Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
BANK OF LUBAO, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
ROMMEL J. MANABAT and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 188722
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: February 1, 2012 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Nature of the Petition
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by the Bank of Lubao, Inc. (petitioner) assailing
the Decision[1] dated April 24, 2009 and Resolution[2] dated July 7, 2009 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106419.
The Antecedent Facts
Sometime
in 2001, Rommel J. Manabat (respondent) was hired by petitioner Bank of Lubao,
a rural bank, as a Market Collector. Subsequently, the respondent was assigned
as an encoder at the Bank of Lubaos Sta. Cruz Extension Office, which he
manned together with two other employees, teller Susan P. Lingad (Lingad) and
May O. Manasan. As an encoder, the respondents primary duty is to encode the
clients deposits on the banks computer after the same are received by Lingad.
In
November 2004, an initial audit on the Bank of Lubaos Sta. Cruz Extension
Office conducted by the petitioner revealed that there was a misappropriation
of funds in the amount of P3,000,000.00, more or less. Apparently, there
were transactions entered and posted in the passbooks of the clients but were not
entered in the banks book of accounts. Further audit showed that there were
various deposits which were entered in the banks computer but were
subsequently reversed and marked as error in posting.
On
November 17, 2004, the respondent, through a memorandum sent by the petitioner,
was asked to explain in writing the discrepancies that were discovered during
the audit. On November 19, 2004, the respondent submitted to the petitioner his
letter-explanation which, in essence, asserted that there were times when
Lingad used the banks computer while he was out on errands.
On
December 11, 2004, an administrative hearing was conducted by the banks
investigating committee where the respondent was further made to explain his
side. Subsequently, the investigating committee concluded that the respondent
conspired with Lingad in making fraudulent entries disguised as error corrections
in the banks computer.
On
August 9, 2005, the petitioner filed several criminal complaints for qualified
theft against Lingad and the respondent with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Lubao, Pampanga. Thereafter, citing serious misconduct tantamount to willful
breach of trust as ground, it terminated the respondents employment effective
September 1, 2005.
On
September 26, 2005, the respondent filed a Complaint[3]
for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
For
its part, the petitioner insists that the dismissal of the respondent is
justified, asserting the February 14, 2006 Audit Report which confirmed the
participation of the respondent in the alleged misappropriations. Likewise, the
petitioner asserted that the dismissal of the qualified theft charge against
the respondent is immaterial to the validity of the ground for the latters
dismissal.
The Labor Arbiters Decision
On
February 28, 2007, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision[4]
sustaining the respondents claim of illegal dismissal thus ordering the
petitioner to reinstate the respondent to his former position and awarding the
latter backwages in the amount of P111,960.00 and 13th month
pay in the amount of P6,220.00. The LA opined that the petitioner failed
to adduce substantial evidence that there was a valid ground for the
respondents dismissal. Further, the February 14, 2006 Audit Report that was
adduced by the petitioner in evidence was disregarded by the LA since it was
unsigned.
The
petitioner appealed the foregoing disposition to the NLRC, submitting a new
audit report dated April 30, 2007. Pending appeal, the petitioner sent the
respondent a letter[5]
dated April 30, 2007 requiring him to report for work on May 4, 2007 pursuant
to the reinstatement order of the LA. The said letter was served to the
respondent on May 3, 2007 but he refused to receive the same.
The NLRCs Decision
On
July 21, 2008, the NLRC rendered a Decision[6]
affirming the February 28, 2007 Decision of the LA. The NLRC held that it was
sufficiently established that only Lingad was the one responsible for the said
misappropriations. Further, the NLRC asserted that the February 14, 2006 and
April 30, 2007 audit reports presented by the petitioner could not be given
evidentiary weight as the same were executed after the respondent had already
been dismissed. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said July 21, 2008
Decision but it was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution[7]
dated September 22, 2009.
Subsequently,
the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[8]
with the CA alleging that the NLRC and the LA gravely abused their discretion
in ruling that the respondent had been illegally dismissed.
The CA Decision
On
April 24, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision[9]
denying the petition for certiorari
filed by the petitioner. However, the CA held that the respondent is entitled
to separation pay equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service in
lieu of reinstatement and backwages to be computed from the time of his illegal
dismissal until the finality of the said decision.
