Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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ROGELIO J. JAKOSALEM and GODOFREDO B. DULFO |
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G.R. No. 175025 |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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- versus- |
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PEREZ,⃰ and |
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SERENO, ⃰ ⃰ JJ. |
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ROBERTO S.
BARANGAN, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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February
15, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
This case
exemplifies the age-old rule that the one who holds a
This Petition
for Review on Certiorari[2]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision[3]
dated August 3, 2006 and the Resolution[4]
dated October 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79283.
Factual
Antecedents
On August 13,
1966, respondent Col. Roberto S. Barangan (respondent Barangan) entered into a
Land Purchase Agreement[5]
with Ireneo S. Labsilica of Citadel Realty Corporation whereby respondent
Barangan agreed to purchase on installment a 300 square meter parcel of land,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 165456,[6]
located in Antipolo, Rizal.[7] Upon full
payment of the purchase price, a Deed of Absolute Sale[8]
was executed on August 31, 1976 in his favor.[9]
Consequently, the old title, TCT No.
171453,[10]
which was a transfer from TCT No. 165456,[11]
was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. N-10772,[12]
was issued in his name.[13] Since then, he has been dutifully paying real
property taxes for the said property.[14]
He was not, however, able to physically
occupy the subject property because as a member of the Philippine Air Force, he
was often assigned to various stations in the
On December 23,
1993, when he was about to retire from the government service, respondent
Barangan went to visit his property, where he was planning to build a
retirement home. It was only then that
he discovered that it was being occupied by petitioner Godofredo Dulfo
(petitioner Dulfo) and his family.[16]
On February 4,
1994, respondent Barangan sent a letter[17]
to petitioner Dulfo demanding that he and his family vacate the subject
property within 30 days. In reply, petitioner Atty. Rogelio J. Jakosalem
(petitioner Jakosalem), the son-in-law of petitioner Dulfo, sent a letter[18]
claiming ownership over the subject property.
On February 19,
1994, respondent Barangan filed with Barangay
San Luis, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint for Violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 or the Anti-Squatting Law against petitioners.[19]
No settlement was reached; hence, the complaint was filed before the
Prosecutors Office of Rizal.[20]
The case, however, was dismissed because the issue of ownership must first be
resolved in a civil action.[21]
On May 28, 1994,
respondent Barangan commissioned Geodetic Engineer Lope C. Jonco (Engr. Jonco)
of J. Surveying Services to conduct a relocation survey of the subject property
based on the technical description appearing on respondent Barangans TCT.[22]
The relocation survey revealed that the property occupied by petitioner Dulfo
and his family is the same property covered by respondent Barangans title.[23]
On November 17,
1994, respondent Barangan filed a Complaint[24]
for Recovery of Possession, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3423, against
petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73,
P3,000.00
for the use and occupancy of the subject property from May 1979 until the time
the subject property is vacated, plus moral and exemplary damages and cost of
suit.[25]
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[26]
petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem claimed that the subject property was assigned
to petitioner Jakosalem by Mr. Nicanor Samson (Samson);[27]
that they have been in possession of the subject property since May 8, 1979;[28]
and that the property covered by respondent Barangans title is not the
property occupied by petitioner Dulfo and his family.[29]
During the
trial, respondent Barangan testified for himself and presented three witnesses:
(1) Gregorio Estardo (Estardo), the caretaker of Villa Editha Subdivision and
Rodville Subdivision[30]
employed by Citadel Realty Corporation, who stated under oath that petitioner
Dulfo used to rent the lot owned by Dionisia Ordialez (Estardos Aunt) and that
when petitioner Dulfo could no longer pay the rent, he and his family squatted on the property of
respondent Barangan;[31]
(2) Candida Lawis, a representative of the Municipal Assessor of Antipolo,
Rizal, who confirmed that respondent Barangan is included in the list of
registered owners of lots in Villa Editha Subdivision III and Rodville
Subdivision[32]
and; (3) Engr. Jonco, who testified that the property occupied by petitioner
Dulfo and his family and the property owned by respondent Barangan are one and
the same.[33]
The defense
moved for the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence but was denied by
the RTC.[34] Thus, the defense presented petitioner
Jakosalem who maintained that he acquired the subject property by assignment
from its previous owner, Samson.[35]
The defense likewise requested an ocular
inspection of the subject property to show that it is not the property covered
by respondent Barangans title.[36]
However, instead of granting the
request, the RTC issued an Order[37]
dated September 15, 2000 directing Engr. Romulo Unciano of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
On March 19, 2003, the RTC rendered
a Decision[41]against
respondent Barangan for failure to present sufficient evidence to prove his
claim.[42] The RTC further said that even if the subject
property is owned by respondent Barangan, prescription and laches have already
set in; thus, respondent Barangan may no longer recover the same.[43] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, for insufficiency of evidence judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
By way of counterclaim, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant
Jakosalem the following amounts:
a.
