Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER), Petitioner, -
versus - FLY ACE CORPORATION/ FLORDELYN CASTILLO, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No.
192558 Present: CARPIO,*
J., PERALTA,** Acting Chairperson, ABAD, PEREZ,*** and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: February 15, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O
N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the March 18, 2010 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 7, 2010 Resolution,[2]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 109975, which reversed the May 28, 2009 Decision[3]
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in the case entitled Bitoy
Javier v. Fly Ace/Flordelyn Castillo,[4] holding that petitioner Bitoy Javier (Javier)
was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering Fly Ace Corporation (Fly
Ace) to pay backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Antecedent Facts
On
To support his
allegations, Javier presented an affidavit of one Bengie Valenzuela who alleged
that Javier was a stevedore or pahinante of Fly Ace
from September 2007 to January 2008. The
said affidavit was subscribed before the Labor Arbiter (LA).[7]
For
its part, Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the business of importation
and sales of groceries. Sometime in December 2007, Javier was contracted by its
employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed
rate of ₱300.00 per trip, which was later increased to ₱325.00 in
January 2008. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly
5 to 6 times only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler,
Milmar Hauling Services, was not available.
On
Ruling of the Labor
Arbiter
On
Complainant
has no employee ID showing his employment with the Respondent nor any document
showing that he received the benefits accorded to regular employees of the
Respondents. His contention that Respondent failed to give him said ID and
payslips implies that indeed he was not a regular employee of Fly Ace
considering that complainant was a helper and that Respondent company has
contracted a regular trucking for the delivery of its products.
Respondent
Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business but in the importation and sales of
groceries. Since there is a regular hauler to deliver its products, we give
credence to Respondents claim that complainant was contracted on pakiao
basis.
As
to the claim for underpayment of salaries, the payroll presented by the
Respondents showing salaries of workers on pakiao basis has evidentiary
weight because although the signature of the complainant appearing thereon are
not uniform, they appeared to be his true signature.
x
x x x
Hence,
as complainant received the rightful salary as shown by the above described
payrolls, Respondents are not liable for salary differentials.
[9]
Ruling of the
NLRC
On appeal with the NLRC, Javier was
favored. It ruled that the LA skirted the argument of Javier and immediately
concluded that he was not a regular employee simply because he failed to
present proof. It was of the view that a
pakyaw-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of
employer-employee relationship. Payment by result x x x is a method of compensation and does not
define the essence of the relation. It is a mere method of computing
compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship.[10]
The NLRC further averred that it did not follow that a worker was a job
contractor and not an employee, just because the work he was doing was not
directly related to the employers trade or business or the work may be
considered as extra helper as in this case; and that the relationship of an
employer and an employee was determined by law and the same would prevail
whatever the parties may call it. In this case, the NLRC held that substantial
evidence was sufficient basis for judgment on the existence of the employer-employee
relationship. Javier was a regular employee of Fly Ace because there was
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee
(as a pahinante) in relation to the usual business or trade of the
employer (importation, sales and delivery of groceries). He may not be
considered as an independent contractor because he could not exercise any
judgment in the delivery of company products.
He was only engaged as a helper.
Finding Javier to be a regular
employee, the NLRC ruled that he was entitled to a security of tenure. For
failing to present proof of a valid cause for his termination, Fly Ace was found
to be liable for illegal dismissal of Javier who was likewise entitled to
backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The NLRC thus ordered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
complainants appeal is partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the labor
arbiter is VACATED and a new one is hereby entered holding respondent FLY ACE
CORPORATION guilty of illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th
month pay. Consequently, it is hereby ordered to pay complainant DANILO Bitoy
JAVIER the following:
1.
Backwages -₱45,770.83
2.
Separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement - 8,450.00
3.
Unpaid 13th month pay (proportionate) - 5,633.33
TOTAL -₱59,854.16
All
other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[11]
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
On
x x x
In
an illegal dismissal case the onus probandi rests on the employer to
prove that its dismissal was for a valid cause. However, before a case for
illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be
established. x x x it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove the employee-employer
relationship by substantial evidence.
x x x
It
is incumbent upon private respondent to prove, by substantial evidence, that he
is an employee of petitioners, but he failed to discharge his burden. The
non-issuance of a company-issued identification card to private respondent
supports petitioners contention that private respondent was not its employee.[12]
The
CA likewise added that Javiers failure to present salary vouchers, payslips,
or other pieces of evidence to bolster his contention, pointed to the
inescapable conclusion that he was not an employee of Fly Ace. Further, it found that Javiers work was not
necessary and desirable to the business or trade of the company, as it was only
when there were scheduled deliveries, which a regular hauling service could not
deliver, that Fly Ace would contract the services of Javier as an extra helper.
