Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
|
JELBERT B. GALICTO, Petitioner, - versus - H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 193978 Present: CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, SERENO,** REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: February
28, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
BRION, J.:
Before
us is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order,[1] seeking
to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the
President on
The
petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth).[2] He is currently holding the position of Court
Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA.[3]
Respondent
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of the Republic of the
The Antecedent Facts
On
Based
on its findings that officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs]
x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses,
incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and
abusive practices,[7] the
Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the
immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive
allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing
boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs].[8]
Heeding
the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on
EO 7 was published on
The Petition
The
petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the
implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, based on the following arguments:
I.
EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 7 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF LEGAL BASIS DUE TO THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
A. P.D.
985 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS BASIS FOR EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 BECAUSE THE
GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED THE
POWER TO FIX COMPENSATION LONG AFTER SUCH POWER HAS BEEN REVOKED BY P.D. 1597
AND R.A. 6758.
B. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
DO NOT NEED TO HAVE ITS COMPENSATION PLANS, RATES AND POLICIES REVIEWED BY THE
DBM AND APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT BECAUSE P.D. 1597 REQUIRES ONLY THE GOCCs TO
REPORT TO THE OFFICE TO THE PRESIDENT THEIR COMPENSATION PLANS AND RATES BUT
THE SAME DOES NOT GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE FISCAL POWER
OF THE GOCCs.
C. J.R. NO. 4, [SERIES] 2009 IS NOT
APPLICABLE AS LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE IT HAD NOT RIPENED INTO X X X LAW, THE SAME
NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED.
D. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT J.R. NO. 1, S.
2004 (sic) AND J.R. 4, S. 2009 ARE VALID, STILL THEY ARE NOT APPLICABLE AS
LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT LAWS WHICH MAY VALIDLY DELEGATE POWER TO THE
PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND THE POWER OF THE BOARD TO FIX COMPENSATION.
II.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
7 IS INVALID FOR DIVESTING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF [THE] GOCCS OF THEIR POWER
TO FIX THE COMPENSATION, A POWER WHICH IS A LEGISLATIVE GRANT AND WHICH COULD
NOT BE REVOKED OR MODIFIED BY AN EXECUTIVE FIAT.
III.
EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 7 IS BY SUBSTANCE A LAW, WHICH IS A DEROGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVE
AND IS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
IV.
THE ACTS OF
SUSPENDING AND IMPOSING MORATORIUM ARE ULTRA VIRES ACTS BECAUSE J.R. NO. 4 DOES
NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE SUCH POWERS.
V.
EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 7 IS AN INVALID ISSUANCE BECAUSE IT
HAS NO SUFFICIENT STANDARDS AND IS THEREFORE ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND
A VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.
VI.
EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 7 INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION AND DISCRETION AS TO WHAT THE LAW SHALL BE AND
IS THEREFORE INVALID FOR ITS USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
VII.
CONSISTENT WITH
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE CASE, EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 7 IS ONLY DIRECTORY AND NOT
MANDATORY.[12]
The Case for the Respondents
On
The respondents also raised
substantive defenses to support the validity of EO 7. They claim that the President exercises
control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their
compensation packages. In addition, EO
7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose of controlling the grant of
excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI
employees. They also advocate the
validity of Joint Resolution (J.R.) No. 4, which they point to as the authority
for issuing EO 7.[14]
Meanwhile, on
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to DISMISS
the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for having
been mooted by subsequent events.
A.
Certiorari
is not the proper remedy.
Under
the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari
and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and
mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an
EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an
incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7:
Section 1. Who may
file petition. Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
(Emphases ours.)
Liga ng mga Barangay
National v. City Mayor of Manila[16]
is a case in point.[17] In Liga,
we dismissed the petition for certiorari
to set aside an EO issued by a City Mayor and insisted that a petition for
declaratory relief should have been filed with the RTC. We painstakingly ruled:
After
due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition
for certiorari.
First, the respondents
neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section
1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for
certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Elsewise
stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A
respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where
he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
Before
a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it
is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer
clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties.
The
respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly
pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of
the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned
executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On
this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the
instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in
essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It,
thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
(2) Review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).