P100,000 for moral damages;
b.
P50,000 as actual damages;
c.
P25,000 as exemplary damages;
d.
P20,000 for litigation expenses; and
e.
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[44]
Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the
findings of the RTC. It found respondent
Barangan entitled to recover possession of the subject property because he was
able to sufficiently prove the identity of the subject property and that the
same is owned by him, as evidenced by TCT No. N-10772.[45] And since respondent Barangan was deprived of
possession of the subject property, the CA ruled that he is entitled to
reasonable compensation for the use of the property with interest, as well as
the payment of moral, temperate or moderate damages, and attorneys fees,[46]
to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 19 March 2003 of the
1.
Appellant Roberto S. Barangan is entitled to the
possession of the subject property-Lot 11, Block 5, of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-60846 situated in Rodville Subdivision, Barangay San Luis, Antipolo,
Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-10772 of the Registry of
Deeds for the
2.
Appellees and all persons deriving rights under them who
are occupants of the subject property are ordered to vacate the subject
property and surrender peaceful possession thereof to appellant;
3.
Appellees and all persons deriving rights under them who
are occupants of the subject property are ordered to pay to appellant
reasonable compensation for the use of the subject property in the amount of
Php3,000.00 per month from 17 November 1994 until they vacate the subject
property and turn over the possession to appellant, plus legal interest of 12% per annum, from
the date of promulgation of this Decision until full payment of all said
reasonable compensation; and
4.
Appellees are ordered to pay to appellant the amount of
Php100,000.00 as moral damages, Php50,000.00 as temperate or moderate
damages, and Php50,000.00 as attorneys
fees.
Cost against appellees.
SO ORDERED.[47]
Issues
Hence, the
instant petition with the following issues:
1.
WHETHER X X X
[BARANGAN] WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE EXACT LOCATION OF HIS PROPERTY DESCRIBED
UNDER TCT NO. N-10772 [AND WHETHER] THE
PROPERTY OCCUPIED BY DULFO [IS] THE SAME PROPERTY CLAIMED BY [BARANGAN];
2.
WHETHER X X X
[BARANGAN] HAS FULLY SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 434 OF THE CIVIL
CODE X X X;
3.
WHETHER X X X
THE AMOUNT OF PHP3,000.00 AS MONTHLY LEASE RENTAL OR COMPENSATION FOR THE USE
OF THE PROPERTY IS REASONABLE;
4.
WHETHER X X X
THE GRANT OF XXX MORAL, TEMPERATE OR MODERATE [DAMAGES] AND ATTORNEYS FEES, X X
X IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EVIDENCE AND LAW;
5.
WHETHER X X X
LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION [HAVE] BARRED THE FILING OF THIS CASE.[48]
Petitioners
Arguments
Petitioners
Dulfo and Jakosalem contend that the CA erred in reversing the findings of the
RTC as respondent Barangans property was not properly identified.[49]
They claim that the relocation survey conducted by Engr. Jonco violated the
agreement they made before the Barangay
that the survey should be conducted in the presence of both parties.[50]
They also claim that the title number
stated in the Land Purchase Agreement is not the same number found in the Deed
of Absolute Sale.[51]
They likewise insist that laches and prescription barred respondent Barangan
from filing the instant case.[52]
Lastly, they contend that the damages
ordered by the CA are exorbitant, excessive and without factual and legal
bases.[53]
Respondents
Arguments
Respondent Barangan, on the other
hand, argues that being the registered owner of the subject property, he is
entitled to its possession.[54]
He maintains that his
The petition
lacks merit.
