SECOND DIVISION
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ANTONIA R. DELA PEA and ALVIN JOHN B.
DELA PEA,
Petitioners, - versus - GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA and FAR EAST
BANK & TRUST CO., Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 187490 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February
8, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this
petition for review on certiorari
seeks the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[1]
dated 31 March 2009 rendered by the then Second Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90485,[2]
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision, dated December 18, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma Avila dated November 4, 1997 and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) on March 15, 1999 are upheld as valid and binding.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The Facts
The
suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with the
improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously registered in
the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), married to Antegono A.
Dela Pea (Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.[4] On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C.
Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 which,
pursuant to the Promissory Note the
former executed in favor of the latter, was payable on or before 7 July 1996,
with interest pegged at 5% per month.[5] On the very same day, Antonia also executed
in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the
payment of said loan obligation. The
deed provided, in part, that (t)his contract is for a period of Three (3)
months from the date of this instrument.[6]
On
4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of respondent
Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00.[7] Utilizing the document, Gemma caused the
cancellation of TCT No. N-32315 as well as the issuance of TCT No. 337834 of
the Marikina City Registry of Deeds, naming her as the owner of the subject
realty.[8] On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a
real estate mortgage over said parcel in favor of respondent Far East Bank and
Trust Company [now Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a
loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.[9] As evidenced by the Promissory Notes she
executed from 12 December 1997 to 10 March 1998,[10]
Gemma obtained the following loans from Visayas Avenue Branch of the FEBTC-BPI,
in the aggregate sum of P1,200,000.00, to wit:
|
Promissory
Note |
Date |
Amount |
Maturity |
|
BDS#970779 |
12/02/97 |
|
04/30/98 |
|
BDS#970790 |
12/15/97 |
|
04/14/98 |
|
BDS#980800 |
01/16/98 |
|
04/30/98 |
|
BDS#980805 |
02/06/98 |
|
04/30/98 |
|
BDS#980817 |
02/27/98 |
|
04/30/98 |
|
BDS#980821 |
03/10/98 |
|
04/30/98 |
On
3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of
Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
to the effect, among others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the
property which had been titled in the name of Gemma under TCT No. 32315; and,
that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was
simulated.[11] As a consequence, Antonias Affidavit of Adverse Claim was inscribed
on TCT No. 337834 as Entry No. 501099 on 10 March 1998.[12] In view of Gemmas failure to pay the
principal as well as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she
obtained, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage constituted over the property. As the highest bidder at the public auction
conducted in the premises,[13]
FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same
to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the
On
18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Pea (
Served
with summons, Gemma specifically denied the material allegations of the
foregoing complaint in her 1 July 1998 answer.
Maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who
misrepresented that her husband was still alive, Gemma averred that the former
failed to pay the P250,000.00 loan she obtained from Aguila on its
stipulated 7 July 1996 maturity; that approached to help prevent the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on the property, she
agreed to settle the outstanding obligation to Aguila and to extend Antonia a P50,000.00
loan, with interest pegged at 10% per month; that to pay back the foregoing
accommodations, Antonia agreed to the use of the property as collateral for a
loan to be obtained by her from FEBTC-BPI, hence, the execution of the impugned
Deed of Absolute Sale; and, that
conformably with the foregoing agreement, she obtained loans in the total sum
of P1,200,000.00 from FEBTC-BPI and applied the proceeds thereof to the
sums owed by Antonia. Together with the
dismissal of the complaint, Gemma also prayed for the grant of her
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and the costs.[16]
On 25
September 1999, the Dela Peas filed a supplemental complaint, impleading
FEBTC-BPI as additional defendant.
Calling attention to Antonias 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the Notice of Lis Pendens they purportedly caused to be annotated on
TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999, the Dela Peas alleged that FEBTC-BPI was
in bad faith when it purchased the property at public auction on 15 March 1999.[17] In their 12 November 1999 answer, FEBTC-BPI,
in turn, asserted that the property was already titled in Gemmas name when she
executed the 26 November 1997 real estate mortgage thereon, to secure the
payment of the loans she obtained in the sum of P1,200,000.00; and, that
not being privy to Antonias transaction with Gemma and unaware of any adverse
claim on the property, it was a mortgagee in good faith, entitled to foreclose
the mortgage upon Gemmas failure to pay the loans she obtained. Seeking the dismissal of the complaint and
the grant of its counterclaims for damages against the Dela Peas, FEBTC-BPI
alternatively interposed cross-claims against Gemma for the payment of the
subject loans, the accumulated interests and penalties thereon as well as such
sums for which it may be held liable in the premises.[18]
On 14 April
2000, the RTC issued the order terminating the pre-trial stage and declaring
Gemma in default for failure to attend the pre-trial settings and to engage the
services of a new lawyer despite due notice and the withdrawal of her counsel
of record.[19] In support of their complaint, Antonia[20]
and Alvin[21] both
took the witness stand and, by way of corroborative evidence, presented the
testimony of one Alessandro Almoden[22]
who claimed to have referred Antonia to Gemma for the purpose of obtaining a
loan. By way of defense evidence, on the
other hand, FEBTC-BPI adduced the oral evidence elicited from Eleanor Abellare,
its Account Officer who handled Gemmas loans,[23]
and Zenaida Torres, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document
Examiner who, after analyzing Antonias specimen signatures on the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and 4
November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale,[24] issued NBI Questioned Documents Report No.
