Republic of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
SECOND division
|
JOSAN, JPS, SANTIAGO cargo MOVERS, and mary
grace s. parungao,* Petitioners, versus eduardo ramos aduna, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 190794 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, VILLARAMA,** PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February 22, 2012 |
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D e c i s i o n
SERENO,
J.:
Before the Court is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the 21 October 2009 Decision and 16 December 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).[1]
The Petition involves a Complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of
employment benefits filed by respondent Eduardo Ramos Aduna (Aduna) against petitioners
JO-SAN Trucking Corporation, Santiago
Cargo Movers, Inc., JPS Santiago Cargo Movers, Inc., and Mary Grace S. Parungao
(Parungao).
Facts
Petitioners are engaged in the trucking business under
the sole proprietorship of Parungao,[2]
their president-manager. Sometime in January 2001, petitioners hired Aduna as a
delivery truck driver. He was tasked to make deliveries of various ingredients
used in the production of poultry feeds. His payment was on a per trip basis,
the amount of which depended on the length of the trip or the distance to the
point of destination.
The factual circumstances surrounding the case are
contentious.
Petitioners narrate that on the morning of 5
December 2005, Parungao told Aduna to come to work later in the day to make
deliveries. When he reported for work a little before 5 p.m. that afternoon, Parungao
noticed that he was drunk. She then advised him not to make deliveries anymore on
account of his inebriated condition. Allegedly, respondent reacted discourteously
by hurling invectives at her. He purportedly uttered, Hindi lang sa inyo makakapagtrabaho dahil maraming kompanya, after
which he threw out the keys of the vehicles assigned to him and stormed out of the
office. On his way out, he met a co-employee, Raymond dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).
The two had a confrontation within company premises, which eventually led to
respondents punching Dela Cruz several times.
Aduna did not report for work until about 50 days
from the date of the incident. On 24 January 2006, when he returned to the
office, he allegedly informed a certain Maria Agnes del Castillo that he no
longer wished to continue working with petitioners. He then purportedly asked for
a certificate of employment, which he would use in applying for a new job. Thus,
petitioners posit that they did not terminate him as it was actually respondent
who had refused to work. He no longer worked for petitioners thereafter.
Respondent, on the other hand, denies
being drunk when he went to work. According to him, he only had a bottle of
beer early that day. He also rejects the allegation that he hurled invectives at
Parungao, as he had never been instructed to cease carrying out his delivery
assignments in the first place. He also denies punching Dela Cruz, explaining
that they simply had a misunderstanding. Supposedly, Dela Cruz was just displeased
with how the new driver, whom Aduna had recommended, was being treated
favorably by petitioners. Respondent then alludes to the police blotter of Dela
Cruz, who only mentioned being elbowed by Aduna. Respondent then narrates that
after the incident of 5 December 2005, he was told to lie low until further
notice in order to set an example to other employees. Despite his objections,
he eventually acceded to the instruction.
Thereafter, respondent claims that he was no longer
given any delivery assignments and was even prevented from entering company
premises. He argues that petitioner voluntarily issued to him a Certificate of
Employment without his asking, and that he was told to look for work for the
time being. He thus contends that he did not abandon his job. Consequently, he filed
a Complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of overtime, holiday, 13th
month, and service incentive leave pays.
Findings
of the Labor Arbiter
The labor arbiter (LA) ruled that
there was no basis to hold petitioners liable for illegal dismissal. Indeed, he
found that the confrontation between respondent and Dela Cruz, which happened
within company premises, was tantamount to a just cause for dismissal. However,
he also found that there was no evidence to show that respondent had been terminated
verbally or in writing. The LA gave credence to the assertion of petitioner
that it was Aduna who was no longer interested in returning to work; respondent
was already contemplating finding another job, as evidenced by his request for the
issuance of a certificate of employment. Consequently, the LA ruled that
respondents failure to report for work may be considered abandonment, which in
turn is a valid ground for dismissal.[3]
Findings
of the National Labor Relations Commission
The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the LAs finding and ruled that respondent had been illegally
dismissed. According to the NLRC, there was no showing that petitioners exerted
efforts to question the absences of respondent. They did not require him to
return to work, which could have enabled them to determine with certainty whether
he really wanted to cease working for them. The NLRC pronounced that it must be
clearly established that there was deliberate and unjustified refusal on the
part of the employee to return to work through a manifestation of a clear
intention to abandon his employment.
Petitioners were found to have failed to discharge
this burden. They relied heavily on the information allegedly given by their
company secretary that Aduna was no longer interested in the job. The NLRC took
note of the absence of an affidavit from the secretary confirming the actual
statement relayed to her by respondent. On the contrary, the commission viewed
the request for a certificate of employment as respondents way of ascertaining
his actual status after he was not recalled for some time. The NLRC admitted as
fact that petitioners told respondent to lie low and to wait for further
notice; however, no such notice was given to him. He was simply eased out of
his job. The Commission reasoned that it was difficult to believe that a worker
would forgo his job simply by abandoning it, without any alternative source of
income or prospect of another employment. Thus, according to the NLRC, the
continued and prolonged unemployment was unreasonable, inconvenient,
prejudicial to respondent, and can be equated with constructive dismissal.[4]
Findings
of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision and the Resolution
of the NLRC. It ruled that respondents failure to come to work for 50 days was
not indicative of his intention to discontinue employment. According to the
appellate court, he did not report for work, as he was told to lie low and to
wait for further notice. It reasoned that, if indeed he had been absent for
such a long period of time, it was implausible for petitioners not to even
exert any effort to call his attention, considering that habitual absenteeism
is a just cause for dismissal. Neither was there any order from petitioners
requiring him to return to work. It pointed out that a company is expected to
call the attention of an employee to any undesirable act or omission within a
reasonable time. Failure of petitioners to take any disciplinary action against
respondent for his alleged absences undermined their claim that these absences were
overt acts of abandonment.[5]
The court also held that Adunas request for a certificate of employment did not,
ipso facto, equate with abandonment. The
CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that respondent had a clear intention
to abandon his work. Consequently, it found that he had been illegally
dismissed. The CA later on denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent
was illegally dismissed.