The
CA agreed with the LA and the NLRC that the petitioner failed to establish by
substantial evidence that there was indeed a valid ground for the respondents
dismissal. Nevertheless, the CA held that the petitioner should pay the
respondent separation pay since the latter did not pray for reinstatement
before the LA and that the same would be in the best interest of the parties
considering the animosity and antagonism that exist between them. The CA stated
the following:
With respect to monetary awards, a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed ordinarily entitles him to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and to the payment of backwages. In this case, however, private respondent did not pray for reinstatement before the Labor Arbiter. This being the case, the employer should pay him separation pay in lieu [of] reinstatement. This is only just and practical because reinstatement of private respondent will no longer be in the best interest of both parties considering the animosity and antagonism that exist between them brought about by the filing of charges in the criminal as well as in the labor proceedings. Consequently, private respondent is entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service up to the finality of this judgment, as an alternative to reinstatement. With respect to his backwages, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it shall be computed from the time of the employees illegal termination up to the finality of this decision, without qualification or deduction.[10] (citations omitted)
Hence, the fallo of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the NLRC are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private respondent is entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement and backwages to be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal until the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[12]
was denied by the CA in its Resolution[13]
dated July 7, 2009.
Undaunted, the petitioner instituted the instant petition for
review on certiorari before this
Court asserting the following arguments: (1) the CA erred in awarding
separation pay in favor of the respondent in lieu of reinstatement considering
that the appeal before it only involved the issue of the legality or illegality
of the respondents dismissal; (2) an award of separation pay to the respondent
is not proper in this case considering that, in his complaint, he merely prayed
for reinstatement and not payment of separation pay; and (3) the CA erred in
awarding backwages in favor of the respondent since it acted in good faith when
it terminated the respondents employment.
In his Comment,[14]
the respondent asserted that the CA did not err in ordering the payment of
separation pay in his favor in lieu of reinstatement since there is already a
strained relationship between him and the petitioner. He intimated that the
petitioner had previously filed various criminal charges against him for
qualified theft thus effectively rendering his reinstatement to his former
position in the Bank of Lubao impracticable.
Issues
In sum, the issues to be resolved by this Court in the instant
case are
the following: (1) whether the CA erred in ordering the petitioner to pay the
respondent separation pay in lieu of reinstatement; and (2) whether the
respondent is entitled to payment of backwages.
The Courts Ruling
This Court notes that the LA, the NLRC and
the CA unanimously ruled that the respondent was illegally dismissed. Factual
findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, if supported by substantial
evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court, more so when
they coincide with those of the LA. Such factual findings are given more weight
when the same are affirmed by the CA. We find no reason to
depart from the foregoing rule.
First Issue: Separation Pay in Lieu of
Reinstatement
At the outset, it should be stressed
that a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of strained relations
is essentially a factual question and, thus, not a proper subject in the
instant petition.[15]
The
well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be
entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits
certain exceptions, such as when, inter
alia, the findings of fact are conflicting.[16]
Here,
in view of the conflicting findings of the NLRC and the CA, this Court is
constrained to pass upon the propriety of the application of the doctrine of
strained relations to justify the award of separation pay to the respondent in
lieu of reinstatement.
The law on reinstatement is provided for under
Article 279 of the Labor Code of the
Article
279. Security of Tenure. - In
cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement. (emphasis supplied)
Under
the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. However, if reinstatement would
only exacerbate the tension and strained relations between the parties, or
where the relationship between the employer and the employee has been unduly strained by reason of their
irreconcilable differences, particularly
where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in the
company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay
instead of reinstatement.[17]
Under
the doctrine of strained relations,
the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On
one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly
oppressive work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer
from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker
it could no longer trust.[18]
In such cases, it should be
proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the
trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated,
an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely
affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.[19]
Here, we agree with the CA that the relations
between the parties had been already strained thereby justifying the grant of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in favor of the respondent.
First, it cannot
be gainsaid that the petitioners reinstatement to his former position would
only serve to intensify the atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism between the
parties. Undoubtedly, the petitioners filing of various criminal complaints
against the respondent for qualified theft and the subsequent filing by the
latter of the complaint for illegal dismissal against the latter, taken
together with the pendency of the instant case for more than six years, had
caused strained relations between the parties.
