Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO.,
INC., Petitioner, -
versus - RODELIO ALBERTO and ENRICO ALBERTO REYES, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 194320 Present: VELASCO, JR., J.,
Chairperson, PERALTA, REYES,* and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: February
1, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, seeking to reverse and set aside the July 28, 2010 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and its October 29, 2010 Resolution[2]
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc. (Malayan Insurance). The July 28, 2010 CA Decision reversed and set
aside the Decision[3] dated February 2, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51 in
At around 5 oclock in the morning of December 17,
1995, an accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and
Based on the Police Report issued by the
on-the-spot investigator, Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga (SPO1
Dungga), the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan
Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. All three (3) vehicles
were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck
simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear
left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to
the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left
portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the
Isuzu Tanker.[5]
Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994, Malayan
Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy No. PV-025-00220 in favor of First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured), insuring the
aforementioned Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability, own damage and
theft, among others. Having insured the
vehicle against such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated October
18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the assured amounting to PhP
700,000.[6]
Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the
rights and interests of the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the
latter, Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto
(Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered owner and the
driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay the amount
it had paid to the assured. When
respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was
constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence against
respondents.[7]
In their Answer, respondents asserted that they
cannot be held liable for the vehicular accident, since its proximate cause was
the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver.
They alleged that the speeding bus, coming from the service road of
EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the middle lane without due regard to Reyes
right of way. When the Nissan Bus
abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but the braking action could
not cope with the inertia and failed to gain sufficient traction. As a consequence, the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit
the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the
vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus,
on the other hand, sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing damage to the
latter in the amount of PhP 20,000.
Respondents also controverted the results of the Police Report,
asserting that it was based solely on the biased narration of the Nissan Bus
driver.[8]
After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings,
trial ensued. Malayan Insurance
presented the testimony of its lone witness, a motor car claim adjuster, who
attested that he processed the insurance claim of the assured and verified the
documents submitted to him. Respondents,
on the other hand, failed to present any evidence.
In its Decision dated February 2, 2009, the trial
court, in Civil Case No. 99-95885, ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and
declared respondents liable for damages. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff against defendants jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The
amount of P700,000.00 with legal interest from the time of the filing of the
complaint;
2.
Attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and;
3. Cost of
suit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Dissatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 93112. In its Decision dated July 28, 2010, the
CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court and ruled in favor of
respondents, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant
appeal is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed Decision dated 2 February 2009 REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Complaint dated
18 October 1999 is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The CA held that the evidence on record has failed
to establish not only negligence on the part of respondents, but also
compliance with the other requisites and the consequent right of Malayan
Insurance to subrogation.[11] It
noted that the police report, which has been made part of the records of the
trial court, was not properly identified by the police officer who conducted
the on-the-spot investigation of the subject collision. It, thus, held that an
appellate court, as a reviewing body, cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the
genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document, much less accord it
evidentiary value.[12]
Subsequently, Malayan Insurance filed its Motion
for Reconsideration, arguing that a police report is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. And inasmuch as they never questioned the
presentation of the report in evidence, respondents are deemed to have waived
their right to question its authenticity and due execution.[13]
In its Resolution dated October 29, 2010, the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, Malayan Insurance filed the instant petition.
In its Memorandum[14]
dated June 27, 2011, Malayan Insurance raises the following issues for Our
consideration:
I
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN REFUSING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE POLICE REPORT SINCE THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHO PREPARED THE SAME DID NOT ACTUALLY TESTIFY IN COURT THEREON.
II
WHETHER THE SUBROGATION OF MALAYAN INSURANCE IS IMPAIRED AND/OR DEFICIENT.
On the other hand, respondents submit
the following issues in its Memorandum[15]
dated July 7, 2011:
I
WHETHER THE CA
IS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE OF MALAYAN INSURANCE TO
OVERCOME THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE NEGLIGENCE OF
RESPONDENTS.
II
WHETHER THE
PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY MALAYAN INSURANCE ARE SUFFICIENT TO CLAIM FOR
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
III
WHETHER THE
SUBROGATION OF MALAYAN INSURANCE HAS PASSED COMPLIANCE AND REQUISITES AS
PROVIDED UNDER PERTINENT LAWS.
Essentially, the issues boil down to the following: (1) the admissibility
of the police report; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support a claim
for gross negligence; and (3) the validity of subrogation in the instant case.
The petition has merit.
Admissibility of the
Police Report
Malayan
Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police
investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still admissible in
evidence, especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its
presentation in evidence.[16]
Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the investigating
police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the evidence on record.[17]
Indeed, under
the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the
witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from
the witness own perception.[18]
Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely
learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those
matters.[19]
Such testimony is considered hearsay and
may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This
is known as the hearsay rule.[20]
As
discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA,[21]
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.
There are
several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which
are entries in official records.[22]
Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,[23]
this Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an
exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus: (a) that the
entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of
his or her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must have been acquired
by the public officer or other person personally or through official
information.
Notably, the
presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented
in court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately proved.[24]
Here, there
is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the
on-the-spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the performance
of his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient
personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to
the police reports presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have
waived their right to do so.[25] As
a result, the police report is still admissible in evidence.
