|
G.R. No. 181974
Present:
CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ,
SERENO,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated:
February
1, 2012 |
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PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari[1] of
the Decision[2] of the Fourteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95094 dated 10 September 2007, granting
the Writ of Certiorari prayed for under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure by herein respondents Andres G. Ariola, Jessie D. Alcovendas,
Jimmy B. Calinao and Leopoldo Sebullen thereby reversing the Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Decision dated March 31, 2004 rendered by the National Labor
Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED, except
as to the award of attorneys fees, which is ordered DELETED.[3]
The version of the petitioners
follows:
1.
Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. (Lynvil) is a company engaged in
deep-sea fishing, operating along the shores of Palawan and other outlying
islands of the Philippines.[4] It is operated and managed by Rosendo S. de
Borja.
2.
On 1 August 1998, Lynvil received a report from Romanito Clarido, one of
its employees, that on 31 July 1998, he witnessed that while on board the
company vessel Analyn VIII, Lynvil employees,
namely: Andres G. Ariola (Ariola), the captain; Jessie D. Alcovendas
(Alcovendas), Chief Mate; Jimmy B. Calinao (Calinao), Chief Engineer; Ismael G.
Nubla (Nubla), cook; Elorde Baez (Baez), oiler; and Leopoldo D. Sebullen
(Sebullen), bodegero, conspired with
one another and stole eight (8) tubs of pampano
and tangigue fish and delivered
them to another vessel, to the prejudice of Lynvil.[5]
3.
The said employees were engaged on a per trip basis or por viaje which terminates at the end
of each trip. Ariola, Alcovendas and
Calinao were managerial field personnel while the rest of the crew were field
personnel.[6]
4.
By reason of the report and after initial investigation, Lynvils General
Manager Rosendo S. De Borja (De Borja) summoned respondents to explain within
five (5) days why they should not be dismissed from service. However, except for Alcovendas and Baez,[7] the
respondents refused to sign the receipt of the notice.
5.
Failing to explain as required, respondents employment was
terminated.
6.
Lynvil, through De Borja, filed a criminal complaint against the
dismissed employees for violation of P.D. 532, or
the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City.[8]
7. On 12 November 1998, First Assistant City
Prosecutor Rosauro Silverio found probable cause for the indictment of the
dismissed employees for the crime of qualified theft[9]
under the Revised
Penal Code.
On the other hand, the story of the
defense is:
1.
The private respondents were crew members of Lynvils vessel named Analyn
VIII.[10]
2. On 31 July 1998, they arrived at the Navotas
Fishport on board Analyn VIII loaded with 1,241 baeras of different kinds of fishes. These baeras
were delivered to a consignee named SAS and Royale.[11]
The following day, the private
respondents reported back to Lynvil office to inquire about their new job
assignment but were told to wait for further advice. They were not allowed to board any vessel.[12]
3.
On 5 August 1998, only Alcovendas and Baez received a memorandum from
De Borja ordering them to explain the incident that happened on 31 July 1998. Upon being informed about this, Ariola,
Calinao, Nubla and Sebullen went to the Lynvil office. However, they were told that their
employments were already terminated.[13]
Aggrieved, the employees filed with
the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission-National
Capital Region on 25 August 1998 a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims
for backwages, salary differential reinstatement, service incentive leave,
holiday pay and its premium and 13th month pay from 1996 to1998. They also claimed for moral, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees for their dismissal with bad faith.[14]
They added that the unwarranted
accusation of theft stemmed from their oral demand of increase of salaries
three months earlier and their request that they should not be required to sign
a blank payroll and vouchers.[15]
On 5 June 2002, Labor Arbiter Ramon
Valentin C. Reyes found merit in complainants charge of illegal dismissal.[16] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding that complainants were
illegally dismissed, ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainants (a) separation pay at one half month pay for every year of