482-802 to the effect, among others, that said signatures were written by one
and the same person.[25]
On 18
December 2007, the RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the subject
property was conjugal in nature and that the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed
in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required
under Article 130 of the Family Code. Brushing aside FEBTC-BPIs claim of good
faith,[26]
the RTC disposed of the case in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
1). Declaring the Deed of Absolute dated November 04, 1997 in favor of defendant, [Gemma] as null and void;
2). Ordering defendant [FEBTC-BPI] to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of the [Dela Peas] involving the subject property now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 415392 in the name of [FEBTC-BPI];
3). Ordering [Gemma] to pay the [Dela Peas] the following:
a). the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
b). the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys
fees; and
c). costs of the suit
On the
cross-claim, [Gemma] is hereby ordered to pay [FEBTC-BPI] the amount of P2,029,317.17
as of November 10, 1999, with twelve (12%) percent interest per annum until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[27]
Aggrieved,
FEBTC-BPI perfected the appeal which was docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. CV
No. 90485. On 31 March 2009 the CAs
Second Division rendered the herein assailed decision, reversing the RTCs
appealed decision, upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) the
property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peas to prove that
the same was acquired during Antonias marriage to Antegono; (b) having misled
Gemma into believing that the property was exclusively hers, Antonia is barred
from seeking the annulment of the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale; (c) Antonias claim that her signature was
forged is belied by her admission in the pleadings that she was misled by Gemma
into executing said Deed of Absolute Sale
and by NBI Questioned Document Report No. 482-802; and, (d) FEBTC-BPI is a
mortgagee in good faith and for value since Gemmas 26 November 1997 execution
of the real estate mortgage in its favor predated Antonias 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the 10
December 1999 annotation of a Notice of
Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834.[28]
The Issues
The Dela Peas
seek the reversal of the assailed 31 March 2009 CA decision upon the
affirmative of following issues, to wit:
1) Whether or
not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT
No. N-32315 conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Pea;
2) Whether or
not the CA erred in reversing the RTC declaring null and void the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to (Gemma); and
3. Whether or
not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding (FEBTC-BPI) a mortgagee/purchaser
in bad faith.[29]
The Courts Ruling
The
petition is bereft of merit.
Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. Although
it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership,[30] proof of
acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[31] In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,[32]
this Court categorically ruled as follows:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that
"all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife." However, the party who invokes this presumption must first
prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof
of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless
to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover,
this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses.[33]
As the parties
invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peas did not even
come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the
marriage between Antonia and Antegono.
Beyond Antonias bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married,[34]
the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition
of the realty can be ascertained. When
queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even
Not having
established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela Peas insist that
the registration thereof in the name of Antonia R. Dela Pea, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Pea should have already sufficiently
established its conjugal nature.
Confronted with the same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals,[37]
this Court ruled, however, that the phrase married to is merely descriptive
of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the
husband is also a registered owner.
Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the
wife while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither
would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was
acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in
nature. Since there is no showing as to
when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the
name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e.,
belonging exclusively to said spouse.[38]
Viewed in light of
the paraphernal nature of the property, the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
reversibly erred in nullifying Antonias 4 November 1997 sale thereof in favor
of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.[39] That Antonia treated the realty as her own
exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization
thereof as security for the payment of the P250,000.00 loan she borrowed
from Aguila.[40] Despite Gemmas forfeiture of the right to
present evidence on her behalf, her alleged alteration of the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to shorten
the maturity of the loan secured thereby was also properly brushed aside by the
CA. The double lie inherent in Antonias
assertion that the same deed was altered by Gemma to shorten the maturity of
the loan to 1997 instead of 1998 is instantly evident from paragraph 1 of the
document which, consistent with 7
July 1996 maturity date provided in the Promissory
Note she executed,[41]
specifically stated that (t)his contract is for a period of Three (3) months
from the date of this instrument.[42]
Antonias evident lack of credibility
also impels us to uphold the CAs rejection of her version of the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute
For all of Antonias denial of her
receipt of any consideration for the sale of the property in favor of Gemma,[47]
the evidence on record also lend credence to Gemmas version of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the assailed 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale. Consistent with Gemmas claim that said deed
was executed to facilitate the loans she obtained from FEBTC-BPI which were
agreed to be used as payment of the sums she expended to settle the outstanding
obligation to Aguila and the P50,000.00 she loaned Antonia,[48]
the latter admitted during her direct examination that she did not pay the loan
she obtained from Aguila.[49] Presented as witness of the Dela Peas,
Alessandro Almoden also admitted that Gemma had extended a loan in the sum of P50,000.00
in favor of Antonia. Notably, Alessandro
Almodens claim that the title to the property had been delivered to Gemma as a
consequence of the transaction[50]
is at odds with Antonias claim that she presented said document to the
Registry of Deeds when she verified the status of the property prior to the
filing of the complaint from which the instant suit originated.[51]
With the material contradictions in
the Dela Peas evidence, the CA cannot be faulted for upholding the validity
of the impugned 4 November 1997 Deed of
Absolute Sale. Having been duly
notarized, said deed is a public document which
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution.[52]
Regarded as evidence of the facts therein
expressed in a clear, unequivocal manner,[53]
public documents enjoy a presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted
by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to
falsity.[54] The burden of proof to overcome said presumptions
lies with the party contesting the notarial document[55]
like the Dela Peas who, unfortunately, failed to discharge said onus. Absent clear and convincing evidence to
contradict the same, we find that the CA correctly pronounced the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and
binding between Antonia and Gemma.