Respondent Barangan is entitled to recover the subject property
Article 434 of
the Civil Code provides that [i]n an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on
the weakness of the defendants claim. In other words, in order to recover
possession, a person must prove (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2)
his title.[58]
In this case,
respondent Barangan was able to prove the identity of the property and his
title. To prove his title to the
property, he presented in evidence the following documents: (1) Land Purchase
Agreement;[59]
(2) Deed of Absolute Sale;[60]
(3) and a
Petitioners
contention that the relocation survey was done in violation of their agreement
deserves scant consideration. Petitioners were informed[65]
beforehand of the scheduled relocation survey on May 29, 1994 but they opted
not to attend. In fact, as testified by
respondent Barangan and Engr. Jonco, the relocation survey had to be postponed
several times because petitioners refused to participate.[66]
By refusing to attend and participate in
the relocation survey, they are now estopped from questioning the results of
the relocation survey.[67]
Records also
show that during the trial, the RTC ordered the DENR to conduct a resurvey of
the subject property; but petitioners moved that the same be abandoned claiming
that the resurvey would only delay the proceedings.[68]
To us, the persistent refusal of
petitioners to participate in the relocation survey does not speak well of
their claim that they are not occupying respondent Barangans property. In fact, their unjustified refusal only shows
either of two things: (1) that they know for a fact that the result would be
detrimental to their case; or (2) that they have doubts that the result would
be in their favor.
Neither is there any discrepancy between the title number stated in the Land Purchase Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale. As correctly found by the CA, TCT No. 171453, the title stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, is a transfer from TCT No. 165456, the title stated in the Land Purchase Agreement.[69] Hence, both TCTs pertain to the same property.
Respondent
Barangan is entitled to actual and moral damages as well as attorneys fees
Since respondent Barangan was deprived of possession of the subject
property, he is entitled to reasonable compensation in the amount of P3,000.00[70] per month from November
17, 1994, the date of judicial demand, up to the time petitioners vacate the
subject property. The legal
interest of which shall be at the rate of 6% per annum from November 17, 1994
and at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the judgment of this Court
becomes final and executory until the obligation is fully satisfied.[71]
The award of
temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00, representing the expenses
for the relocation survey, however, must be deleted as these expenses were not
alleged in the complaint.[72]
For the mental
anguish, sleepless nights, and serious anxiety suffered by respondent Barangan,
he is entitled to moral damages under Article 2217[73]
of the Civil Code but in the reduced amount of P50,000.00, which is the
amount prayed for in the complaint.[74]
Although not
alleged in the complaint, we sustain the CAs award of P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees because it is sanctioned by law, specifically, paragraphs 2 and
11 of Article 2208[75]
of the Civil Code.[76]
Laches and prescription do not apply
Finally, as to
the issue of laches and prescription, we agree with the CA that these do not
apply in the instant case. Jurisprudence consistently holds that prescription
and laches can not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system
because under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.[77]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
August 3, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 79283 are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. The award of
moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00
while the award of temperate damages is DELETED. The reasonable monthly rental of P3,000.00
shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 17, 1994,
and at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until the obligation is fully satisfied.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
⃰
Per raffle dated September 7,
2011.
⃰ ⃰
In lieu of Associate Justice
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order o, 1193 dated February 10, 2012.
[1] Esmaquel v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 428, 438.
[2] Rollo, pp. 76-470 with Annexes A to J inclusive.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] The subdivision where the property is
located;
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] Records, p. 176.
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41] Rollo, pp. 181-185.
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58] Spouses Hutchison v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 262 (2005).
[59] Rollo, p. 249.
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]
[67] Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 370, 443.
[68] Rollo, pp. 127-128.
[69]
[70] The amount alleged in the complaint filed by respondent Barangan; id at 170.
[71] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95-97.
[72] TSN dated November 8, 1996, Direct Examination of respondent Barangan, pp. 4-5.
[73] Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
[74] Rollo, p. 170.
[75] Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
x x x x
(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
x x x x
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorneys fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
[76] Micro Sales Operation Network v. National Labor Relations Commission, 509 Phil. 313, 322 (2005).
[77] Velez,
Sr. v. Rev. Demetrio, 436 Phil. 1, 9 (2002).