service; (b) backwages; (c) salary differential; (d) 13th month pay;
and (e) attorneys fees, as follows:
1)
Andres Ariola
Backwages P234,000.00
(P6,500.00 x 36 =
P234,000.00)
Separation Pay
P74,650.00
13th Month
Pay P6,500.00
P325,250.00
2)
Jessie Alcovendas
Backwages P195,328.00
(P5,148.00 x 36 = P195,328.00)
Separation Pay
P44,304.00
13th Month
Pay 5,538.00
Salary Differential
1,547.52
P246,717.52
3)
Jimmy Calinao
Backwages P234,000.00
(P6,500.00 x 36 =
P234,000.00)
Separation Pay
55,250.00
13th Month
Pay P6,500.00 P295,700.00
4)
Leopoldo Sebullen
Backwages P154,440.00
(P4, 290.00 x 36 =
P154,440.00)
Separation Pay
P44,073.00
13th Month
Pay 2,473.12
Salary Differential
4,472.00
P208,455.12
5)
Ismael Nubla
Backwages P199,640.12
Separation Pay
P58,149.00
13th Month
Pay 2,473.12
Salary Differential
P5,538.00
P265,
28.12
___________
TOTAL P
1, 341, 650.76
All other claims are dismissed for
lack of merit.[17]
The Labor Arbiter found that there was no evidence showing
that the private respondents received the 41 baeras of pampano as
alleged by De Borja in his reply-affidavit; and that no proof was presented
that the 8 baeras of pampano [and tangigue] were missing at the place of destination.[18]
The Labor
Arbiter disregarded the Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Rosauro
Silverio on the theft case. He reasoned
out that the Labor Office is governed by different rules for the determination
of the validity of the dismissal of employees.[19]
The Labor
Arbiter also ruled that the contractual provision that the employment terminates
upon the end of each trip does not make the respondents dismissal legal. He pointed
out that respondents and Lynvil did not negotiate on equal terms because of the
moral dominance of the employer.[20]
The Labor
Arbiter found that the procedural due process was not complied with and that the
mere notice given to the private respondents fell short of the requirement of
ample opportunity to present the employees side.[21]
On appeal before
the National Labor Relations Commission, petitioners asserted that private
respondents were only contractual employees; that they were not illegally
dismissed but were accorded procedural due process and that De Borja did not
commit bad faith in dismissing the employees so as to warrant his joint
liability with Lynvil.[22]
On 31 March 2004, the NLRC reversed
and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE the Decision of the Labor Arbiter a quo and a new one entered
DISMISSING the present complaints for utter lack of merit;
However
as above discussed, an administrative fine of PhP5,000.00 for each complainant,
Andres Ariola, Jessie Alcovendas, Jimmy Canilao, Leopoldo Sebullen and Ismael
Nobla or a total of PhP25,000.00 is hereby awarded.[23]
The private respondents except Elorde
Baez filed a Petition for Certiorari[24]
before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
NLRC.
The Court of Appeals found merit in
the petition and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter except as to the
award of attorneys fees. The appellate
court held that the allegation of theft did not warrant the dismissal of the
employees since there was no evidence to prove the actual quantities of the
missing kinds of fish loaded to Analyn VIII.[25] It also reversed the finding of the NLRC that
the dismissed employees were merely contractual employees and added that they
were regular ones performing activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the business and trade of Lynvil.
Finally, it ruled that the two-notice rule provided by law and
jurisprudence is mandatory and non-compliance therewith rendered the dismissal
of the employees illegal.
The following are the assignment of
errors presented before this Court by Lynvil:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY V. NLRC HOLDING
THAT THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE THE PROSECUTORS OFFICE CONSTITUTES
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR A VALID TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT AND/OR LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TERMINATION OF RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT, IN ANY
EVENT, WERE CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE BEING ON A PER VOYAGE BASIS. THUS, THEIR
RESPECTIVE EMPLOYMENT TERMINATED AFTER THE END OF EACH VOYAGE
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ACCORDED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF
THEIR MONEY CLAIMS.
