Republic of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
FEDERICO S. ROBOSA,
ROLANDO E. PANDY, NOEL D. ROXAS,
ALEXANDER ANGELES, VERONICA GUTIERREZ, FERNANDO EMBAT, and NANETTE H. PINTO, Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (First Division), CHEMO-TECHNISCHE MANUFACTURING, INC. and its
responsible officials led by FRANKLIN R. DE LUZURIAGA, and PROCTER &
GAMBLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 176085
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February 8, 2012 |
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D
E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on
certiorari[1]
seeking the reversal of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered on
Factual Background
Federico
S. Robosa, Rolando E. Pandy, Noel D. Roxas, Alexander Angeles, Veronica
Gutierrez, Fernando Embat and Nanette H. Pinto (petitioners) were rank-and-file employees of respondent Chemo-Technische
Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI), the
manufacturer and distributor of Wella products. They were officers and
members of the CTMI Employees Union-DFA (union).
Respondent Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. (P & GPI) acquired all the interests, franchises and goodwill of
CTMI during the pendency of the dispute.
Sometime
in the first semester of 1991, the union filed a petition for certification
election at CTMI. On
On
July 15, 1991, CTMI, through its President and General Manager Franklin R. de
Luzuriaga, issued a memorandum[4]
announcing that effective that day: (1) all sales territories were demobilized;
(2) all vehicles assigned to sales representatives should be returned to the
company and would be sold; (3) sales representatives would continue to service
their customers through public transportation and would be given transportation
allowance; (4) deliveries of customers orders would be undertaken by the
warehouses; and (5) revolving funds for ex-truck selling held by sales
representatives should be surrendered to the cashier (for Metro Manila) or to
the supervisor (for Visayas and Mindanao), and truck stocks should immediately
be surrendered to the warehouse.
On
the same day, CTMI issued another memorandum[5]
informing the companys sales representatives and sales drivers of the new
system in the Salon Business Groups selling operations.
The
union asked for the withdrawal and deferment of CTMIs directives, branding
them as union busting acts constituting unfair labor practice. CTMI ignored the
request. Instead, it issued on
On
The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings
The
labor arbiter handling the case denied the unions motion for a stay order on
the ground that the issues raised by the petitioners can best be ventilated
during the trial on the merits of the case. This prompted the union to file on
On
Allegedly,
the respondents did not comply with the NLRCs
On
On
Meanwhile,
the NLRC heard the contempt charge. On
The petitioners moved for, but failed
to secure, a reconsideration from the NLRC on the dismissal of the contempt
charge. They then sought relief from the CA by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The CA Decision
The
CA saw no need to dwell on the issues raised by the petitioners as the question
it deemed appropriate for resolution is whether the NLRCs dismissal of the
contempt charge against the respondents may be the proper subject of an appeal.
It opined that the dismissal is not subject to review by an appellate court.
Accordingly, the CA Special Sixth Division dismissed the petition in its
resolution of
The CA considered the prayer of P
& GPI to be dropped as party-respondent moot and academic.
The petitioners sought a
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of
The Petition
The
petitioners charge the CA with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRC
resolutions, despite the reversible errors the labor tribunal committed in
dismissing the contempt charge against the respondents. They contend that the
respondents were guilty of contempt for their failure (1) to observe strictly
the NLRC status quo order; and (2) to
reinstate the dismissed petitioners and to pay them their lost wages, sales
commissions, per diems, allowances and other employee benefits. They also claim
that the NLRC, in effect, overturned this Courts affirmation of the TRO and of
the preliminary injunction.
The
petitioners assail the CAs reliance on the Courts ruling that a contempt
charge partakes of a criminal proceeding where an acquittal is not subject to
appeal. They argue that the facts obtaining in the present case are different
from the facts of the cases where the Courts ruling was made. They further
argue that by the nature of this case, the Labor Code and its implementing
rules and regulations should apply, but in any event, the appellate court is
not prevented from reviewing the factual basis of the acquittal of the
respondents from the contempt charges.