Discussion
We rule in the affirmative.
Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot
lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts, especially during times of hardship.[6] Thus, we have ruled in a series of
cases that there are two elements that must concur in order for an act to
constitute abandonment: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship.[7] The second element is the more
determinative factor, which must be manifested by some overt acts.[8]
Mere absence or failure to report for work does not, ipso facto, amount to abandonment of work.[9]
To prove abandonment, the employer must show that the employee deliberately and
unjustifiably refused to resume his employment without any intention of
returning.[10]
The NLRC and the CA found that the true reason why
respondent did not report for work for about 50 days was that he had been told
by petitioners to lie low. This is a finding of fact, which we shall no
longer disturb. Thus, when respondent realized that he was no longer going to
receive work assignments, he wasted no time in filing a case for illegal
dismissal against petitioners. Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal
cannot logically be said to have abandoned their work.[11] A charge of abandonment is totally
inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.[12]
The filing thereof is proof enough of ones desire to return to work, thus
negating any suggestion of abandonment.[13]
Respondent must therefore be deemed to have been
constructively dismissed. There is constructive dismissal when continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely.[14]
In this case, although Aduna agreed to lie low because of the incident, it
became clear that petitioners no longer had the intention to give him future assignments.
In fact, they already deemed the issuance of the Certificate of Employment as a
sign of abandonment of work. The continued failure of petitioners to offer him a
new assignment makes the former liable for constructive dismissal.[15]
Clearly, the instruction to temporarily lie low was meant to be for a
permanent cessation from work. With the absence of any proof of dire exigency
that would justify the failure to give further assignments, the only logical
conclusion is that respondent was constructively dismissed.[16]
In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer, who
has to prove that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. [17]
Since petitioners based their defense on abandonment by respondent, it is
likewise incumbent upon them, as employers, to prove that he clearly, voluntarily,
and intentionally abandoned his work.[18]
As previously discussed, it is clear from the evidence on record that
petitioners failed to discharge this burden.[19]
As we have consistently affirmed, if the evidence presented by the employer and
the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of
the latter.[20]
Accordingly, the finding of illegal dismissal must be upheld.[21]
Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges; to his full back wages,
inclusive of allowances; and to other applicable benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of
actual reinstatement.[22]
However, in recognition of the strained relations between petitioners and
respondent, the former are instead liable to give separation pay as found by
the CA.
WHEREFORE
the Petition is DENIED. The 21
October 2009 Decision and 16 December 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 108996 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.
A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L.
REYES
Associate
Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
* The case title
indicated in the Petition filed before this Court was followed. However, a review
of court records reveals that petitioners were also referred to as JO-SAN trucking corporation / SANTIAGO cargo
MOVERS, inc. / JPS SANTIAGO cargo MOVERs, inc., and mary grace s. parungao. See respondents Position Paper, pp. 1-3;
rollo, pp. 53-55.
**
Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice
Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1195 dated 15 February 2012.
[1] Both the Decision and the
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 108996 were penned by CA
Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices
Jose Catral Mendoza and Romeo F. Barza.
[2] Petition for Review on
Certiorari, p. 2; rollo, p. 10.
However, records are inconsistent as to the true form of the business
organization of petitioner-entities. A perusal of respondents Position Paper,
as quoted in the labor arbiters Decision, indicates that the entities are duly
organized domestic corporations. It also mentioned that the
business names JO-SAN
Trucking Corporation and JPS Santiago Cargo Movers, Inc. are, in fact, the
former or alternative names of the business entity Santiago Cargo Movers,
Inc. (See respondent-complainants
Position Paper, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp.
54-55).
[3] LA
Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 80-81.
[4] NLRC
Decision, pp. 4-6; rollo, pp.
100-102.
[5] CA
Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 37-38.
[6] Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506 (2003).
[7] Icawat v. National Labor Relations Commission, 389 Phil. 441 (2000).
[8] Id.
[9] Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., supra note 6.
[10] Icawat v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 7.
[11]
Megaforce Security and Allied Services,
Inc. v. Lactao, G.R. No. 160940, 21 July 2008, 559 SCRA 110.
[12] Icawat v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 7.
[13]
Megaforce Security and Allied Services,
Inc. v. Lactao, supra note 11.
[14] Philippine Wireless, Inc. (Pocketbell) v. NLRC, 369 Phil. 907 (1999);
Ledesma & Co. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 316 Phil. 80 (1995).
[15]
Megaforce Security and Allied Services,
Inc. v. Lactao, supra note 11.
[16] See Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, 497 Phil.
621 (2005).
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22]
Megaforce Security and Allied Services,
Inc. v. Lactao, supra note 11.