VI
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PETITIONER ROSENDO S. DE BORJA IS NOT
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE JUDGMENT WHEN THERE WAS NO FINDING OF BAD FAITH.[26]
The Courts Ruling
The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. Under Rule 45,[27]
parties may raise only questions of law. We are not duty-bound to analyze again
and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. Generally
when supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,
unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1)
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting;
(6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7)
When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10)
When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis
supplied)[28]
The contrariety of the findings of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC prevents reliance on the principle of special
administrative expertise and provides the reason for judicial review, at first instance
by the appellate court, and on final study through the present petition.
In the
first assignment of error, Lynvil contends that the filing of a criminal case
before the Office of the Prosecutor is sufficient basis for a valid termination
of employment based on serious misconduct and/or loss of trust and confidence
relying on Nasipit Lumber Company v. NLRC.[29]
Nasipit is about a security guard who was charged with
qualified theft which charge was dismissed by the Office of the
Prosecutor. However, despite the
dismissal of the complaint, he was still terminated from his employment on the
ground of loss of confidence. We ruled
that proof
beyond reasonable doubt of an employee's misconduct is not required when loss
of confidence is the ground for dismissal. It is sufficient if the
employer has "some basis" to lose confidence or that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the
employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position.[30]
It added that the dropping of the qualified theft charges against the
respondent is not binding upon a labor tribunal.[31]
In Nicolas v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[32] we held that a criminal conviction is not
necessary to find just cause for employment termination. Otherwise stated, an
employees acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the
existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor
case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the employers interests.[33] In the reverse, the finding of probable cause
is not followed by automatic adoption of such finding by the labor tribunals.
In other words, whichever way the public prosecutor
disposes of a complaint, the finding does not bind the labor tribunal.
Thus, Lynvil
cannot argue that since the Office of the Prosecutor found probable cause for
theft the Labor Arbiter must follow the finding as a valid reason for the
termination of respondents employment. The
proof required for purposes that differ from one and the other are likewise different.
Nonetheless,
even without reliance on the prosecutors finding, we find that there was valid
cause for respondents dismissal.
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of
proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.[34]
Just cause is required for a valid dismissal. The Labor Code[35]
provides that an employer may terminate an employment based on fraud or
willful breach of the trust reposed on the employee. Such breach is considered willful if it is
done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently. It must also be based on substantial evidence and not on the
employers whims or caprices or suspicions otherwise, the employee would
eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Loss of confidence must not be
indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the
dismissal of an employee was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just
cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and shows that
the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In
addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is
premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of
responsibility, trust and confidence or that the employee concerned is
entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as the
handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. The
betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is
penalized.[36]
Breach of trust is present
in this case.
We agree with the ruling of
the Labor Arbiter and Court of Appeals that the quantity of tubs expected to be
received was the same as that which was loaded.
However, what is material is the kind of fish loaded and then
unloaded. Sameness is likewise needed.
We cannot close our eyes to
the positive and clear narration of facts of the three witnesses to the commission
of qualified theft. Jonathan Distajo, a
crew member of the Analyn VIII, stated in his letter addressed to De Borja[37]
dated 8 August 1998, that while the vessel was traversing San Nicolas, Cavite,
he saw a small boat approach them. When
the boat was next to their vessel, Alcovendas went inside the stockroom while
Sebullen pushed an estimated four tubs of fish away from it. Ariola, on the other hand, served as the
lookout and negotiator of the transaction.
Finally, Baez and Calinao helped in putting the tubs in the small
boat. He further added that he received P800.00
as his share for the transaction.
Romanito Clarido, who was also on board the vessel, corroborated the
narration of Distajo on all accounts in his 25 August 1998 affidavit.[38] He added that Alcovendas told him to keep
silent about what happened on that day. Sealing
tight the credibility of the narration of theft is the affidavit[39]
executed by Elorde Baez dated 3 May 1999.
Baez was one of the dismissed employees who actively participated in
the taking of the tubs. He clarified in
the affidavit that the four tubs taken out of the stockroom in fact contained
fish taken from the eight tubs. He
further stated that Ariola told everyone in the vessel not to say anything and
instead file a labor case against the management. Clearly, we cannot fault Lynvil and De Borja
when it dismissed the employees.
The second to the
fifth assignment of errors interconnect.