Lastly, the CA declared that the facts alleged by Javier did not pass the
control test.
He contracted work outside the
company premises; he was not required to observe definite hours of work; he was
not required to report daily; and he was free to accept other work elsewhere as
there was no exclusivity of his contracted service to the company, the same
being co-terminous with the trip only.[13] Since no substantial evidence was presented
to establish an employer-employee relationship, the case for illegal dismissal could
not prosper.
The petitioners moved
for reconsideration, but to no avail.
Hence, this appeal
anchored on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT A REGULAR
EMPLOYEE OF FLY ACE.
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS
MONETARY CLAIMS.[14]
The
petitioner contends that other than its bare allegations and self-serving
affidavits of the other employees, Fly Ace has nothing to substantiate its claim
that Javier was engaged on a pakyaw basis. Assuming that Javier was
indeed hired on a pakyaw basis, it does not preclude his regular
employment with the company. Even the acknowledgment receipts bearing his
signature and the confirming receipt of his salaries will not show the true
nature of his employment as they do not reflect the necessary details of the
commissioned task. Besides, Javiers tasks as
pahinante are related, necessary and desirable to the line of
business by Fly Ace which is engaged in the importation and sale of grocery
items. On days when there were no scheduled deliveries, he worked in
petitioners warehouse, arranging and cleaning the stored cans for delivery to
clients.[15]
More importantly, Javier was subject to the control and supervision of the
company, as he was made to report to the office from Monday to Saturday, from
The
petitioner chiefly relied on Chavez v. NLRC,[17]
where the Court ruled that payment to a worker on a per trip basis is not
significant because this is merely a method of computing compensation and not
a basis for determining the existence of employer-employee relationship. Javier
likewise invokes the rule that, in controversies between a laborer and his
master, x x x doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in
the formers favour. The policy is reflected is no less than the Constitution,
Labor Code and Civil Code.[18]
Claiming
to be an employee of Fly Ace, petitioner asserts that he was illegally
dismissed by the latters failure to observe substantive and procedural due
process. Since his dismissal was not based on any of the causes recognized by
law, and was implemented without notice, Javier is entitled to separation pay
and backwages.
In
its Comment,[19]
Fly Ace insists that there was no substantial evidence to prove employer-employee
relationship. Having a service contract with Milmar Hauling Services for the
purpose of transporting and delivering company products to customers, Fly Ace
contracted Javier as an extra helper or pahinante on a mere per trip
basis. Javier, who was actually a
loiterer in the area, only accompanied and assisted the company driver when Milmar
could not deliver or when the exigency of extra deliveries arises for roughly
five to six times a month. Before making
a delivery, Fly Ace would turn over to the driver and Javier the delivery
vehicle with its loaded company products. With the vehicle and products in
their custody, the driver and Javier would leave the company premises using
their own means, method, best judgment and discretion on how to deliver, time to
deliver, where and [when] to start, and manner of delivering the products.[20]
Fly
Ace dismisses Javiers claims of employment as baseless assertions. Aside from
his bare allegations, he presented nothing to substantiate his status as an
employee. It is a basic rule of
evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. If he claims a right granted by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of his opponent.[21]
Invoking the case of Lopez v. Bodega City,[22]
Fly Ace insists that in an illegal dismissal case, the burden of proof is upon
the complainant who claims to be an employee. It is essential that an
employer-employee relationship be proved by substantial evidence. Thus, it
cites:
In an illegal dismissal case, the onus
probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee
was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can
prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established.