The
petitioners lament that the NLRC, in issuing the challenged resolutions, had unconstitutionally
applied the law. They maintain that not
only did the NLRC unconscionably delay the disposition of the case for more
than twelve (12) years; it also rendered an unjust, unkind and dubious
judgment. They bewail that [f]or some strange reason, the respondent NLRC made
a queer [somersault] from its earlier rulings which favor the petitioners.[13]
The Case for the Respondents
Franklin K. De Luzuriaga
De
Luzuriaga filed a Comment[14]
on
De
Luzuriaga argues that the CA committed no error when it dismissed the petition
for certiorari since the dismissal of
the contempt charge against the respondents amounted to an acquittal where
review by an appellate court will not lie. In any event, he submits, the
respondents were charged with indirect contempt which may be initiated only in
the appropriate regional trial court, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. He posits that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over an indirect
contempt charge. He thus argues that the
petitioners improperly brought the contempt charge before the NLRC.
Additionally,
De Luzuriaga points out that the petition raises only questions of facts which,
procedurally, is not allowed in a petition for review on certiorari. Be this as it may, he submits that pursuant to Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
Inc. v. Tiamson,[16]
factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise
in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality. He stresses that the CA committed no reversible
error in not reviewing the NLRCs factual findings.
Further,
De Luzuriaga contends that the petitioners verification and certification
against forum shopping is defective because it was only Robosa and Pandy who
executed the document. There was no indication that they were authorized by
Roxas, Angeles, Gutierrez, Embat and Pinto to execute the required verification
and certification.
Lastly,
De Luzuriaga maintains that the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping as the
reliefs prayed for in the petition before the CA, as well as in the present
petition, are the same reliefs that the petitioners may be entitled to in the
complaint before the labor arbiter.[17]
P & GPI
As it did with the CA when it was
asked to comment on the petitioners motion for reconsideration,[18] P
& GPI prays in its Comment[19]
and Memorandum[20] that it
be dropped as a party-respondent, and that it be excused from further
participating in the proceedings. It argues that inasmuch as the NLRC resolved
the contempt charge on the merits, an appeal from its dismissal through a
petition for certiorari is barred.
Especially in its case, the dismissal of the petition for certiorari is correct because it was never made a party to the
contempt proceedings and, thus, it was never afforded the opportunity to be
heard. It adds that it is an entity separate from CTMI. It submits that it
cannot be made to assume any or all of CTMIs liabilities, absent an agreement
to that effect but even if it may be liable, the present proceedings are not
the proper venue to determine its liability, if any.
On
The Courts Ruling
Issues
The
parties submissions raise the following issues:
(1) whether the NLRC has contempt powers;
(2) whether the dismissal of a contempt
charge is appealable; and
(3) whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the contempt charge against the respondents.
On the first issue, we stress that
under Article 218[22]
of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending
party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in
accordance with law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either
imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against
the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the
labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner
prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[23]
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does
not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt
proceedings before the trial court. This
mode is to be observed only when there is no law granting them contempt powers.[24] As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor
Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to
hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt. The
petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contempt
charges against the respondents before the NLRC.
The second issue pertains to the
nature of contempt proceedings, especially with respect to the remedy available
to the party adjudged to have committed indirect contempt or has been absolved
of indirect contempt charges. In this regard, Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court states that the judgment or final order of a court in a case of
indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in a criminal
case. This is not the point at issue,
however, in this petition. It is rather the question of whether the dismissal
of a contempt charge, as in the present case, is appealable. The CA held that the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the respondents
amounts to an acquittal in a criminal case and is not subject to appeal.
The CA ruling is grounded on
prevailing jurisprudence.
In Yasay, Jr. v. Recto,[25] the Court declared:
A distinction is made between a civil and [a] criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court.[26]
The Court further explained in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[27] and People
v. Godoy[28] the
character of contempt proceedings, thus
The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Still further, the Court held in Santiago v. Anunciacion, Jr.[29]
that:
But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining the character of punishment to be administered.