Since foreclosure
of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage
debt,[56]
FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it
foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property upon Gemmas failure to pay
the loans secured thereby. Executed on 26 November 1997, the
mortgage predated Antonias filing of an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim with the Register of Deeds of Marikina on 3 March 1998 and
the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens
on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999.
The mortgage directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be,
to the fulfilment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.[57] When
the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee consequently has
the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds
of the sale to the satisfaction of the unpaid loan.[58]
Finally, the resolution of this case cannot be
affected by the principles that banks like FEBTC-BPI are expected to exercise
more care and prudence than private individuals in that their dealings because
their business is impressed with public interest[59]
and their standard practice is to
conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify
the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners thereof, hence,
the inapplicability of the general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond
the title does not apply to them.[60] The validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia in favor of Gemma having
been upheld, FEBTC-BPIs supposed failure to ascertain the ownership of the
property has been rendered immaterial for the purpose of determining the
validity of the mortgage executed in its favor as well as the subsequent
extrajudicial foreclosure thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the
assailed CA Decision dated 31 March 2009 is, accordingly, AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
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|
JOSE
|
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato,
Jr.
[2] CA
rollo, CA-G.R. CV No. 90485, CAs 31
March 2009 Decision, pp. 113-131.
[3]
[4] Exhibit
C, TCT No. N-32315, Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. II, pp. 4-5.
[5] Exhibit E, Promissory Note, id.
at 9.
[6] Exhibit D, Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage, id. at 6-9.
[7] Exhibit F, Deed of Absolute
[8] Exhibit G, TCT No. 337834, id.
at 12-13.
[9] Exhibit 7, Real Estate Mortgage,
id. at 27-30.
[10] Exhibits 1 to 13A, FEBTC-BPI
Promissory Notes, id. at 15-26.
[11] Exhibit H, Affidavit of Adverse
Claim, id. at 14.
[12]
[13] Exhibit 9, FEBTC-BPIs Written Bid,
id. at 31.
[14] Exhibit 12, TCT No. 415392, id. at
34.
[15] Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK,
Vol. 1, Dela Peas Complaint, pp. 1-4.
[16] Gemmas Answer, id. at 28-40.
[17] Dela Peas Supplemental Complaint,
id. at 129-134.
[18] FEBTCs Answer, id. at 148-155.
[19]
[20] TSN,
26 May 2000; TSN, 30 June 2000.
[21] TSN,
22 September 2000; TSN, 13 October 2000.
[22] TSN,
12 August 2004.
[23] TSN,
18 November 2004.
[24] TSN,
20 July 2006.
[25] Exhibit 13 and submarkings, Record,
Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. II, pp. 35-36.
[26] Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK,
Vol. I, pp. 440-457.
[27]
[28] CA rollo, CA-G.R. CV No. 90485, pp. 113-131.
[29] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[30] Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120594, 10 June 1997, 273 SCRA 229, 236.
[31] Manongsong v. Estimo, 452 Phil. 862, 878
(2003) citing Francisco v. CA, 359
Phil. 519, 526 (1998).
[32] 359 Phil. 519 (1998).
[33]
[34] TSN, 30 June 2000, p. 5.
[35] TSN, 13 October 2000, pp. 4; 6.
[36] Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, 3 May
2006, 489 SCRA 107, 117.
[37] 449 Phil. 419, 431 (2003).
[38]
[39] Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If
no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or
extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of said period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
x
x x x
[40] TSN, 26 May 2000, p. 13
[41] Exhibit E, supra
[42] Exhibit D, supra
[43] TSN, 26 May 2000, p. 20
[44] Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, p.
2
[45] Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 154430, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA
49, 54.
[46] Exhibit 13.
[47] TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 18-19.
[48] Record,
Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, pp. 33-37.
[49] TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 21-22.
[50] TSN, 12 August 2004, pp. 6-12.
[51] TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 27-28.
[52] Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 517 Phil. 380, 388
(2006).
[53] Sps.
Alfarero v. Sps. Sevilla, 458
Phil. 255, 262 (2003).
[54] Meneses
v. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196, 19
October 2011.
[55] Destreza v. Rinoza-Plazo, G.R. No. 176863, 30 October 2009, 604
SCRA 775, 785.
[56]
[57] Article 2126, Civil Code of the
[58] Talmonte v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, Ltd., G.R. No. 166970, 17 August 2011.
[59] Rural Bank of Siaton (
[60] Alano
v. Planters Development Bank, G.R.
No. 171628, 13 June 2011.