Sufficiency of
Evidence
Malayan
Insurance contends that since Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo Cargo truck, bumped
the rear of the Mitsubishi Galant, he is presumed to be negligent unless proved
otherwise. It further contends that respondents failed to present any evidence
to overturn the presumption of negligence.[26]
Contrarily, respondents claim that since Malayan Insurance did not present any
witness who shall affirm any negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo
truck before and after the incident, there is no evidence which would show
negligence on the part of respondents.[27]
We agree
with Malayan Insurance. Even if We consider the inadmissibility of the police
report in evidence, still, respondents cannot evade liability by virtue of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The D.M. Consunji, Inc. case is quite
elucidating:
Petitioners contention, however, loses
relevance in the face of the application of res
ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the
person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred
or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be
such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or
instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury
was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had
its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or,
as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendants want of
care.
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine
is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.
The res
ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant
in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause
of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the
plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine
permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by
which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant
who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by
the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another
court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that
under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his
part, and direct proof of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power.
Accordingly, some courts add to the three prerequisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
further requirement that for the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no
knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the
party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation
of the accident.
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the
case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellees husband
fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was
working with appellants construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant.
It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and
others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances
of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of
the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a
position to know what caused the accident. Res
ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is
absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the
injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th
floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction
site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all
its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under
the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second
requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the
appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All
the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or
inference of appellants negligence arises. x x x.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of
the requisites for the application of res
ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent
did not arise since it proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident
which befell respondents husband.
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the
procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendants negligence
is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur.
Once the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to
explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for the
defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or
inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into
play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been
established.[28]
In the case
at bar, aside from the statement in the police report, none of the parties
disputes the fact that the Fuzo Cargo
Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear
end of the vehicle in front of it. Respondents, however, point to the reckless
driving of the Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision, which
allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence on record. And assuming that
this allegation is, indeed, true, it is astonishing that respondents never even
bothered to file a cross-claim against the owner or driver of the Nissan Bus.
What is at once evident from the instant case,
however, is the presence of all the requisites for the application of the rule
of res ipsa loquitur. To reiterate, res
ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity which applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. As
explained in D.M.
Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident
or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no
such knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege negligence in general
terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites
for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur rule are the following: (1) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.[29]
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not
have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent.
Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver,
Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the Nissan
Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally,
no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi
Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur are present,
thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of
respondents.
It is worth mentioning
that just like any other disputable presumptions or inferences, the presumption
of negligence may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence to the contrary. It
is unfortunate, however, that respondents failed to present any evidence before
the trial court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains. Consequently, the
CA erred in dismissing the complaint for Malayan Insurances adverted failure
to prove negligence on the part of respondents.
Validity of
Subrogation
Malayan
Insurance contends that there was a valid subrogation in the instant case, as
evidenced by the claim check voucher[30]
and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt[31]
presented by it before the trial court. Respondents, however, claim that the
documents presented by Malayan Insurance do not indicate certain important
details that would show proper subrogation.
As noted by Malayan Insurance, respondents had all
the opportunity, but failed to object to the presentation of its evidence. Thus, and as We have mentioned earlier, respondents
are deemed to have waived their right to make an objection. As this Court held
in Asian Construction and Development
Corporation v. COMFAC Corporation:
The
rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible,
and the court cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence. We note that ASIAKONSTRUCTs counsel of
record before the trial court, Atty. Bernard Dy, who actively participated in
the initial stages of the case stopped attending the hearings when COMFAC was
about to end its presentation. Thus, ASIAKONSTRUCT could not object to COMFACs
offer of evidence nor present evidence in its defense; ASIAKONSTRUCT was deemed
by the trial court to have waived its chance to do so.
Note
also that when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, it
must so state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the
objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. Because of a partys
failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of the evidence in the
case. Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by any outcome arising
from the offer of evidence properly presented.[32]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Bearing in
mind that the claim check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation
Receipt presented by Malayan Insurance are already part of the evidence on
record, and since it is not disputed that the insurance company, indeed, paid PhP
700,000 to the assured, then there is a valid subrogation in the case at bar.
As explained in Keppel Cebu Shipyard,
Inc. v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation:
Subrogation is the substitution of one person
by another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is
substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim,
including its remedies or securities. The principle covers a situation wherein
an insurer has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the
rights and remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with respect
to any loss covered by the policy. It contemplates full substitution such that
it places the party subrogated in the shoes of the creditor, and he may use all
means that the creditor could employ to enforce payment.
We have held that payment by the insurer to
the insured operates as an equitable assignment to the insurer of all the
remedies that the insured may have against the third party whose negligence or
wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon,
nor does it grow out of, any privity of contract. It accrues simply upon
payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim. The doctrine of
subrogation has its roots in equity. It is designed to promote and to
accomplish justice; and is the mode that equity adopts to compel the ultimate
payment of a debt by one who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, ought to
pay.[33]
Considering
the above ruling, it is only but proper that Malayan Insurance be subrogated to
the rights of the assured.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The CAs July 28, 2010 Decision and October 29,
2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 93112 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated February 2, 2009 issued by the
trial court in Civil Case No. 99-95885 is hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 1178 dated January 26, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 16-26. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Franchito N. Diamante.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 36.
[19] D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 253-254.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] G.R. Nos. 162243, 164516 & 171875, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 444, 525; citing Africa v. Caltex, 123 Phil. 272, 277 (1966).
[24]
[25] Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. COMFAC Corporation, G.R. No. 163915, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 519, 524.
[26] Rollo, p. 105.
[27]
[28] Supra note 19, at 257-260; citations omitted.
[29]
[30] Rollo, p. 106, Exhibit D.
[31]
[32] Supra note 25.
[33] G.R. Nos. 180880-81 & 180896-97, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 96, 141-142.