In the earlier case of The Insurance Commissioner v. Globe
Assurance Co., Inc.,[30]
the Court dismissed the appeal from the ruling of the lower court denying a
petition to punish the respondent therein from contempt for lack of evidence.
The Court said in that case:
It
is not the sole reason for dismissing this appeal. In the leading case of In re
Mison, Jr. v. Subido, it was stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente, that the contempt proceeding
far from being a civil action is of a criminal nature and of summary character
in which the court exercises but limited jurisdiction. It was then explicitly
held: Hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the
order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt of court.
[footnote omitted]
Is the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the
respondents beyond review by this Court? On this important question, we note that the petitioners,
in assailing the CA main decision, claim that the appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion in not ruling on the dismissal by the NLRC of the
contempt charges.[31]
They also charge the NLRC of having gravely abused its discretion and having
committed reversible errors in:
(1) setting aside its
earlier resolutions and orders, including the writ of preliminary injunction it
issued, with its dismissal of the petition to cite the respondents in contempt
of court;
(2) overturning this
Courts resolutions upholding the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction;
(3) failing to impose
administrative fines upon the respondents for violation of the TRO and the writ
of preliminary injunction; and
(4) failing to order the
reinstatement of the dismissed petitioners and the payment of their accrued
wages and other benefits.
In view of the grave
abuse of discretion allegation in this case, we deem it necessary to look into
the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the respondents. As the
charges were rooted into the respondents alleged non-compliance with the NLRC
directives contained in the TRO[32]
and the writ of preliminary injunction,[33]
we first inquire into what really happened to these directives.
The
assailed NLRC resolution of
On the first directive, x x x We find that
there was no violation of the said order. A perusal of the records would show
that in compliance with the temporary restraining order (TRO), respondents
reinstated back to work the sales drivers who complained of illegal dismissal (Memorandum
of Respondents, page 4).
Petitioners
allegation that there was only payroll reinstatement does not make the
respondents guilty of contempt of court.
Even if the drivers were just in the garage doing nothing, the same does
not make respondents guilty of contempt nor does it make them violators of the
injunction order. What is important is that they were reinstated and receiving
their salaries.
As
for petitioners Danilo Real, Roberto Sedano and Rolando Manalo, they have
resigned from their jobs and were paid their separation pay xxx (Exhibits 6,
6-A, 7, 7-A, 8, 8-A, Respondents Memorandum dated August 12, 1996).
The issue of whether they were illegally dismissed should be threshed out
before the Labor Arbiter in whose sala the case of unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal were (sic) filed. Records also show that petitioner Antonio
Desquitado during the pendency of the case executed an affidavit of desistance
asking that he be dropped as party complainant in as much as he has already
accepted separation benefits totaling to P63,087.33.
With
respect to the second directive ordering respondents to cease and desist from
implementing the memoranda dated July 15, 1991 designed to ground sales
personnel who are members of the union, respondents alleged that they can no
longer be restrained or enjoined and that the status quo can no longer be
restored, for implementation of the memorandum was already consummated or was a
fait accompli. x x x
All
sales vehicles were ordered to be turned
over to management and the same were already sold[.] xxx [I]t would be hard to
undo the sales transactions, the same being valid and binding. The memorandum
of
x x x x
The
third directive of the Commission is to preserve the status quo ante between
the parties.
Records
reveal that WELLA AG of
On
The petitioners strongly dispute the
above account. They maintain that the NLRC failed to consider the following:
1. CTMI
violated the status quo ante order
when it did not restore to their former work assignments the dismissed sales
drivers. They lament that their being garaged deprived them of benefits, and
they were subjected to ridicule and psychological abuse. They assail the NLRC
for considering the payroll reinstatement of the drivers as compliance with its
stay order.
They also bewail the NLRCs
recognition of the resignation of Danilo Real, Roberto Sedano, Rolando Manalo
and Antonio Desquitado as they were just compelled by economic necessity to
resign from their employment. The quitclaims they executed were contrary to
public policy and should not bar them from claiming the full measure of their rights,
including their counsel who was unduly deprived of his right to collect
attorneys fees.