The
nature of employment is defined in the Labor Code, thus:
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
Lynvil
contends that it cannot be guilty of illegal dismissal because the private
respondents were employed under a fixed-term contract which expired at the end
of the voyage. The pertinent provisions
of the contract are:
xxxx
1.
NA ako ay
sumasang-ayon na maglingkod at gumawa ng mga gawain sang-ayon sa patakarang
por viaje na magmumula sa pagalis sa Navotas papunta sa pangisdaan at
pagbabalik sa pondohan ng lantsa sa Navotas, Metro Manila;
xxxx
1.
NA ako ay
nakipagkasundo na babayaran ang aking paglilingkod sa paraang por viaje sa
halagang P__________ isang biyahe ng kabuuang araw xxxx.[40]
Lynvil insists on the applicability of the case of Brent School,[41]
to wit:
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind
the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the
Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent
circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in
said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral
agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined
therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code
itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent
security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed
period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties,
without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on
more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by
the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would
be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers;
it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead
to absurd and unintended consequences.
Contrarily,
the private respondents contend that they became regular employees by reason of
their continuous hiring and performance of tasks necessary and desirable in the
usual trade and business of Lynvil.
Jurisprudence,[42]
laid two conditions for the validity of a fixed-contract agreement between the
employer and employee:
First, the fixed period of employment was knowingly and
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent; or
Second, it satisfactorily appears that the employer and
the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral
dominance exercised by the former or the latter.[43]
Textually,
the provision that: NA ako ay sumasang-ayon na
maglingkod at gumawa ng mga gawain sang-ayon sa patakarang por viaje na
magmumula sa pagalis sa Navotas papunta sa pangisdaan at pagbabalik sa pondohan
ng lantsa sa Navotas, Metro Manila is for a fixed
period of employment. In the context,
however, of the facts that: (1) the
respondents were doing tasks necessarily to Lynvils fishing business with
positions ranging from captain of the vessel to bodegero; (2) after the end of a trip, they will again be hired for
another trip with new contracts; and (3) this arrangement continued for more
than ten years, the clear intention is to go around the security of tenure of
the respondents as regular employees.
And respondents are so by the express provisions of the second paragraph
of Article 280, thus:
xxx Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
The same set of circumstances indicate clearly enough that
it was the need for a continued source of income that forced the employees
acceptance of the por viaje
provision.
Having
found that respondents are regular employees who may be, however, dismissed for
cause as we have so found in this case, there is a need to look into the
procedural requirement of due process in Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code. It is
required that the employer furnish the employee with two written notices:
(1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination
served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
From the
records, there was only one written notice which required respondents to explain within five (5) days why
they should not be dismissed from the service. Alcovendas was the only one who signed the receipt
of the notice. The others, as claimed by
Lynvil, refused to sign. The other
employees argue that no notice was given to them. Despite
the inconsistencies, what is clear is that no final written notice or notices
of termination were sent to the employees.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the elements of [due] process in cases of employee's
dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee
concerned of the employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed
dismissal. Upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee
an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly, to
defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected.[44] Obviously, the second written notice, as
indispensable as the first, is intended to ensure the observance of due
process.
Applying
the rule to the facts at hand, we grant a monetary award of P50,000.00
as nominal damages, this, pursuant to the fresh ruling of this Court in Culili v. Eastern Communication Philippines,
Inc.[45] Due to the failure of Lynvil to follow the
procedural requirement of two-notice rule, nominal damages are due to
respondents despite their dismissal for just cause.
Given the fact that their dismissal
was for just cause, we cannot grant backwages and separation pay to
respondents. However, following the
findings of the Labor Arbiter who with the expertise presided over the proceedings
below, which findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we grant the 13th
month pay and salary differential of the dismissed employees.
Whether De Borja is jointly and
severally liable with Lynvil
As to the last issue, this Court has ruled that in
labor cases, the corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with
the corporation for the termination of employment of employees done with malice
or in bad faith.[46] Indeed, moral damages are recoverable when
the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes
an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals,
good customs or public policy.