Second, considering
that the respondents former position as bank encoder involves the handling of
accounts of the depositors of the Bank of Lubao, it would not be equitable on
the part of the petitioner to be ordered to maintain the former in its employ
since it may only inspire vindictiveness on the part of the respondent.
Third, the refusal
of the respondent to be re-admitted to work is in itself indicative of the
existence of strained relations between him and the petitioner. In the case of Lagniton,
Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[20]
the Court held that the refusal of the dismissed employee to be re-admitted is
constitutive of strained relations:
It appears that
relations between the petitioner and the complainants have been so strained
that the complainants are no longer willing to be reinstated. As such reinstatement
would only exacerbate the animosities that have developed between the parties,
the public respondents were correct in ordering instead the grant of separation
pay to the dismissed employees in the interest of industrial peace.[21]
Time and again, this Court has recognized that strained relations
between the employer and employee is an exception to the rule requiring actual
reinstatement for illegally dismissed employees for the practical reason that
the already existing antagonism will only fester and deteriorate, and will only
worsen with possible adverse effects on the parties, if we shall compel
reinstatement; thus, the use of a viable substitute that protects the interests
of both parties while ensuring that the law is respected.[22]
Second Issue: Backwages
Anent the second issue, the petitioner claimed that the respondent is not
entitled to the payment of backwages considering that there was no bad faith on
its part when it terminated the latters employment. The petitioner insists
that it is within its prerogative to dismiss the respondent on the basis of
loss of trust and confidence.
We do not agree.
The arguments raised by the petitioner
with regard to the issue of backwages, essentially, attacks the factual
findings of the CA, the NLRC and the LA. As stated earlier, subject to
well-defined exceptions, factual questions may not be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 as
this Court is not a trier of facts. The petitioner failed to assert any
circumstance which would impel this Court to disregard the findings of fact of
the lower tribunals on the propriety of the award of backwages in favor of the
respondent.
However, the backwages that should be awarded to the respondent
should be modified. Employees who are illegally
dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement. But if reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall
be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of
the decision.[23]
Thus, when there is an order of reinstatement, the computation of
backwages shall be reckoned from the time of illegal dismissal up to the time
that the employee is actually reinstated to his former position.
Pursuant to the order of reinstatement rendered by the LA, the
petitioner sent the respondent a letter requiring him to report back to work on
May 4, 2007. Notwithstanding the said letter, the respondent opted not to
report for work. Thus, it is but fair that the backwages that should be awarded
to the respondent be computed from the time that the respondent was illegally
dismissed until the time when he was required to report for work, i.e. from September 1, 2005 until May 4,
2007. It is only during the said period that the respondent is deemed to be
entitled to the payment of backwages.
The fact that the CA, in its April 4, 2009 decision, ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu
of the respondents reinstatement would not entitle the latter to backwages. It
bears stressing that decisions of the CA, unlike that of the LA, are not
immediately executory. Accordingly, the petitioner should only pay the
respondent backwages from September 1, 2005, the date when the respondent
was illegally dismissed, until May 4, 2007, the date when the petitioner
required the former to report to work.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated April 24, 2009 and Resolution dated July 7, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106419 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The petitioner is ordered to pay the respondent backwages from September 1,
2005 until May 4, 2007. For
this purpose, the case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the
computation of the amounts due the respondent.
SO
ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO
L. REYES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring; rollo, pp. 42-52.
[2] Rollo, p. 54.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Supra
note 1.
[10] Rollo, p. 51.
[11]
[12]
[13] Supra note 2.
[14] Rollo, pp. 149-154.
[15] See
Cabigting v. San Miguel Foods, Inc.,
G.R. No. 167706, November 5, 2009, 605 SCRA 14.
[16] Phil. Charter Insurance Corp. v. Unknown
Owner of the Vessel M/V National Honor, 501 Phil 498, 509 (2005).
[17] Quijano
v. Mercury Drug Corp., 354 Phil 112, 121-122 (1998). (citations omitted)
[18] Golden
Ace Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 283, 289-290.
[19] Globe-Mackay
Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992, 206
SCRA 701, 711.
[20] G.R.
No. 86339, February 5, 1993, 218 SCRA 456.
[21]
[22] CRC Agricultural Trading v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 177664, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 138, 151-152.
[23] Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Del
Villar, G.R. No. 163091, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 293, 320.