2. It
was error for the NLRC to rule that the memorandum, grounding the sales drivers,
could no longer be restrained or enjoined because all sales vehicles were
already sold. No substantial evidence was presented by the respondents to prove
their allegation, but even if there was a valid sale of the vehicles, it did
not relieve the respondents of responsibility under the stay order.
3. The
alleged termination of the licensing agreement between CTMI and WELLA AG of
Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the contempt
charges against the respondents? An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as
committed in grave abuse of discretion when it was performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.[35]
The petitioners insist that the
respondents violated the NLRC directives, especially the status quo ante order, for their failure to reinstate the dismissed
petitioners and to pay them their
benefits. In light of the facts of the case as drawn above, we cannot see how
the status quo ante or the
employer-employee situation before the formation of the union and the conduct
of the consent election can be maintained. As the NLRC explained, CTMI closed
its manufacturing and marketing operations after the termination of its
licensing agreement with WELLA AG of
Note that when the injunction order was
issued, WELLA AG of
Respondents could no longer be ordered to
restore the status quo as far as the individual petitioners are concerned as
these matters regarding the termination of the employees are now pending
litigation with the Arbitration Branch of the Commission. To resolve the
incident now regarding the closure of the respondent company and the matters
alleged by petitioners such as the creations of three (3) new corporations xxx
as successor-corporations are matters best left to the Labor Arbiter hearing
the merits of the unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal cases.[37]
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed NLRC ruling. It rightly avoided delving into
issues which would clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they are issues
involving the merits of the case which are by law within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.[38] To be sure, whether payroll reinstatement of
some of the petitioners is proper; whether the resignation of some of them was
compelled by dire economic necessity; whether the petitioners are entitled to
their money claims; and whether quitclaims are contrary to law or public policy
are issues that should be heard by the labor arbiter in the first instance. The
NLRC can inquire into them only on appeal after the merits of the case shall
have been adjudicated by the labor arbiter.
The NLRC correctly dismissed the
contempt charges against the respondents. The CA likewise committed no grave
abuse of discretion in not disturbing the NLRC resolution.
In light of the above discussion, we
find no need to dwell into the other issues the parties raised.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRM the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-91; filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
[3]
[4] Rollo, p. 450.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Supra note 2.
[12] Supra note 3.
[13] Rollo, p. 74.
[14]
[15]
[16] G.R. Nos. 164684-85,
[17] NLRCNCR Case No. 00-08-04455-91.
[18] Rollo, pp. 370-375.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Article
218 of the Labor Code provides:
Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have
the power and authority:
x x x x
(d) To hold any person in contempt directly or
indirectly and impose appropriate penalties therefor in accordance with law.
A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so
near the Chairman or any member of the Commission or any Labor Arbiter as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward said officials, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn, or to answer as a witness or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt
by said officials and punished by fine not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500)
or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) days, or both, if it be the Commission,
or a member thereof, or by a fine not exceeding one hundred pesos (P100)
or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a Labor Arbiter.
The person adjudged in direct contempt by a Labor
Arbiter may appeal to the Commission and the execution of the judgment shall be
suspended pending the resolution of the appeal upon the filing by such person
of a bond on condition that he will abide by and perform the judgment of the
Commission should the appeal be decided against him. Judgment of the Commission
on direct contempt is immediately executory and unappealable. Indirect contempt
shall be dealt with by the Commission or Labor Arbiter in the manner prescribed
under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court[.]
[23]
[24] SEC. 12.
Contempt
against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, this
Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect
to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by
law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the
contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be
filed therefor.
[25] G.R. No. 129521,
[26] See also People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09,
[27] G.R. No. 107671,
[28] Supra note 26, at 78.
[29] G.R. No. 89318,
[30] No. L-27874,
[31] Supra note 1, at 47-48.
[32] Supra note 8.
[33] Supra note 9.
[34] Supra note 10, at 181-183.
[35] Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 252 Phil. 253 (1989); see also Manila Electric Company v. Barlis, G.R. No. 114231, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 11.
[36] Supra note 10.
[37]
[38] LABOR CODE, Article 217.