Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD
DIVISION
|
NORBERTO
LEE, Petitioner,
- versus - PEOPLE OF
THE Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 192274 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: February 8, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA,
J.:
Through this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Norberto Lee (Lee) assails the
October 26, 2009 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
SP No. 106247, which dismissed his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and
affirmed the two (2) questioned interlocutory orders[2]
of the public respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 00-1809 to
00-1816.
In the questioned interlocutory orders, the RTC
denied Lees Motion for Document and Handwriting Examination by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
and his subsequent motion for the reconsideration of the denial.
The Facts
Lee was the New Account
Service Representative of Managers Check and Gift Check Processor at the Cash
Department of Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank). The bank filed a complaint
against him alleging that, on several occasions, he forged the signatures of
responsible bank officers in several managers checks causing damage and
prejudice to it.
After the requisite preliminary
investigation, he was
charged with Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents which were
committed on separate dates involving separate instruments in eight (8)
Informations.[3]
Except for the details, the Informations were uniformly worded as follows:
That on or about the 20th
day of May 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
[petitioner], being then the New Account Service Representative of Managers
Check and Gift Check Processor at Cash Department of complainant Allied Banking
Corporation, herein represented by Ketty Uy and taking advantage of his
position, by means of deceit and false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said complainant in the
following manner, to wit: the said
accused forged and falsified the signatures of Ketty Uy, Tess Chiong, Manuel
Fronda, the approving officers of complainant of the Man[a]gers Check No. MC
0000473205 in the amount of ₱200,500.00 dated May 20, 1999 payable to
Noli Baldonado which was issued by complainant-bank in favor of Filway
Marketing, Inc., which is a commercial document, by then and there making it
appear that the approving officers of complainant-bank had signed and approved
the said Managers Check when in truth and in fact said accused knew, that the
approving officers had not participated or intervened in the signing of said
managers check, thereafter the accused encashed the said Managers Check and
represented himself as the payee thereto and received the amount of ₱200,500.00 from complainant-bank and then
and there misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Allied Banking
Corporation, herein represented by Ketty Uy in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO
LAW.[4]
On
1. The record of the preliminary investigation of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati shows that Document Report No. 065-2000, dated 16
June 2000, prepared by the officials of the Crime Laboratory of the National
Headquarters of the Philippine National Police at Camp Came, Quezon City,
excluded and failed to examine the questioned and standard signatures of the
accused in relation to the questioned and standard documents and signatures of
the other signatories of the subject Allied Bank checks, application forms and
related documents.
x x x x
6. The accused [petitioner] is suspicious of the credibility,
neutrality and sincerity of the PNP Crime Laboratory examiners who had
submitted the Report because they seemed to have been prevailed upon and
influenced by the officers of the Bank to conduct the partial, biased and
prejudiced examination without the participation of and said notice to the
accused.
7. In the interest of justice and fair play, there is a need for
the forensic laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct a new, confirmatory and independent document and handwriting signature
examination of the questioned and standard documents and signatures of the
concerned officers and staff of the Bank and the Filway Marketing Inc., on one
hand, and of the accused, on the other, in a manner that is complete,
comprehensive, fair, neutral, transparent and credible.[6]
On
After due assessment of the
assertions of the contending counsels, the Court is disinclined to grant
instant motion. First, the trial of the case is already on-going and the
accused has the option to utilize the concerned NBI intended witness during the
presentation of defense evidence. And second, the Court is called upon to
conduct its own evaluation of the questioned signature even with the opinion on
the matter coming from an NBI expert. For this purpose, the Court may utilize,
among others, the provisions of Sections 20 and 22, Rules of Court, on the rules
in authentication of private documents [Rule 132].
It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts,
even those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon [the] courts.
Handwriting experts are usually
helpful in the examination of forged Documents because of the technical
procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not
mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting
(Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio vs. CA, 300 SCRA, December 1998) A finding of
forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
because the judge must conduct an independent examination on the questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
(Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2004 Ed., p. 428).
Accordingly, defense motion for
document and handwriting examination by the NBI is hereby DENIED.[7]
Undaunted,
Lee filed his Motion for Reconsideration[8]
on
In
his petition before the CA, Lee raised the sole issue of whether or not the two
questioned interlocutory orders should be nullified for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and in
the interest of fair play, justice, due process, and equal protection of the
law.
Without
disputing the late filing of his motion for reconsideration, Lee sought the
CAs liberal interpretation of the rules and the need to decide his case on the
merits. He insisted that it was legally and physically impossible for him to
secure an NBI witness without a compulsory judicial process or order.