As
such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved.[18]
Likewise,
in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc. v. Anti Terrorism Council,[19] we similarly dismissed the petitions
for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007, since the respondents therein (members of the
Anti-Terrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
While
we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion and rulemaking
authority we are granted under the Constitution,[20]
and set aside procedural considerations to permit parties to bring a suit
before us at the first instance through certiorari
and/or prohibition,[21]
this liberal policy remains to be an exception to the general rule, and thus,
has its limits. In Concepcion v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),[22]
we emphasized the importance of availing of the proper remedies and cautioned
against the wrongful use of certiorari
in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of the COMELEC, especially by the
wrong party. In ruling that liberality
and the transcendental doctrine cannot trump blatant disregard of procedural
rules, and considering that the petitioner had other available remedies (such as a petition for declaratory relief with the
appropriate RTC under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in this
case, we categorically ruled:
The petitioners unusual approaches
and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result
of any error in reading Rule 65, given the way the petition was
crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the
petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule
65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other
available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of Court
provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioners
approaches constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative reading and
application of the Rules of Court, we
nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant
violation of the Rules. The
transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be
justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly
when remedial measures were available under these same rules to achieve the
petitioners objectives. For our part, we cannot and should not in
the name of liberality and the transcendental importance doctrine entertain
these types of petitions. As we held in the very recent case
of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different
perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused.[23] [emphasis
supplied]
B.
Petitioner
lacks locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing has
been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.[24] This
requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court
settle only actual cases or controversies.[25]
Thus,
as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when
(1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.[26]
Jurisprudence
defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest."[27]
To
support his claim that he has locus
standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an
employee of PhilHealth, he stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends
or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased
benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the
prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation.[28] The
petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good
standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine
government are legally and validly issued and implemented.
The
respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest
since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent
events or expectancies.[29] The petitioner, too, is not asserting a
public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection. Section 9 of EO 7 reads:
Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and Other
Benefits. Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and the grant
of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits,
except salary adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17,
2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until
specifically authorized by the President. [emphasis
ours]
In the present case, we are not
convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or
material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is
speculative and based on a mere expectancy.
In this case, the curtailment of
future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized
as contingent events or expectancies. To
be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the
absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO
7.
It has been held that as to the element of injury,
such aspect is not something that just anybody with some grievance or pain may
assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth
the courts time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality
of the acts of another department of government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than
real, or is merely superficial and
insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a
matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional
adjudication.[30] The rationale for this constitutional
requirement of locus standi is by no
means trifle. Not only does it assure
the vigorous adversary presentation of the case; more importantly, it must
suffice to warrant the Judiciarys overruling the determination of a
coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such as the President,
and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to
the very essence of representative democracies.[31]
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners
claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in
good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the
Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by
the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils.
(IBP) v. Hon. Zamora,[32] as
too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole
citizenry.[33] Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in that case.
The Court made a similar ruling in Prof.
David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo[34] and held that the petitioners therein,
who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having failed to
allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its
members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.[35]
We
note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory
questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation
packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and
employees, the same cannot infuse or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental importance or paramount
public interest doctrine. In Velarde
v. Social Justice Society,[36]
we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic
effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved
any way, due to procedural infirmities
and shortcomings, as in the present case.[37] In other words, giving due course to the
present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities
explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that
does not merit the Courts liberality.
As we emphasized in Lozano v.
Nograles,[38] while the Court has taken an increasingly
liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements
of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such
liberality is not to be abused.[39]
Finally,
since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest
in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present
case as a representative of PhilHealth.
In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the
petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretarys Certificate from
PhilHealth to act as its representative.
C.
The petition has a defective
jurat.
The
respondents claim that the petition should be dismissed for failing to comply
with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the
party or the counsel representing him to sign the pleading and indicate an
address that should not be a post office box.
The petition also allegedly violated the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated
We
do not see any violation of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
as the petition bears the petitioners signature and office address. The present suit was brought before this Court
by
the petitioner himself as a party litigant and not through counsel. Therefore,
the requirements under the Supreme Court En
Banc Resolution dated
However,
the point raised by the respondents regarding the petitioners defective jurat is correct. Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, dated February
19, 2008, calls for a current identification document issued by an official
agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual as competent
evidence of identity. Nevertheless, we hasten
to clarify that the defective jurat
in the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect,
as we held in In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v.
Sehwani, Incorporated.[41] The verification is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive.
D.
The petition has
been mooted
by
supervening events.
Because of the transitory nature of EO
7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already been rendered moot
by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10
of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees
of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the
provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of
directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the
grant of authority to the President to perform this act.
With
the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now
authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 5. Creation of the Governance Commission for
Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations. There is hereby created an
advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with authority to formulate, implement
and coordinate policies to be known as the Governance Commission for
Government-Owned or-Controlled Corporations, hereinafter referred to as the
GCG, which shall be attached to the Office of the President. The GCG shall have the following powers and
functions:
x x x x
h) Conduct compensation studies,
develop and recommend to the President a competitive compensation and
remuneration system which shall attract and retain talent, at the same time
allowing the GOCC to be financially sound and sustainable;
x x x x
Section 8. Coverage
of the Compensation and Position Classification System. The GCG, after
conducting a compensation study, shall develop a Compensation and Position
Classification System which shall apply to all officers and employees of the
GOCCs whether under the Salary Standardization Law or exempt therefrom and
shall consist of classes of positions grouped into such categories as the GCG
may determine, subject to approval of the President.