Fly Ace points
out that Javier merely offers factual assertions that he was an employee of Fly
Ace, which are unfortunately not supported by proof, documentary or otherwise.[23] Javier simply assumed that he was an employee
of Fly Ace, absent any competent or relevant evidence to support it. He
performed his contracted work outside the premises of the respondent; he was
not even required to report to work at regular hours; he was not made to
register his time in and time out every time he was contracted to work; he was
not subjected to any disciplinary sanction imposed to other employees for
company violations; he was not issued a company I.D.; he was not accorded the
same benefits given to other employees; he was not registered with the Social
Security System (SSS) as petitioners employee; and, he was free to
leave, accept and engage in other means of livelihood as there is no
exclusivity of his contracted services with the petitioner, his services being
co-terminus with the trip only. All these lead to the conclusion that
petitioner is not an employee of the respondents.[24]
Moreover, Fly
Ace claims that it had no right to control the result, means, manner and
methods by which Javier would perform his work or by which the same is to be
accomplished.[25] In
other words, Javier and the company driver were given a free hand as to how
they would perform their contracted services and neither were they subjected to
definite hours or condition of work.
Fly Ace likewise
claims that Javiers function as a pahinante was not directly related or
necessary to its principal business of importation and sales of groceries. Even
without Javier, the business could operate its usual course as it did not
involve the business of inland transportation. Lastly, the acknowledgment
receipts bearing Javiers signature and words pakiao rate, referring
to his earned salaries on a per trip basis, have evidentiary weight that the LA
correctly considered in arriving at the conclusion that Javier was not an
employee of the company.
The
Court affirms the assailed CA decision.
It must be noted that
the issue of Javiers alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between him and Fly Ace. This is essentially
a question of fact. Generally, the Court does not review errors that raise
factual questions. However, when there is conflict among the factual findings
of the antecedent deciding bodies like the LA, the NLRC and the CA, it is
proper, in the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate
the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine the
questioned findings.[26] In dealing with factual issues in labor
cases, substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion is
sufficient.[27]
As
the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javiers claim of employment with
Fly Ace as wanting and deficient. The Court is constrained to agree. Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC[28]
allows a relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this
rule of liberality does not mean a complete dispensation of proof. Labor officials are enjoined to use reasonable
means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively with little regard to
technicalities or formalities but nowhere in the rules are they provided a
license to completely discount evidence, or the lack of it. The quantum of
proof required, however, must still be satisfied. Hence, when confronted with
conflicting versions on factual matters, it is for them in the exercise of
discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of evidence
received, subject only to the requirement that their decision must be supported
by substantial evidence.[29] Accordingly, the petitioner needs to show by
substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against
which he claims illegal dismissal.
Expectedly, opposing parties would stand
poles apart and proffer allegations as different as chalk and cheese. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon the Court to determine whether the party on whom the
burden to prove lies was able to hurdle the same. No particular form of evidence is required
to prove the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent
and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. Hence, while no particular form of evidence
is required, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest on some
substantial evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the evidence depends on
its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects.[30] Although substantial evidence is not a
function of quantity but rather of quality, the x x x circumstances of the
instant case demand that something more should have been proffered. Had there
been other proofs of employment, such as x x x inclusion in petitioners
payroll, or a clear exercise of control, the Court would have affirmed the
finding of employer-employee relationship.[31]
In
sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to
establish or substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence.[32] Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits
provided by law should establish his or her right thereto x x x.[33] Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial
evidence as basis for the grant of relief.
In
this case, the LA and the CA both concluded that Javier failed to establish his
employment with Fly Ace. By way of evidence on this point, all that Javier
presented were his self-serving statements purportedly showing his activities
as an employee of Fly Ace. Clearly,
Javier failed to pass the substantiality requirement to support his claim. Hence, the Court sees no reason to depart from
the findings of the CA.
While
Javier remains firm in his position that as an employed stevedore of Fly Ace,
he was made to work in the company premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning
grocery items for delivery to clients, no other proof was submitted to fortify
his claim. The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was
unsuccessful in strengthening Javiers cause. In said document, all Valenzuela
attested to was that he would frequently see Javier at the workplace where the
latter was also hired as stevedore.[34] Certainly, in gauging the evidence presented by
Javier, the Court cannot ignore the inescapable conclusion that his mere
presence at the workplace falls short in proving employment therein. The
supporting affidavit could have, to an extent, bolstered Javiers claim of
being tasked to clean grocery items when there were no scheduled delivery
trips, but no information was offered in this subject simply because the
witness had no personal knowledge of Javiers employment status in the company.
Verily, the Court cannot accept Javiers statements, hook, line and sinker.