In
the assailed
The
CA further stated that the RTC did not err in denying petitioners motion for
document and handwriting examination by the NBI, as said motion was intended
only to dispute the examination of documents and handwritings conducted by the
PNP Crime Laboratory, which was a matter that may be exercised during the
presentation of defense evidence.
The
CA added that Lee could not claim deprivation of his life, liberty and property
with the denial of his motion as both Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 115(g) of the Rules of Court guarantee his right to the
courts compulsory processes to ensure the attendance of his witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
Lastly,
the CA stated that the trial court did not err, much less gravely, when it
denied Lees motion for consideration because it was filed out of time.
Persistent,
Lee interposed this petition for review on certiorari raising the following:
ISSUES[9]
1. Whether
or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in ignoring the traditional doctrine
of liberality in the interpretation and application of mechanical rules of
procedure.
2.
Whether or not the petitioner was legally entitled to a new and credible NBI
document and handwriting examination of all the relevant and material documents
relative to the allegedly falsified bank documents and checks with his full
participation and submissions, as part of his right to constitutional due
process and equal protection rights.
3.
Did the RTC and CA gravely err in denying the petitioners motion for a
credible NBI document and handwriting examination?
4. Whether or not the RTC and the CA
gravely erred in concluding that the two (2) questioned interlocutory orders
had attained finality, as if they partook of the legal nature of a final and
executory judgment or of a final order.
After
a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit a
grave abuse of discretion in denying the subject motion and that the CA was
correct in affirming the denial. The RTC did not err either in turning down Lees
motion for reconsideration for being filed two days late.
Contrary to the claim of Lee, the RTC and the
CA did not ignore the traditional doctrine of liberality but merely relied
upon the guidelines as to when it is applicable and, after being so guided, chose
not to apply it under the existing circumstances. It is true that rules of
procedure may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure for persuasive and
weights reasons. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the
rules of procedure, however, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[10]
In this case, however, Lee did not bother to offer any convincing reason for
this Court to relax the rules and just plainly sought its liberal
interpretation. The Court, in Daikoku
Electronics Phils., Inc v. Alberto J. Raza,[11] stated:
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without
any valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality,
petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the
rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of substantive justice.[12] Utter
disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy
of liberal construction.[13]
At
any rate, the Court does not perceive any injustice in the denial of Lees
motion. In fact, the RTC wrote that the accused has the option to utilize the
concerned NBI intended witness during the presentation of defense evidence.[14]
When his time comes to present evidence, Lee can utilize the NBI by availing of
the coercive power of the court.
The
Court had the occasion to rule on an almost similar issue in Joey P. Marquez v. Sandiganbayan,[15]
where the Court ordered the Sandiganbayan to act favorably on the motion of the
accused therein to cause the NBI to examine the documents already submitted to
the court. In said case, the Court wrote:
In
this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his
signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations
were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and
must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of
proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Thus,
Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his
signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he
must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence to support his
allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the signatures he is
questioning by no less than the countrys premier investigative force the
NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is
negative testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he cannot
submit any other examination result because the signatures are on the original
documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft
court.
At
any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court. It will still be subject to its scrutiny and
evaluation in line with Section 22 of Rule 132.
Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived of his right to present his
own defense. How the prosecution, or
even the court, perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense
may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce
evidence of his own choice. The court
should not control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken
will not be in violation of the rules.
The Marquez
ruling, however, cannot be applied in this case. In Marquez, the accused had requested for the examination of the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests by the NBI from
the beginning. Records of the case showed that right upon his alleged discovery
of the forged signatures, while the case was still with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), the accused
already sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorization requests to the NBI for examination. At that stage, OSP denied his
plea. In the case at bench, the trial had already started and, worse,
the accuseds motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary
period.
At
any rate, as earlier pointed out, the denial of his motion was without
prejudice as the RTC stated that he could utilize the concerned NBI intended
witness during the presentation of defense evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 26, 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 106247 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 41-47. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring.
[2]
[3] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-1809 to 00-1816.
[4] Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[5]
[6]
[7] Id. at 61-62.
[8] Id. at 63-74.
[9] Id. at 19.
[10] Navarro v.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, 473 Phil.
472, 481(2004), citing Sebastian v. Morales, G.R. No. 141116, February
17, 2003, 397 SCRA 549; Cresenciano Duremdes v. Agustin Duremdes, 461
Phil. 388 (2003).
[11] G.R.
No. 181688,
[12] United Paragon Mining Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 529 Phil. 632 (2006); citing Philippine Valve Mfg. Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, 485 Phil. 58 (2004).
[13] Torres v. Abundo, G.R. No. 174263, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 556, 565; citing Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159971, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 369, 375.
[14]
Rollo, p. 61.
[15] G.R.
Nos. 187912-14,