Section 9. Position
Titles and Salary Grades. All positions in the Positions Classification
System, as determined by the GCG and as approved by the President, shall be
allocated to their proper position titles and salary grades in accordance with
an Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades of the
Compensation and Position Classification System, which shall be prepared by the
GCG and approved by the President.
x x x x
[N]o GOCC shall be exempt from the
coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System developed by
the GCG under this Act.
As
may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and
other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation
frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation and
position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other entities
covered by the law. This means that,
the President can now reissue an EO containing these same provisions without
any legal constraints.
A
moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value.[42] [A]n action is considered moot when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x
court to resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent
events.[43]
This
is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered
the President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed
unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the
constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the
enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the
words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., the
Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching on an issue that
has become moot
because x x x there would [be] no longer
x x x a flesh and blood case for the Court to resolve.[44]
All
told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as
its patent formal and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason for
the Court to resolve the other issues raised in the certiorari
petition.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice
|
|
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice
|
(On Leave) MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
|
|
ROBERTO A.
ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
JOSE Associate Justice
|
JOSE
CATRAL Associate Justice
|
(On leave)
MARIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA
M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
** On Leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-72.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] The Senate Committee found that: (a)
the representatives of the Social Security Commission (SSC) to the Board of
Directors of Philex Mining earned, in addition to their bonuses, some P55
million by way of stock options; (b) three SSC representatives in the Board of
Directors of the Union Bank earned P46 million in bonuses in 2009, or
around P15 million each; (c) the MWSS, despite incurring a loss of P3.5
billion in 2008, declared a bonus of P5 million to its board chairman in
2009 and granted 25 bonuses in one year; and (d) GOCCs have failed to comply
with the requirement of R.A. No. 7656 to remit 50% of its net earnings to the
national government. (
[8] Ibid.
[9]
Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and Other Benefits. Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by the President.
[10] Section 10 of EO 7 provides:
Section 10. Suspension of All
Allowances, Bonuses and Incentives for Members of the Board of
Directors/Trustees. The grant of allowances, bonuses, incentives, and other
perks to members of the board of directors/trustees of GOCCs and GFIs, except
reasonable per diems, is hereby suspended until
[11] Rollo, p. 24.
[12]
[13] Comment, pp. 39-62.
[14]
[15] AN ACT TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL VIABILITY AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE IN GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR -CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS AND TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ITS GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT TO MAKE THEM MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[16] 465 Phil. 529 (2004).
[17] We are aware of our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre, 391 Phil. 84 (2000), where we gave due course to a petition for certiorari and prohibition to assail an Administrative Order issued by the President. Pimentel, however, has no bearing in the present case since the propriety of the petition or the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein.
[18] Supra note 16, at 540-542.
[19] G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890,
179157 and 179461,
[20] CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(5).
[21] See Pimentel,
Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre, supra note
16. We similarly glossed over the
erroneous remedies the petitioners used in Rivera
v. Hon. Espiritu, 425 Phil. 169 (2002),
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 435 Phil. 586 (2003), and Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory
Board v. Barin, G.R. No. 150974, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 1 recognizing that
the procedural errors were overshadowed by the public interest involved and the
crucial constitutional questions that the Court needed to resolve.
[22] G.R. No. 178624,
[23]
[24] Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti Terrorism Council, supra note
19, at 167, citing Anak Mindanao
Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052,
[25] Lozano
v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883 & 187910,
[26] Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
[27] Stefan
Tito Mioza v. Hon. Cesar Tomas Lopez, etc., et al., G.R. No. 170914,
[28] Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[29]
[30] See Rene B. Gorospe, Songs, Singers and Shadows: Revisiting Locus Standi In Light Of The People Power Provisions Of The 1987 Constitution, UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. LI, AY 2006-2007, pp. 15-16, citing Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 131954, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 99, 104; Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124262, October 12, 1999, 316 SCRA 502, 508; and Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18 , 79.
[31] Id. at 10-11, citing then Associate
Justice Reynato S. Punos Dissenting Opinion in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.,
at 232 SCRA 110 (1994), at 169.
[32] 392 Phil. 618 (2000).
[33]
[34] 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
[35]
[36] G.R. No. 159357,
[37] Rene B. Gorospe, Songs, Singers and Shadows: Revisiting Locus Standi In Light Of The People Power Provisions Of The 1987 Constitution, UST LAW REVIEW, supra note 30, at 53, citing Velarde v. Social Justice Society, id. at 298.
[38] Supra note 25.
[39]
[40] Rollo, pp. 183-190.
[41] G.R. No. 179127,
[42] Funa
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740,
[43]
[44] See J. Brion Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 703.