It has also been discussed in MAM Realty
Development Corporation v. NLRC[47] that:
x x x A corporation being a juridical entity, may act only through its
directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such
corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the
corporation they represent. True, solidary liabilities may at times be incurred
but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the
following cases:
1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of
a corporation:
xxx
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate
affairs;
x x x [48]
The
term "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or
for ulterior purpose."[49]
We agree with
the ruling of both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals when they pronounced that
there was no evidence on record that indicates commission of bad faith on the
part of De Borja. He is the general
manager of Lynvil, the one tasked with the supervision by the employees and the
operation of the business. However,
there is no proof that he imposed on the respondents the por viaje provision for purpose of effecting their summary
dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The 10 September 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95094 reversing the Resolution dated 31 March 2004
of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED. The Court hereby
rules that the employees were dismissed for just cause by Lynvil Fishing
Enterprises, Inc. and Rosendo S. De Borja, hence, the reversal of the award for
backwages and separation pay. However,
we affirm the award for 13th month pay, salary differential and grant
an additional P50,000.00 in favor of the employees representing nominal damages for
petitioners non-compliance with statutory due process. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
|
|
WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice |
|
BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-51.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M.
Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of
this Court) and Romeo F. Barza concurring. Id. at 60-70.
[3] Id. at 70.
[4] Position
Paper of Lynvil, id. at 144.
[5] Id.
at 144-145.
[6] Id.
at 145.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Art. 310, Revised Penal Code. Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime
of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
[10] Position
Paper of the Private Respondents, rollo,
p. 124.
[11] Id.
at 126.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Complaint Forms, id. at 119-122.
[15] Id. at 126-127.
[16] Id. at 190-203.
[17] Decision
of the Labor Arbiter, id. at 202-203.
[18] Id.
at 198.
[19] Id.
at 199.
[20] Id.
at 763.
[21] Id.
at 764.
[22] Decision
of the NLRC, id. at 251.
[23] Id.
at 264.
[24] Id.
at 279-297.
[25] Decision
of the Court of Appeals, id. at 66.
[26] Id. at 9-10.
[27] Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
[28] Cirtek Employees
Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515, 6 June 2011.
[29] 257 Phil. 937 (1989).
[30] Id. at 946.
[31] Id. at 946-947.
[32] 327 Phil. 883, 886-887 (1996); Reno Foods, Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa (NLM) Katipunan, G.R. No. 164016, 15 March
2010, 615 SCRA 240.
[33] Reno
Foods, Inc. and/or Vicente Khu v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)
Katipunan, G.R. No. 164016, 15 March
2010, 615 SCRA 240, 248.
[34] Well-entrenched is the
principle that in order to establish a case before judicial and
quasi-administrative bodies, it is necessary that allegations must be supported
by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. Ledesma, Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 174585, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA
358, 368; Philippine
Air Lines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 159556, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 236, 251.
It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
[35]
Art.
282. ARTICLE
282. Termination by employer. An employer may
terminate an employment for any
of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct
or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with
his work;
(b)
Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a
crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e)
Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[36]
Lopez
v. Alturas Group of Companies, G.R.
No. 191008, 11 April 2011. 647 SCRA 568, 573-574.
[37] Rollo, p. 338.
[38] Id. at 339.
[39] Id. at 341.
[40] Rollo, p. 344-347.
[41] Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, supra note 19.
[42] Caparoso and Quindipan v. Court of Appeals et. al., G.R. No. 155505, 15 February 2007, 516 SCRA 30; Pure Foods Corp. v. NLRC, 347 Phil 434, 443 (1997).
[43] Id. at 35.
[44] Rubia v. NLRC, Fourth Division, et. al, G.R. No. 178621, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 494, 509.
[45] G.R. No. 165381, 9
February 2011, 642 SCRA 338.
[46] Alba v. Yupangco, G.R.
No. 188233, 29 June 2010, 622 SCRA 503, 508.
[47] G.R.
No. 114787, 2 June 1995, 244 SCRA 797.
[48] Id. at 802.
[49]
Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438, 28 September
1966, 18 SCRA 155,
166-167.