The
Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the
well-settled tests to determine the existence of
an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the selection and engagement
of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4)
the power to control the employees conduct. Of
these elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls
or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of
the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be
accomplished.[35]
In
this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements
exist in his case. He could not submit
competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular employee; that
Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his
conduct should be while at work. In other words, Javiers allegations did not
establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-employee
relationship on the basis of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Worse, Javier
was not able to refute Fly Aces assertion that it had an agreement with a
hauling company to undertake the delivery of its goods. It was also baffling to realize that Javier
did not dispute Fly Aces denial of his services exclusivity to the company. In
short, all that Javier laid down were bare allegations without corroborative
proof.
Fly
Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a per trip rate
as a stevedore, albeit on a pakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail to note that Fly Ace
presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid on a pakyaw
basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent evidence by the
LA. Unfortunately for Javier, his mere
denial of the signatures affixed therein cannot automatically sway us to ignore
the documents because forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery.[36]
Considering the above
findings, the Court does not see the necessity to resolve the second issue
presented.
One final note. The Courts decision does not contradict the
settled rule that payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and
does not define the essence of the relation.[37] Payment on a piece-rate basis does not negate
regular employment. The term wage is broadly defined in Article 97 of the
Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of
money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis.
Payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the
essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that the petitioner is not covered
by the SSS affect the employer-employee relationship. However, in determining whether the
relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent
contractor, each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features
of the relationship are to be considered.[38] Unfortunately for Javier, the attendant facts
and circumstances of the instant case do not provide the Court with sufficient
reason to uphold his claimed status as employee of Fly Ace.
While the Constitution
is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern
for the less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than not,
toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such
favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in
every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established
facts and the applicable law and doctrine.[39]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
JOSE
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Designated as additional member in lieu
of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1185 dated
** Designated as Acting
Chairperson, per Special Order No. 1184 dated
*** Designated as additional
member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order
No. 1192 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 33-46. Penned by Associate
Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Stephen
C. Cruz.
[2]
[3]
[4] Docketed as NLRC LAC No.
02-000346-09(8) and NLRC NCR CN. 05-07424-08.
[5] Rollo, p. 78.
[6] Decision of LA, id. at 88.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] 489 Phil. 44 (2005).
[18] Dealco Farms v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 153192,
[19] Rollo, pp. 207-220.
[20]
[21]
[22] G.R. No. 155731,
[23] Respondents Comment, rollo,
p. 212.
[24]
[25]
[26] Masing and Sons Development
Corporation and Crispin Chan v. Gregorio P. Rogelio, G.R. No. 161787, April
27, 2011.
[27] Id., citing Opulencia Ice
Plant and Storage v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98368, December 15, 1993, 228 SCRA 473,
478.
[28] The rules of procedure and
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and
the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts
in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
[29] Salvador
Lacorte v. Hon. Amado G. Inciong, 248 Phil. 232 (1988), citing Gelmart
Industries [Phil.] Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., 239 Phil. 386 (1987).
[30] People's Broadcasting
(Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, G.R. No. 179652, May 8,
2009, 587 SCRA 724, citing Opulencia Ice Plant and Storage v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 98368, December 15, 1993, 228 SCRA 473 and Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd. Employees Association-Natu v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 166
Phil. 505 (1977).
[31]
[32] Jebsens
Maritime Inc., represented by Ms. Arlene Asuncion and/or Alliance Marine
Services, Ltd. v. Enrique Undag,
G.R. No. 191491,
[33] Alex C. Cootauco v. MMS Phil.
Maritime Services, Inc., Ms. Mary C. Maquilan and/or MMS Co. Ltd., G.R. No.
184722, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 529, 544-545.
[34] Rollo, p. 126.
[35]Avelino
Lambo and Vicente Belocura v. NLRC and J.C. Tailor Shop and/or Johnny Co.,
375 Phil. 855 (1999), citing Makati Haberdashery, Inc. v. NLRC, 259
Phil. 52 (1989).
[36] Dionisio C.
Ladignon v. Court of Appeals and Luzviminda C. Dimaun, 390 Phil. 1161
(2000), citing Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753
(1998).
[37] Elias
Villuga v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-75038,
[38] Avelino Lambo and Vicente
Belocura v. NLRC and J.C. Tailor Shop and/or Johnny Co., supra note 35, citing
Elias Villuga v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-75038,
[39] Philippine
Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) v. Virgilio E. Pulgar, G.R. No.
169227, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 244, 257.