. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court
or reexamine it for any other purpose other than execution; much less may it
review the same upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor
intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been demanded.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability
of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of
the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck
down.
But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3)
void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. The exception
to the doctrine of immutability of judgment has been applied in several cases
in order to serve substantial justice. The early case of City of Butuan
vs. Ortiz is one where the Court held as follows:
Obviously a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled
to a writ of execution of the final judgment obtained by him within five years
from its entry (Section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been
repeatedly held, and it is now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when
after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and
circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, the
interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize
the same with justice and the facts (Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil. 569; Behn,
Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil. 276; Warner, Barnes & Co. vs.
Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil. 588; Flor Mata
vs. Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil. 809). In the instant case the respondent
Cleofas alleged that subsequent to the judgment obtained by Sto. Domingo, they
entered into an agreement which showed that he was no longer indebted in the
amount claimed of P995, but in a lesser amount. Sto. Domingo had no right to an
execution for the amount claimed by him. (De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil.
686-693).
Shortly after City of Butuan v. Ortiz, the
case of Candelario v. Caizares was promulgated, where it was
written that:
After a judgment has become final, if there is evidence of
an event or circumstance which would affect or change the rights of the parties
thereto, the court should be allowed to admit evidence of such new facts and
circumstances, and thereafter suspend execution thereof and grant relief as the
new facts and circumstances warrant. We, therefore, find that the ruling of the
court declaring that the order for the payment of P40,000.00 is final and
may not be reversed, is erroneous as above explained.
These rulings were reiterated in the cases of Abellana
vs. Dosdos, The City of
Here,
the March 22, 2005 Decision of the CA ordering, inter alia, the respondent to pay the petitioner actual and
compensatory damages in the event that the latter is constrained to demolish
the said portion of his house, is already final. Pursuant to the doctrine of finality
of judgment, the said decision may not be modified in any respect.
Nevertheless, we are loath to apply the doctrine of finality of
judgment with regard to the payment of actual and compensatory damages in favor
of the petitioner. There are circumstances in the instant case which transpired
after the finality of the March 22, 2005 Decision of the CA and which rendered
the execution of the same unjust and inequitable with respect to the award of
actual and compensatory damages in favor of the petitioner.
After the March 22, 2005 CA Decision had attained finality, the
respondent had fully satisfied the judgment in favor of Spouses Beltran by
conveying a parcel of land it owned in exchange for the lot encroached upon by
the petitioners house. It bears stressing that the petitioner has been
informed of the fact of the satisfaction of the judgment in favor of Spouses
Beltran. Fil-Homes, then, had become the registered owners of the property
encroached upon.
Accordingly, the petitioner, in view of the foregoing, could
reasonably expect that Spouses Beltran would no longer demand from him the
payment of the value of the latters lot and, as a practical consequence, there
would be no need for the former to cause the demolition of his house. There
being no necessity for the demolition of the petitioners house, there would
likewise be no need for the order directing the respondent to pay the
petitioner actual and compensatory damages.
On this point, the CA aptly ruled that:
The foregoing ratiocination
failed to take into consideration that the [Spouses Beltran] had lost whatever
interest they may have in the case as adjudged in their favor. Their position
as party-plaintiffs entitled to a writ of execution enforced against the owner
of the structure erected on the subject lots has been transferred to the [respondent].
They have, for all intents and purposes, been considered to have received
payment for the value of the lot. Thus, after taking into consideration the
subsequent events that transpired, this Court finds and so holds that it will
now be unjust to enforce to enforce paragraphs 6 and 7 of the decision. By
receiving payment over the value of the lot, [Spouses Beltran] clearly lost
their right to alternatively order the demolition of the portions of the
Indeed, it
would be the height of inequity if the respondent would still be required to
pay the petitioner actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P1,323,554.30
after it had fully satisfied the judgment in favor of Spouses Beltran.
Moreover, we
agree with the CA that there was evident bad faith on the part of the
petitioner when he caused the demolition of his house. The petitioner, despite
knowing that the respondent had fully satisfied the judgment in favor of Spouses
Beltran, still proceeded with the demolition of his house. Thus, whatever
injury that may have been incurred by the petitioner when his house was
demolished could only be attributed to him. Thus, the CA stressed that:
What
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July
30, 2010 and Resolution dated November 24, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104394 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Danton Q. Bueser, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-39.
[2] Id. at 41-42.
[3] Supra note 1.
[4] Rollo, p. 38.
[5]
[6] Supra note 2.
[7] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[8]
[9] G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011.
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 36.
[12]