Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
SPOUSES ROMAN A. PASCUAL
and MERCEDITA R. PASCUAL, FRANCISCO A. PASCUAL, MARGARITA CORAZON D. MARIANO,
EDWIN D. MARIANO and DANNY R. MARIANO Petitioners, -
versus - SPOUSES ANTONIO
BALLESTEROS and LORENZA MELCHOR-BALLESTEROS, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 186269
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, VILLARAMA, JR.,* PEREZ, SERENO,
and
REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February 15, 2012 |
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by the spouses Roman A. Pascual and Mercedita R.
Pascual (Spouses Pascual), Francisco A. Pascual (Francisco), Margarita Corazon
D. Mariano (Margarita), Edwin D. Mariano and Danny R. Mariano (petitioners) assailing
the Decision[1] dated July 29, 2008 and Resolution[2] dated January 30, 2009 issued by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89111.
The instant case involves a 1,539 square meter parcel of land (subject
property) situated in Barangay Sta.
Maria,
Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share in the subject
property was inherited by their daughter Lorenza Melchor Ballesteros (Lorenza).
Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros (respondents) acquired
the share of Angela in the subject property by virtue of an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale[4]
dated October 1, 1986.
On August 11, 2000, Margarita, then already widowed, together with
her children, sold their share in the subject property to Spouses Pascual and
Francisco.[5]
Subsequently, Spouses Pascual and Francisco caused the cancellation of TCT No.
30375 and, thus, TCT No. T-32522[6]
was then issued in their names together with Angela and Spouses Melchor.
Consequently, the respondents, claiming that they did not receive
any written notice of the said sale in favor of Spouses Pascual and Francisco,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
For their part, the petitioners claimed that there was no
co-ownership over the subject property considering that the shares of the
registered owners thereof had been particularized, specified and subdivided
and, hence, the respondents has no right to redeem the portion of the subject
property that was sold to them.[8]
On January 31, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision[9]
dismissing the complaint for legal redemption filed by the respondents. In
disposing of the said complaint, the RTC summed up the issues raised therein as
follows: (1) whether the respondents herein and the predecessors-in-interest of
the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property who have the right of
redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code; and (2) if so, whether that
right was seasonably exercised by the respondents within the 30-day redemption
period under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
On the first issue, the RTC held that the respondents and the
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of the subject
property considering that the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing
that the respective shares of each of the registered owners thereof were indeed
particularized, specified and subdivided.
On the second issue, the RTC ruled that the respondents failed to
seasonably exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day period pursuant
to Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding the lack of a written notice
of the sale of a portion of the subject property to Spouses Pascual and
Francisco, the RTC asserted that the respondents had actual notice of the said
sale. Failing to exercise their right of redemption within 30 days from actual
notice of the said sale, the RTC opined that the respondents can no longer seek
for the redemption of the property as against the petitioners.
Thereupon, the respondents appealed from the January 31, 2007 decision
of the RTC of Laoag City with the CA. On July 29, 2008, the CA rendered the
herein assailed Decision[10]
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the appealed January 31,
2007 Decision is, accordingly, REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
another is entered approving [respondents] legal redemption of the portion in
litigation. The rest of their monetary claims are, however, DENIED for lack of factual and/or legal
bases.
SO
ORDERED.[11]
In allowing the respondents to exercise their right of redemption,
the CA held that the 30-day period within which to exercise the said right had
not yet lapsed considering the absence of a written notice of the said sale. Thus,
the CA stated that [t]he mandatory nature of the written notice requirement
is such that, notwithstanding the actual knowledge of the sale, written notice
from the seller is still necessary in order to remove all uncertainties about
the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.[12]
The petitioners sought for a reconsideration of the said July 29,
2008 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution[13]
dated January 30, 2009.
Undaunted, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for
review on certiorari before this
Court essentially asserting the following arguments: (1) their
predecessors-in-interest and the respondents are not co-owners of the subject
property since their respective shares therein had already been particularized,
specified and subdivided; and (2) even if such co-ownership exists, the
respondents could no longer exercise their right of redemption having failed to
exercise the same within 30 days from actual knowledge of the said sale.
The petition is denied.
Primarily,
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition
filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to
be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.[14]
The first issue raised
by the petitioners is a factual question as it entails a determination of
whether the subject property was indeed co-owned by the respondents and the
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. Such determination would inevitably
necessitate a review of the probative value of the evidence adduced in the case
below.
In any case, it ought to be stressed that both the RTC and the CA
found that the subject property was indeed co-owned by the respondents and the
predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. Thus, in the absence of any exceptional circumstances to warrant the contrary,
this Court must abide by
the prevailing rule that findings of fact of the trial court, more so when
affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon it.[15]
Anent the second issue
asserted by the petitioners, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA
in ruling that the 30-day period given to the respondents within which to
exercise their right of redemption has not commenced in view of the absence of
a written notice. Verily, despite the respondents actual knowledge of the sale
to the respondents, a written notice is still mandatory and indispensable for
purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period within which to exercise the
right of redemption.
Article 1623 of the Civil Code succinctly provides that:
Article 1623. The
right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed
of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right
of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (emphasis
supplied)
The indispensability of the written notice requirement for
purposes of the exercise of the right of redemption was explained by this Court
in Barcellano v. Baas,[16]
thus:
Nothing
in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there was a
written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the
period of thirty days within which the right of legal pre-emption may be
exercised, does not start.
The
indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the early case
of Conejero
v. Court of Appeals, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
With
regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is
indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in which Article of the
Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some
other manner by the redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written
notice was obviously exacted by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the
sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation
is not definitive. The statute not having provided for any alternative, the
method of notification prescribed remains exclusive.
This is
the same ruling in Verdad v. Court of Appeals:
The written
notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to
a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties
about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Lately,
in Gosiengfiao Guillen v. The Court of Appeals, this Court again
emphasized the mandatory character of a written notice in legal redemption:
From
these premises, we ruled that [P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their right
to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the
vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run. These premises and
conclusion leave no doubt about the thrust of Mariano: The right of the
petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of legal redemption exists, and the
running of the period for its exercise has not even been triggered because they
have not been notified in writing of the fact of sale.
x x x x
Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement,
would explain in his commentaries on the New Civil Code that despite actual
knowledge, the person having the right to redeem is STILL entitled to
the written notice. Both the letter and the spirit of the New Civil Code
argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the written notice by
including therein any other kind of notice such as an oral one, or by
registration. If the intent of the law has been to include verbal notice
or any other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this
notice, there would have been no necessity or reason to specify in the article
that said notice be in writing, for under the old law, a verbal notice or mere
information was already deemed sufficient.
Time and
time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. Where the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice. x x x (citations omitted)
Here, it is
undisputed that the respondents did not receive a written notice of the sale in
favor of the petitioners. Accordingly, the 30-day period stated under Article
1623 of the Civil Code within which to exercise their right of redemption has
not begun to run. Consequently, the respondents may still redeem from the
petitioners the portion of the subject property that was sold to the latter.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated July 29, 2008 and Resolution dated January 30, 2009 issued by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89111 are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice
|
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1195 dated February 15, 2012.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca
De Guia-
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Supra note 1.
[11] Rollo,
p. 53.
[12]
[13] Supra note 2.
[14] Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine
National Bank, G.R.
No. 154704, June 1, 2011.
[15] Bormaheco,
Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., G.R. No. 156599, July 26, 2010, 625
SCRA 309, 318-319.
[16] G.R.
No. 165287, September 14, 2011.